SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 6D2024-2391
Lower Tribunal No. 2020-DR-001642
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ROBERT D. SWIFT,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v.
JENNIFER L. POITRAS,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County.
Ramiro Mañalich, Judge.
September 10, 2026
TRAVER, C.J.
Robert D. Swift (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s amended final paternity judgment, and Jennifer L. Poitras (“Mother”) cross-appeals. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to award Mother retroactive child support, but we reverse in part because the trial court calculated it incorrectly. The trial court did not abuse its discretion on the parties’ remaining appellate issues, and we otherwise affirm.
I.
The parties started dating in 2018. Father is an orthopedic surgeon; Mother is a business executive. Their twins were born in May 2019. The parties dated long- distance over this time; Father regularly traveled from his home in Michigan. Until the parties’ relationship ended in August 2020, Father stayed at Mother’s home in Naples during his visits. According to him, he did not pay rent, and except for one day, Mother was home when he visited.
After the children’s birth, Mother took leave from work for six months to recover from childbirth and support the children. During three of these months, she was unpaid. Mother hired a part-time nanny, who worked until March 2020. When Mother resumed full-time work in 2020, she enrolled the children in daycare, where they went until they started attending school.
Father filed the underlying paternity action in August 2020 and relocated from Michigan to Naples sometime at the end of 2021 or the beginning of 2022. The parties shared equal timesharing from May 2022 forward. Trial occurred over five days at the beginning of 2023.
Mother testified that she needed additional financial support in 2019 and 2020 for child care. She said that she incurred expensive nanny and daycare payments. Further, one of the children has autism, and financial support would have allowed
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for therapy. She had to dip into her savings to pay for child care. Father’s income during this time vastly exceeded Mother’s.
The trial court calculated the parties’ incomes and, in its initial final judgment, ordered Father to pay child support retroactive to the children’s birth, using child support guidelines worksheets appended to the final judgment to illustrate its calculations. The trial court found that Mother needed this support, and Father had the ability to pay. It observed that the children had significant daycare and medical expenses, and that they should benefit from the standard of living two professional parents could have provided them under the child support guidelines. It concluded that Father’s obligations under the guidelines significantly exceeded the voluntary payments he made during the May 2019 through January 2023 retroactive period.
The trial court gave Father credit for 120 overnights with the children during 2019 and 2020, representing part of the time he visited Mother and stayed in her home. It also credited Father travel expenses against his retroactive support total. The trial court determined that these expenses would be credited “on a pro rata basis” according to the parties’ guideline child support shares. And it ordered the parties to share the cost of daycare during the retroactive period according to those shares. But it did not reference Mother’s nanny or daycare expenses, awarding Mother no credit for her payments during the retroactive period.
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Mother filed a motion for rehearing, in which she preserved five salient appellate issues: 1) the trial court improperly credited Father for tax payments he did not make in 2019 and 2020; 2) the trial court improperly credited Father with overnights for his visits to a home in which only Mother resided; 3) the trial court incorrectly computed Father’s travel expenses; 4) the trial court failed to make findings about Mother’s nanny expenses in 2019 and 2020; and 5) the trial court did not credit Mother for her daycare expenses in 2020. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for rehearing in part on issues unrelated to this opinion, but it denied her requests on these issues. It issued an amended final judgment, from which both parties appeal.
II.
This case concerns the computation of retroactive child support. In paternity actions, a trial court may “award child support retroactive to the date when the parents did not reside together in the same household with the child, not to exceed a period of 24 months preceding the filing of the petition, regardless of whether that date precedes the filing of the petition.” § 61.30(17), Fla. Stat. (2024).
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant retroactive child support for an abuse of discretion. See § 61.30(17); Kirtley v. Fla. Dep’t of Rev., 221 So. 3d 1267, 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). And it reviews a trial court’s factual findings for
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competent, substantial evidence. See Mannella v. Mannella, 363 So. 3d 236, 239 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023).
III.
Governed by statute, retroactive child support is based on the guidelines and a formula. See § 61.30. The starting point is the parties’ gross income, reduced to net income by enumerated deductions. See § 61.30(2)–(4), (17). “The [trial] court shall apply the guidelines schedule in effect at the time of hearing subject to the obligor’s demonstration of his or her actual income . . . during the retroactive period.” § 61.30(17)(a). In this case, Father, as obligor, demonstrated his actual income during the retroactive period. If he had not, the trial court would have used his income at the time of the hearing to compute his obligation. Id.
