TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-22-00002-CV
Robert Norton, Appellant
v.
Camtu Phan, Appellee
FROM THE 368TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 20-1075-C368, THE HONORABLE RICK J. KENNON, JUDGE PRESIDING
M E M O RAN D U M O PI N I O N
Robert Norton sued his landlord, Camtu Phan, in district court for breach of
contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Phan filed
a trespass counterclaim and a motion for an injunction against Norton. Norton appeals the district
court’s grant of: (1) Phan’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion dismissing Norton’s claims;
(2) Phan’s traditional summary-judgment motion on Phan’s trespass claim and related temporary
and permanent injunctions; and (3) Phan’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the district court’s judgments
on Phan’s traditional summary-judgment motion and permanent injunction but reverse the trial
court’s grant of the no-evidence summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. BACKGROUND
On March 19, 2019, Norton and Phan executed a one-year residential lease
agreement for a property owned by Phan in Round Rock. The lease term was from April 5, 2019,
to April 30, 2020. Phan declined to extend the lease period. Norton did not vacate the property
when the lease expired. On July 23, 2020, Norton sued Phan in district court, alleging breach of
contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In April 2021, the district court granted Phan’s no-evidence motion for summary
judgment, dismissing Norton’s claims and noting in the order that the only remaining issue in the
case was the calculation of attorney’s fees. In October 2021, Phan filed a petition asserting a
counterclaim for trespass and requesting a temporary injunction. The district court granted Phan’s
temporary injunction, which prohibited Norton from occupying the rental property.
Phan filed a traditional motion for summary judgment regarding her trespass claim
and requesting a permanent injunction. Norton did not file a response but did attend the pretrial
hearing, which included discussion of the motion for summary judgment and the injunction. After
the hearing, the district court granted Phan’s summary-judgment motion and request for permanent
injunction. The district court also awarded Phan her attorney’s fees related to defending against
Norton’s claims. Norton appealed the final judgment.
DISCUSSION
In his pro se appellate brief, Norton states that he “simply seeks all orders of [the
district] court reversed by this Appeals Court based on the many errors and clear showing of bias
. . . .” His brief presents two lists of nine issues each, which include some overlap, and together
raise thirteen separate issues. He also asserts that the lists are “not comprehensive and limited to
2 the most serious issues to reverse this judge’s orders.” However, because appellants bear the
burden of identifying and discussing their assertions of error, we will only address the alleged
errors that Norton has identified. See Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2007, pet. struck) (“An appellate court has no duty to perform an independent review of
the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.”).
Norton generally fails to present substantive arguments or cite to relevant
authorities. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain “a clear and concise
argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”).
Pro se litigants must comply with all rules applicable to licensed attorneys. Mathis v. Lockwood,
166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). However, we construe pro se filings “liberally and with patience
‘so as to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the parties’ rights.’” Housing Auth. of City
of Austin v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (quoting Veigel
v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc., 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018,
no pet.)). In the interest of justice, we will address Norton’s issues, as best we can, based on his
arguments. See Onkst v. Onkst, No. 03-15-00636-CV, 2017 WL 2628245, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Austin June 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (deciding to address “pro se issues ‘as best we can’ in
the interest of justice” (quoting Forbes v. Forbes, No. 03-15-00130-CV, 2016 WL 612175, at *4
(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.))).
