NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0591n.06
No. 25-3208
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 19, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ROBERT B. WEIR, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF SUSAN ANNE WASSERMAN, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: GILMAN, GRIFFIN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Defendant Susan Wasserman, an attorney representing herself, removed
a collection action against her from state to federal court. The district court remanded the case to
the state court and awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff, Robert Weir. Wasserman now
appeals. We lack jurisdiction to review the remand order, so we dismiss the appeal in part. We
otherwise affirm.
In 2018, Wasserman, a probate attorney, sought to reopen an estate on behalf of her client,
Elizabeth Koeberer. Weir, the executor and trustee of the trust holding Koeberer’s share of the
proceeds, opposed that effort, as did Koeberer’s siblings. Ultimately, the Franklin County Probate
Court refused to reopen the estate and sanctioned Wasserman and Koeberer for frivolous conduct.
In December 2023, the probate court ordered Wasserman to pay Weir $64,675.46 in attorney fees
and expenses.
In February 2024, Weir moved the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for a
certificate of judgment, seeking to collect that award. The trial court ordered Wasserman to appear No. 25-3208, Weir v. Wasserman
at a judgment-debtor’s examination, and Weir subpoenaed her to appear for a deposition in June
2024. Wasserman unsuccessfully moved the state appellate court to stay those proceedings. After
Wasserman failed to appear for her deposition, Weir moved the trial court to compel her
appearance and for sanctions. A few days later, Wasserman removed the case, invoking the district
court’s diversity and federal-question jurisdiction.
Weir promptly moved to remand the case to the state court, arguing that the requirements
for diversity jurisdiction were not met and that the case did not present a federal question. He also
argued that Wasserman had failed to remove the case within the 30-day time limit. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b). And, characterizing the removal as frivolous, he requested attorney fees and costs.
The district court granted Weir’s motion to remand, concluding that Wasserman had
“utterly failed” to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction. First, the district court explained
that the amount in controversy—$64,675.46—fell below the threshold for diversity jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Second, the district court found no basis for federal-question jurisdiction
because Weir sought only to execute a state-court judgment and raised no claims arising under
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And the district court ordered Wasserman to pay attorney fees
and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) because the removal “lacked an objectively reasonable basis.”
The district court directed Weir’s counsel to submit an accounting of his fees and costs within 14
days, after which the case would be remanded to the state court.
Wasserman moved to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), generally asserting that the state-court proceedings had been tainted by fraud and violations
of her right to due process. The district court denied that motion, issued a separate order granting
Weir’s request for $20,831.25 in attorney fees and $32 in costs, and entered judgment. On appeal,
Wasserman challenges both the remand and the decision to award fees.
-2- No. 25-3208, Weir v. Wasserman
Our review of remand orders is circumscribed by statute. Except when a case is removed
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1443—neither of which was invoked or applies here—a district
court’s remand order “is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). This
provision is read in conjunction with § 1447(c) and bars review of remands based on the grounds
specified there—a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a timely raised procedural defect. Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127–28 (1995); In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., 680 F.3d 849, 851 (6th Cir. 2012). Because the district court remanded this case on one of
those grounds—lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—we cannot review its decision. See Warthman
v. Genoa Twp. Bd. of Trs., 549 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[R]emands based on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction are shielded from appellate review by § 1447(d).” (citing Powerex Corp.
v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229–30 (2007))).
Wasserman counters that we can review the district court’s decision because it was based
on the untimeliness of her removal, not on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. But she is incorrect
as a matter of both fact and law. The district court never mentioned untimeliness, basing its
decision solely on the lack of jurisdiction. And, in any event, “untimely removal [is] precisely the
type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c),” so a remand on that basis would be
unreviewable as well. Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 128.
Although we cannot review the district court’s decision to remand, we can review its award
of attorney fees and costs under § 1447(c), which authorizes the award of costs, including attorney
fees, resulting from improper removal. Warthman, 549 F.3d at 1059. We review that decision
under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. A fee award under this provision is generally
appropriate when “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.”
Id. (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)).
-3- No. 25-3208, Weir v. Wasserman
As the removing party, it was Wasserman’s burden to demonstrate that the district court
had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. See Mays v. City of Flint, 871 F.3d 437, 442 (6th
Cir. 2017). To do so, she needed to show either that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction
were met or that the case arose under federal law. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
392 (1987).
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0591n.06
No. 25-3208
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 19, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ROBERT B. WEIR, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF SUSAN ANNE WASSERMAN, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: GILMAN, GRIFFIN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Defendant Susan Wasserman, an attorney representing herself, removed
a collection action against her from state to federal court. The district court remanded the case to
the state court and awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff, Robert Weir. Wasserman now
appeals. We lack jurisdiction to review the remand order, so we dismiss the appeal in part. We
otherwise affirm.
