Affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand; Opinion Filed August 2, 2018.
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-16-01161-CV
ROBERT THOMAS, A TRUSTEE OF THE ROBERT K. THOMAS TRUST, THE TABATHA D. THOMAS EXEMPT TRUST, THE TABATHA D. THOMAS GST- EXEMPT TRUST A, THE ROBERT T. THOMAS EXEMPT TRUST, THE ROBERT T. THOMAS GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, THE TIERNEY G. THOMAS EXEMPT TRUST, THE TIERNEY G. THOMAS GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, THE TYLER J. THOMAS EXEMPT TRUST, AND THE TYLER J. THOMAS GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, Appellant
V.
462 THOMAS FAMILY PROPERTIES, LP, 462 THOMAS FAMILY PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT, LLC, DONALD T. CONLON, ROBYN THOMAS CONLON, INDIVIDUALLY, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF HOWARD GILLIS THOMAS, DECEASED, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ROBYN THOMAS CONLON TRUST, THE KEVIN T. CONLON EXEMPT TRUST, KEVIN T. CONLON GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, THE PATRICK C. CONLON EXEMPT TRUST, THE PATRICK C. CONLON GST- EXEMPT TRUST A, THE WILLIAM K. CONLON EXEMPT TRUST, AND THE WILLIAM K. CONLON GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, Appellees
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. PR-16-01660-2
OPINION Before Justices Lang-Miers, Fillmore, and Stoddart Opinion by Justice Stoddart Appellant Robert Thomas, a Trustee of the Robert K. Thomas Trust, the Tabatha D.
Thomas Exempt Trust, the Tabatha D. Thomas GST-Exempt Trust A, the Robert T. Thomas
Exempt Trust, the Robert T. Thomas GST-Exempt Trust A, the Tierney G. Thomas Exempt Trust,
the Tierney G. Thomas GST-Exempt Trust A, the Tyler J. Thomas Exempt Trust, and the Tyler J. Thomas GST-Exempt Trust A, appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing his petition for a bill
of review. Appellees, 462 Thomas Family Properties, LP, 462 Thomas Family Properties
Management, LLC, Donald T. Conlon, Robyn Thomas Conlon, Individually, as Executor of the
Estate of Howard Gillis Thomas, Deceased, and as Trustee of the Robyn Thomas Conlon Trust,
the Kevin T. Conlon Exempt Trust, Kevin T. Conlon GST-Exempt Trust A, the Patrick C. Conlon
Exempt Trust, the Patrick C. Conlon GST-Exempt Trust A, the William K. Conlon Exempt Trust,
and the William K. Conlon GST-Exempt Trust A, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for bill of
review pursuant to rule of civil procedure 91a, which the trial court granted. In two issues,
appellant argues the trial court erred by dismissing his bill of review and by awarding attorney’s
fees to appellees. In a single cross-issue, appellees assert the trial court erred by failing to award
appellate attorney’s fees to them. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and we affirm in
part. We remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On July 29, 2015, a probate court in Dallas County signed a final judgment in cause number
PR-10-00877-2 (“Estate Case”). The Estate Case judgment, which was favorable to the defendants
(appellees in this appeal), has been appealed to this Court and bears a separate cause number. The
appeal of the Estate Case has been abated pending resolution of this appeal.
After the appeal of the Estate Case was filed, appellant filed a petition for an equitable and
a statutory bill of review in the trial court. Appellant alleges: “[u]pon information and belief,
during the proceedings and [sic] the trial that led to the [Estate Case] Judgment, one of the attorneys
of record for the Defendants had a personal relationship with the judge presiding over those
proceedings.” Appellant asserts the existence of the relationship during the pendency of the Estate
Case, the judge’s and attorney’s failures to disclose the relationship, and the judge’s failure to
recuse himself constituted judicial and attorney misconduct that destroyed the integrity of the
–2– proceedings and violated appellant’s due process rights. Specifically as to his request for an
equitable bill of review, appellant alleges: “The misconduct of the presiding judge and opposing
counsel constitutes extrinsic fraud which denied [appellant] the right to fully and fairly present his
claims, deprived [appellant] of due process, and fundamentally distorted the judicial process.” The
petition states appellant could not have discovered the relationship prior to the entry of judgment
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Appellant seeks to set aside the judgment as well as
all orders signed by the judge in the Estate Case.