Reading Norton’s brief liberally and renumbering his claims to combine his two
lists into one set of issues, we understand him to raise thirteen issues on appeal. Norton contends:
(1) that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear Phan’s counterclaim for trespass and
associated injunction requests because only justice of the peace courts may hear a forcible entry
and detainer suit pursuant to Texas Property Code Section 24.004, see generally Tex. Prop. Code
3 §§ 24.001–.011 (addressing cause of action for forcible entry and detainer); (2) that the district
court erred by denying him “extra time for discovery;” (3) that the trial court abused its discretion
when it granted Phan’s no-evidence summary judgment that disposed of Norton’s claims because
there were disputed facts and opposing counsel refused to cooperate during discovery; (4) that the
district court erred when it allowed Phan to file her counterclaim fourteen months into the case
“after the deadline for a counterclaim had expired” in violation of Rule 47 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure; (5) that the district court erred by allowing Phan to raise her counterclaim after
the first summary judgment was decided; (6) that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s
temporary injunction; (7) that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s injunction because
she did not show irreparable harm, but rather only showed economic harm; (8) that the district
court’s first through third findings of facts in its order for temporary injunction were not supported
by evidence; (9) that the district court’s award of attorney’s fees was unlawful and inappropriate
because Norton had a reasonable belief that he could stay in the property until a proper eviction
and writ were issued; (10) that the trial court’s award of Phan’s attorney’s fees was an abuse of
discretion because the landlord was attempting to evict him during “the federal and Texas
moratorium on evictions”; (11) that the judge displayed inappropriate behavior and violated his
duty to be impartial when he “stated he believed the permanent injunction was not warranted,
discussed legal strategy with counsel, and then chang[ed] his mind when the defendant’s attorney
pressed multiple times and appeared to be asking a favor”; (12) that the district court judge should
have recused himself after “eleven documented acts of bias,” violating the code of civil procedure
by allowing Phan to bring her counterclaim for trespass, and ignoring the requirements of an
4 injunction; and (13) that Phan’s “Notice to Vacate” did not conform to the requirements of Texas
Property Code Section 24.002. 1
Jurisdiction
Norton contends that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear Phan’s
counterclaim for trespass and associated injunction requests because only justice of the peace
courts may hear a forcible eviction and detainer suit pursuant to Texas Property Code Section
24.004. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 24.001–.011 (addressing cause of action for forcible entry
and detainer).
Whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we
review de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998). Norton correctly
asserts that a justice court has exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions under
the Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004; Breceda v. Whi, 224 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) However, a justice of the peace court does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases that require a determination of the right of possession of real property.
Breceda, 224 S.W.3d at 240. A suit for eviction under the forcible entry and detainer statute “does
not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.” Tex. Prop. Code § 24.008.
1 Phan asserts in her appellate brief that the only relevant issues on appeal are those related
to the district court’s grant of Phan’s traditional motion for summary judgment and the permanent injunction. Thus, Phan briefed only those issues. Norton has not raised any issues regarding the second summary-judgment motion. Thus, we do not address Phan’s arguments defending that ruling. Further, Phan does not provide any support or any explanation for her contention that Norton’s issues are limited. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”), 38.2 (applying requirements of Rule 38.1 to appellee’s brief, subject to exceptions not applicable here). We address all of Norton’s issues as we understand them. We address Phan’s briefing as it relates to Norton’s issue challenging the permanent injunction. 5 Further, while Chapter 24 does provide procedural protections for a holdover tenant, it does “not
grant to tenants at sufferance any legal interests in or possessory rights to the property at issue,”
and they remain a trespasser on the property. Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp.,
417 S.W.3d 909, 920 (Tex. 2013). Thus, evictions under Chapter 24 involving a holdover tenant
and trespass suits requesting an injunction for a trespasser are distinct proceedings. Here, Phan’s
trespass claim requiring a determination of the right of possession of property and the grant of an
injunction did not divest the district court of jurisdiction because it was not a Chapter 24 eviction
case. See Breceda, 224 S.W.3d at 240 (affirming district court’s grant of temporary injunction
barring interference with enjoyment of property).
We overrule Norton’s jurisdictional issue.
Denial of continuance
Norton contends that the district court erred by denying him “extra time for
discovery.” Although Norton does not specify when this alleged error occurred, based on a review
of the record we understand him to be referring to the district court not granting his request for “a
continuance of discovery” that Norton made at the pretrial hearing on Phan’s traditional
summary-judgment motion.
We review the district court’s order denying a motion for continuance for a clear
abuse of discretion. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002).
A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to
a clear and prejudicial error. Id. The rules of civil procedure permit a district court to grant a
continuance to a party opposing a motion for summary judgment if that party files an affidavit
explaining the reasons such continuance is necessary. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g) (“Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present
6 by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.”); Stierwalt v. FFE Transp. Serv.,
Inc., 499 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). Here, Norton did not file any
response, including any affidavit, in response to Phan’s second motion for summary judgment.
Nor did Norton file or otherwise make any motions to compel discovery after his original claims
were dismissed. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Stierwalt,
499 S.W.3d at 189 (“In general, a litigant is not entitled to a continuance if he or she fails to
diligently use the rules of civil procedure for discovery purposes prior to filing a motion
for continuance.”).
