IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1175 Filed November 23, 2021
ROBERT M. HOGG and KATHRYN A. HOGG, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CITY COUNCIL OF CEDAR RAPIDS, Defendant-Appellee,
and
PROTECT THE PRAIRIE PARK CORRIDOR, INC., an Iowa Nonprofit Membership Corporation, JEREMIAH KENNY, RONALD LIPPE, MICHAEL NOKE, LOUWANNA MORRIS, JOHN SCHRINER, and KERRY SANDERS, Intervenors-Appellants,
CARGILL, INCORPORATED, Intervenor-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Mary E. Chiccelly,
Judge.
Property owners appeal the city council’s determination to amend the future
land use map and rezone a property to allow industrial use. REVERSED AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.
Robert M. Hogg and Kathryn A. Hogg, self-represented. 2
Elizabeth D. Jacobi of the City of Cedar Rapids City Attorney's Office, Cedar
Rapids, for appellee.
James C. Larew of Larew Law Office, Iowa City, for Intervenor-Appellants.
Samuel E. Jones of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.C., Cedar Rapids, and
Shannon L. Sole of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Des Moines and
Christopher H. Dolan, Minneapolis, MN, for Intervenor-Appellee.
Heard by May, P.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ. 3
GREER, Judge.
“A man who does not plan long ahead will find trouble at his door.”1 These
neighbors2 (Landowners) near the “Stewart Road Property” 3 (the Property)
believed the land use and zoning plans of Cedar Rapids (the City) left trouble off
their doors. In their view, the City then threw the plans aside to appease Cargill,
Inc., but the district court and City resolved that the plans legally allowed for the
Cargill development. The Landowners filed writs of certiorari after the City granted
a change to the land use plan and moved forward with a rezoning of the property
to allow Cargill the opportunity to develop a railyard near the Landowners’
residential properties.
Now on appeal, Hoggs argue there are issues of first impression and issues
of broad public importance regarding: (1) land use amendments which allow an
industrial use to be built in an existing residential neighborhood on public property
currently used as a state-funded prairie, (2) the application of Iowa Flood Mitigation
Program as codified in Iowa Code chapter 418 (2019) and a state-funded
applicant’s flood control system master plan, (3) a city’s misinformation about its
1 Also translated as, “If a man is not far-sighted, then trouble is impending.” A. Charles Muller, The Analects of Confusius, 15:12, http://www.acmuller.net/con- dao/analects (last visited: Nov. 8, 2021). 2 Robert and Kathryn Hogg own a home in the neighborhood contiguous to the
Stewart Road property. Other neighbors, Jeremiah Kenny, Ronald Lippe, Michael Noke, Louwanna Morris, John Schriner, and Kerry Sanders, appeared and moved to intervene and consolidate their objections to the city plan along with a non-profit group called Protect the Prairie Park Corridor, Inc. The single family residential neighborhood is known locally as “Rompot.” Because all of their concerns align, we refer to all of these parties as the “Landowners.” 3 The City has owned these approximately twenty-seven acres since 1997. The
property is located south of Otis Avenue SE and west of Cole Street SE in Cedar Rapids. 4
own authority over neighborhood flood protection and its failure to follow its own
procedures for a city-initiated land use amendment, and (4) the requirement for a
hearing under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1410 in certiorari cases. The
neighborhood group also raises these issues and adds that the City decision-
makers were materially misinformed by the City’s own staff about other options
available to Cargill. They assert those other options would have avoided the loss
of the nature reserve area.
I. The Legal Proceedings.
After attempts to change the course of the City, on December 16, 2019,
Hoggs petitioned for a writ of certiorari to set aside the approval of the amended
future land use map (FLUM) that allowed the Cargill project to proceed. Then on
December 20, 2019, Hoggs filed another writ of certiorari challenging the
ordinance to rezone the Property. For appellate purposes, the cases are
consolidated.