Appellees answered and generally denied the allegations. Appellees moved to dismiss
pursuant to rule of civil procedure 91a, arguing appellant’s bill of review has no basis in law
because, even if the allegations are true, appellant’s petition does not meet the requirements for a
bill of review and dismissal is appropriate. Appellees did not contend they lacked understanding
of the allegations and they did not file special exceptions. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted the motion to dismiss, issued a memorandum opinion in support of its order, and dismissed
appellant’s petition for a bill of review with prejudice.1 This appeal followed.
LAW & ANALYSIS
In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by granting appellees’ motion to
dismiss his petition for a bill of review.2
A. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, “a party may move to dismiss a cause of action
on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. Dismissal is
appropriate under rule 91a if the allegations made in the petition, taken as true, together with
1 The judge who presided over the Estate Case is not the same judge who granted appellees’ motion to dismiss. 2 Appellant phrases his first issue as follows: “Did the trial Court [sic] below err in holding that a close, personal relationship between a trial judge . . . and an attorney of record in the pending action . . . cannot, under any circumstances, create the appearance or a possibility of bias that rises to the level of a due process violation?” We construe appellant’s first issue to question whether the trial court erred by granting the rule 91a motion to dismiss filed by appellees.
–3– inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought or no
reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded. See id. When considering a motion to dismiss,
the court “must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together
with any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59” of the rules of civil procedure. TEX. R. CIV. P.
91a.6. We review the merits of a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 91a de novo because the
availability of a remedy under the facts alleged is a question of law. City of Dallas v. Sanchez,
494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016).
To determine whether dismissal under rule 91a is required in this case, we apply the fair-
notice pleading standard applicable in Texas to determine whether the allegations of the petition
are sufficient to allege a cause of action. See Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594,
599 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.) (applying notice pleading standard to rule 91a
motion to dismiss); Koenig v. Blaylock, 497 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet.
denied) (“We apply the fair-notice pleading standard to determine whether the allegations of the
petition are sufficient to allege a cause of action.”). Our procedural rules merely require that the
pleadings provide fair notice of the claim and the relief sought such that the opposing party can
prepare a defense. Reaves, 518 S.W.3d at 559-600 (citing In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 45 & 47)). A petition is sufficient if it gives fair
and adequate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim. Id. at 600 (citing Italian
Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 346 (Tex. 2011)). “Even
the omission of an element is not fatal if the cause of action may be reasonably inferred from what
is specifically stated.” Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590 (internal quotations omitted). Under this
standard, courts assess whether an opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature of the
controversy, its basic issues, and the type of evidence that might be relevant. Low v. Henry, 221
S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2007); Reaves, 518 S.W.3d at 600.
–4– B. Petition for Bill of Review
“A bill of review is brought as a direct attack on a judgment that is no longer appealable or
subject to a motion for new trial.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2015). “The
grounds upon which a bill of review can be obtained are narrow because the procedure conflicts
with the fundamental policy that judgments must become final at some point.” King Ranch, Inc.
v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). Courts do not readily grant bills of review
“[b]ecause it is fundamentally important in the administration of justice that some finality be
accorded to judgments.” Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 226 (quoting Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex.
565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950)).