After determining the parties’ income, the trial court applies the guidelines schedule and calculates child support in accordance with the statutory formula. See § 61.30(5), (6), (9), & (10). The trial court then adds certain child care and health insurance costs to the basic obligation. § 61.30(7) (“Child care costs incurred due to employment, job search, or education calculated to result in employment or to enhance income of current employment of either parent shall be added to the basic obligation.”); § 61.30(8) (“Health insurance costs resulting from coverage ordered pursuant to s. 61.13(1)(b), and any noncovered medical, dental, and prescription medication expenses of the child, shall be added to the basic obligation unless these
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expenses have been ordered to be separately paid on a percentage basis.”). Child care costs, though, “may not exceed the level to provide quality care from a licensed source.” § 61.30(7).
Whenever a parenting plan, court-ordered timesharing schedule, or party agreement leads to children spending “a substantial amount of time with each parent,” the trial court must adjust any child support award via a separate calculation. § 61.30(11)(b). This includes calculating “the percentage of overnight stays the child spends with each parent.” § 61.30(11)(b)2. “‘Substantial amount of time’ means that a parent exercises time-sharing at least 20 percent of the overnights of the year.” § 61.30(11)(b)8. This calculation also requires the trial court to determine the net amounts each parent owes for day care and health insurance coverage and adjusting the calculated amount accordingly. § 61.30(11)(b)4.–6. (citing § 61.30(7)– (8)).
Once the trial court calculates the total minimum child support award under the guidelines, it may vary the award plus or minus five percent “after considering all relevant factors, including the needs of the child or children, age, station in life, standard of living, and the financial status and ability of each parent.” § 61.30(1)(a). If the trial court wishes to adjust the guidelines award by more than five percent, it must make “a written finding explaining why ordering payment of such guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate.” Id. It may thus adjust either or both
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parents’ share based on a non-exclusive list of deviation factors. § 61.30(11)(a), (11)(b)7.
The trial court must consider all “actual payments made by a parent to the other parent or the child or third parties for the benefit of the child throughout the proposed retroactive period.” § 61.30(17)(b). Finally, it “should consider an installment payment plan for the payment of retroactive child support.” § 61.30(17)(c).
IV.
We first conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded child support retroactive to the children’s birth in May 2019, which occurred within twenty-four months of when Father filed his paternity petition in August 2020. See § 61.30(17). Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Mother had a need, and Father had the ability to pay. But the trial court erred in five ways when it computed Father’s retroactive support obligation.
A.
First, in calculating Father’s net income, the trial court gave him credit for taxes he did not pay in 2019 and 2020. We pause here to note that it has become commonplace for trial counsel and trial courts to use computer programs to calculate child support. Upon inputting key numbers—like gross income—the program will
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calculate other key numbers, typically to include taxes. But competent, substantial evidence must support every number contained in the worksheet. See George v. George, 93 So. 3d 464, 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“Although it is likely that the trial court adopted certain figures set forth in a worksheet filed by the former wife as part of her closing argument, that worksheet by itself is not competent, substantial evidence. We have also been unable to independently corroborate record evidence supporting the trial court’s finding[s] [of] the former husband’s . . . deductions . . . .”). Here, no such evidence supports the trial court’s deductions for Father’s 2019 and 2020 taxes. Father paid nearly $20,000 in taxes during 2019 and around $103,000 in taxes in 2020. But the trial court credited him with over $193,000 in tax deductions for 2019 and over $481,000 in tax deductions for 2020. “Net income is obtained by subtracting allowable deductions from gross income.” § 61.30(3). “Allowable deductions shall include . . . [f]ederal, state, and local income tax deductions, adjusted for actual filing status” and “self-employment tax.” § 61.30(3)(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
Father argues that his 2019 and 2020 tax returns show a lower gross income than what the trial court found that he made for those years, and therefore we should affirm the lower deductions. But this misses the point. Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s gross income findings. Indeed, Father does not
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dispute them. But no competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s deductions.
On remand, the trial court should recalculate Father’s net income using his actual tax deductions for 2019 and 2020. See § 61.30(3)(a)–(b); George, 93 So. 3d at 467 (“Because there is no competent, substantial evidence supporting the tax liability numbers attributed by the trial court to the former husband, we must remand for the trial court to reconsider this issue and include that information in the final judgment.”).
B.
Second, the trial court erred when it credited Father with 120 overnights in 2019 and 2020. Retroactive support is not allowed when parties are “resid[ing] together.” See § 61.30(17). But the parties were not “residing together” in 2019 and 2020. Father regularly visited Mother in her Naples home, where he did not pay rent. Indeed, Father sought, and the trial court credited him with, his travel expenses for his visits. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Father credit for overnight timesharing that he spent as a guest in Mother’s home. Because this error affected Father’s ultimate support obligation, the trial court should recalculate the number of overnights awarded to Father in 2019 and 2020, awarding Mother the overnights the children spent with her in her home. See Lennon v. Lennon, 264 So. 3d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
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C.
