NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1098-24
ROBERT CAUVIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BRUNSWICK, MIDDLESEX COUNTY and NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF STUDENT PROTECTION,
Respondents-Respondents. ________________________________
Submitted January 13, 2026 – Decided February 3, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of Education, Docket No. 195-7/22.
Schwartz Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Andrew L. Schwartz, on the briefs).
Methfessel & Werbel, PC, attorneys for respondent Board of Education of the Township of North Brunswick (Eric L. Harrison, of counsel; Jeffrey R. Merlino, on the brief).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Commissioner of Education (David L. Kalisky, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Robert Cauvin appeals from the November 4, 2024 final agency
decision (FAD) of the Acting Commissioner of Education (Commissioner)
finding he is permanently disqualified from working in any Department of
Education (DOE) supervised educational institution pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
7.1 because he was convicted of lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4. Having reviewed
the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law, we affirm.
I.
To give context to the issues presented on appeal, we summarize the facts
and procedural history from the record. In October 1997, Cauvin was convicted
of disorderly persons lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4(a), in North Brunswick
Municipal Court. He pled guilty and admitted to having consensual sex in a
parked vehicle. The municipal court sentenced Cauvin to a $255 fine, which he
paid.
In 1998, following his conviction, Cauvin was hired by the Scotch Plains-
A-1098-24 2 Fanwood Regional School District as a public school teacher and worked there
for approximately five years. He obtained teaching certificates in "Elementary
School Teacher" and "Teaching of Handicapped." In September 2003, the North
Brunswick Township School District (North Brunswick School District) hired
Cauvin as a tenured special education teacher. While Cauvin underwent
employment background checks for both school districts, his lewdness
conviction was not discovered.
On May 3, 2022, the DOE's Office of Student Protection (OSP) 1 emailed
the North Brunswick School District's Superintendent, advising information was
received that Cauvin had a lewdness conviction. The OSP's email stated that
Cauvin's conviction permanently disqualified him from "serving in any
position . . . with any educational institution under the supervision of the
[DOE]." The OSP also notified Cauvin by letter that a municipal court record
showed his lewdness conviction in 1997 and it "permanently disqualified" him
from serving in a teaching position under the supervision of the DOE. The letter
further stated Cauvin "[had fourteen] days from the date of [the] written notice
to challenge the accuracy of [his] criminal history record."
1 We note the record and parties' merits briefs interchangeably refer to the DOE and OSP. For the purposes of consistency, we refer only to the DOE unless the action taken was directly by the OSP. A-1098-24 3 The same day, the acting superintendent had Cauvin personally served
with a letter informing him that the North Brunswick School District received a
notice of his permanent disqualification from teaching based on his conviction,
and, as a result, he was terminated from employment. On May 11, the North
Brunswick Board of Education (Board) adopted a resolution retroactively
terminating Cauvin's employment.
On July 21, 2022, Cauvin filed an application for emergent relief with the
Commissioner. About two weeks later, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
heard the application and denied Cauvin's requested emergent relief. Thereafter,
the Commissioner issued an order adopting the ALJ's decision and finding
Cauvin "failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief." The
Commissioner also ordered that "th[e] case shall continue at the [Office of
Administrative Law (OAL)]."
On August 26, 2022, Cauvin filed a three-count amended petition of
appeal requesting the Commissioner find the following: the Board violated
Cauvin's tenure rights because he was entitled to have tenure charges filed and
further proceedings; the Board was required to reemploy him as a teacher and
compensate his economic damages; Cauvin did not commit a "disqualifying
crime or offense" requiring termination based on the Supreme Court's holding
A-1098-24 4 in State v. J.O., 69 N.J. 574 (1976); and the OSP was required to modify its
records to indicate Cauvin "was not disqualified from holding a tenured full time
teaching position."
On August 21, 2023, Cauvin and the DOE filed cross-motions before the
ALJ for a summary decision. The parties also filed joint stipulations. Cauvin
stipulated to the lewdness conviction but argued it resulted from his engaging in
a consensual sexual act in his car that was parked in a private area. He argued
the Board should be ordered to reinstate him as a teacher because his lewdness
conviction was based on an act of "private consensual sexual activity" that
should not be considered a disqualifying offense. He also contended legal
precedent, prior arbitration awards, and earlier Commissioner decisions
regarding "unbecoming conduct" mandated that his conviction should not be
considered a disqualifying offense. Finally, he asserted the DOE was equitably
estopped and barred under laches from determining he was disqualified.
