MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert Leroy Bryan was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first degree malice murder and sentenced to death. See Bryan v. State (Bryan I), 935 P.2d 338 (Okla.Crim.App.1997). After the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied his state petition for post-conviction relief, see Bryan v. State (Bryan II), 948 P.2d 1230 (Okla.Crim.App.1997), Bryan filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court, alleging, inter alia: (1) the state failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his conviction for first degree malice murder; (2) counsel labored under a conflict of interest; (3) counsel was ineffective at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial because counsel failed to present mental health evidence; and (4) he was incompetent to stand trial. The district court denied relief. A panel of this court unanimously concluded that Bryan was not entitled to relief on his evidence-sufficiency, conflict of interest, and competency claims. See Bryan v. Gibson (Bryan III), 276 F.3d 1163, 1166-68, 1172-75, 1168-72 (10th Cir.2001); id. at 1179, 1180 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The panel, although divided, further held that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance during either the guilt or penalty phase of the trial by failing to present mental health evidence. Compare id. at 1172-79 (panel majority), with id. at 1182-85 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).1
A majority of the active judges of this court ordered the case reheard en banc and requested that the parties brief whether trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to present evidence of Bryan’s [1211]*1211mental illness “during either the guilt or penalty phases of the trial.”2 Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and submissions, we vacate that portion of the panel opinion addressing Bryan’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, see id. at 1175-79, and affirm the denial of habeas relief for the reasons set out below. We do not reconsider as an en banc court the panel’s denial of habeas relief as to Bryan’s evidence-sufficiency, competency, or conflict of interest claims. See id. at 1166-68, 1168-72, 1172-75. Accordingly, all remaining portions of the panel opinion remain undisturbed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The evidence presented at trial linking Bryan to the murder of his aunt, Inabel Bryan, was almost entirely circumstantial. Inabel disappeared from her home in September of 1993. A neighbor found tire marks at Inabel’s home matching the tracks of a car Bryan had rented at that time. A potted plant was also found at Inabel’s home; Bryan purchased that plant the day Inabel disappeared. Police found Inabel’s body, and a receipt for the purchase of the plant, several days after her disappearance on a parcel of property owned by Bryan’s parents. Inabel died from a gunshot wound to the forehead; a pillowcase was duct-taped over her head. There was a single set of vehicle tracks present at the scene; the tracks matched the tread pattern of the right rear tire on Bryan’s rental car.
Authorities searched the property where Inabel’s body was found because, several years earlier, Bryan had solicited an undercover police officer to kidnap and kill a local banker and dump the body at the same location. This solicitation scheme included plans to force the banker to sign a number of fraudulent promissory notes and personal checks. Similarly, in this case, Bryan possessed several handwritten promissory notes and agreements in which Inabel purportedly agreed she owed him millions of dollars as a result of an investment in his failed businesses. A handwriting expert testified Bryan wrote the agreements and forged Inabel’s signature. Police also found in Bryan’s possession several of Inabel’s personal checks. According to the expert, Bryan had forged Inabel’s signature on one of the checks and had made four others signed by Inabel payable to himself in varying amounts. Police found Inabel’s checkbook just outside the Bryan home, burned in a can of ashes.
Before Inabel’s disappearance, Bryan rented a car from a local dealership. When making the arrangements, he requested a car with a large trunk. When he returned the car two days after Inabel’s disappearance, he could not pay the rental fee. He did, however, show the owner of the dealership one of the forged checks. Police found a hair in the trunk similar to the hair of the victim. They also found grass and vegetation, like that on the property where Inabel’s body was discovered, throughout the car’s undercarriage. Fibers lining the trunk were similar to those on Inabel’s clothes and tape found on or near her body.
Police located additional evidence in Bryan’s bedroom tying Bryan to the murder. They discovered a roll of duct tape of the same type as pieces found near Ina-bel’s body and on the pillowcase over her head. An expert testified that the edges [1212]*1212of the tape taken from Bryan’s bedroom matched the edges of one of the pieces of tape near Inabel’s body. Police also found ammunition in Bryan’s bedroom consistent with the type of ammunition used to kill Inabel and consistent with a bullet in the rental car. A metallurgy study indicated that all the bullets — the one that killed Inabel, the one in the rental car, and the ones in the Bryan home — were manufactured at the same time and could have come from the same box.
