Robert Sepulveda v. Pacific Maritime Association

878 F.2d 1137, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2931, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9151
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 23, 1989
Docket87-6283
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 878 F.2d 1137 (Robert Sepulveda v. Pacific Maritime Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robert Sepulveda v. Pacific Maritime Association, 878 F.2d 1137, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2931, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9151 (9th Cir. 1989).

Opinion

878 F.2d 1137

131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2931, 58 USLW 2084,
112 Lab.Cas. P 11,329

Robert SEPULVEDA; Richard Nervik; William J. Merino;
William J. Harris; Frank Aguirre, Jr.; Ronald C.
Adler, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION; International Longshoremen's
& Warehousemen's Union, Local 94, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-6283.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 12, 1989.
Decided June 23, 1989.

George W. Shaeffer, Jr., Silver, Kreisler, Goldwasser & Shaeffer, Newport Beach, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.

J. Kevin Lilly, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Newport Beach, Cal., and Richard S. Zuckerman, Leonard, Carder & Zuckerman, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before WALLACE, CANBY and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Seven unsuccessful applicants for employment as foremen of longshoremen brought this action under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, against Pacific Maritime Association (Pacific Maritime) and International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 94 (Local 94), alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement (Agreement). The district court dismissed the action with prejudice, finding that the seven lacked standing to sue for breach of the Agreement. Four of them (Applicants) took this appeal. The district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 and we have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm.

* Pacific Maritime represents its employer members in collective bargaining with the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU). Pacific Maritime member companies employ three groups of employees who belong to three bargaining units covered by three distinct labor contracts. At the Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbors (the Harbors), the longshoremen's unit is represented by ILWU Local 13, the marine clerks by ILWU Local 63, and the walking bosses and foremen by ILWU Local 94. Employees are hired into each unit primarily by means of a formal registration process under the respective contracts.

Pacific Maritime and Local 94 have executed successive collective bargaining agreements covering the terms and conditions of employment of walking bosses and foremen. The Agreement details the procedure for registering foremen. The registration process is administered by a joint union-management committee (the Committee). The Agreement provides that the Committee "shall select the best qualified applicant or applicants" on the basis of the applications on file, the information presented by the applicants, and personal interviews. The Agreement enumerates both "qualification" and "disqualification" factors which the Committee must consider.

Applicants were denied registration as foremen at the Harbors. Applicants allege that Pacific Maritime and Local 94 breached the Agreement by not registering them. Applicants contend that the Committee disregarded or misapplied the "qualification" and "disqualification" factors and thereby failed to register the "best qualified applicants" as mandated by the Agreement. Applicants were not bargaining unit employees: they were members of neither Local 94 nor the foremen's bargaining unit covered by the Agreement.

The parties stipulated to a bifurcated trial at which the issue of Applicants' standing would be tried first without a jury. At the conclusion of Applicants' case, the district court granted Pacific Maritime and Local 94's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The court found that Applicants lacked standing to sue for breach of the Agreement, reasoning that Applicants failed to show that the Agreement was made for their benefit.

II

In a bench trial, the court may involuntarily dismiss an action under Rule 41(b) when the court finds, after considering the evidence, that the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); Stone v. Millstein, 804 F.2d 1434, 1436-37 (9th Cir.1986) (Stone ). We review the district court's dismissal under Rule 41(b) the same as a judgment in defendant's favor after a bench trial: the district court's legal conclusions are reviewed independently and its findings of fact for clear error. Stone, 804 F.2d at 1437. We will reverse the court's findings of fact only upon a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir.1987) (Gregory K.). We review the court's findings of fact for clear error even if the court relied exclusively on a written record. Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1310.

III

To have standing to bring an action for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, a party must be either a member of the collective bargaining unit covered by the agreement or a third party beneficiary of that agreement. Karo v. San Diego Symphony Orchestra Association, 762 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir.1985) (Karo ). Conceding that they are not members of the collective bargaining unit until covered by the Agreement, Applicants argue that they are third party beneficiaries.

To determine whether Applicants are third party beneficiaries to the Agreement, we apply California law to the extent it is compatible with federal labor policy. Id. "A third party qualifies as a beneficiary under a contract if the parties intended to benefit the third party and the terms of the contract make that intent evident." Id. at 821-22, citing Garcia v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 36 Cal.3d 426, 436-37, 204 Cal.Rptr. 435, 439-40, 682 P.2d 1100, 1104-05 (1984) (Garcia ); Strauss v. Summerhays, 157 Cal.App.3d 806, 816, 204 Cal.Rptr. 227, 233 (1984); Kirst v. Silna, 103 Cal.App.3d 759, 763, 163 Cal.Rptr. 230, 232 (1980). In discerning intent, the court may look to evidence outside the four corners of the document, such as the circumstances and negotiations of the parties in making the contract. Garcia, 36 Cal.3d at 437, 204 Cal.Rptr. at 439. "Although the beneficiary need not be named in the contract, he must be a member of a class referred to and identified in it." Karo, 762 F.2d at 822.

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878 F.2d 1137, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2931, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-sepulveda-v-pacific-maritime-association-ca9-1989.