Robert Salley v. United States

786 F.2d 546, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 23451

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 21, 1986
• Docket: Cal. 357, Docket 85-2171
• Status: Published

Opinions

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge:

Robert Salley, pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bramwell, J.) denying Salley’s motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he sought an order directing the Bureau of Prisons to calculate his federal sentence from the date the sentence was imposed rather than the date Salley was delivered into federal custody by state authorities. Although we do not agree completely with the reasoning of the district judge, we believe that his decision to deny the motion was correct.

Federal agents arrested Salley on May 1, 1981 for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 1708, possession of stolen treasury checks and stolen mail. On the following day, he was released on his own recognizance. Several weeks later, New York City police arrested Salley on State charges of robbery, and he was incarcerated in State facilities.

On October 5, 1981 Salley was brought before Judge Bramwell pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, and bail was set in the amount of $1,000. Salley then was returned to State custody, and the United States Marshal lodged a federal detainer against him.

In November of 1981 Salley again appeared before Judge Bramwell pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. On December 16, 1981 Salley appeared for a third time before Judge Bramwell and was sentenced to a term of four years and nine months. Judge Bramwell directed, however, that the federal sentence was to run consecutively to whatever sentence Salley received in connection with his pending New York robbery charge. Salley was returned to State custody, and the United States renewed its detainer against him.

Salley subsequently pled guilty to the State charge, and on July 23, 1982 was sentenced to a term of one and one-half to four and one-half years, to run concurrently with the previously imposed federal sentence. Salley served his State sentence at various State correctional facilities. During this incarceration, he sought unsuccessfully on several occasions to be transferred to federal custody so that his sentences could run concurrently as the State court had directed. However, in accordance with the district court’s sentence, the transfer did not take place until after Salley’s State sentence was completed.

On April 27, 1984 Salley moved in the district court for an order directing the Bureau of Prisons to begin its calculation of the time served on Salley’s federal sentence from the date Salley was sentenced in federal court rather than the date he was delivered into federal custody. This appeal is from the denial of that motion.

In United States v. Sackinger, 704 F.2d 29, 30 (2d Cir.1983), we stated that “sentences imposed by a federal court are administered by the Attorney General and, while the court may recommend that a federal sentence be served in a state facility concurrently with a state sentence, the Attorney General has discretion as to whether or not he will follow the recommendation.” However, this statement does not apply to a federal sentence that is not to commence until the state sentence has been completed. The right of federal judges to impose such a sentence has been recognized for many years. See, e.g., Hayden v. Warden, 124 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.1941); United States ex rel. Lombardo v. McDonnell, 153 F.2d 919 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 872, 66 S.Ct. 1365, 90 L.Ed. 1641 (1946); Lavoie v. United States, 310 F.2d 117 (1st Cir.1962) (per curiam); Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965, 89 S.Ct. 1318, 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969); United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 322, 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974). Moreover, this right may be exercised regardless of whether the state sentence has as yet been imposed. Anderson v. United States, supra, 405 F.2d at 493; Farley v. Nelson, 469 F.Supp. 796, 801 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.1979); see Casias v. United States, 421 (10th Cir.1970) (per curiam). “The Courts agree that the law does not require a person to know the exact date that his sentence will begin.” United States v. Buide-Gomez, 744 F.2d 781, 783 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 1774, 84 L.Ed.2d 833 (1985).

To the extent that United States v. Eastman, 758 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.1985), enunciates a different rule, it is dictum with which we disagree. In that case, after the defendant was sentenced in federal court, he was “taken by the United States Marshal to the place designated by the Attorney General for service of his federal sentence.” In the instant case, Salley was remanded to the Metropolitan Correction Center and was transferred several days later to State custody at Rikers Island.

Although the Attorney General has the authority under 18 U.S.C. § 4082 to designate the place of confinement in cases where sentences are to run concurrently, an order which delays the commencement of a consecutive sentence does not invade the power of the Attorney General in any way. United States v. Thornton, 710 F.2d 513, 515-16 (9th Cir.1983). Appellant’s federal sentence did not begin to run until he was received at the correctional facility for service of that sentence. Roche v. Sizer, 675 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir.1982); United States v. Campisi, 622 F.2d 697, 699-70 (3d Cir.1980) (per curiam); 18 U.S.C. § 3568.

Accordingly, what we have here are conflicting state and federal sentences. There is no reason why the district court’s sentence, which was prior in time, must give way to that of the State court. See United States v. Sackinger, supra, 704 F.2d at 32 (quoting Lionel v. Day, 430 F.Supp. 384, 386 (W.D.Okla.1976)).

Affirmed.