B. Additional Background
The issues before this court turn on evidence of Bryan’s mental health at the time of the murder and the non-use of that evidence during both the guilt and penalty phases of Bryan’s trial. As a consequence, some brief additional background is in order.
Bryan has a history of organic brain disease, possibly related to his severe case of diabetes mellitus, dating back to his mid-twenties. In 1989, when Bryan was forty-nine-years-old, he was charged with solicitation of murder relating to the scheme to kidnap and kill the banker described above. He was initially found incompetent to stand trial and was sent to Eastern State Hospital in March of 1989 for treatment. Bryan was diagnosed as suffering from an organic delusional disorder and was considered severely psychotic at the time of his admission to the hospital. Doctors also discovered that Bryan’s brain exhibited significant signs of atrophy. Doctors treated Bryan’s diabetes and medicated him with Navane, an antipsychotic drug, until Bryan was determined competent in 1990.
After Bryan was charged in 1993 with Inabel’s murder, Bryan’s family hired Raymond Munkres to represent Bryan. At the arraignment, Munkres expressed serious doubt as to Bryan’s competency and made an oral motion for a competency determination. A jury trial on the question of Bryan’s competency was eventually held on December 30, 1993. Because it was beyond the financial resources of Bryan’s family, Munkres' did not present any medical testimony at the hearing. Instead, Munkres adduced the testimony of Mike Jackson, an individual who volunteered his services to Munkres as an investigator. The essence of Munkres’ presentation at the competency hearing was that Bryan was incompetent because the version of events he described surrounding the murder had no basis in reality, but that Bryan nonetheless sincerely believed in the veracity of his version of events. The jury concluded that Bryan had failed to demonstrate that he was incompetent to undergo further criminal proceedings.3
On January 3, 1994, just four days after the competency trial was completed, Bryan filed a letter with the trial court indicating as follows: “I wish to advise the court that as [of] this date I am dismissing my attorney of record because of philosophical differences in how this case should proceed in my best and most aggressive defense to the charges leveled against me.” The trial court allowed Munkres to withdraw from the case and appointed the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (“OIDS”) to represent Bryan.
Wesley Gibson of the OIDS replaced Munkres as Bryan’s attorney. Like [1213]*1213Munkres, Gibson could not verify Bryan’s version of the events surrounding the murder. Gibson hired Dr. J.R. Smith, a board-certified psychiatrist, to evaluate Bryan. It was Dr. Smith’s opinion that Bryan’s “delusional system and circum-stantiality of thought (as well as the fluctuating blood sugar levels) affect his ability to assist his attorney in his own defense. He produces volumes of information that are irrelevant and often erroneous (but believed by the patient).” Based on the information provided by Dr. Smith, Gibson requested a second competency hearing. At a hearing on the application, the trial court considered the testimony of Gibson and the sheriff in charge of the jail where Bryan was housed, as well as the affidavit of Dr. Smith. The trial court denied the application for a new competency hearing, concluding that there was no doubt that Bryan was then competent.
Gibson continued to represent Bryan until May of 1994, when he had a slight stroke. He was replaced by Steven Hess, also of the OIDS. Hess continued to consult medical experts and hired Dr. Philip Murphy, a clinical psychologist, to evaluate Bryan. Based on an evaluation which included numerous psychological tests and a review of relevant medical records, Dr. Murphy concluded as follows: “Mr. Bryan suffers from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question his competence to stand trial, as well as his legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged.”
Based on the opinions expressed by Drs. Smith and Murphy, and the two unsuccessful attempts to challenge Bryan’s competency, Hess thought it was in Bryan’s best interest to utilize an insanity defense rather than to continue to litigate the competency issue. Accordingly, Hess filed a notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense and a witness list setting out expert witnesses, including particularly Drs. Smith and Murphy, in support of such a defense. When Hess informed Bryan and his parents that he intended to utilize an insanity defense, both Bryan and his parents expressed their disapproval. Shortly thereafter, Bryan and- his parents informed Hess that he would be replaced by privately retained counsel. In so doing, they indicated that Hess was being replaced because he had filed the notice to rely on an insanity defense.