We overrule Norton’s issue regarding the denial of his motion for a continuance
made at the pretrial hearing.
No-evidence summary judgment
Norton contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Phan’s
no-evidence summary judgment that disposed of Norton’s claims because there were disputed
facts, and opposing counsel refused to cooperate during discovery. We understand Norton’s
complaint regarding discovery to be asserting that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s
no-evidence summary-judgment motion without there being “an adequate time for discovery.” See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a. Phan did not respond to this issue in her appellate brief. Phan’s no-evidence
motion filed in the district court also did not address the issue of “adequate discovery.”
“After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment
evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more
7 essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof
at trial.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a. “When a party contends that it has not had an adequate opportunity
for discovery before a summary-judgment hearing, it must file either an affidavit explaining the
need for further discovery or a verified motion for continuance.” Tempay, Inc. v. TNT Concrete &
Constr., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 517, 520–21 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied) (citing Tenneco Inc.
v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996)); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g)
(“Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.”). Norton
filed an affidavit in response to Phan’s no-evidence motion asserting that there had not been
adequate time for discovery because both the previous and current opposing counsel would not
cooperate with him. He also referred the district court to his then pending motion to compel
discovery and set a discovery schedule.
An appellate court reviews “a trial court’s determination that there has been an
adequate time for discovery on a case-by-case basis, under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
McInnis v. Mallia, 261 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). When
deciding whether the district court permitted an adequate time for discovery, we consider the
following factors: (1) the nature of the cause of action; (2) the nature of the evidence necessary to
controvert the no-evidence motion; (3) the length of time the case had been active in the trial court;
(4) the amount of time the no-evidence motion had been on file; and (5) the amount of discovery
that had already taken place. Tempay, Inc., 37 S.W.3d at 522. “Furthermore, a party should not
be able to abuse the discovery process, withhold key evidence from its opponents, and then use
8 that lack of evidence to win a judgment.” Id. (citing Robert W. Clore, Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 166a(i): A New Weapon for Texas Defendants, 29 St. Mary’s L.J. 813, 843 (1998)
(asserting that plaintiffs “who could show the defendant delayed discovery by failing to answer
the plaintiff’s interrogatories would likely be entitled to further discovery”)).
Norton filed his complaint on July 23, 2020. Phan’s no-evidence
summary-judgment motion was filed on March 31, 2021. The district court held a hearing and
granted Phan’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Norton’s motion to compel discovery
as moot on April 30, 2021. Thus, Norton’s case had been pending for about eight months when
Phan filed her no-evidence motion. See McInnis, 261 S.W.3d at 200 (concluding that there had
not been adequate time for discovery when no-evidence motion filed six months into case and less
than half of discovery period had expired). The record reflects that there was no discovery
schedule set and no trial date set. Norton has argued consistently before the district court and on
appeal that opposing counsel refused to cooperate with him on discovery, including not responding
to his requests for discovery. In Norton’s affidavit he asserted that no discovery had occurred
including initial disclosures. Norton also filed a motion to compel discovery. Both Norton’s
affidavit and his motion to compel were filed during the one-month period between Phan’s
no-evidence motion and the hearing.
Norton’s discovery requests sent to Phan’s attorney on April 14, 2021, are in the
record. Norton requested documents and communications between Phan and her listing agent and
her broker. Norton’s fraudulent inducement claim was premised in part on his argument that Phan
had intentionally misrepresented the condition of the property with the assistance of her listing
agent and broker knowing that he was out of state and relying on Phan’s and Phan’s representatives’
representations. Norton also requested all versions of the property lease and documents of
9 maintenance records or inspections of the property. As part of his breach-of-contract claim Norton
argued that additional agreements were reached between Norton and Phan regarding the property
that were not included in the lease agreement that both parties filed with the court and that he had
relied on those agreements in making repairs to the property. Phan has not responded to this
allegation in her brief.
Under these circumstances, Norton was not provided an adequate opportunity to
conduct discovery. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant
Norton’s request for additional discovery time. See Tempay, Inc., 37 S.W.3d at 522–23 (concluding
appellant had not been given adequate time for discovery when opposing party refused to
participate in discovery). We do not reach Norton’s issue regarding whether he presented material
issues of fact.
