Robert J. Triffin v. Jumpinjax Kids Corp.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 22, 2023
• Docket: A-0542-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0542-22

ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JUMPINJAX KIDS CORP. and DIANA SMITH,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

VAUGHNISHA SCOTT,

Defendant. _____________________________

Argued October 30, 2023 – Decided November 22, 2023

Before Judges Marczyk and Chase.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. DC-004261-22.

Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Respondents have not filed a brief. PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from an August 25, 2022 order

dismissing his complaint against defendants JumpinJax Kids Corp.

("JumpinJax") and its director Diana Smith ("Smith"). We affirm.

We discern the material facts from the record, viewing them in the light

most favorable to plaintiff. See Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507,

515 (2021). JumpinJax issued a paycheck drawn on its bank, Bank of America

("BOA"), to its employee, Vaughnisha Scott ("Scott") for $623.63. Scott

presented the check for payment via electronic check deposit and was paid by

BOA. Scott then presented the check for payment a second time to Garfield

Financial Services d/b/a/ United Check Cashing ("United"). United was denied

payment by BOA because it was a "duplicate presentment." After United was

denied payment, plaintiff purchased United's interest and was assigned its rights

in the dishonored check.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against JumpinJax, Smith, and Scott in the

Special Civil Part, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414 and 12A:3-415, seeking to

recover the amount of the dishonored check, pre-judgment interest, fees, and

court costs. Plaintiff also claimed he was entitled to collect the amount owed

on the dishonored check under the Federal Check Clearing for the 21st Century

A-0542-22 2 Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001 to 5018 (2003). ("Check 21 Act"). JumpinJax and Smith

answered, stating they did not owe plaintiff because they previously paid the

check plaintiff sought to enforce and attached a copy of their BOA statement

showing the check was paid. Additionally, JumpinJax stated they did not issue

a "stop payment" on the check, and they notified plaintiff that Scott had been

paid on the check. Scott did not answer plaintiff's complaint.

The parties appeared before the Special Civil Part, and before the trial

commenced, the judge summarized the facts, the documents brought to court as

exhibits, and the relief sought by plaintiff as follows:

[THE COURT:] I've reviewed the complaint and from what I can tell, this is a situation where a check had been cashed and then it was cashed again . . . . [T]he check, [No.] 7351[,] was paid on . . . [December 7, 2022]. . . . There was duplicate presentation. And I'm aware that defendant sent an email to [plaintiff] stating the check was issued to . . . Scott and was paid out.

....

[F]rom what I understand, obviously this individual . . . cashed the check twice . . . and [plaintiff], you're seeking to have the party that issued the check be responsible for the fact that it was cashed twice, correct?

[PLAINTIFF:] Yes, Your Honor.

A-0542-22 3 [PLAINTIFF:] Your Honor, . . . JumpinJax[] has the obligation . . . to prove their defense and they have not set forth in their papers proofs to establish that as a matter of both federal and state law, the check in question was previously paid.

The court then entered an order dismissing the case against JumpinJax and

Smith. The court also granted plaintiff default judgment against Scott in the

amount of the check, $623.63, plus costs. This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiff argues as follows:

POINT I Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause; 12 U.S.C. 5003's requirements to prove a non-original check was paid preempts New Jersey's conflicting check drawer's records standard in Triffin v. SHS Group, 466 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 2021).

POINT II The trial judge committed prejudicial and reversible[] error[] when she summarily assumed JumpinJax . . . has a 12 U.S.C. 5003 compliant copy of the original check JumpinJax used to pay its dishonored check.

"If, on a motion to dismiss based on [Rule 4:6-2(e)], matters outside the

pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be

treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by

Rule 4:46[.]" R. 4:6-2. Where "the motion was based upon evidence, including

certifications, outside of the pleadings[,]" the court applies the summary

A-0542-22 4 judgment standard. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010). "Thus, a motion to

dismiss under R[ule] 4:6-2(e) is effectually converted into a motion for

summary judgment when the court relies on facts beyond the pleadings." Jersey

City Educ. Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 316 N.J. Super. 245, 254 (App. Div.

1998).

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, applying the same

standard as the motion judge. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567,

582 (2021). That standard requires us to "determine whether 'the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a

matter of law.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). "To decide whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists, the trial court must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences

from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242

N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v.

Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). "The 'trial court's interpretation of the law

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to

any special deference.'" Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 92 (2013)

(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,

A-0542-22 5 378 (1995)). Summary judgment is properly granted "when the evidence 'is so

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law' . . . ." Brill v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)); see also Davis v. Brickman

Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014).