Hess was replaced by Jack Freeman. Freeman contacted Hess and indicated that he would be Hess’ replacement. He also set up a meeting with Hess and the medical experts. Hess turned over Bryan’s file to Freeman, including all of the records and expert reports on Bryan’s mental health. Freeman did not ultimately present any mental health evidence during either the guilt or penalty phase of Bryan’s trial, although he arranged for Dr. Murphy to be available in case his testimony would be helpful during the guilt phase of the trial.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
On direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), Bryan asserted that Freeman was ineffective during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial because he failed to present evidence of Bryan’s mental illness.4 Contemporaneously with the filing of his opening brief on direct appeal, Bryan filed an application for an evidentiary hearing, supported by affidavits, seeking a hearing on the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “failure to utilize available evidence of [Bryan’s] mental illness at any point in the trial.” The OCCA did not specifically reject Bryan’s request for an evidentiary [1214]*1214hearing; it did so implicitly, however, when it proceeded to the merits of Bryan’s ineffective assistance claims without an ev-identiary hearing and denied him relief. See Bryan I, 935 P.2d at 363.
In the instant § 2254 habeas corpus petition, Bryan asserted the same claims of ineffective assistance he asserted in state court. The federal district court granted Bryan an evidentiary hearing, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and denied relief. Although the respondent contended before the district court that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because “there is plenty of information in the record before this Court to make that determination,” he did not raise the propriety of that hearing before this court. Accordingly, the panel declined to address the question whether the district court should have granted Bryan an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance. See Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1172 n. 6 (citing Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1174 n. 9 (10th Cir.2001) (declining to consider propriety of district court’s grant of an evidentiary hearing when such hearing had already taken place and respondent had not challenged on appeal district court’s decision to grant hearing)).
In the order granting rehearing en banc, this court instructed the parties to address the following questions:
Did the district court’s decision to take evidence on Mr. Bryan’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to present mental health evidence at trial comport with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)? By failing to argue the issue on appeal, did the government waive its objection to the district court’s grant of an evidentia-ry. hearing?
In his supplemental brief, the respondent cites Romano and asserts that the issue is not “properly before this court for review at this time” because he did not appeal the district court’s grant of an evidentiary hearing. The respondent nevertheless proceeds to brief the issue on the merits and again asserts that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because “there [was] plenty of information in the [existing state court] record” to decide the merits of Bryan’s claims of ineffective assistance. We conclude that the district court’s decision to grant Bryan an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance did not contravene 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Accordingly, it is unnecessary to determine what steps a respondent must undertake to preserve an objection, predicated on § 2254(e)(2), to a district court decision to grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing.
Section 2254(e)(2) provides that “[i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant” satisfies one of the two exceptions set out in § 2254(e)(2)(A) or (B). If, however, the petitioner did not “fail[ ] to develop the factual basis of [his] claim in State court,” id., § 2254(e)(2) is not applicable and a federal habeas court should proceed to analyze whether a hearing is appropriate or required under pre-AEDPA standards. Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir.1998). Under those standards, Bryan is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “so long as his allegations, if true and not contravened by the existing factual record, would entitle him to habeas relief.” Id. See generally Medina v. Barnes, 71 F.3d 363, 369-71 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing at length pre-AEDPA standard for obtaining an evidentiary hearing).
In his supplemental brief before the en banc court, the respondent does not dispute that Bryan diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his claims [1215]*1215of ineffective assistance in state court.5 Instead, he argues that the evidentiary hearing was inappropriate because Bryan’s allegations “are contravened by the existing record.” Respondent’s Brief at 19. Notably, however, the respondent does not identify those portions of the state court record which allegedly contravene the allegations of ineffective assistance set out in Bryan’s § 2254 habeas petition. Instead, he broadly asserts that the trial record contained sufficient information to allow the OCCA to decide the merits of Bryan’s claims without an evidentiary hearing and that, in light of that record, the decision of the OCCA rejecting Bryan’s claims of ineffective assistance is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable interpretation of governing Supreme Court precedent.6
We find the respondent’s argument, which is not supported by a single citation to the state court record, unconvincing. This court has reviewed the entire state court record, including the transcript of the retrospective competency hearing. Although that record contains much information relevant to the question whether Freeman’s failure to utilize mental health evidence during both the guilt and penalty phases of Bryan’s trial was constitutionally ineffective, it is missing key testimony from Freeman regarding what he knew and understood about Bryan’s mental health history and, most importantly, why he decided not to utilize that evidence. It is exactly this information Bryan sought to develop in state court when he requested an evidentiary hearing before the OCCA. Because Bryan diligently sought to “develop the factual basis of [his] claim in State court proceedings,” § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly, the appropriate question is whether Bryan was entitled to a hearing under pre-AEDPA law. See Miller, 161 F.3d at 1253 (holding that preAEDPA standards govern question of propriety of granting an evidentiary hearing when a petitioner diligently sought to develop the factual basis of his claim- in state court and citing Medina, 71 F.3d at 368-69, as setting out the controlling pre-AEDPA standard). The answer to that question is clearly “yes.” See Medina, 71 F.3d at 369-70 (examining controlling Supreme Court cases and holding that those cases require “an evidentiary hearing when the facts were not adequately developed in the state court, so long as that failure is not attributable to the petitioner”).