In general, there are two types of bills of review: equitable and statutory. See id. To obtain
an equitable bill of review, a petitioner generally must plead and prove (1) a meritorious claim or
defense to the judgment, (2) which the petitioner was prevented from making by official mistake
or by the opposing party’s fraud, accident, or wrongful act, (3) unmixed with any fault or
negligence on the petitioner’s own part. Id. However the Texas Supreme Court has recognized
some instances when a party is not required to satisfy each element. See Mabon Ltd. v. Afri–Carib
Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 810 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (“It is well established that once a
bill-of-review plaintiff proves the absence of service or the lack of notice of the dispositive trial
setting, the plaintiff is then relieved of proving the traditional bill-of-review elements and the court
should grant the plaintiff’s bill of review.”); see also Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S.
80, 86–87 (1988) (holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding
violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the
default judgment was rendered); Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)
(bill-of-review plaintiff claiming non-service is relieved of proving first two elements of bill of
review). We must determine whether a bill-of-review plaintiff who alleges undisclosed judicial
–5– and attorney misconduct destroyed the integrity of the proceedings and denied the party’s due
process rights may be afforded similar latitude in the face of a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule
91a.
C. Analysis of Equitable Bill of Review & Due Process
Appellant alleges that, in the Estate Case, the trial court judge and an attorney of record for
the prevailing party had an undisclosed personal relationship and their decision not to disclose it
and the judge’s failure to recuse himself “constitute[d] attorney and judicial misconduct that
destroyed the integrity of the proceedings and denied appellant his due process rights.” He alleges
the judge’s and attorney’s misconduct constituted extrinsic fraud that denied his right to fully and
fairly present his claims and “fundamentally distorted the judicial process.” Appellant also asserts
he could not have discovered the alleged relationship through the exercise of reasonable diligence
prior to the entry of judgment in the Estate Case.
A showing that the former judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud will justify a bill of
review to set aside a judgment. See In re Marriage of Stroud, 376 S.W.3d 346, 353 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (citing Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. 1984);
Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1001). Extrinsic fraud is “fraud which denies a losing litigant the
opportunity to fully litigate his rights or defenses” at trial. Id. (quoting Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d
at 312). It is conduct that occurs outside an adversarial proceeding that affects how the judgment
is procured or prevents a real trial on the issues involved. Id. (citing Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at
313; Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1002). “A collateral attack on a judgment on the basis of extrinsic
fraud is allowed because such fraud distorts the judicial process to such an extent that confidence
in the ability to discover the fraudulent conduct through the regular adversarial process is
undermined.” Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 348 (Tex. 2005) (citing United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878) (“But there is an admitted exception to this general rule [of
–6– finality] in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was
in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case.”)).
Accepting appellant’s allegations as true, together with any inference reasonably drawn
therefrom, we conclude the petition alleges a wrongful act by the judge and the opposing party’s
attorney that occurred outside of the adversarial proceeding and affects how the judgment was
procured. The alleged wrongful act was unmixed with any fault on the part of appellant. We
conclude appellant’s allegations are sufficient to meet the second and third elements of a bill of
review in the face of a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 91a.
Appellees argue appellant cannot satisfy the first element of a bill of review, showing a
meritorious claim or defense to the judgment, and, therefore, the trial court correctly granted their
motion to dismiss. Appellant argues he is not required to plead or prove a meritorious claim or
defense because he alleges a due process violation that deprived him of his fundamental rights. At
this early stage in the litigation, we conclude appellant’s allegations of judicial and attorney
misconduct that violated his right to due process are sufficient to survive a rule 91a motion to
dismiss.3
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009)
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955)). This Court also has concluded that a party
has a right to a fair trial under the federal and state constitutions. Rymer v. Lewis, 206 S.W.3d 732,
736 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (citing Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 37 (Tex. App.—
3 In its memorandum opinion in support of its order granting the rule 91a motion, the trial court stated a petition for a bill of review must be sworn and appellant’s petition was not. The only element of a bill of review that must be sworn is the first: facts sufficient to constitute a meritorious claim or defense. See Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex. 1979) (bill-of-review plaintiff “must allege factually and with particularity that the prior judgment was rendered as a result of fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite party or official mistake unmixed with his own negligence” and “must further allege, with particularity, sworn facts sufficient to constitute [a] defense and, as a pretrial matter, present prima facie proof to support the contention.”); see also State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, VIN 1GCEK14HLFS165672, 778 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam) (petition for bill of review must allege factually and with particularity prior judgment rendered as a result of fraud, accident, or wrongful act of opposing party or official mistake unmixed with own negligence, and must allege, with particularity, sworn facts sufficient to constitute defense). Because we conclude appellant was not required to plead a meritorious defense to survive the rule 91a motion, we also conclude he was not required to file a sworn pleading.