In 2018, Wasserman, a probate attorney, sought to reopen an estate on behalf of her client,
Elizabeth Koeberer. Weir, the executor and trustee of the trust holding Koeberer’s share of the
proceeds, opposed that effort, as did Koeberer’s siblings. Ultimately, the Franklin County Probate
Court refused to reopen the estate and sanctioned Wasserman and Koeberer for frivolous conduct.
In December 2023, the probate court ordered Wasserman to pay Weir $64,675.46 in attorney fees
and expenses.
In February 2024, Weir moved the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for a
certificate of judgment, seeking to collect that award. The trial court ordered Wasserman to appear No. 25-3208, Weir v. Wasserman
at a judgment-debtor’s examination, and Weir subpoenaed her to appear for a deposition in June
2024. Wasserman unsuccessfully moved the state appellate court to stay those proceedings. After
Wasserman failed to appear for her deposition, Weir moved the trial court to compel her
appearance and for sanctions. A few days later, Wasserman removed the case, invoking the district
court’s diversity and federal-question jurisdiction.
Weir promptly moved to remand the case to the state court, arguing that the requirements
for diversity jurisdiction were not met and that the case did not present a federal question. He also
argued that Wasserman had failed to remove the case within the 30-day time limit. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b). And, characterizing the removal as frivolous, he requested attorney fees and costs.
The district court granted Weir’s motion to remand, concluding that Wasserman had
“utterly failed” to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction. First, the district court explained
that the amount in controversy—$64,675.46—fell below the threshold for diversity jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Second, the district court found no basis for federal-question jurisdiction
because Weir sought only to execute a state-court judgment and raised no claims arising under
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And the district court ordered Wasserman to pay attorney fees
and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) because the removal “lacked an objectively reasonable basis.”
The district court directed Weir’s counsel to submit an accounting of his fees and costs within 14
days, after which the case would be remanded to the state court.
Wasserman moved to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), generally asserting that the state-court proceedings had been tainted by fraud and violations
of her right to due process. The district court denied that motion, issued a separate order granting
Weir’s request for $20,831.25 in attorney fees and $32 in costs, and entered judgment. On appeal,
Wasserman challenges both the remand and the decision to award fees.
-2- No. 25-3208, Weir v. Wasserman
Our review of remand orders is circumscribed by statute. Except when a case is removed
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1443—neither of which was invoked or applies here—a district
court’s remand order “is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). This
provision is read in conjunction with § 1447(c) and bars review of remands based on the grounds
specified there—a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a timely raised procedural defect. Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127–28 (1995); In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc., 680 F.3d 849, 851 (6th Cir. 2012). Because the district court remanded this case on one of
those grounds—lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—we cannot review its decision. See Warthman
v. Genoa Twp. Bd. of Trs., 549 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[R]emands based on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction are shielded from appellate review by § 1447(d).” (citing Powerex Corp.
v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229–30 (2007))).
Wasserman counters that we can review the district court’s decision because it was based
on the untimeliness of her removal, not on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. But she is incorrect
as a matter of both fact and law. The district court never mentioned untimeliness, basing its
decision solely on the lack of jurisdiction. And, in any event, “untimely removal [is] precisely the
type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c),” so a remand on that basis would be
unreviewable as well. Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 128.
Although we cannot review the district court’s decision to remand, we can review its award
of attorney fees and costs under § 1447(c), which authorizes the award of costs, including attorney
fees, resulting from improper removal. Warthman, 549 F.3d at 1059. We review that decision
under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. A fee award under this provision is generally
appropriate when “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.”
Id. (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)).
-3- No. 25-3208, Weir v. Wasserman
As the removing party, it was Wasserman’s burden to demonstrate that the district court
had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. See Mays v. City of Flint, 871 F.3d 437, 442 (6th
Cir. 2017). To do so, she needed to show either that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction
were met or that the case arose under federal law. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
392 (1987). The district court concluded that she lacked an objectively reasonable basis for
removal on either basis because the amount in controversy fell below the statutory threshold and
because no federal law was implicated in Weir’s action to execute a state-court judgment. See id.
(explaining that the “federal question” must be “presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint”). Wasserman does not address either conclusion on appeal, arguing only that
the removal was in good faith because it was timely in light of Weir’s alleged forgery of service
in the state-court proceeding. She has thus forfeited any argument that she had an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that the case fell within the district court’s jurisdiction. See Blick v.
Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist., 105 F.4th 868, 881–82 (6th Cir. 2024) (explaining that an inadequately
developed argument is forfeited). To the extent that her vague references to due process can be
construed as an attempt to establish federal-question jurisdiction, they fall short. Because a federal
question must appear on the face of the complaint, “potential federal defenses” are not considered.
Miller v. Bruenger, 949 F.3d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 2020). And Wasserman does not raise any other
challenge to the fee award. In these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the district
court.
For these reasons, we DISMISS Wasserman’s appeal of the district court’s remand order
for lack of jurisdiction and AFFIRM the district court’s fee award. We also DENY the motions
to supplement the record and for judicial notice and DENY as moot the motions to dismiss the
appeal and to strike.
-4-