Having determined that the district court correctly afforded Bryan an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance, the appropriate standard of review is that set out in Miller.
[Ineffective assistance claim[s] presente ] a mixed question of law and fact. Because our analysis of this claim primarily involves consideration of legal [1216]*1216principles, we review this claim de novo. Further, we note that because the state court did not hold any evidentiary hearing, we are in the same position to evaluate the factual record as it was. Accordingly, to the extent the state court’s dismissal of [petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim] was based on its own factual findings, we need not afford those findings any deference.
Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254 (citations omitted).7 But see Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 953 (5th Cir.2001) (specifically rejecting Miller approach and holding instead that even where a petitioner was denied a full and fair hearing, federal court is obligated to apply the deferential review standards set out in § 2254(d) and (e)).8 In these circumstances, this court accepts the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and reviews de novo whether counsel’s performance was legally deficient and whether the deficiencies prejudiced the defendant. See United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir.1995).
B. Discussion
“A convicted defendant’s [or habeas petitioner’s] claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial.”). To be entitled to relief, a petitioner must prove both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”). To carry his burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient, a petitioner must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. To carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice, a petitioner must show “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is rehable.” Id.
The Supreme Court has made clear that “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in [any particular order] or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As set out more fully below, this court resolves Bryan’s claim of ineffective assistance on the basis of Strickland’s performance prong. For that reason, and because it is important to reemphasize that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferen[1217]*1217tial,” we set out the Supreme Court’s teachings on the matter at some length. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
The proper measure of attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms, considering all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court has been crystal clear that “judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Id. at 689,104 S.Ct. 2052. For that reason, a reviewing court must “reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct [and] evaluate [that] conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id.; see also id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”). Because of the difficulties that inhere in such a process, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689,104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). The importance of this presumption cannot be overstated. This is made clear by the Court’s repeated invocation of the “strong presumption” that counsel provided constitutionally adequate assistance. See id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[T]he court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”); id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.”).
Thus, this court must analyze whether Bryan has adduced sufficient evidence to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel provided constitutionally adequate assistance during both the guilt and penalty phases of Bryan’s capital trial. In so doing, we recognize the “need to apply even closer scrutiny when reviewing attorney performance during the sentencing phase of a capital case.” Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).
1. Failure to present mental health evidence during the guilt phase
In his brief before the panel,9 Bryan contended that Freeman should have presented evidence of his mental illness during the trial’s guilt stage in support of either an insanity defense or in support of a second-degree murder instruction. In particular, Bryan relies on a report prepared by Dr. Murphy for the defense in May of 1994 which indicates that “Mr. Bryan suffers from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question ... his legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged.” Bryan asserts that this evidence, when coupled with the interview performed by Dr. Smith, evidence derived from CAT and SPECT scans of Bryan’s brain, and the Eastern State Hospital records, casts doubt on his ability to form an intent to kill.
