Roberto Camara Sanchez v. Warden, Alligator Detention Center et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

ROBERTO CAMARA SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00548-SPC-DNF

WARDEN, ALLIGATOR DETENTION CENTER et al.,

Respondent, /

OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Roberto Camara Sanchez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), the government’s response (Doc. 3), and Camara Sanchez’s reply (Doc. 4). Camara Sanchez is a native of Cuba who was admitted into the United States on May 7, 1980, and later adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident. Following a 2008 conviction for second-degree murder, an immigration judge ordered Camara Sanchez removed to Cuba on January 7, 2020. Camara Sanchez was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody until June 24, 2020, when ICE released him under an order of supervision because it could not execute the removal order. Since then, Camara Sanchez has fully complied with all conditions of supervision. On January 12, 2026, Camara Sanchez reported to ICE for a routine check-in, and ICE revoked his release and detained him. He is currently detained at Alligator Alcatraz. Camara Sanchez challenges the legality of his detention under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678

(2001). “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).

The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably

foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The

Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus

an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id. The respondents argue Camara Sanchez’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the

removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Camara Sanchez

has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government was unable to remove him in 2020, no change in circumstances makes removal more likely now, and the government has provided no plan or timeline for removal since Camara Sanchez’s re-detention in January. The burden thus shifts to the respondents, but they make no attempt at rebuttal.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Camara Sanchez will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. However, assuring the presence of a noncitizen at the moment of removal is not the only statutory justification for immigration detention. “The second

justification—protecting the community—does not necessarily diminish in force over time.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Supreme Court has “upheld preventative detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.” Id. Given

Camara Sanchez’s criminal history, the Court will give ICE an opportunity to determine whether his detention is necessary to protect the community. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

Roberto Camara Sanchez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) remains under advisement. 1. Within 30 days of this Order, ICE shall conduct a custody review to determine whether Camara Sanchez poses a danger to the community

sufficient to justify continued detention. 2. Within seven days of the custody review, the respondents shall file a supplemental response, addressing the results of the review and any updates on removal efforts. 3. Camara Sanchez may file a reply within three days of the supplemental response. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 9, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record