–7– Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)); see also Udeh v. Kabobi, No. 05-99-01071-CV, 2000 WL
1690188, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 13, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication);
Maasoumi v. Highland Park Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 05-95-00727-CV, 1997 WL 657091, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Oct. 23, 1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication). “One of the most
fundamental components of a fair trial is a neutral and detached judge.”4 Rymer, 206 S.W.3d at
736; Udeh, 2000 WL 1690188, at *5; Maasoumi, 1997 WL 657091, at *2. Although the Supreme
Court traditionally has concluded that personal bias or prejudice alone was not a sufficient basis
“for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause,” in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Company, the Court stated there are circumstances “in which experience teaches that
the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877.
Taking appellant’s allegations, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, as
true, appellant’s petition for a bill of review complains he was denied the right to a fair trial by a
neutral and detached judge because the judge and an attorney of record for the prevailing party
had an undisclosed personal relationship that was sufficient to “constitute attorney and judicial
misconduct which destroyed the integrity of the proceedings leading to the Judgment and denied
[appellant] of his due process rights.” We conclude appellant’s allegations of judicial and attorney
misconduct that violated his right to due process and precluded him from fully litigating his case
are sufficient to survive a rule 91a motion to dismiss. We cannot say that the due process right
appellant seeks to protect is less important than the one recognized in the context of allowing a
party who was not served or did not receive proper notice of a dispositive hearing to pursue a bill
4 The concern that a judge must remain impartial is also reflected in our rules of civil procedure. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b requires a judge to recuse in any proceeding in which “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” “the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party,” or the judge’s spouse is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(1)-(2), (8). Although appellant does not specifically contend the trial judge in the Estate Case should have recused himself pursuant to rule 18b, the rule provides a framework for determining whether a judge should recuse. Appellant’s allegations raise concerns identified in rule 18b. Appellant’s allegations, taken as true, could lead to the conclusion that the trial judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned because the judge may have had a strong personal bias toward one of the prevailing party’s attorneys.
–8– of review without showing a meritorious defense. However, we expressly do not find appellant
has shown a due process violation occurred.
Appellees’ motion to dismiss also states appellant’s bill of review must fail because “the
only possible basis for new trial or appeal related to the allegations would have been related to
recusal of the judge” and any recusal motion must not be filed after the tenth day before the date
set for trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(1)(B). Rule 18a states a motion to recuse must be filed
“as soon as practicable after the movant knows of the ground stated in the motion” and not after
the tenth day before the date set for trial or other hearing “unless, before that day, the movant
neither knew nor reasonably should have known: . . . (ii) that the ground stated in the motion
existed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a (b)(1); see Newby v. Uhl, No. 02-10-00466-CV, 2012 WL 3115628,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 2, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (motion to recuse must not be
filed after tenth day before date set for trial, unless movant neither knew nor reasonably should
have known “that the ground stated in the motion existed.”). Appellant alleges he did not know
and could not have known about the facts underlying his bill of review before trial. Assuming
appellant’s allegations, as well as reasonable inferences drawn from them, are true, appellant
neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the grounds for recusal existed. Thus, a
motion to recuse filed after the tenth day before the date of trial would not have been untimely.