The DOE argued Cauvin's lewdness conviction was a clear disqualifying
offense under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.l mandating his termination. The DOE
explained the OSP learned of the conviction after "a routine follow-up into an
A-1098-24 5 unrelated situation involving Cauvin." 2 In September 2023, the DOE filed a
supplemental brief explaining that "Cauvin's [filed] expungement was denied."
On August 26, 2024, the ALJ issued an order accompanied by an initial
decision granting Cauvin's motion for summary decision, denying the DOE's
cross-motion for summary decision, and recommending the Commissioner
reinstate Cauvin's employment. While the ALJ noted Cauvin's lewdness
conviction was undisputed and that the conviction "resulted in his
disqualification" under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, the ALJ nevertheless ordered
Cauvin's employment reinstatement, effective May 3, 2022. The ALJ
determined the DOE failed to provide Cauvin a hearing "to challenge the
veracity, accuracy[,] and impact of the disqualifying criminal history." The ALJ
reasoned Cauvin's reinstatement was required based on the following: "[J.O.]
dictate[s] that individuals engaged in private consensual sexual activity could
not be found guilty of indecent exposure, or committing an act of open
lewdness" under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4; Caucino v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs.' Pension and
Annuity Fund, 475 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 2023) supports a finding that "an
2 We note the Commissioner's FAD and other documents reference Cauvin was involved in a separate incident. The Commissioner's FAD states that Cauvin was "on paid administrative leave following an unrelated November 2021 arrest." The separate incident is not relevant to this appeal.
A-1098-24 6 individual cannot be presumed guilty of any form of 'unbecoming conduct' if
they were not employed as a teacher" at the time of the offense; and prior
Commissioner's decisions and TEACHNJ arbitration awards support Cauvin's
reinstatement. Additionally, he found the DOE was not "equitably estopped and
barred" under the doctrine of laches from finding Cauvin's 1997 conviction
permanently disqualified him from public school employment.
In September 2024, the Board and DOE filed exceptions to the ALJ's
decision. They argued the ALJ incorrectly found Cauvin's conviction for
lewdness was not a disqualifying event under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, because the
ALJ determined the facts underpinning Cauvin's 1997 offense did not support a
conviction. They also argued the ALJ's additional findings were erroneous and
did not support Cauvin's reinstatement and back pay. Cauvin's opposition
requested the Commissioner to adopt the ALJ's findings, "[d]etermine that . . .
[Cauvin] be reinstated as a tenured teaching staff member," and "[i]mmediately
reinstate . . . hi[m to the] paid tenured teaching position, retroactive to May 3,
2022." Cauvin did not file an exception to the ALJ's finding that the DOE was
not "equitably estopped and barred by the principal of laches from arguing that
the 1997 [conviction] constituted a [d]isqualifying [c]rime or [o]ffense."
On November 4, 2024, the Commissioner issued the FAD rejecting the
A-1098-24 7 ALJ's decision and upholding Cauvin's permanent disqualification "from public
school employment," termination, and dismissal of his petition. The
Commissioner recognized Cauvin had a conviction for lewdness, which resulted
after he pled guilty, and that "N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(a) unambiguously states that
individuals . . . are 'permanently disqualified from employment' in public
schools" for any conviction for "an offense set as forth in [c]hapter 14 of Title
2C." The Commissioner determined the ALJ committed several legal errors in
"summarily reversing [Cauvin's] disqualification and ordering his
reinstatement." The Commissioner found the ALJ erred in finding the
following: Cauvin was not disqualified for a lewdness conviction despite the
plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(a); the law permitted the ALJ to revisit
"the propriety of the 1997 lewdness conviction entered following [a] guilty
plea"; "the Board violated [Cauvin's] tenure rights by terminating his
employment without the filing of tenure charges, and that he [was] entitled to a
hearing before an arbitrator regarding his employment"; and Cauvin's
"termination [was] unwarranted given prior Commissioner decisions in tenure
matters."
