Roberts v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.

487 A.2d 136, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 436, 1985 WL 1083654
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedFebruary 1, 1985
Docket83-511-M.P.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 487 A.2d 136 (Roberts v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roberts v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 487 A.2d 136, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 436, 1985 WL 1083654 (R.I. 1985).

Opinion

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is a petition for certiorari brought by the Attorney General (appellant or Attorney General) as an aggrieved person and as the representative of the public interest pursuant to G.L.1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 39-5-1 to review the report and order of the Public Utilities Commission (the commission) issued in docket No. 1698 regarding the tariff filing of January 12, 1983, of New England Telephone & Telegraph Company (NET or the company). This tariff sought to generate additional annual intrastate revenues in excess of $37 million.

Following a prehearing conference held March 25, 1983, the commission held its first public hearing on April 5, 1983, and the hearings concluded in mid-July 1983. On October 7, 1983, the commission issued its report and order authorizing NET to increase its revenues by $24,730,000. Later, this amount was amended to read $23,-330,000. This revised amount was about $4 million more than the amount recommended by the expert witness presented by the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (DPUC). The commission, in reaching its conclusion, approved several rate-restructuring proposals advanced by the company, which proposals are now being challenged by the Attorney General. They are (1) a plan calling for a charge in certain instances for subscribers seeking information or, as the telephone industry would have it, “directory assistance”; (2) the imposition of a charge for the use of “inside wire”; (3) an increase in the charge for local calls made from public or semipublic pay telephones from ten to fifteen cents; (4) increases in the charges imposed for “measured residence service,” and a variety of other services referred to by all the litigants as “other company proposals.” The changes effectuated by the commission, in the Attorney General’s opinion, were arbitrary and capricious. He also claims a deprivation of procedural due-process safeguards. In our opinion, the only category of services deserving of comment, having in mind the arbitrary-and-capricious charge, are directory assistance and the nickel increase in the price of a local call made from a public or semipublic pay telephone.

As noted in Interstate Navigation Co. v. Burke, R.I., 465 A.2d 750, 755 (1983), and stated many times earlier by this court, our role in reviewing the commission’s findings is clearly defined by statute and case law. The commission does the factfinding; we do not. Instead, we determine whether the commission's findings are lawful and reasonable, fairly and substantially supported by legal evidence, and sufficiently specific to enable us to ascertain if the evidence upon which the commission based its findings reasonably supports the result. With these standards in mind, we now turn to the record as it relates to the charge for information.

The commission first encountered the directory-assistance-charge issue in 1978. At that time, the commission expressed its concern about deficiencies in the readability of local directories and conditioned any prospective approval of directory-assistance charging upon the upgrading of directory readability. Once sufficient improvements were made in this area, the stage was then set for consideration of such a plan in docket No. 1698.

Laura A. Cardinale, NET's district manager, Network Services Planning, testified on the directory-assistance-charge plan proposed by the company. As the plan was originally envisioned, there was to be no charge for the first five inquiries to the directory-assistance division, but thereafter the charge for each inquiry was to be fifty cents for each call placed through a local or toll operator and twenty-five cents for each customer-dialed call. The company proposed exemptions for coin-operated (pay) telephone service, disabled persons, and hotels, motels, and hospitals. Ms. Cardinale *139 testified that on average 45 percent of NET’S Rhode Island customers make no use of the directory-assistance service in a given month. The company’s records also indicate that, without a charging plan, only 28 percent of its customers made more than five calls a month to directory assistance, but significantly, this group made 90 percent of such calls. Ms. Cardinale further testified that with the company’s proposed directory-assistance plan, 60 percent of NET’s customers would make no calls to directory assistance and, with the five-free-call allowance in Rhode Island, less than 9 percent of NET’S customers would eventually be billed for this service. The commission observed that Ms. Cardinale’s study of average-monthly-customer-usage characteristics “was subject to' extensive and often telling cross-examination.” The company concluded, and the commission apparently agreed, that the implementation of the directory-assistance plan would reduce calls to directory assistance, thus eliminating expenses primarily because the company could decrease the number of operators.

The DPUC, in opposing this plan, presented the testimony of Dr. Marvin H. Kahn, a public utility consultant. Doctor Kahn testified that the costs to NET ratepayers for directory-assistance charging would outweigh the benefits of the plan, and he added that calls from hotels, motels, and hospitals should not be exempt. He further asserted that the directory-assistance plan would be more acceptable if the company would immediately lay off employees upon implementation of the plan so that the full impact of the savings could be realized in the first year. In its report and order the commission observed that Dr. Kahn did not dispute Ms. Cardinale’s testimony that the directory-assistance-service tariff would place on the major cost-causer a larger proportion of the financial burden associated with the service.

The commission found insufficient record support for a fifty-cent charge for calls placed through an operator but did agree that a twenty-five-cent charge for information inquiries was cost justified. As far as the hotel, motel, and hospital exemptions were concerned, the commission ruled that only the hospital exemption would be approved because hospital patients, like the functionally disabled, are particularly limited when it comes to use of telephone directories.

The company had estimated that its directory-assistance-charge plan would result in savings of $1.5 million during its first year of operation. Before the commission’s order, directory-assistance costs were met with revenues collected in the flat monthly rate, a component of the exchange category. The Attorney General argues that because of the commission’s action, residential and commercial subscribers, who are included within this category, will lose the benefit of unfettered recourse to directory assistance while gaining an almost insignificant benefit of a decrease in their basic rate of approximately ten cents a month because the expense savings were to be shared by all the subscribers to the various services provided by the company.

An examination of the record as it relates to the directory-assistance plan leaves little doubt that the commission’s approval of this plan must be affirmed. We have already outlined in considerable detail the evidence presented to the commission by both the company and the DPUC’s experts on the directory-assistance-plan issue. Surely the commission was not required to adopt Dr. Kahn’s approach, and in approving the plan, it is quite evident that the commission chose to rely more heavily on the evidence presented by the company.

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Bluebook (online)
487 A.2d 136, 1985 R.I. LEXIS 436, 1985 WL 1083654, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roberts-v-new-england-telephone-telegraph-co-ri-1985.