Robert J. Triffin v. Hmp, LLC

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: December 7, 2023
• Docket: A-3285-21
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3285-21

ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HMP, LLC, d/b/a MEADOWLANDS PLAZA HOTEL, and CARL DECAVALCANTE,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

YUNIOR A. LORA,

Defendant. _________________________________

Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided December 7, 2023

Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. DC-013551-21.

Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Anthony G. DelGuercio argued the cause for respondents HMP, LLC and Carl DeCavalcante (Gaccione Pomaco, PC, attorneys; Anthony G. Del Guercio, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from an April 5, 2022 order dismissing

his complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff also appeals from a May 13, 2022 order

awarding frivolous litigation sanctions in favor of defendants HMP, LLC d/b/a

Meadowlands Plaza Hotel (HMP) and Carl DeCavalcante.1 We affirm the orders

on appeal.

We recite the facts from the testimony presented to the trial judge during

the one-day virtual bench trial. On or around February 14, 2020, HMP issued a

payroll check, number 22332 (check), in the amount of $116.92 to HMP's then-

employee, defendant Yunior A. Lora. Lora electronically deposited the check

into his account on or around February 14, 2020 at Valley National Bank

(Valley) by way of a mobile deposit.

Subsequent to Lora's mobile deposit of this check, he indorsed the same

check to Friendly Check Cashing Corp. (Friendly) and Friendly paid Lora.

1 Prior to the start of the trial, plaintiff dismissed his claims against DeCavalcante with prejudice. A-3285-21 2 Because the check presented to Friendly was the very same check Lora deposited

electronically with Valley, HMP's bank refused to pay Friendly on the check.

In June 2020, plaintiff entered into a written assignment agreement with

Friendly. Pursuant to that agreement, plaintiff purchased Friendly's rights, title,

and interest to the dishonored check.

On December 10, 2021, plaintiff filed an action in the Special Civil Part

against defendant HMP pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(b) to recover payment

on the check dishonored by Valley and associated fees. In the complaint,

plaintiff asserted acceptance of the dishonored check invalidated the transaction

under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-201(b), and defendants were liable for payment.

Specifically, plaintiff alleged "Lora electronically deposited the check [he]

received from . . . HMP with an endorsement that is not enforceable under the

terms of Lora's electronic depository agreement with [his] referenced bank."

Prior to filing an answer, defense counsel served a Rule 1:4-8 letter dated

January 24, 2022, demanding plaintiff dismiss the matter with prejudice. The

letter set forth reasons why the complaint must be dismissed, including that the

very same arguments asserted in plaintiff's complaint against HMP were rejected

by another appellate panel. Plaintiff did not respond to HMP's letter.

A-3285-21 3 In its January 27, 2022 answer to plaintiff's complaint, HMP asserted Lora

electronically deposited the check with Valley before attempting to cash the

same check at Friendly. Additionally, defendants claimed plaintiff was

collaterally estopped from asserting HMP's acceptance of the check was

improper under Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 460 (App. Div.

2021).

During discovery, defendants produced evidence of Lora's mobile deposit

of the check with Valley. Defendants also provided proof that Valley paid the

check before Lora attempted to negotiate the check with Friendly.

The trial proceeded virtually on April 5, 2022. Plaintiff testified on his

own behalf and called one witness at trial. According to plaintiff, he purchased

Friendly's rights related to the dishonored check. Plaintiff then called an

employee of Friendly, Jose Fernandez, III, to testify about the dishonored check.

However, the judge sustained defense counsel's objection to testimony about the

dishonored check because Fernandez lacked personal knowledge regarding that

check. Plaintiff never succeeded in having the check admitted as evidence

during the trial.

HMP's counsel called its general manager, Nicholas Cimorelli, to testify.

Cimorelli testified he approved "every check that leaves the office," and

A-3285-21 4 therefore had personal knowledge of the subject check. He confirmed HMP

issued the check to Lora and received a photocopy of the check after it was

cashed. After plaintiff contacted HMP regarding the check, Cimorelli requested

and received a copy of the check from Valley. Through his testimony, Cimorelli

established the check was "the copy that [Valley] cashed. That was the copy

that came with our bank statement." Because HMP's counsel laid a foundation

for the documents, the judge overruled plaintiff's objection and admitted the

check and bank statement in evidence.

After considering the parties' closing arguments and reviewing the

testimony and documents, the judge rendered detailed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. She found HMP was not liable for payment on the

dishonored check. The judge determined Valley paid the check issued by HMP

to Lora on or around February 14, 2020. She further concluded that when Lora

thereafter presented the check to Friendly for payment, the check had already

been cashed and paid in full.