Third, the trial court’s calculations involving Father’s travel expenses are incorrect. 1 The trial court credited these amounts in the “child care costs paid” in the child support worksheets. But these amounts do not add up to the trial court’s determination of Father’s total travel expenses. 2 On remand, the trial court should include the correct monthly travel costs over the retroactive period in the child support guidelines worksheets as child care costs paid, so that Father is credited the pro rata share for his 2019 and 2020 travel expenses.
1 The trial court apparently classified Father’s travel expenses as a “child care cost[]” under section 61.30(7), allowing Father his pro rata share under the guidelines because he was traveling to carry out his timesharing. We observe that at least one of our sister courts has approved this classification. See McWilson v. McWilson, 192 So. 3d 719, 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“Visitation travel expenses should be allocated in the same guidelines ratio as governs allocation of the other child care expenses, unless the trial court makes findings explaining why a different allocation is needed to achieve an equitable result.”) (citation modified). It does not appear, though, that a visiting parent’s travel expenses fits neatly into section 61.30(7)’s description of “child care costs” so much as section 61.30(11)(a)11.’s deviation factor. The former results in a pro rata share under the guidelines, while the latter serves as a deduction once the trial court has calculated the total minimum child support award. Neither party, though, has raised this issue, so we do not resolve it here. Nobody should construe our remand instructions as settling our view on this issue so much as resolving the matter before us in the way the parties have presented it.
2 The trial court credited Father with $36,885.07 in travel expenses.
According to the guidelines worksheets, though, Father’s child care costs in the worksheets total $24,120 for 2019 ($3,015 x 8), $4,008 for 2020 ($334 x 12), and $7,260 for 2022 ($605 x 12), which totals $35,388.
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D.
Fourth, the trial court’s failure to make findings about Mother’s nanny expenses in 2019 and 2020 limits our review. Mother argues that nanny expenses are child care expenses, subject to restrictions on cost. See § 61.30(7). She contends that hiring a nanny allowed Father to work. Father responds that Mother wrote him an email that said she was not seeking financial support for the nanny, and regardless, the nanny was too expensive. The record thus contains competent, substantial evidence to accept or reject this cost, but without trial court findings, we cannot resolve this issue. See Layeni v. Layeni, 843 So. 2d 295, 300–01 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“We are unable to determine from the record before us whether the trial court considered day-care expenses. . . . [B]ecause there were no findings in the final judgment regarding child-care expenses, we cannot meaningfully review this issue. On remand, the trial court shall determine the amount and necessity of child-care expenses and include that sum, if any, as required by section 61.30(7).”). We remand for the trial court to make appropriate findings on Mother’s nanny expenses. See Ingram v. Ingram, 59 So. 3d 147, 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“In circumstances where the record may contain competent, substantial evidence to support these specific findings, but the trial court’s order omits such findings, the case should be remanded for entry of an appropriate order.”).
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E.
Fifth, the trial court erred when it failed to credit Mother for the daycare expenses she incurred when she returned to work in 2020. See § 61.30(7); Gillette v. Gillette, 226 So. 3d 958, 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (finding error where trial court calculated former wife’s child support obligation without considering amount she paid each month for child care). Mother adduced evidence of these costs, and the trial court ruled that the parties would share daycare costs for 2020, but the trial court did not include these costs in its guidelines worksheet. On remand, the trial court should include these costs in the child support guidelines worksheet for 2020. See Gillette, 226 So. 3d at 963.
V.
We conclude by noting that this proceeding has been ongoing for over six years. The children are seven. Recognizing the significant work that the trial court has already done on a case that it appropriately characterized as “intensely litigated,” we expect that the trial court will prioritize this matter to give the parties finality. While we do not preclude the trial court from taking additional evidence if necessary, we note that our remand instructions require revised mathematical computations using numbers the record already contains.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
WOZNIAK, J., concurs. KAMOUTSAS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
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KAMOUTSAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s conclusions with respect to the retroactive child support award. But I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the lower court’s decision to change the minors’ names as I believe it was an abuse of discretion to do so. A contested name change of a minor, where a surname was already determined at birth pursuant to section 382.013, Florida Statutes, also raises questions, left unanswered here, as to whether section 68.07, Florida Statutes, governs such cases, and if so, the correct standard to apply in exercising the court’s discretion.
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John R. Gilhart, II, and Alexander C. Peterson, of Family First Legal Group, Naples, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Lisa A. Baird, of Lisa A. Baird, P.A., Miami, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.