The basis of these filings related to the City’s action in allowing “an industrial
rail yard to be constructed on a 27-acre city-owned parcel in the 2008 floodplain
long used as green space and currently used as a state-funded ‘Prairie Pollinator
Zone’ in the ‘Sac and Fox Natureway.’” Once the writs were filed, Cargill
intervened in these proceedings. Also intervening in the actions were the Prairie
Park Corridor, Inc., and six landowners (collectively, “Prairie Park”) in the area.
The Landowners requested an oral hearing to address each writ. All parties filed
briefs in the district court and submitted voluminous exhibits. Without a hearing,
the district court annulled the writs of certiorari in two separate orders. The district
court found both the FLUM and the rezoning decisions were supported by 5
substantial evidence and the Landowers did not overcome the strong presumption
of legality. Also, the court reasoned that the Landowners failed to prove the City
acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Finally, the district court found the
reasonableness of the land use changes were fairly debatable so that the court
could not substitute its judgment over the City’s. Multiple motions to amend,
enlarge, and reconsider followed. All Landowner motions were denied without
hearing. Hoggs and Prairie Park appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
Certiorari is a procedure to test whether a lower board, tribunal, or court
exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally. State Pub. Def. v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 886 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 2016). Our review is for errors at law.
Id. When reviewing for correction of errors at law, we are bound by “the district
court's well-supported factual findings” but not its legal conclusions. State Pub.
Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 745 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Iowa 2008) (citation omitted).
“Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support or
when the court has not properly applied the law.” Id. “Evidence is substantial
when ‘a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion.’”
Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Hasselman
v. Hasselman, 596 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Iowa 1999)). “If a district court’s findings of
fact leave the reasonableness of the board’s action open to a fair difference of
opinion, the court may not substitute its decision for that of the board.” Helmke v.
Bd. of Adjustment, 418 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Iowa 1988) (citation omitted).
As for the application of the rules of civil procedure, we note that “rules have
the force and effect of statutes.” Fisher v. Davis, 601 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Iowa 1999). 6
With that in mind, “we interpret rules in the same manner we interpret statutes.”
Id. Because the issue is one of interpretation, our review is for correction of errors
at law. See State v. Azneer, 526 N.W.2d 298, 299 (Iowa 1995) (reviewing statutory
construction matters for corrections of errors at law).
III. Analysis.
Because we resolve this stage of the proceedings under procedural
considerations, we do not reach the Landowners’ substantive issues at this time.
Instead, we remand for the district court to hold the hearing required under Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1410. Here is our reasoning.
Before proceeding to the merits, the procedural concern of the Landowners
needed resolution. To review, the procedural rule controlling our approach to
resolve a petition for writ of certiorari states:
When full return has been made, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing. In addition to the record made by the return, the court may receive any transcript or recording of the original proceeding and such other oral or written evidence explaining the matters contained in the return. Unless otherwise specially provided by statute, such transcript, recording, or additional evidence shall be considered only to determine the legality of the proceedings or the sufficiency of the evidence before the original tribunal, board, officer, or magistrate.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1410 (emphasis added). The Landowners say “shall” means a
hearing was required to be set by the district court on their claims against the City.
The district court declined the Landowners’ requests for a hearing on each of the
writs. Instead, the district court said, “[I]t is routine practice of the Sixth Judicial
District to rule without oral hearing when the Court has been fully briefed on the
issues presented.” But, the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure are not aspirational,
they are the rules and they take precedence over any district’s local rules. See 7
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.101 (“The rules in this chapter shall govern the practice and
procedure in all courts of the state, except where they expressly provide otherwise
or statutes not affected hereby provide different procedure in particular courts or
cases.”); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1806 (“Each district court, by action of a
majority of its district judges, may from time to time make and amend rules
governing its practice and administration not inconsistent with these rules.”
(emphasis added)). So it follows that if the rules governing all courts require a
hearing, a hearing shall be held in all judicial districts of Iowa. Even so, the City
and Cargill ask if the hearing was “mandatory.”