The judge set forth her credibility findings as well. She found Cimorelli's

testimony credible and consistent. On the other hand, she found plaintiff's

testimony lacking both credibility and consistency. Specifically, the judge

explained plaintiff "tr[ied] to suggest that he had no awareness [the] mobile

A-3285-21 5 deposit happened prior to filing this complaint." In rejecting plaintiff's

testimony in this regard, the judge noted plaintiff's complaint proved plaintiff

had notice of Lora's prior mobile deposit. The judge further stated there was no

credible evidence establishing Lora's actions after Valley accepted the mobile

deposit. Thus, the judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

In addition to dismissing the complaint, the judge granted HMP's request

for leave to file a motion for sanctions based on plaintiff's filing a frivolous

lawsuit. HMP filed its motion on April 19, 2022, asserting plaintiff's complaint

was not filed in good faith and lacked any factual or legal support. Specifically,

HMP contended plaintiff's claims were legally barred under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-

305(a)(2), N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c), and Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC.

Plaintiff opposed the sanction motion. However, in his response to the

motion, plaintiff did not dispute defendants' payment on the check. Nor did

plaintiff deny he had personal knowledge of defendants' payment when he filed

the complaint. Instead, plaintiff asserted the copy of the check admitted as

evidence during the trial violated 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b).

On May 13, 2022, the judge heard argument on HMP's sanction motion.

The judge granted the motion, finding plaintiff had actual knowledge prior to

filing his complaint that Lora electronically deposited the check at Valley and

A-3285-21 6 thus the check had been paid by HMP prior to Lora's presentation of the check

to Friendly. The judge stated plaintiff "knew or should have known that the

complaint that he filed was without any reasonable basis in law or equity." She

also noted that prior to plaintiff filing the complaint against defendants, the

Appellate Division issued a decision in Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC rejecting

identical arguments presented by plaintiff. After determining the fees requested

by HMP were reasonable, the judge entered an award of $11,519.84.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred in dismissing his complaint

with prejudice. He also challenges the judge's evidentiary ruling during the trial,

asserting those rulings assumed facts not in evidence and lacked the required

findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 1:7-4. Additionally, plaintiff

asserts the judge erred in awarding frivolous litigation sanctions in favor of

defendants. We reject these arguments.

We apply a deferential standard when reviewing factual findings made by

a trial judge after a bench trial. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 594-95 (2020).

"[We] give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the

competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp. of

Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015). A trial court's findings of facts will be

accepted unless the "findings are 'manifestly unsupported' by the 'reasonably

A-3285-21 7 credible evidence' in the record." Balducci, 240 N.J. at 595 (quoting Seidman

v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011)). However, "[a] trial

court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from

established facts are not entitled to any special deference[,]" Manalapan Realty,

L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), and are reviewed

de novo, T.L. v. Goldberg, 238 N.J. 218, 228 (2019).

We also defer to a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of

discretion. Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 551 (2019). We do so

because "the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the

trial court's discretion." Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J.

369, 383-84 (2010).

We review a trial court's imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion.

Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (citing R. 1:4-8).

We begin our discussion by noting plaintiff's same arguments were

previously addressed in Triffin v. SHS Group, Inc. In that case, we rejected the

plaintiff's argument that the lack of a specific endorsement on an electronically

deposited check prevented a valid transfer and negotiation of the check. 466

N.J. Super. at 468-69. Additionally, we agreed with the trial judge that payment

A-3285-21 8 of a check resulting from an electronic deposit supported the defendants' prior

payment defense. Id. at 469-70.

Here, HMP was the drawer of its former employee's payroll check. See

N.J.S.A. 12A:3-103(a)(3). Valley was the depository bank. See N.J.S.A.

12A:4-105(b). Lora initially deposited the check electronically into his account

at Valley. Valley accepted Lora's mobile deposit and Lora received payment

via HMP's payroll account consistent with N.J.S.A. 12A:4-205. Based on the

unrefuted evidence and banking records, Valley was the first to deposit the

check via mobile deposit. Because HMP proved its prior payment defense

regarding the dishonored check, plaintiff did not have a right to payment under

N.J.S.A. 12A:3-308(b) and N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414(c).

Consistent with our decision in Triffin v. SHS Group, Inc., the judge

correctly concluded the check was electronically deposited by Lora at Valley

before Lora then attempted to cash the same check at Friendly. Thus, she found

HMP established a valid prior payment defense.