Bryan’s arguments regarding the viability of a guilt-phase insanity de[1218]*1218fense are completely at odds with the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court. To assert an insanity defense, “Oklahoma ... requires] the defendant to show that at the time of the crime he suffered from a mental disease or defect rendering him unable to differentiate between right and wrong, or unable to understand the nature and consequences of his actions.” James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 553 (10th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). Despite the statements in Dr. Murphy’s May 1994 report relied upon so heavily by Bryan, Freeman testified unequivocally that both Drs. Murphy and Smith told him that Bryan was not legally insane and that he relied on the doctors’ opinions in formulating his trial strategy.10 Freeman’s testimony in this regard was fully corroborated by testimony provided by Hess at the federal eviden-tiary hearing. Hess specifically testified there was no medical evidence indicating that Bryan did not understand the consequences of his actions and no medical evidence that would provide a defense during the guilt phase of the trial. Instead of presenting a viable defense based on medical evidence during the guilt phase of the trial, Hess’ strategy was to utilize the guilt phase to lay the foundation for a mitigation case at the penalty phase.11 Accordingly, Freeman lacked the medical evidence necessary to present an insanity defense at the guilt stage of Bryan’s trial.12
[1219]*1219Significantly, Bryan did not want his attorney to present evidence suggesting he was mentally ill13; he was also apparently unwilling to accept a guilty plea to avoid a possible death sentence.14 This court must presume that Bryan was competent to rationally assist defense counsel at trial, as he was adjudicated competent at the retrospective competency hearing. See Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1169-72. “The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Romano, 239 F.3d at 1181 (collecting cases for this proposition). “Although trial counsel has an independent duty to investigate and make a case in [defense], counsel also has to be responsive to the wishes of his client.” Romano, 239 F.3d at 1181; see also Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235, 1247-48 (10th Cir.1999) (concluding counsel’s decision to acquiesce to petitioner’s wishes that attorney not present any mitigating evidence during penalty phase was not deficient performance). Additionally, the prosecution’s case, although strong, was almost entirely circumstantial. See Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 461-62 (10th Cir.1999) (holding defense counsel’s innocence-based defense was reasonable strategy in light of circumstantial nature of prosecution’s case). There was evidence admitted at trial indicating that Bryan’s physical condition had so deteriorated at the time of the murder, due to his diabetes, that he was physically incapable of carrying out this crime.
Accordingly, based on the record before this court, it appears that Freeman had two options during the guilt phase of the trial. He could put the prosecution to its burden of proof, as he was specifically instructed to do by Bryan. Or, alterna[1220]*1220tively, he could present a non-viable insanity defense, as foundation for a mitigation case during the penalty phase, the very strategy that led to Bryan’s termination of Munkres15 and Hess. Freeman’s decision to follow the former course — after meeting with the medical experts, reviewing all of the additional medical evidence, consulting with Bryan on numerous occasions, and noting the circumstantial nature of the prosecution’s case and the evidence of Bryan’s deteriorated health — is not objectively unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”).
2. Failure to present mental health evidence during the penalty phase
In his supplemental brief before the en banc court, Bryan argues that Freeman provided objectively unreasonable representation during the penalty phase of the trial through ignorance of the law and failure to act as a knowledgeable guide and advisor. In particular, Bryan asserts that Freeman did not understand the importance of thoroughly investigating and presenting mitigating evidence as demonstrated by his view that evidence of mental illness short of insanity was not relevant during the penalty phase. He further asserts that in light of this failure, Freeman “failed adequately to advise Mr. Bryan regarding the mitigating evidence which was available and its potential benefits.”
This court finds Bryan’s arguments unconvincing on several levels. First, Freeman’s testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing relied upon by Bryan in support of his claim that Freeman did not understand the relevance of Bryan’s mental health evidence is presented out of context and is clearly insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that Freeman “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, Hess clearly testified that he discussed with Bryan his preferred strategy of utilizing mental health evidence during both the guilt and penalty phases of Bryan’s trial, with a focus on the penalty phase and preventing a sentence of death, and that Bryan had vigorously rejected the use of mental health evidence and terminated him. Accordingly, Bryan was certainly apprised of the benefits of using mental health evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase and rejected that strategy. Freeman was well aware of this history, having spent an extensive amount of time with Bryan16 and having met with Hess to discuss the case and the available mental health evidence. Finally, the only testimony adduced at the federal evidentiary hearing on the question demonstrates that the use of mental health evidence during the penalty phase would not have been effective following á guilt phase defense of actual innocence. See infra n. 22. Accordingly, Freeman’s decision not to employ medical evidence, viewed from “his perspective at the time” of the trial, is not objectively unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,104 S.Ct. 2052.