The Commissioner explained that the "ALJ lacked jurisdiction" to review
Cauvin's lewdness conviction because N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4 is a criminal statute and
A-1098-24 8 "not a school law . . . [that] falls within the Commissioner's purview." The
Commissioner found the Board was not required to file tenure charges against
Cauvin, and he "[was] not entitled to a hearing before an arbitrator."
On appeal, Cauvin argues the DOE failed to provide him with meaningful
due process before permanently disqualifying him from New Jersey public
school employment.
II.
"Judicial review of agency determinations is limited." Bd. of Educ. of
Kinnelon v. D'Amico, 477 N.J. Super. 184, 195 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting
Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157
(2018)). "[A]n agency's findings of fact 'are considered binding on appeal when
supported by adequate, substantial[,] and credible evidence.'" Donnerstag v.
Borawski, 481 N.J. Super. 311, 322 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting Sager v. O.A.
Peterson Constr., Co., 182 N.J. 156, 164 (2004)).
A reviewing "court ordinarily should not disturb an administrative
agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the
agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In
re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413,
A-1098-24 9 422 (2008). In determining if an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable, we examine "(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies," (2) whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the agency's decision, and (3) whether in applying the law to
the facts, the agency reached a conclusion "that could not reasonably have been
made on a showing of the relevant factors." Allstars Auto Grp., Inc., 234 N.J.
at 157 (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). Further, "when an
agency's decision is based on the 'agency's interpretation of a statute or its
determination of a strictly legal issue,' we are not bound by the agency's
interpretation." In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020)
(quoting Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014)). We review
statutory interpretation de novo. Ibid.
To effectuate the Legislature's intent when interpreting a statute, a court
must first examine the plain language and ascribe to its words their ordinary
meaning. Conforti v. County of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 163 (2023). "Where
statutory language is clear, courts should give it effect unless it is evident that
the Legislature did not intend such meaning." Bubis v. Kassin, 184 N.J. 612,
626 (2005) (quoting Rumson Ests., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Fair Haven, 177
N.J. 338, 354 (2003)). We "ascribe[] to the statutory words their ordinary
A-1098-24 10 meaning and significance and read[] them in context with related provisions so
as to give sense to the legislation as a whole." W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506,
519 (2023) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "The
Legislature is presumed to be familiar with its own enactments, with judicial
declarations relating to them, and to have passed or preserved cognate laws with
the intention that they be construed to serve a useful and consistent purpose."
In re Petition for Referendum on Trenton Ordinance 09-02, 201 N.J. 349, 359
(2010) (quoting State v. Federanko, 26 N.J. 119, 129 (1958)).
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 provides that a school district "under the supervision
of the [DOE] . . . shall not employ . . . the paid services of any teaching staff
member . . . unless the employer has first determined consistent with the
requirements and standards of this act, that no [disqualifying] criminal history
record information exists." Further, "[a]n individual, . . . shall be permanently
disqualified from employment or service under this act if the individual's
criminal history record check reveals a record of conviction for" "[a]n offense
as set forth in chapter 14 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes." N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1(a). "For the purposes of this section, a conviction exists if the
individual has at any time been convicted under the laws of this State . . . ."
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(d). Subsection (e) provides that "an individual shall not be
A-1098-24 11 disqualified from employment or service under this act on the basis of any
conviction disclosed by a criminal record check performed pursuant to this act
without an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the disqualifying criminal
history record." N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(e).
III.
Cauvin contends reversal of his disqualification is warranted because the
Commissioner's FAD failed to provide him meaningful due process. He
specifically argues the DOE deprived him of "his protected interest in public
educational employment" by not affording an "opportunity for a hearing."
While Cauvin argues the DOE failed to provide a hearing, he does not
challenge N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1's validity or the Commissioner's statutory
interpretation. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 clearly states that a school district "shall not
employ . . . any teaching staff member" who is disqualified because of a criminal
record. The plain language of the criminal record check in public school
employment statute specifically enumerates the disqualifying offenses and
crimes. The Legislature's purpose in establishing disqualifying offenses is to
protect school "children under the age of 18." N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. To that end,
the Legislature determined that a teacher with a conviction for "[a]n offense as
A-1098-24 12 set forth in chapter 14 of Title 2C" is permanently disqualified from public
school employment. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(a).
The Legislature's use of the word "offense" in subsection (a) of N.J.S.A.
