Robert Sharkey v. Food and Drug Administration

250 F. App'x 284
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 5, 2007
Docket06-11774
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 250 F. App'x 284 (Robert Sharkey v. Food and Drug Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert Sharkey v. Food and Drug Administration, 250 F. App'x 284 (11th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

We must determine in this appeal whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that records requested under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (“FOIA”), are protected from disclosure under Exemption 4 of the FOIA. We are convinced that the Defendants have carried their burden of proving the applicability of Exception 4 and affirm summary judgment in their favor.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Dr. and Mrs. Sharkey, filed a FOIA request with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) seeking “records reflecting the net number of doses in each lot of Recombivax HB and Engerix-B hepatitis B vaccine[s] distributed in the United States.” (R.l-39, Attach. 1, Ex. A.) *286 The request defined “net number of doses” as “the number of doses distributed less the number of doses returned to the manufacturer.” (R.l-39, Attach. 1, Ex. A.) The Sharkeys, whose son had experienced an adverse reaction to a hepatitis B vaccine, alleged they needed these records to determine whether an adverse reaction was in fact the cause of his medical problems. (R.l-1 Hit 5-6.)

The FDA identified nineteen responsive documents filed by Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) and GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (“Glaxo”) pursuant to federal regulations mandating periodic reporting of vaccine distributions. 21 C.F.R. § 600.81 (2007). The FDA refused to disclose all nineteen of the documents, citing Exemption 4 of the FOIA, which exempts from disclosure records containing trade secrets and confidential commercial information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).

The Sharkeys filed an administrative appeal with the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”). While this appeal was pending, the Sharkeys filed a lawsuit in federal district court seeking an order compelling the FDA to disclose the records. The DHHS then notified the Sharkeys that its response to the their lawsuit would address issues raised in their appeal and it would therefore take no further administrative action on it. (R.l-39, Attach. 1, Ex. H.)

The FDA filed an answer, as did Merck, who intervened as a defendant. 1 The FDA and Merck then filed motions for summary judgment supported by a Vaughn index 2 and sworn declarations detailing the competitive harm that Merck and Glaxo would suffer if the FDA released the requested records.

The Sharkeys opposed the FDA’s and Merck’s motions for summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for leave to conduct discovery pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f) (permitting limited discovery where the party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot by affidavit present facts essential to justify its opposition). The Sharkeys supported their motions and opposition to the Defendants’ motions with the affidavits of Donald Marks, M.D., Ph.D, and their attorney. Dr. Marks opined that release of the requested information would not cause Merck and Glaxo any competitive harm (Marks Aff., R.1-45, Ex. B H 13) and the Sharkeys’ attorney stated that he expected discovery would produce facts supporting their position that no competitive harm will result from disclosure (Maglio Aff., R.1-15, Ex. D H 6).

The district court adopted the amended report and recommendation of the magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred and granted the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (R.2-64.) The magistrate judge found that the declarations submitted by the Defendants were sufficient to demonstrate that “there is actual competition in the hepatitis B vaccine market!;] • • • that the release of the net number of doses per lot would in fact cause competitive harm” to Merck and *287 Glaxo; and that the evidence presented by the Sharkeys did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding competitive harm. (R.2-60 at 10-12.) The district court denied the Sharkeys’ motion for discovery, based on the magistrate judge’s finding that the Sharkeys’ attorney’s affidavit was conclusory and “that the factual basis provided by the Defendants [was] sufficient to make an informed decision on the Motion without further discovery.” (R.2-60 at 18.) The Sharkeys appeal.

II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Sharkeys argue that the Defendants have not carried their burden of proving that the withheld information falls within a FOIA exemption. More specifically, the Sharkeys maintain that the declarations submitted by the Defendants fail to explain how release of the requested information would cause substantial competitive harm to Merck or Glaxo, and the Sharkeys also maintain that even if the declarations adequately explain how release of the information would cause substantial competitive harm, the Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because the Sharkeys’ affidavits create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the likelihood of substantial competitive harm. Accordingly, they argue, the district court should have permitted limited discovery before ruling on whether Exemption 4 barred release of the records.

The Defendants respond that summary judgment in their favor was proper because them declarations contain factual evidence detailing the competitive harm likely to result from release of the withheld records. By contrast, the Defendants argue, the Sharkeys’ affidavits are conclusory as they merely deny the assertions made in the Defendants’ declarations without offering contradictory evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Finally, the Defendants argue the Sharkeys did not put forth sufficient evidence to justify their discovery request under Rule 56(f).

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The parties dispute what standard of review we apply in reviewing summary judgment in a FOIA claim. The Sharkeys argue that we should apply de novo review, as we typically do on appeals from summary judgment. Times Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 236 F.3d 1286, 1288 n. 1 (11th Cir.2001). Defendants, on the other hand, argue that assessing the applicability of Exemption 4 involves factual determinations, and therefore, we should review only for clear error. Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 367 (11th Cir. 1993). Because we determine that summary judgment should be affirmed under either standard, we need not resolve this dispute. See Marecek v. BellSouth Servs., Inc., 49 F.3d 702, 707 (11th Cir.1995) (declining to decide which standard of review applies where the parties dispute the applicable standard and the district court’s opinion can be affirmed under either).

We review denial of a discovery motion under Rule 56(f) for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Cintas Corp.,

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Bluebook (online)
250 F. App'x 284, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-sharkey-v-food-and-drug-administration-ca11-2007.