Relying on limited portions of Freeman’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing held by the district court, Bryan argues that Freeman did not understand the po[1221]*1221tential usefulness of mental health evidence during the penalty phase, instead thinking that such evidence was irrelevant unless it demonstrated insanity or lack of competence. A review of Freeman’s statements in context, however, confirms the district court’s conclusion that “[t]rial counsel’s decision not to present evidence of Petitioner’s organic brain syndrome and mental illness [at the penalty phase] was clearly a strategic one.”17
For instance, Bryan notes at the eviden-tiary hearing, Freeman responded affirmatively to the following cross-examination question: “So you saw no use for the experts’ mental testimony, except to prove either insanity or incompetence, right?” When read in context, however, it is clear that Freeman is referring only to the guilt stage of the trial.18 Furthermore, Bryan simply misreads the transcript in asserting Freeman testified that he thought the testimony of the medical experts “would not have been relevant at all.” Instead, when read in context, Freeman was indicating that it was the opinion of Bryan’s parents that was irrelevant to his determination not to mount an insanity defense during the guilt phase of the trial, not the opinions of the medical experts.19 Nor can it be asserted that Freeman thought that he [1222]*1222was ethically prohibited from presenting mental health evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. Instead, taken in context, Freeman’s testimony reflects the fact that he had no medical evidence supporting a guilt-phase insanity defense and that he was fearful that any testimony by Dr. Murphy during the second stage would do more harm than good.20
Accordingly, when viewed as a whole, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing simply does not support Bryan’s assertion that Freeman suffered under a misapprehension as to the propriety of adducing mental health evidence short of an insanity diagnosis during the penalty phase of the trial. Instead, the testimony set out above demonstrates a concern with two consider?-ations. First, Freeman was concerned that testimony by either Dr. Smith or Dr. Murphy might play into the prosecution’s case that Bryan was a continuing threat to society. See Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1277-78 (10th Cir.2001) (noting that mental health evidence like that at issue here has the possibility of being a “two-edged sword”).21 Second, Freeman was [1223]*1223concerned that an about-face during the penalty phase might compromise Bryan in the eyes of the jurors.22 Bryan has simply not pointed to any evidence in the record sufficient to overcome the “strong presumption” that Freeman’s decision not to present mental health evidence during the penalty phase of the trial was a strategic decision. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.23
Having determined that Freeman’s decision not to present mental health evidence during the penalty phase was strategic, this court moves on to the question whether that strategic decision was reasonable when viewed from Freeman’s perspective at the time of the trial. See id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Perhaps most importantly, Bryan did not want Freeman to present any psychiatric evidence, was adamant about pursuing an innocence defense during the guilt phase of his trial, and had apparently refused to even consider a guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence. See, e.g., Romano, 239 F.3d at 1181; Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259, 1278 (10th Cir.2000); Wallace, 191 F.3d at 1247-48. This court must presume that Bryan was competent to make that determination. See Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1169-72. Furthermore, the record reveals that Hess specifically discussed with Bryan his proposed strategy of utilizing mental health evidence during the first stage of the trial as a foundation for a strong mitigation case during the penalty phase of the trial, asserting that this was the only viable strategy to save Bryan’s life.24 In response, Bryan terminated Hess and hired Freeman. Freeman, well aware of this history after having met with Hess to discuss the case, and well aware that no medical expert would support a guilt-phase insanity defense, complied with Bryan’s informed strategic choice and put the government to its proof at trial.
It is worth emphasizing again what was stated above: “Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although this strategy limited Bryan’s options during the penalty phase, it was not objectively unreasonable [1224]*1224for Freeman to utilize an innocence defense during the guilt phase for those reasons set out above. Furthermore, in light of the testimony of Hess, Wilson, and Freeman regarding the need for consistency between guilt and penalty phase presentations, and the possibility that Dr. Murphy’s testimony during the second stage could have supported the prosecution’s argument that Bryan constituted a continuing threat to society, it was not unreasonable for Freeman to utilize a mercy approach during the penalty phase.25 Bryan has simply not overcome the strong presumption set out in Strickland that Freeman provided objectively reasonable assistance during the penalty phase of the trial.26
IV. CONCLUSION
This court cannot say, under the facts set out above, that Freeman’s strategic choice not to present mental health evidence during Bryan’s trial was objectively unreasonable. “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). We are mindful that it is “all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, “in considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we address not what is prudent [1225]*1225or [even] appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (quotation omitted). In this case, Bryan has failed to establish that “in light of all the circumstances, [counsel’s] identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,104 S.Ct. 2052.