Robert H. Alloway v. The Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Company Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor
This text of 43 F.3d 1471 (Robert H. Alloway v. The Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Company Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
Robert H. ALLOWAY, Petitioner,
v.
The YOUGHIOGHENY AND OHIO COAL COMPANY; Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States
Department of Labor, Respondents.
No. 94-3542.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Dec. 14, 1994.
Before: NORRIS and SILER, Circuit Judges; and NEWBLATT, District Judge.*
ORDER
Robert H. Alloway, pro se, petitions for review of the Benefits Review Board's decision denying him benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. 30 U.S.C. Secs. 901-945. The case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).
Alloway filed his claim for benefits on March 12, 1980. In June of 1981, the District Director issued an initial determination that Alloway was entitled to benefits. However, the respondent Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Company contested this finding, and the case was heard before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 25, 1983.
In September 1983, the ALJ issued a Decision and Order Denying Benefits. Applying the regulations found at 20 C.F.R. Part 727, the ALJ determined that Alloway was entitled to the interim presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis under Sec. 727.203(a)(2) and Sec. 727.203(a)(4). However, the ALJ denied benefits because he determined that the employer had rebutted the presumption pursuant to Sec. 727.203(b)(2) and Sec. 727.203(b)(4). Lastly, the ALJ found that the evidence did not justify a finding of pneumoconiosis or a totally disabling pulmonary or respiratory impairment under Part 410 of the regulations. Thus, benefits were denied.
On appeal, the Board agreed that the interim presumption was invoked under Sec. 727.203(a), but that it was rebutted under Sec. 727.203(b)(4). However, the Board remanded the claim for reconsideration under the interim presumption provided in Sec. 410.490, relying on this court's holding in Kyle v. Director, OWCP, 819 F.2d 139, 144 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 997 (1988). Upon remand, the ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Alloway was disabled based on the presumption provided in Sec. 410.490(b). The ALJ concluded that the employer had failed to rebut the presumption under Sec. 410.490(c). Thus, the ALJ determined that Alloway was entitled to benefits commencing March 1, 1980.
Once again, the employer appealed the ALJ's decision to the Board. The Board then applied the "intervening precedent" of this court's announcement in Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 866 F.2d 195 (6th Cir.1989), to conclude that the regulations contained at Sec. 410.490 were not applicable to Alloway's claim. The Board observed that Alloway had shown more than ten years of coal mine employment and, thus, the claim should have been adjudicated under Part 718 of the regulations. The Board vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded for further consideration.
After reviewing the claim under Part 718, the ALJ determined that Alloway could not show the existence of pneumoconiosis under any of the subsections in 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.202(a). Moreover, the ALJ concluded that no total disability could be established under Sec. 718.204(c). Thus, benefits were denied by Decision and Order issued July 29, 1991. In a third appeal, the Board concluded that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and the Board affirmed the order denying benefits.
In his appeal to this court, Alloway states that the agency and the ALJ failed to consider that he worked 18 years on a coal drill and 6 years on a cutting machine, jobs that he alleges "cause a lot of [coal] dust...." Alloway maintains that the agency personnel are "gentlemen who have not spent any time in that environment and do not realize the dust inhaled."
This court has recognized that it must affirm the Board's decision if the Board has not committed any legal error or exceeded its statutory scope of review of the ALJ's factual determinations. Director, OWCP v. Quarto Mining Co., 901 F.2d 532, 536 (6th Cir.1990). This court must review the decision below only to decide whether it is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with the applicable law. Kolesar v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 760 F.2d 728, 729 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Ramey v. Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp., 755 F.2d 485, 488 (6th Cir.1985). For the reasons set forth below, this court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's third and final decision and that the petition for review must be denied.
The ALJ considered each piece of relevant medical evidence submitted by the parties and properly found that the interim presumption under 20 C.F.R. Secs. 727.203(a)(2) and (a)(4) were properly rebutted under Secs. 727.203(b)(2) and (b)(4) based on Alloway's type of coal mine work and Dr. Kress's medical conclusions. See Bowling v. Director, OWCP, 920 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir.1990); York v. Benefits Review Bd., 819 F.2d 134, 136-39 (6th Cir.1987).
The Board appropriately remanded the case for consideration of the claim under Part 718 of the regulations, pursuant to this court's holding in Milliken, 866 F.2d at 201. To establish eligibility for benefits under this Part, a miner must show that: 1) he has pneumoconiosis; 2) the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment; and 3) the pneumoconiosis has rendered him totally disabled. 20 C.F.R. Secs. 712.2, 718.202-718.205; Adams v. Director, OWCP, 886 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir.1989). Because the ALJ made a quantitative evaluation of the X-ray readings, considering the qualifications of the readers, as well as a qualitative evaluation, the ALJ's conclusion that the x-ray evidence did not establish pneumoconiosis under Sec. 718.202(a)(1) is supported by substantial evidence. Mullins Coal Co. v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
43 F.3d 1471, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 39696, 1994 WL 705037, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-h-alloway-v-the-youghiogheny-and-ohio-coal-company-director-ca6-1994.