Robert Wayne, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. The Washington University d/b/a Washington University, Defendant/Respondent.

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 15, 2025
• Docket: ED113127
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE

ROBERT WAYNE, ) No. ED113127 ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Louis County ) 24SL-CC02739 vs. ) ) Honorable Richard Stewart THE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY ) d/b/a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ) ) Defendant/Respondent. ) Filed: July 15, 2025

Plaintiff, Robert Wayne, appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of St. Louis

County dismissing his petition against Defendant Washington University for violation of his

rights pursuant to Missouri’s Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, section 590.502 RSMo.

(Supp. 2023).1 Because the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights does not apply to private

universities, such as Washington University, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing

Plaintiff’s petition.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff worked as a police officer for the University from 2011 until 2023, and became

commissioned as a peace officer through the St. Louis County Police Department. 2 On October

1 References to section 590.502 are to RSMo. (Supp. 2023). All other statutory references are to RSMo. (2016). 2 When not obviously referring to the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission, the term “commission” as used in Chapter 590 means “a grant of authority to act as a peace officer.” Section 590.010(1). 12, 2023, the University terminated Plaintiff’s employment following several complaints against

him and five resulting Internal Affairs investigations between June and September 2023.

Plaintiff filed suit against the University, claiming his investigation and due process

rights pursuant to Missouri’s Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, section 590.502, were

violated. The allegations contained in Plaintiff’s petition included that: the University is a

Missouri benevolent corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis County,

Missouri; for purposes of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, the University police

department is a law enforcement agency that must provide Plaintiff the rights afforded by the

statute; and the “University police officers are peace officers commissioned through St. Louis

County and employed by the University as government officials.”

Plaintiff further alleged that the University violated his rights by failing to, among other

things, provide copies of the complaints against him at least 24 hours prior to an investigation,

conduct interviews while Plaintiff was on duty, provide written statements in support of the

complaints, provide Plaintiff with a Garrity warning prior to questioning; and provide Plaintiff

with a full due process hearing following termination of his employment. 3 Plaintiff sought a

judgment voiding both the issuance of the written reprimand/final warning and the termination of

his employment, ordering his immediate reinstatement, awarding lost wages from the date of

termination to the date of reinstatement, ordering restoration of his retirement and other benefits,

and awarding reasonable attorney’s fees.

3 “A Garrity warning is a statement intended to advise a public employee that any statements made or evidence obtained from any such statements which are required as a condition of continued employment can be used against the employee only in an investigation by the employer of such employee’s performance of his or her public trust and cannot be used against the employee in a criminal prosecution. Such warning resulted from the decision in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) ….” Gardner v. Mo. State Highway Patrol Superintendent, 901 S.W.2d 107, 110 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (internal citations omitted).

2 The University filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s petition, Plaintiff was allowed to

amend his petition, and the University again filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. The University argued the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of

Rights applies only to public entities and does not impose obligations on private universities.

Without providing its reasoning, the trial court granted the University’s motion to dismiss with

prejudice. This appeal follows.

Discussion

In three points on appeal, Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his amended

petition alleging that the University violated his rights pursuant to section 590.502, commonly

referred to as Missouri’s Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights. For the sake of clarity, we

consider Plaintiff’s points out of order.

Standard of Review

We review de novo the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Sullivan v. City of

University City, 677 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). We will affirm the dismissal if it

can be sustained on any grounds raised in the motion. Id. at 848. “A motion to dismiss for failure

to state a cause of action is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff’s petition.” Id. We

assume the plaintiff's averments are true, and we liberally grant the plaintiff all reasonable

inferences. Id. “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim assesses whether the petition

alleged facts giving rise ‘to a cognizable cause of action or of a cause that might be adopted.’”

Id. (quoting Graves v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrections, 630 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Mo. banc 2021))

(emphasis in original).

The Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights

3 The Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“the LEOBOR”) enumerates certain due

process and other rights that law enforcement officers in Missouri possess when undergoing

administrative investigation, administrative questioning, discipline, demotion, transfer,

termination of employment, or placement on a status that could result in economic loss. Section

590.502. The statute also provides definitions and a remedy for its violation. Id. Only law

enforcement officers as defined in the statute are entitled to the LEOBOR’s protections. See

generally 590.502. “Any aggrieved law enforcement officer or authorized representative may

seek judicial enforcement of the requirements of this section.” Section 590.502.9.

Subsection 590.502.1(5) defines a “law enforcement officer” for purposes of the

LEOBOR:

“Law enforcement officer”, any commissioned peace officer with the power to arrest for a violation of the criminal code who is employed by any unit of the state or any county, charter county, city, charter city, municipality, district, college, university, or any other political subdivision or is employed by the board of police commissioners as defined in chapter 84. Law enforcement officer shall not include any officer who is the highest ranking officer in the law enforcement agency.

Consequently, the definition of “law enforcement officer” is critical in determining which

persons are encompassed within the parameters of the LEOBOR’s protections.