Plaintiff believes that because JumpinJax has neither its original paid

check, nor a substitute check meeting the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b),

it cannot prove that it paid the dishonored check plaintiff seeks to enforce.

Plaintiff cites Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. for the proposition that

in enacting a federal statute, "[the] [L]egislature says . . . what it means and

means . . . what it says." 582 U.S. 79, 89 (2017) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005)). Plaintiff also cites

the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. , art. VI, cl. 2,

to support the argument that the legal legend described in 12 U.S.C. 5003(b) is

required for a substitute check to be considered "compliant" and protect

JumpinJax from liability. He asserts we held in Triffin v. Quality Urban Hous.

Partners "it [is] plain that critical facts must be proved and not merely assumed."

352 N.J. Super. 538, 543 (App. Div. 2002). Plaintiff argues JumpinJax did not

present the original paid check as required by N.J.R.E. 1002 or a

A-0542-22 6 12 U.S.C. § 5003-compliant substitute copy, and therefore, JumpinJax has

"failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden under [N.J.S.A. 12A:3-308(b)]." Thus,

he argues the matter must be remanded to determine whether JumpinJax has its

original check or its compliant substitute check that was used to pay the

employee who cashed the check twice, causing it to be dishonored.

As plaintiff acknowledges, these arguments were answered in SHS.

However, he insists our previous decision is incorrect and must be reversed. In

SHS, Triffin moved for reconsideration after the trial court held the defendant

was not liable because the check was electronically deposited and paid by the

defendant's bank before it was presented for payment a second time and

dishonored. 466 N.J. Super. at 460. Triffin argued the "previously paid" defense

was not available to SHS because the check had not been endorsed when it was

first electronically deposited into the codefendant's account. Ibid. The trial

judge relied on N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), which discharges the drawer's obligation

to pay if the check was accepted by a bank. Ibid. We affirmed the trial court's

conclusion that the defendant was entitled to dismissal on its "previously paid"

defense, because it had presented the court with proof that "clearly

demonstrate[d] the check was processed and paid as a result of the electronic

deposit." Id. at 470. In SHS, even though the check offered by the defendant

A-0542-22 7 lacked an endorsement, the judge found that it, along with the defendant's bank

statement showing the withdrawal, was adequate evidential support of the

defense. We discern no error in our reasoning in SHS and affirm here for

substantially the same reasons.

Plaintiff's claim that defendants did not satisfy their evidentiary burden is

without merit. Scott signed and presented the check twice for payment, which

plaintiff acknowledges is true. JumpinJax is not obligated to present the original

check, nor the substitute check as described under 12 U.S.C. § 5003, as plaintiff

argues. The purpose of the Check 21 Act is to "facilitate check truncation by

authorizing substitute checks[,]" "foster innovation in the check collection

system without mandating receipt of checks in electronic form[,]" and "improve

the overall efficiency of the Nation's payments system." 12 U.S.C. § 5001(b)(1)

to (3). It addresses the negotiation of instruments within the federal banking

system, not the admission of evidence at a state court trial.

Here, the court found defendants had an immediately apparent and

recognizable defense that extinguished plaintiff's claim to the dishonored check.

The court had before it the check written by JumpinJax, submitted by plaintiff,

and JumpinJax's BOA transaction statement showing the money was withdrawn

when it was presented the first time. This substantial and credible evidence

A-0542-22 8 supports the trial court's finding JumpinJax and Smith "are not the responsible

part[ies]." Under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), after the check was initially cashed

and paid by BOA, the liability of the drawer, JumpinJax, was discharged. The

presence of an endorsement on the check as well as the fact it was paid out of

JumpinJax's BOA account on December 7, 2020, the day it was issued, proves

Scott presented the check twice, causing it to be dishonored.

Plaintiff's argument that JumpinJax's evidence was insufficient under

N.J.R.E. 1002 is also without merit. N.J.R.E. 1003 permits the admission of

duplicates "to the same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised

about the original's authenticity[,] or the circumstances make it unfair to admit

the duplicate." The judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the

evidence. Ehrlich v. Sorokin, 451 N.J. Super. 119, 128 (App. Div. 2017).

The substantial credible evidence before the court supports the trial

judge's decision to dismiss plaintiff's claims against JumpinJax and Smith.

Plaintiff received default judgment against Scott for the value of the check plus

costs. Plaintiff is not without an avenue to recover on the dishonored check he

purchased.

Plaintiff's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

A-0542-22 9 Affirmed.

A-0542-22 10