18A:6-7.1 corresponds with the disorderly persons offense of lewdness under
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4(a), which provide, "A person commits a disorderly persons
offense if he does any flagrantly lewd and offensive act which he knows or
reasonably expects is likely to be observed by other nonconsenting persons who
would be affronted or alarmed." When "the [statutory] language is clear, the
court's job is complete." In re DiGuglielmo, 252 N.J. 350, 360 (2022) (quoting
In re Expungement Application of D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433, 440 (2014)). While we
are not unsympathetic to Cauvin based on his extensive teaching work history,
a review of the applicable statutes makes clear that his lewdness conviction is a
disqualifying offense.
We agree with the Commissioner's FAD finding that the ALJ erroneously
revisited Cauvin's conviction. The ALJ reviewed Cauvin's presently alleged
facts regarding his 1997 lewdness offense and determined the conviction "did
not represent any criminal activity" and "was not a disqualifying crime." The
validity of Cauvin's conviction was not before the ALJ, and his reliance on the
Supreme Court's holding in J.O. was misplaced. The Supreme Court in J.O.
A-1098-24 13 considered that the defendants had timely appealed their lewdness convictions
and reversed based on a full review of the specific facts established in the
appellate record. 69 N.J. at 576 (holding the facts showed the defendants'
consensual sexual acts "did [not] occur under circumstances in which the
defendants could reasonably be deemed to have intended, or known, that their
conduct was likely to be seen by the public"). As Cauvin concedes in his merits
brief—"this matter does not provide a forum to re-litigate the [m]unicipal
matter." Thus, the Commissioner's determination that the ALJ wrongly set aside
Cauvin's conviction and jurisdiction was limited to the "controversies and
disputes arising under the school laws" is supported. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.
We further conclude the DOE appropriately afforded Cauvin his due
process rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. The Commissioner transmitted the
matter to the OAL and the ALJ addressed the cross-motions for summary
decision, providing a meaningful opportunity to be heard. As Cauvin admitted
to the conviction, a DOE or OSP hearing under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(e) was not
statutorily authorized. A hearing is afforded under the statute when an
individual challenges "the accuracy of the disqualifying criminal history
record." N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(e). Further, a plain reading of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1
supports Cauvin's mandatory permanent disqualification because it "appl[ies] to
A-1098-24 14 criminal history record checks conducted on or after" the statute's 1998
amendment, P.L. 1998, c. 31. While the ALJ disagreed with the statute's
application, he was not free to "write in an additional qualification which the
Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment or engage in
conjecture or surmise which will circumvent the plain meaning of the act." Doe
v. Est. of C.V.O., 477 N.J. Super. 42, 59 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Soto v.
Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558, 569-70 (2007)).
We also discern no error in the Commissioner's FAD finding that the
ALJ's reliance on Caucino was misplaced. In Caucino, we addressed a teacher's
eligibility for retirement benefits after the teacher was "permanently disqualified
from employment in a school system because of a conviction for a crime
enumerated in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1." 475 N.J. Super. at 409. The teacher in
Caucino had worked in a school district for almost ten years when New Jersey
State Board of Education notified the school district of his permanently
disqualifying conviction, resulting in the teacher's termination. Id. at 409-10.
The ALJ wrongly interpreted our holding and misstated that Caucino
"supports . . . any alleged disqualifying criminal misconduct must in some way
involve an employee's official employment duties in order to qualify for the
forfeiture of any vested rights under a New Jersey State Pension statute." To be
A-1098-24 15 clear, in Caucino we addressed a teacher's pension eligibility after we
acknowledged the teacher was permanently disqualified from public school
employment under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 based on an enumerated offense
conviction. Id. at 409.
Finally, we decline to address the Board's request in its merits brief that
we conclude "regardless of what steps [Cauvin] might take to vacate or expunge
his disqualifying criminal conviction, there is no basis to require . . . [it] to
create a position or opening to re-employ" him. The parties did not fully address
below the merits of the issues surrounding Cauvin's possible expungement. We
generally decline to consider questions or issues not presented below when an
opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions raised on
appeal concern jurisdiction or matters of great public interest. Nieder v. Royal
Indem. Ins., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); see also Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199,
226-27 (2014) (recognizing claims that are not presented to a trial court are
inappropriate for consideration on appeal). As the Board's contention was not
addressed, the issue is not properly before us.
Affirmed.
A-1098-24 16