Applying the notice pleading standard and liberally construing appellant’s petition
according to his intent, we conclude the trial court erred by dismissing his petition for an equitable
bill of review as lacking any basis in law at this early stage. Appellant provided fair notice of a
cause of action that is cognizable under Texas law and his allegations, when taken as true, could
entitle him to relief through a bill of review. Appellant’s petition would enable appellees to
ascertain the nature of the controversy, its basic issues, and the type of evidence that might be
relevant. See Low, 221 S.W.3d at 612. We conclude the trial court erred by granting the motion
–9– to dismiss pursuant to rule 91a and by dismissing appellant’s petition for an equitable bill of
review. We sustain appellant’s first issue to this extent.5
D. Statutory Bill of Review
Appellant’s petition also seeks a statutory bill of review pursuant to Texas Estates Code
section 55.251. Section 55.251 states: “An interested person may, by a bill of review filed in the
court in which the probate proceedings were held, have an order or judgment rendered by the court
revised and corrected on a showing of error in the order or judgment, as applicable.” TEX. ESTATES
CODE ANN. § 55.251(a). The interested party is required to allege and prove that the trial court
committed substantial error in a prior decision, order, or judgment. Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 226–
27 (interpreting former Texas Probate Code § 31); In re Estate of Jones, 286 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (“To be entitled to relief under the probate code’s statutory bill of
review, it is necessary to specifically allege and prove substantial error by the trial court.”).
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to appellant’s petition for both an equitable
and a statutory bill of review. The trial court’s memorandum opinion explained why it granted the
motion to dismiss as to each. However, appellant makes no argument on appeal that the trial court
erred by granting the motion to dismiss his petition for a statutory bill of review. Appellant’s brief
does not cite section 55.251 or any other provision of the estates code. Appellant also does not
argue the trial court committed “substantial error” in the Estate Case. Although appellant makes
a brief assertion in his reply brief that his opening brief addressed the trial court’s order as to the
statutory bill of review, we disagree because he made no argument with respect to the estates code
and did not cite any legal authority supporting an argument based on the estates code. See TEX.
5 In reaching the conclusion that appellant’s allegations are sufficient to survive a rule 91a motion to dismiss, we express no view on the ultimate merits of any element of the equitable bill of review.
–10– R. APP. P. 38.1. We conclude he has not presented any error with respect to the petition for a
statutory bill of review for our consideration. We overrule appellant’s first issue to this extent.
E. Attorney’s Fees
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to
appellees because appellees offered evidence of their fees more than forty-five days after filing
their motion to dismiss. Appellant asks this Court to render judgment denying appellees’ request
for attorney’s fees. Appellant asserts that because the trial court must grant or deny the motion to
dismiss within forty-five days after it is filed, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3(c), the trial court could not
consider evidence of attorney’s fees submitted after the forty-five day deadline passed. When
construing rules of procedure, we apply the same rules of construction that govern the
interpretation of statutes. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex. 2012); see also
Weizhong Zheng v. Vacation Network, Inc., 468 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (interpreting rule 91a). We first look to the plain language of the rule and
construe it according to its plain or literal meaning. Ford Motor Co., 363 S.W.3d at 579; see also
Weizhong Zheng, 468 S.W.3d at 188.
Rule 91a establishes a two-step process for a trial court considering a motion to dismiss.
First, within forty-five days of the motion being filed, the trial court must grant or deny the motion.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3(c). When considering and ruling on the motion, the trial court “may not
consider evidence” and “must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of
action.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. Second, once the trial court has ruled on the motion, thereby
determining which party is the prevailing party, the trial court must award costs and reasonable
and necessary attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7. The trial court
must consider evidence regarding costs and fees when determining this award. Id. The rule only
requires that the trial court grant or deny the motion to dismiss within forty-five days of the motion
–11– being filed. The rule does not require it also rule on the attorney’s fee issue or that evidence of
attorney’s fees be submitted within forty-five days of the motion being filed.
