Robert Glen Myers v. Affton Diner, LLC
This text of Robert Glen Myers v. Affton Diner, LLC (Robert Glen Myers v. Affton Diner, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT GLEN MYERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-0815-MTS ) AFFTON DINER, LLC, ) ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendant Affton Diner, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, which seeks dismissal of this action for, among other reasons, Plaintiff’s lack of standing. Doc. [9]; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). After a complete review of the filings and Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he has suffered an Article III injury in fact. For this reason, the Court must grant the Motion and dismiss this action without prejudice. * Robert Glen Myers, a blind man living in Caldwell County, Missouri, is a serial litigant who has filed numerous civil actions against various entities in multiple federal district courts under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). In this action, he sued Defendant Affton Diner, LLC, which—as one might guess—operates a diner in Affton, Missouri. Defendant has moved the Court to dismiss this action against it for multiple reasons, one being that Plaintiff, according to Defendant, lacks Article III standing. To survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing, Plaintiff needed only to have “allege[d] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to support a reasonable and plausible inference that []he satisfies the elements of Article III standing.”
Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506, 510 (8th Cir. 2023). While this burden is “relatively modest,” see id., Plaintiff did not meet it. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has consistently explained that, while plaintiffs need not engage in the “futile gesture” of visiting a place of public accommodation that contains known barriers that the owner has no intention of remedying, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1), plaintiffs must at least establish knowledge of
the barriers and that they would visit the place of public accommodation in the imminent future but for those barriers. Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000); Dalton v. NPC Int’l, Inc., 932 F.3d 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2019). While Plaintiff has visited Defendant’s website, he has never visited Defendant’s diner. The place of public accommodation—contrary to Plaintiff’s position—is Defendant’s diner, not its website.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B) (listing “a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink” as a public accommodation); see also Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[A] public accommodation is a physical place.”). To be sure, Plaintiff says that he intends to visit Defendant’s diner. But a mere
“some day” intention, even if plausible, is “insufficient.” Steger, 228 F.3d at 893 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)); see also Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2021) (concluding the “totality of relevant facts simply d[id] not support the conclusion” that plaintiff faced a real and immediate threat of future discrimination at defendant’s hotel because she “had no credible or concrete plan to return” to the hotel or even the city in which it was located).
In any event, even his “some day” intention simply is implausible since he has not pleaded facts that show he has any real intention to visit or to partake in the goods and services available at Defendant’s diner. This diner is around 250 miles away from Plaintiff’s residence—roughly four- hours away by car. Plaintiff is blind, Doc. [1] ¶ 9, and, quite understandably, he finds “traveling outside of his home” to be an “often difficult, hazardous, frightening,
frustrating, and confusing experience,” id. ¶ 24. So, when is he going to visit Affton and dine at this diner? Though his Complaint is twenty-four pages in length, it contains no allegations that Plaintiff has any specific plans to do so. He points to no future travel to Affton. Indeed, he does not even allege that he has specific plans to be anywhere in the greater St. Louis region. He does not allege that he has been in the area recently. Nor
does he discuss how he would travel to the area. And he does not allege any reason why he might do so—e.g., friends, family, or business in the area. All Rule 11(b) apparently allowed him to muster is that he is “interested in patronizing, and intends to patronize [Defendant’s diner] in the near future.” Doc. [1] ¶ 21. But “[c]onclusory allegations do not satisfy the requirements of Article III.” Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 344
(6th Cir. 2016) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)). For these reasons, it is not plausible that Plaintiff has any intent to visit the diner, let alone a specific intent to do so. The circumstances here buttress this conclusion. Plaintiff is a serial litigant. Court records show that he has filed almost fifty ADA actions in the Eastern District of Missouri alone. This tally does not include the many other ADA actions Plaintiff has filed elsewhere against entities closer to his home.1 At bottom,
Defendant’s diner is just one of the dozens and dozens of eating establishments peppered throughout Missouri that Plaintiff has sued and avowed a general interest and intention to visit. Judicial experience and common sense point to the conclusion that, at least as to the Affton diner, Plaintiff’s intention is not remotely plausible. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (explaining that determining plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”).
* * * As this Court found in a previous ADA action Plaintiff brought, he has not shown he can answer the “What’s it to you?” of standing. See Myers v. Adam’s Smokehouse, LLC, 4:25-cv-0860-MTS, 2025 WL 2522430, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2025), reconsideration denied, 2025 WL 2538382 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 3, 2025); see also Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983). Defendant Afton Diner LLC’s alleged failure to provide an accessible website “is nothing to [Myers],” because he has no “intent to visit the [restaurant].” See Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 12 (2023) (Thomas, J.
1 See, e.g., Myers v. Fun Farm Barn Co., 5:25-cv-6213-RK (W.D. Mo.); Myers v. A & G Restaurant, Inc., 5:25-cv-6138-FJG (W.D. Mo.); Myers v. Hand Cut Steaks of Poplar Bluff, Inc., 5:25-cv-06129-BCW (W.D. Mo.); Myers v. Pirtle Winery LLC, 5:25-cv-6116-RK (W.D. Mo.); Myers v. Red Barn Food & Wine, LLC, 5:25-cv-6010-BCW (W.D. Mo.); Myers v. Cameron Mitchell Restaurants, LLC, 5:24-cv-06103-SRB (W.D. Mo.). concurring in the judgment).
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Robert Glen Myers v. Affton Diner, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robert-glen-myers-v-affton-diner-llc-moed-2026.