We sustain Norton’s issue challenging Phan’s no-evidence motion.
Allowing Phan’s counterclaim
Norton contends, in two issues, that the district court erred when it allowed Phan to
file her counterclaim fourteen months into the case “after the deadline for a counterclaim had
expired,” and after the first summary-judgment motion was granted in violation of Rule 47 of the
rules of civil procedure. Tex. R. Civ. P. 47. Rule 47 sets substantive requirements for “[a]n original
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original petition, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third party claim . . . . Id. However, Rule 47 contains no time limit and no prohibition on filing
a counterclaim after a district court has ruled on a summary judgment motion on different claims.
See id. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in allowing Phan to file her
counterclaim. See In re Bustamante, 510 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, orig.
10 proceeding) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing issue alleging trial court error
under Rule 47.)
We overrule Norton’s issues asserting that Phan was barred from filing her
counterclaim pursuant to Rule 47.
Temporary injunction
Norton contends that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s temporary
injunction. Norton also contends that the district court’s first through third findings of facts in its
order for temporary injunction were not supported by the evidence. Because the district court
rendered final judgment in this case, including a permanent injunction, Norton’s
temporary-injunction issues are moot. See Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A.,
802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (“If, while on the appeal of the granting or denying of the
temporary injunction, the trial court renders final judgment, the case on appeal becomes moot.”);
Norton v. Phan, No. 03-21-00603-CV, 2022 WL 243191, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 26, 2022,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing Norton’s interlocutory appeal challenging temporary injunction
because issues became moot).
Permanent injunction
Norton contends that the district court erred when it granted Phan’s request for a
permanent injunction.
We review a trial court’s issuance of injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion.
Operation Rescue–National v. Planned Parenthood, 975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998). An abuse
of discretion occurs when a district court acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, or without
any reference to any guiding rules or principles. Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health
11 Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). “To be entitled to a
permanent injunction, a party must prove (1) a wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) an irreparable
injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law.” Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC,
610 S.W.3d 763, 792 (Tex. 2020). When determining the appropriateness of a permanent
injunction, a court should balance the competing equities by considering the injury that would
result to the complainant, the defendant, and the public. Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co.,
226 S.W.2d 615, 618–19 (Tex. 1950).
Norton argues that Phan did not show irreparable harm, but rather only showed
economic harm. We understand Norton to allege that the only harm that Phan demonstrated was
the loss of rent. Phan argues that the irreparable harm was the loss of her use and enjoyment of
her property. Contrary to Norton’s assertion that Phan’s claimed harm was unpaid rent, she did
not request back-rent damages in the district court but rather argued that Norton’s continuing
trespass prevented her from selling her property or otherwise using it as she saw fit. When “a
trespass invades the possession of a person’s land, or destroys the use and enjoyment of that land,
an injunction is a proper remedy.” Beathard Joint Venture v. W. Houston Airport Corp., 72 S.W.3d
426, 432 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). Here, by living in her home as a trespasser, Norton
was continuing to trespass on Phan’s property in a way that prevented her from using and enjoying
her property.
Norton also contends that Phan failed to show that there was no adequate remedy
at law because she could have waited for the resolution of her eviction case in the justice of the
peace court. Phan asserts that an injunction was a proper remedy because Phan had an inadequate
remedy due to the continuous nature of Norton’s trespass. See id. (“An injunction is also a proper
remedy to restrain repeated or continuing trespasses where the remedy at law is inadequate because
12 of the nature of the injury . . . . In such situations, the requirements of no adequate remedy at law
and irreparable damage are satisfied.”). The record reflects that the justice of the peace court that
was hearing Phan’s eviction would be closed for about three more months as of the day of the
injunction hearing. At the injunction hearing, Norton expressed his intention of staying in the
home until the eviction was final or until a permanent injunction was ordered and upheld on appeal.
Thus, he intended to continue to benefit from Phan’s inability to get adequate relief due to court
closures by continually trespassing on her property and preventing her from using and enjoying it.