Point I

In his first point, Plaintiff claims the trial court erred when it dismissed his amended

petition because the LEOBOR’s application is not limited to public colleges and universities. He

argues the plain language of the LEOBOR establishes that it applies to all law enforcement

officers employed by a university and the trial court’s determination that it applied only to

officers employed by public universities required the court to add language to the statute that

alters legislative intent. We disagree.

4 Statutory interpretation is a matter of law that this Court reviews de novo. Nexgen Silica,

LLC v. Missouri Dep’t of Natural Res., 677 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). The primary

rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature as reflected in the

plain language of the statute. Kehlenbrink v. Dir. of Revenue, 577 S.W.3d 798, 800 (Mo. banc

2019). We do not read words in a statute in isolation, but rather, we read them in the context of

the statute to determine the words’ plain and ordinary meaning. Id. When the statute’s terms are

plain and clear to a person of ordinary intelligence, the statute’s language is clear and

unambiguous, and the rules of statutory construction do not apply. Id. While in isolation a word

may be susceptible to multiple meanings, we determine the plain meaning of a word from its

usage in the context of the entire statute. Holmes v. Steelman, 624 S.W.3d 144, 152 (Mo. banc

2021). “A court cannot look at single, separate words in a statute and then apply to each a

definition untethered from its context.” Id. This, however, is precisely what Plaintiff urges us to

do.

In relevant part, section 590.502.1(5) defines a “law enforcement officer” for purposes of

the LEOBOR as “any commissioned peace officer … who is employed by any unit of the state or

any county, charter county, city, charter city, municipality, district, college, university, or any

other political subdivision or is employed by the board of police commissioners ….” (emphasis

added). In its definition of “law enforcement officer,” the legislature chose to include

commissioned peace officers with the power to arrest for criminal violations, and chose to limit

coverage to those commissioned peace officers who are employed by certain enumerated entities.

Section 590.502.1(5). Thus, the employer of a commissioned peace officer is vital to the question

of whether the commissioned peace officer qualifies as a “law enforcement officer” as defined

by the LEOBOR.

5 “We presume that the legislature intended that each word, clause, sentence, and provision of a

statute have effect and should be given meaning.” Bolen v. Orchard Farm R-V Sch. Dist., 291

S.W.3d 747, 751 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009). Had the legislature intended the LEOBOR’s protections

to apply to any and all commissioned peace officers, regardless of employment, then the

legislature would have said so, and would not have included limiting language.

In addition, the words “college” and “university” conclude a list of six purely public

entities, namely any county, charter county, city, charter city, municipality, and district. Section

590.502.1(5). “College” and “university” then immediately precede the phrase “or any other

political subdivision.” Id. The phrase “or any other political subdivision” plainly means that all

the nouns listed immediately preceding this phrase—county, charter county, city, charter city,

municipality, district, college, university—are likewise political subdivisions. Thus, a plain

reading reveals that the statute applies to public entities, namely political subdivisions of the

State, including counties, cities, municipalities, districts, colleges, and universities. 4

Plaintiff would have us insert the phrase “public and private” to modify the words

“college” and “university” in the LEOBOR definition of “law enforcement officer.” This we

cannot do. Nothing in section 590.502.1(5) suggests that the legislature intended the term “law

enforcement officer” to apply to those employed by a private college or private university when

the legislature inserted “college” and “university” in the midst of a list of public entities,

concluding with “any other political subdivision.” In addition to reading words in the context of

4 This Court’s primary obligation is to ascertain the legislature’s intent from the language used in the statute. Wood v. Criminal Records Repository, 668 S.W.3d 597, 599 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). “We must interpret and apply the laws as the legislature writes them.” State v. Haynes, 564 S.W.3d 780, 787 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). “[A]ny argument as to the alleged unfairness of construction of a statute as written, the difficulty in obtaining relief occasioned by the wording of a statute, or the policy ramifications thereof should be addressed to the legislative and executive branches of government.” Id. (quoting State v. Fields, 517 S.W.3d 549, 558 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016)). If the legislature actually intended for section 590.502 to apply to both public and private colleges and universities, then it is the role of the legislature to amend the statute to explicitly say so.

6 the statute to determine their plain and ordinary meaning, Kehlenbrink, 577 S.W.3d at 800, we

decline to add provisions not plainly written in the law or necessarily implied from what is

written, Sullivan, 677 S.W.3d at 848. We are obligated to examine the language used by the

legislature, not to supply something the legislature omitted by adding language to the statute. Id.

Further, the definition of “peace officer” as used generally in Chapter 590 lends support

to our interpretation. The term “peace officer” is defined as “a law enforcement officer of the

state or any political subdivision of the state with the power of arrest for a violation of the

criminal code or declared or deemed to be a peace officer by state statute[.]” Section 590.010(3)

(emphasis added).

Based on the plain language of the LEOBOR, we deny Plaintiff’s first point.

Point III

In his third point, Plaintiff claims the trial court erred when it dismissed his amended

petition because Plaintiff stated a claim entitling him to relief for violation of the LEOBOR.