As further backdrop, the district court noted that because the issue was
“fully briefed,” a hearing was not necessary. And, the City and Cargill maintain
that the Landowners are not prejudiced by the lack of a hearing because of the
voluminous record and extensive briefing already provided to the district court,
operating in an appellate capacity. They argue a hearing would be a waste of
judicial resources. In its oral argument, Cargill also championed the idea that
because the Landowners got appellate oral argument, their opportunity for a
“hearing” was satisfied. With the limited time afforded in appellate oral argument,
we do not consider a hearing on the merits to be on equal footing with the targeted
discussions had in front of our court.
At the oral arguments, Cargill cited Wieslander v. Iowa Department of
Transportation as additional authority supporting the district court’s denial of a
hearing on the writs. 596 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 1999). Wieslander involved an appeal
from an administrative agency, the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT). Id.
at 519. The DOT revoked a woman’s drivers’ license after she was caught drunk 8
driving. Id. Simultaneously, she faced criminal charges. Id. In her criminal case,
the court sustained her motion to suppress evidence from the breathalyzer. Id. At
this point, she filed to reopen the revocation hearing based on the criminal finding.
Id. However, the law had recently changed and affected whether reopening the
DOT action was possible. Id. The court applied the amendment to the law
retroactively and denied her petition to reopen the DOT action. Id. Wieslander
filed a motion to appeal under then Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) (now rule
1.904). Id. The district court determined that it neither needed to have a hearing
nor accept briefs because there was a single legal issue to consider. Id. at 520.
Noting that the district court acted out of turn in this “procedural irregularity,” the
supreme court found the error was rectified because the issues were fully
addressed on appeal and in oral argument and Wieslander made no request to
supplement the record, so she was not prejudiced. Id. But Wieslander referenced
Kernodle v. Commissioner of Insurance, 331 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Iowa 1983), which
also involved a review from an administrative agency. In Kernodle, there was no
opportunity for an oral or written submission, and the Kernodle court remanded the
case, stating:
Rule 333(b), Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure [now rule 1.1603] provides that in proceedings for judicial review of agency action in a contested case: “Upon request of any party the reviewing court shall, or upon its own motion may, establish a schedule for the conduct of the proceeding.” In reconciling the provisions of this rule with the language in section 17A.19(7) which refers to “the date set for hearing,” we conclude that in the review of contested cases a hearing must be held for submission of the issues for decision unless an alternative means of submission on written arguments is established by the court under rule 333(b). The district court’s failure to provide for either of these modes of submission in the present case requires reversal of its judgment. 9
331 N.W.2d at 135 (noting the language in the rule “suggests some type of hearing
will be accorded the parties in reviewing agency action in contested cases”).
Neither Wieslander nor Kernodle dealt with the same “shall” language in play
here.4 Plus “certiorari rules are different from the laws applicable to state
administrative appeals.” Jensen v. City Council of Cambridge, No. 09-0697, 2010
WL 2383778, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2010) (Mansfield, J., concurring
specially).
Likewise, rule 1.1410 uses both “shall” and “may.” The use of “may” in the
rule has afforded the district court “discretion” to receive evidence at a certiorari
proceeding. Fisher v. Chickasaw Cnty., 553 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Iowa 1996). So
conversely, it would seem use of “shall” in the rule does not allow discretion.
Kopecky v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Comm’n, 891 N.W.2d 439, 444 (Iowa 2017)
(noting that when the words “may” and “shall” are in close proximity in a statute,
“the intent of the legislature could not have been for ‘may’ to mean the same thing
4Iowa Code section 17A.19(7) provides in part: In proceedings for judicial review of agency action a court may hear and consider such evidence as it deems appropriate. In proceedings for judicial review of agency action in a contested case, however, a court shall not itself hear any further evidence with respect to those issues of fact whose determination was entrusted by the Constitution or a statute to the agency in that contested case proceeding. Before the date set for hearing a petition for judicial review of agency action in a contested case, application may be made to the court for leave to present evidence in addition to that found in the record of the case. If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the contested case proceeding before the agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court. (Emphasis added.) 10
as ‘shall’”). Court rules are subject to rules of statutory construction. See Comm.
on Pro. Ethics v. Shaffer, 230 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1975).
Returning to the mandatory/directory dilemma, Cargill and the City also urge
the provisions of rule 1.1410 are directory, not mandatory, and unless the
Landowners show prejudice, they are not now entitled to a hearing. See Taylor v.