A rule requiring evidence of attorney’s fees be submitted before the trial court issues its
order would be wasteful. Because only the prevailing party is entitled to fees, and which party
will prevail is unknown until the trial court issues its order, accepting appellant’s argument would
effectively require all parties to submit evidence of their costs and fees to the trial court before it
is known which party prevailed on the motion. This approach would needlessly increase costs of
litigation and filings with the trial court. Appellant’s argument is not supported by the plain
language of the rule. To the extent appellant argues appellees were required to offer evidence of
their fees within forty-five days of filing their motion to dismiss, we overrule appellant’s second
issue.
In their single cross-issue, appellees assert the trial court erred by failing to award appellate
attorney’s fees. The award of attorney’s fees under rule 91a.7 includes recovery for reasonable
and necessary appellate attorney’s fees as to the claims on which a party prevails. Weizhong
Zheng, 468 S.W.3d at 188; see also Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 154 (Tex. 2015) (“If
trial attorney’s fees are mandatory under section 38.001, then appellate attorney’s fees are also
mandatory when proof of reasonable fees is presented.”). “Whether a party prevails turns on
whether the party prevails upon the court to award it something, either monetary or equitable.”
Ventling, 466 S.W.3d at 154 (applying civil practice and remedies code section 38.001); see also
Goldman v. Olmstead, 414 S.W.3d 346, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“A prevailing
party is the party who successfully prosecutes a cause of action or defends against it.”).
In light of our disposition of appellant’s first issue, we conclude each party prevailed on a
portion of appellees’ motion to dismiss. Appellant defeated the motion to dismiss his petition for
–12– an equitable bill of review. In the trial court, appellees obtained dismissal of appellant’s petition
for a statutory bill of review and we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order.
Because each party prevailed on a portion of appellees’ motion to dismiss, we reverse the
trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to appellees and remand the issue of attorney’s fees to the
trial court for further consideration in light of this opinion. We sustain appellant’s second issue
and appellees’ cross-issue to this extent.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment and order granting appellees’ motion to dismiss
appellant’s petition for a statutory bill of review. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and order
granting appellees’ motion to dismiss appellant’s petition for an equitable bill of review. We
reverse the trial court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to appellees. We remand this cause for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/Craig Stoddart/ CRAIG STODDART JUSTICE
161161F.P05
–13– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
ROBERT THOMAS, A TRUSTEE OF On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2, THE ROBERT K. THOMAS TRUST, THE Dallas County, Texas TABATHA D. THOMAS EXEMPT Trial Court Cause No. PR-16-01660-2. TRUST, THE TABATHA D. THOMAS Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, THE ROBERT Justices Lang-Miers and Fillmore T. THOMAS EXEMPT TRUST, THE participating. ROBERT T. THOMAS GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, THE TIERNEY G. THOMAS EXEMPT TRUST, THE TIERNEY G. THOMAS GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, THE TYLER J. THOMAS EXEMPT TRUST, AND THE TYLER J. THOMAS GST- EXEMPT TRUST A, Appellant
No. 05-16-01161-CV V.
462 THOMAS FAMILY PROPERTIES, LP, 462 THOMAS FAMILY PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT, LLC, DONALD T. CONLON, ROBYN THOMAS CONLON, INDIVIDUALLY, AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF HOWARD GILLIS THOMAS, DECEASED, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ROBYN THOMAS CONLON TRUST, THE KEVIN T. CONLON EXEMPT TRUST, KEVIN T. CONLON GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, THE PATRICK C. CONLON EXEMPT TRUST, THE PATRICK C. CONLON GST EXEMPT TRUST A, THE WILLIAM K. CONLON EXEMPT TRUST, AND THE WILLIAM K. CONLON GST-EXEMPT TRUST A, Appellees
–14– In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We AFFIRM that portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing appellant’s petition for a statutory bill of review. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing appellant’s petition for an equitable bill of review and the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to appellees. We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered this 2nd day of August, 2018.
–15–