Plaintiff contends he alleged facts that established he was a law enforcement officer employed by

a university (whether public or private) whose investigative and appeal rights were denied by the

University, and the University’s assertion of its private status—which required the use of

additional extrinsic purported facts—cannot change the legal effect of those alleged facts.

As the University observed in its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss,

Plaintiff alleged in his first amended petition that the University is not a State actor but a

“Missouri benevolent corporation” whose principal place of business is in St. Louis County,

Missouri. A “benevolent corporation” is defined as “[a] nonprofit corporation; created for

charitable rather than for business purposes.” Benevolent corporation, Black’s Law Dictionary

(6th ed. 1990). Section 352.010 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny number of persons not less

7 than three, who shall have associated themselves by articles of agreement in writing, as a society,

company, association or organization formed for benevolent, religious, scientific, fraternal-

beneficial, or educational purposes, may be consolidated and united into a corporation.” It is

axiomatic that a “benevolent corporation” is not a public entity.

As discussed in Point I, the LEOBOR applies by its plain language only to public entities.

The statute does not impose obligations on private institutions, such as the University, that

Plaintiff’s petition alleged is a “benevolent corporation” and thus by definition a private entity.

Because Plaintiff’s alleged cause of action rests solely on the LEOBOR and depends on its

applicability to the University, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff cannot seek to hold the University liable for noncompliance with a statute that is

applicable on its face only to public entities while he avers that the University is something other

than a public entity.

Accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegation that the University is a Missouri benevolent

corporation, the trial court appropriately determined that the University is a private institution to

which the LEOBOR does not apply. We deny Plaintiff’s third point.

Point II

In his second point, Plaintiff claims:

The Circuit Court abused its discretion when it denied [Plaintiff’s] Motion for New Trial because [Plaintiff] alleged facts in his Amended Petition that (if accepted as true) establish that [the University] is a public university for purposes of the Bill of Rights. Even if the Bill of Rights applies only to public universities, [Plaintiff’s] allegations establish that [the University] employs police officers that are an arm of the government with powers that render [the University] a public entity for purposes of the obligations imposed by the Bill of Rights.

A trial court’s order denying a motion for new trial is not appealable. Watson v. City of

St. Peters, 599 S.W.3d 479, 485 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). While Plaintiff may not appeal the order

8 denying his motion for new trial, we typically will consider the issues raised as an appeal from

the trial court’s final judgment, and will review it as such. Id.

Plaintiff alleged in his petition that “Washington University Police Officers are peace

officers commissioned through St. Louis County and employed by the University as government

officials.” He averred that “the University entered into a formal relationship with St. Louis

County whereby the University’s Police Officers are deputized members of the St. Louis County

Police Department and provided the same powers and authority for law enforcement as

commissioned St. Louis County Police Officers.” Plaintiff continued, “[a]s such, the University

Police Department is (for purposes of the LEOBOR) a law enforcement agency that must

provide Plaintiff (and all of its other Police Officers) the rights afforded them by the LEOBOR.”

He now contends his allegation that members of the University police department are

government officials, if accepted as true, is sufficient to establish that the University has been

rendered a public university for purposes of the LEOBOR: “Even if the Bill of Rights applies

only to public universities, [Plaintiff’s] allegations establish that [the University] employs police

officers that are an arm of the government with powers that render [the University] a public

entity for purposes of the obligations imposed by the Bill of Rights.” We disagree.

The allegations contained in Plaintiff’s petition included that the University is a Missouri

benevolent corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis County, Missouri; for

purposes of the LEOBOR, the University police department is a law enforcement agency that

must provide Plaintiff the rights afforded by the statute; and the “University police officers are

peace officers commissioned through St. Louis County and employed by the University as

government officials.” Nowhere in his petition did Plaintiff allege that the University was thus

rendered a public entity for purposes of the LEOBOR.

9 First, Plaintiff’s assertion that the University police officers are “government officials” is

itself a legal conclusion rather than a factual allegation. Second, even if Plaintiff had alleged in

his petition that the University was rendered a public entity by virtue of its employment of

“peace officers commissioned through St. Louis County,” such an assertion would likewise

constitute a legal conclusion, not a statement of fact. Such assertions could not be properly

considered by the trial court as allegations of fact for purposes of determining whether Plaintiff’s

petition could survive the motion to dismiss. McConnell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 606 S.W.3d

181, 190 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). “[A]lthough we treat all of the factual allegations in a petition

as true, and liberally grant to plaintiffs all reasonable inferences therefrom, ‘[c]onclusory

allegations of fact and legal conclusions are not considered in determining whether a petition

states a claim upon which relief can be granted.’” Id. (quoting Hendricks v. Curators of Univ. of

Mo., 308 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)) (emphasis in original). It is axiomatic that a

plaintiff cannot plead legal conclusions as ultimate facts to survive a motion to dismiss. Id.

We deny Plaintiff’s second point.

Conclusion

Because the plain language of Missouri’s Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights,

section 590.502, does not apply to private universities, such as Defendant Washington

University, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s petition for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

_____________________________________ Angela T. Quigless, J.

James M. Dowd, P.J., and Craig K. Higgins, Sp.J., concur.