Dep’t of Transp., 260 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1977) (providing that directory
provisions fix “the time, form and mode of proceeding of public functionaries . . .
because they are not of the essence of the thing to be done but are designed to
secure system, uniformity, and dispatch in public business. Such statutes direct
the thing to be done at a particular time but do not prohibit it from being done later
when the rights of interested persons are not injuriously affected by the delay”).
The difference between mandatory and directory statutes is in the consequences
of failing to perform the duty which is imposed. Id. at 522–23 (holding that while
Taylor received of a hearing outside of the statutory timeframe, the delay would
not invalidate subsequent proceedings unless prejudice was shown because the
statute about the timing of the hearing was directory). “The failure to perform a
mandatory duty will invalidate subsequent proceedings, while the failure to perform
a directory duty will not invalidate the subsequent proceedings unless prejudice is
shown.” $99 Down Payment, Inc. v. Garard, 592 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Iowa 1999)
(remanding the case after the court violated its duty and proceeded sua sponte to
deny the arbitration award in contradiction to the statutory language mandating
that the district court “shall confirm” the arbitration award).
Thus, the core inquiry of the mandatory/directory analysis is if the failure to
exercise the duty “destroy[s] a right or sacrifice[s] a benefit to the public or 11
individual.” Willett v. Cerro Gordo Cnty. Zoning Bd., 490 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Iowa
1992) (finding the “must” requirement to obtain governmental permits before
submitting the special use application was directory as no prejudice occurred
because property owner was required to submit the permits prior to commencing
the operation); see also Wisdom v. Bd. of Supervisors, 19 N.W.2d 602, 607–08
(1945) (finding that when “shall” appears and “is not addressed to public officials
and no right is destroyed by giving it a directory meaning, it will be so construed”).
And we have considered a sentencing court to be in the category of a public official
when applying “the uniform rule . . . that the word ‘shall,’ when addressed to public
officials, is mandatory and excludes the idea of discretion.” State v. Klawonn, 609
N.W.2d 515, 522 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted) (finding the word “shall” in Iowa
Code section 910.3B created a duty on the sentencing court to impose restitution).
Yet, in agency cases defining the scope of the duty, the focus is whether
the failure to perform the required duty is essential to the process. See, e.g., Tyler
v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 420 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Iowa 1988) (finding requirement in
section 321J.9 that an officer provide a “sworn report” a driver had refused to
submit to testing was directory because the affirmation of the report before a notary
was not essential to the purpose of the statute); Downing v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,
415 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1987) (holding section 321B.13, providing an officer
“shall” issue a temporary license, was directory because the duty was not essential
to the main purpose of the statute, which was to promote public safety); McFee v.
Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Iowa 1987) (holding a delay in
administrative proceedings without showing of actual prejudice will not mandate
reversal of final agency action); Pietig v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 385 N.W.2d 251, 12
253 (Iowa 1986) (requirement to “forthwith” revoke license under section 321.209
is directory only, so licensee could not avoid revocation absent showing of
prejudice); Taylor, 260 N.W.2d at 523 (finding that because the legislative goal
could still be attained when hearings are late, the hearing time provision is
directory).
But this requirement for a hearing is more like the situation in Didonato v.
Iowa Department of Transportation, 456 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Iowa 1990), where the
court noted the purpose of the statute was to provide an opportunity to consult with
counsel or a family member after an arrest which made the provision that an officer
“shall permit that [detained] person . . . to call” mandatory. Here, the Landowners
lost the right to a hearing on the merits of the writ. It is not that the right to a hearing
is to be done at a particular time and then was set at a later date; here, it is a
complete denial of the right to a hearing.
To better understand, we look for guidance in cases involving rules where
the language “hearing shall be held” is discussed. More recently, estate cases
have faced this question with Iowa Court Rule 7.2(3), which requires a hearing to
request an allowance for extraordinary expenses. In Uhlenhake v. Uhlenhake, a
party sought extraordinary expense allowances. No. 13-1734, 2014 WL 5862043,
at *12 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2014). Iowa Court Rule 7.2(3) states:
When an allowance for extraordinary expenses or services is sought . . . [t]he request may be made in the final report or by separate application. It shall be set for hearing upon reasonable notice, specifying the amounts claimed, unless waivers of notice identifying the amounts claimed are filed by all interested persons.
