Robert Dewey Glock v. Harry K. Singletary

Eleventh Circuit

Robert Dewey Glock v. Harry K. Singletary

84 F.3d 385

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedJuly 18, 1996

Docket91-3528

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 84 F.3d 385 (Robert Dewey Glock v. Harry K. Singletary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Robert Dewey Glock v. Harry K. Singletary, 84 F.3d 385 (11th Cir. 1996).

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PER CURIAM:

In Glock v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir.1994), we rejected petitioner’s constitutional attacks on his first degree murder conviction but directed that the writ issue with respect to his sentence, concluding that under Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), petitioner was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. The en banc court disagreed with our conclusion, finding that petitioner’s Espi-nosa claim was barred by the nonretroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). We now address petitioner’s remaining attacks on his capital sentence.

Petitioner claims that his sentence should be set aside because (1) the trial court refused to sever his sentencing proceeding from his co-defendant’s, thereby depriving him of individualized sentencing; 1 (2) the trial court failed to find three non-statutory mitigating circumstances; (3) the trial court’s charge to the jury shifted to petitioner the burden of proof on the appropriateness of the death sentence; (4) the trial court’s charge to the jury “diluted” the jury’s sense of responsibility for the sentence petitioner would receive; and (5) petitioner’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to discover through routine investigation mitigating evidence and to present that evidence *386 at the separate sentencing proceedings before the jury and the court.

We find no merit in the first four claims and therefore affirm the district court’s denial of relief thereon. Petitioner’s fifth claim has heretofore been resolved on the record, without an evidentiary hearing. The district court, echoing the Florida courts, Glock v. Dugger, 537 So.2d 99 (Fla.1989), rejected this claim as meritless on its face. See Glock, 36 F.3d at 1020. We conclude that the claim is not meritless on its face; hence, an evidentia-ry hearing must be held to resolve the historical facts concerning counsel’s performance and the mitigating evidence that petitioner contends should have been presented.

We therefore remand the case for an evi-dentiary hearing, and findings of fact and conclusions of law, on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

SO ORDERED.

1

. All of petitioner's claims are brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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PER CURIAM:

In Glock v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir.1994), we rejected petitioner’s constitutional attacks on his first degree murder conviction but directed that the writ issue with respect to his sentence, concluding that under Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), petitioner was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. The en banc court disagreed with our conclusion, finding that petitioner’s Espi-nosa claim was barred by the nonretroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). We now address petitioner’s remaining attacks on his capital sentence.

Petitioner claims that his sentence should be set aside because (1) the trial court refused to sever his sentencing proceeding from his co-defendant’s, thereby depriving him of individualized sentencing; 1 (2) the trial court failed to find three non-statutory mitigating circumstances; (3) the trial court’s charge to the jury shifted to petitioner the burden of proof on the appropriateness of the death sentence; (4) the trial court’s charge to the jury “diluted” the jury’s sense of responsibility for the sentence petitioner would receive; and (5) petitioner’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to discover through routine investigation mitigating evidence and to present that evidence *386 at the separate sentencing proceedings before the jury and the court.

We find no merit in the first four claims and therefore affirm the district court’s denial of relief thereon. Petitioner’s fifth claim has heretofore been resolved on the record, without an evidentiary hearing. The district court, echoing the Florida courts, Glock v. Dugger, 537 So.2d 99 (Fla.1989), rejected this claim as meritless on its face. See Glock, 36 F.3d at 1020. We conclude that the claim is not meritless on its face; hence, an evidentia-ry hearing must be held to resolve the historical facts concerning counsel’s performance and the mitigating evidence that petitioner contends should have been presented.

We therefore remand the case for an evi-dentiary hearing, and findings of fact and conclusions of law, on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

SO ORDERED.

1

. All of petitioner's claims are brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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