We next address plaintiff's arguments that the judge erred in dismissing

his complaint because she failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law

and admitted defendants' copy of the check in evidence contrary to 12 U.S.C. §

5003(b). We reject these arguments.

A-3285-21 9 Nothing in 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) supersedes or modifies the New Jersey

Rules of Evidence governing the admissibility of documents at trial. To the

contrary, the Code provisions are aimed at facilitating commerce and have no

bearing on evidentiary matters. Plaintiff failed to provide any support for his

argument that Congress's adoption of 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b) was intended to

supersede, modify, alter, or override a state's evidentiary rules.

Moreover, N.J.R.E. 1001(c) permits a computer printout of a document

from a bank's website or database to be deemed an original document for

admission of the document as evidence. See Garden State Bank v. Graef, 341

N.J. Super. 241, 245 (App. Div. 2001). HMP's witness testified he personally

issued the check admitted as evidence at trial and personally printed a copy of

the check from Valley's website.

Further, the check was admissible under N.J.R.E. 1003 as a duplicate

based on the unrebutted testimony of HMP's trial witness. Rather than challenge

the authenticity of the check, plaintiff, citing 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b), argued the

lack of language on the check, stating "This is a legal copy of your check. You

can use it in the same way you would use the original check," precluded

admission of the document as evidence. As we previously stated, nothing in 12

A-3285-21 10 U.S.C. § 5003(b) overrides New Jersey's evidence rules governing the

admissibility of documents.

We also reject plaintiff's argument the judge failed to follow Rule 1:7-4

in rendering her evidentiary rulings during the trial. Rule 1:7-4(a) provides:

The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon . . ., on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of right ....

During the trial, the judge set forth her evidentiary rulings on the record.

Although plaintiff was dissatisfied with the judge's evidentiary rulings, he never

requested that the judge amplify her rulings on his evidentiary objections.

"As a general rule, admission or exclusion of proffered evidence is within

the discretion of the trial judge whose ruling is not disturbed unless there is a

clear abuse of discretion." Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84,

92 (App. Div. 1991). Having reviewed the judge's evidentiary rulings during

the course of the trial, we are satisfied her rulings did not constitute a clear abuse

of discretion.

We next address plaintiff's argument the judge erred in granting frivolous

litigation sanctions against him. He asserts, 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b), in accordance

A-3285-21 11 with the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, supersedes New

Jersey law governing sanctions. We reject his argument.

A court may award reasonable counsel fees and litigation costs to a

prevailing party in a civil action if the court determines the complaint is

frivolous. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. A claim is considered frivolous when there is

"no rational argument" that "can be advanced in its support" and it is "not

supported by any credible evidence" or is "completely untenable." Belfer v.

Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999). The party seeking fees and

costs bears the burden of proving bad faith. Bove v. AK Pharma Inc., 460 N.J.

Super. 123, 151 (App. Div. 2019).

Rule 1:4-8 supplements N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. Under Rule 1:4-8(b)(1), the

moving party must send a notice and demand, which shall:

(i) state that the paper is believed to violate the provisions of this rule[;]

(ii) set forth the basis for that belief with specificity[;]

(iii) include a demand that the paper be withdrawn[;] and

(iv) give notice, except as otherwise provided herein, that an application for sanctions will be made within a reasonable time thereafter if the offending paper is not withdrawn within 28 days of service of the written demand.

A-3285-21 12 Here, HMP sent a letter to plaintiff pursuant to Rule 1:4-8. In reviewing

the arguments regarding HMP's motion for sanctions, the judge found plaintiff

failed to provide any substantive defense to counter HMP's Rule 1:4-8 letter. In

fact, the judge noted "plaintiff admitted that he had knowledge that the check

was electronically deposited and paid by HMP" when he filed his complaint.

In awarding the fee amount, the judge set forth a detailed review and

evaluation of billable hours expended by HMP's counsel. After a thorough

review, she found the fees requested by counsel to be reasonable and

appropriate. As our Supreme Court has held, "fee determinations by trial courts

will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear

abuse of discretion." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995).

Here, the judge reviewed "a number of invoices that were submitted in

support of [HMP's counsel's] request for attorney's fees." She concluded "all of

the work that was done in this particular matter," as outlined "very specifically"

by HMP's counsel, was reasonable. Thus, the judge awarded the sum of

$11,519.84, finding the amount "well supported" by HMP's application for

sanctions under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and Rule 1:4-8. We discern no abuse of

discretion in the judge's awarded amount.

A-3285-21 13 Any remaining arguments raised by plaintiff lack sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-3285-21 14