Norton also contends that the district court abused its discretion when it resolved
the equitable balance against him because his “business will have to be shut down completely by a
forced, rapid eviction doing great potential damage to his business,” he was suffering from health issues
at the time of the district court’s ruling, and this type of injunction would set a dangerous precedent
by allowing evictions to be done through a trespass claim. Phan correctly points out in her
appellate brief that Norton neither filed a response to Phan’s traditional motion for summary
judgment regarding her trespass claim nor otherwise presented any evidence of either the
anticipated effect on his business or of his health issues for the district court to consider as part of
balancing the competing equities. Additionally, we are unconvinced by Norton’s assertion that
upholding the injunction would set a dangerous precedent because it would allow injunctions
instead of evictions. Injunctions and evictions will still have different requirements and injunctions
will still require a showing of inadequate remedy at law. Further, the legislature chose to explicitly
allow for a property owner to pursue available relief through both a Chapter 24 eviction case and
a trespass case. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.008 (“An eviction suit does not bar a suit
for trespass . . . .).
13 Based on the record in this case, the district court’s grant of the permanent
injunction was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, or without any reference to any guiding rules or
principles. See Texas Health Care Info. Council, 94 S.W.3d at 850. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion.
We overrule Norton’s issue regarding the permanent injunction.
Attorney’s fees
In two issues, Norton challenges the district court’s award of Phan’s attorney’s fees.
The district court awarded Phan’s attorney’s fees pursuant to the lease agreement, which provides:
“Any person who is a prevailing party in any legal proceeding brought under or related to the
transaction described in this lease is entitled to recover prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, costs
of service, and all other costs of the legal proceeding from the non-prevailing party.” The district
court ordered “that Phan recover [her] attorney’s fees from Norton as the prevailing party on the
claims raised in Norton’s Original ‘Complaint’ . . . .” Because we are sustaining Norton’s issue
challenging Phan’s motion for no-evidence summary judgment we vacate the related attorney’s
fees order. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of Norton’s attorney’s fees issues.
Biased judge claims
In two issues, Norton complains of behavior of the district-court judge, which
Norton asserts demonstrated bias. First, Norton contends that the judge displayed inappropriate
behavior and violated his duty to be impartial when he “stated he believed the permanent injunction
was not warranted, discussed legal strategy with counsel, and then changing his mind when the
defendant’s attorney pressed multiple times and appeared to be asking a favor.” We understand
Norton to be referencing part of the hearing on Phan’s traditional summary-judgment motion, in
14 which the judge asked both parties for their views on the legal implications for a possible appeal
of the case if he granted the summary judgment versus if they went to trial and received the same
outcome through a jury. That hearing occurred after Norton filed his only motion for recusal and
Norton did not otherwise object to the judge’s questions. Thus, Norton has waived this issue on
appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (“As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review,
the record must show that [] the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request,
objection, or motion . . . .”).
Norton also contends that the district court judge should have recused himself after
“eleven documented acts of bias,” for violating the rules of civil procedure by allowing Phan to
bring her counterclaim for trespass, and for ignoring the requirements of an injunction. We
understand the “eleven documented acts of bias” to be referring to the eleven grounds that Norton
asserted in support of his motion requesting that the district court judge recuse himself.
Among other requirements, Rule 18a of the rules of civil procedure requires that
requests for judges to recuse themselves be made through a verified motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a.
“The procedural requirements of Rule 18a regarding recusal are mandatory, and a party who fails
to comply with them waives the right to complain of a judge’s failure to recuse himself.” Pease
v. Pease, No. 03-03-00644-CV, 2004 WL 2028023, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 10, 2004, no
pet.) (mem. op.); see also Kennedy v. Staples, 336 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011,
no pet.). Norton’s motion was not verified. Because Norton’s motion did not satisfy the mandatory
recusal procedures, his issue regarding the judge’s failure to recuse himself is waived. See id.
We overrule Norton’s two issues regarding alleged judge bias.
15 Notice to vacate
Norton contends that Phan’s “Notice to Vacate” did not conform to the requirements
of Texas Property Code Section 24.002. As discussed above in our discussion of the jurisdictional
issue, this is not a Chapter 24 eviction case. This is a trespass case. Norton has not explained how
the procedural requirements of an eviction case apply to this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We
overrule his final issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgments on Phan’s traditional summary-judgment
motion on her claims and the permanent injunction. We reverse the district court’s judgment
granting Phan’s no-evidence summary judgment that dismissed Norton’s claims and the attorney’s
fees granted for this. We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
__________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice
Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Theofanis
Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part
Filed: July 27, 2023