(Emphasis added.) The district court failed to set a hearing on the issue and just
approved the expenses. Uhlenhake, 2014 WL 5862043, at *12. On appeal from 13
the order allowing the expenses, the Uhlenhake court remanded for a review of
the application and to require specific findings. Id. (“But because the objectors
asked for and were entitled to a hearing on the application, we reverse the court’s
attorney fee award and remand for a hearing on the application.”). In 2004, the
court of appeals again interpreted this rule in In re Estate of Schuster, No. 03-2067,
2004 WL 2579231, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2004). There, the party’s
attorneys had not originally requested a hearing to address their fees. Schuster,
2004 WL 2579231, at *3. When they eventually did, the district court said that the
motion raised “no matters not taken into account in the original determination.” Id.
On appeal, the court stated that even though the party had not originally requested
a hearing, they were procedurally entitled to one. Id. (“[W]e cannot say that even
with consents an attorney should be precluded from presenting his evidence to the
court if the court is opposed to granting the fee application.”). The court ultimately
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. Id.
The process is important. After a writ is issued, a return is made by the
defendant setting forth that party’s position. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1408. In a certiorari
proceeding challenging a zoning decision, the return contains certified or sworn
copies of the documents acted upon by the board and “such other facts as may be
pertinent and material to show the grounds of the decision appealed from and shall
be verified.” Iowa Code § 414.17. Then, the rules further provide, “When full return
has been made, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing.” Iowa R. Civ.
P. 1.1410 (emphasis added). The rule allows parties to offer other oral or written
evidence at the time of the hearing, along with transcripts or recordings of the city
proceedings. See also Geisler v. City Council, 769 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2009) 14
(noting the court has the ability to take additional evidence at a hearing). Here, the
Landowners specifically requested an oral hearing in their petitions for writs of
certiorari. In their words, “[a]n oral hearing would have been helpful to resolve the
factual and legal issues raised previously in this motion.”
The district court found a hearing unnecessary. But the rule does not make
the duty5 to set a hearing optional. See Riley v. Bd. of Trs. of Policemen’s Pension
Fund, 222 N.W. 403, 405 (1928) (“The procedure upon a trial of a certiorari
proceeding . . . provides that, when full return of the writ has been made, the court
must proceed to hear the parties upon the record, proceedings, and facts as
certified, and such other testimony, oral or written, as either party may introduce.”).
Noting that the current rule language is stronger than in Riley, Landowners assert
they are entitled to “a full and complete hearing before a proper court of record and
according to accepted judicial method of ascertaining facts.” See Residential &
Agric. Advisory Comm., LLC v. Dyersville City Council, No. 13-0015, 2013 WL
5951191, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2013) (citation omitted).
We are sensitive to the nature of these proceedings and their importance to
the citizens of Iowa. See Baker v. Bd. of Adjustment, 671 N.W.2d 405, 413 (Iowa
2003), as amended on denial of reh’g (Nov. 25, 2003) (“Questions likely to arise in
such cases are of such great importance that the Legislature appears to have had
in mind that the parties should, on the question of the legality of the board’s action,
be entitled to a full and complete hearing before a proper court of record and
5 “[T]he Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure have the force and effect of statute.” Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 134 N.W.2d 916, 917 (Iowa 1965); see also Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (“The word ‘shall’ imposes a duty.”), (b) (“The word ‘must’ states a requirement.”). 15
according to accepted judicial method of ascertaining facts.”). Even so, pointing
to the extensive written record submitted, the City and Cargill posit that the
petitioners suffered no prejudice by the failure to have a hearing and, even if a
hearing were held, the result would be the same. While that prophecy may be
true, we find the process must guide the result, not fall to the result guiding the
process. Thus, we remand to the district court for a hearing on the writs as required
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1410.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.