Cite as 2025 Ark. 87 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. D-16-301
Opinion Delivered: May 29, 2025
ROBERT BRECH, AS EXECUTIVE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT DIRECTOR OF THE ARKANSAS [NOS. CPC NO. 2014-053; CPC NO. SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE 2014-067; CPC NO. 2015-013; CPC ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT NO. 2015-016; CPC NO. 2015-020; PETITIONER CPC NO. 2015-029; CPC NO. 2015- 088; CPC NO. 2015-092; AND CPC V. NO. 2015-108]
TERESA LYNETTE BLOODMAN, HONORABLE KIM M. SMITH, ATTORNEY AT LAW, ARKANSAS SPECIAL JUDGE ON ASSIGNMENT BAR NO. 2005055 RESPONDENT
ORDER OF DISBARMENT ISSUED.
KAREN R. BAKER, Chief Justice
This is an original action brought under the Arkansas Supreme Court Procedures
Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys (“Procedures”). Robert Brech, as Executive
Director of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct (the “Committee”),
seeks the disbarment of Teresa Lynette Bloodman, an attorney licensed to practice law in
Arkansas. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Procedures section 13(A).
I. Facts and Procedural History
On April 1, 2016, Stark Ligon, former Executive Director of the Committee, filed
a petition for disbarment against Bloodman. This petition was amended four times to
incorporate additional matters and allege further violations of the Arkansas Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Rules”). On April 28, we appointed special judge Kim Smith to preside over this matter and provide the court with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations of an appropriate sanction. Ligon v. Bloodman, 2016 Ark. 191 (per curiam).
In total, the Committee alleged 176 violations of the Rules stemming from
Bloodman’s conduct in at least fifteen separate matters. The disbarment proceedings were
bifurcated into two phases. The first phase was the allegations phase, and the hearing took
place across several dates from 2018 through early 2019. The forty-two-volume record for
the allegations phase spans over 7,700 pages. On May 9, 2023, the special judge entered
findings of facts and conclusions of law wherein he detailed his findings over 236 pages. The
second phase was the sanctions phase, and the hearing took place on June 22 and August
21, 2023. On February 2, 2024, the special judge entered his findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and recommendation of sanction, wherein he recommended that Bloodman be
disbarred. Upon a review of the record, we accept the special judge’s findings and
recommendation.
II. Standard of Review
Section 1(C) of the Procedures provides that “[d]isciplinary proceedings are neither
civil nor criminal in nature but are sui generis, meaning of their own kind.” See Procedures
§ 1(C); see also Ligon v. Dunklin, 368 Ark. 443, 447, 247 S.W.3d 498, 503 (2007). We will
accept the special judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ligon v. Tapp,
2017 Ark. 185, at 2, 519 S.W.3d 315, 318. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Ligon v. Newman, 365 Ark. 510,
at 516, 231 S.W.3d 662, 667 (2006). We must view the evidence in a light most favorable
2 to the decision of the special judge, resolving all inferences in favor of his or her findings of
fact.1 Ligon v. Stewart, 369 Ark. 380, 384–85, 255 S.W.3d 435, 439 (2007). Disputed facts
and determinations of the credibility of witnesses are within the province of the fact-finder.
Newman, supra. We impose the appropriate sanctions based on the evidence. Id. There is no
appeal from this court except as may be provided by federal law. Id.
III. Preliminary Issues
A. Procedural Due Process
As an initial matter, Bloodman contends that the Committee violated her right to
procedural due process because it imposed an interim suspension of her law license without
providing her notice and a hearing.
In March 2016, the Committee’s order of interim suspension was issued with its
disbarment referral pursuant to section 16(A)(1) of the Procedures. Section 16(A)(1)
provides that “[a]n action for the interim suspension of a lawyer is initiated, adjudicated,
and imposed in the following manner: . . . Pursuant to Section 17(E)(3)(a), an interim
1 Bloodman cites Ligon v. Price, 360 Ark. 98, 200 S.W.3d 417 (2004), asserting that we must instead view the evidence in a light most favorable to the responding attorney and resolve all inferences in favor of the responding attorney. However, that is a misstatement of our standard of review. We clarified in Newman, supra, that
[w]e erroneously stated in Price, 360 Ark. 98, 200 S.W.3d 417, that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent. We now take the opportunity to clarify our standard of review. As previously stated, this court will accept the special judge’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Here, as in Price, the special judge found that the respondent committed serious misconduct warranting disbarment; thus, in order to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Newman, we would be forced to disregard the findings of the special judge. This we will not do.
Newman, 365 Ark. at 516, 231 S.W.3d at 667.
3 suspension may be imposed immediately upon a panel’s decision to institute disbarment
action on any formal complaint pending before it[.]” Section 17(E)(3)(a) of the Procedures
provides that
[w]hen a panel of the Committee finds that an attorney has violated any provision of the Rules, the panel is authorized . . . [t]o temporarily suspend the lawyer’s privilege to practice law pending final adjudication and disposition of a disciplinary matter. Interim suspension shall be appropriate in the following situations: (a) Immediately on decision to initiate disbarment[.]
On March 22, 2016, the Committee filed its interim-suspension order, and
Bloodman’s law license has been suspended since that date. Bloodman subsequently filed a
petition for writ of certiorari challenging the Committee’s order of interim suspension. See
Bloodman v. Ligon, 2016 Ark. 309, at 1 (per curiam). She argued, in relevant part, that she
was denied procedural due process of law because she was not afforded a hearing prior to
her suspension and that the factors adopted by this court in Tapp v. Ligon, 2013 Ark. 259,
428 S.W.3d 492, did not support the interim suspension. On September 15, we remanded
to the Committee for entry of a new order with an analysis of the Tapp factors. See Bloodman
v. Ligon, 2016 Ark. 309, at 1–3. On October 4, the Committee entered its revised findings
and order, stating that an analysis of the Tapp factors demonstrated that the interim
suspension of Bloodman’s law license during the pendency of the disbarment proceeding
was appropriate. On October 27, we denied Bloodman’s petition, and the interim
suspension remained in place. Bloodman v. Ligon, CV-16-434 (formal order, Oct. 27, 2016).
At the outset of the June 22, 2023 sanction hearing of the disbarment proceedings,
Bloodman asserted that this court had an opportunity to “revisit” this due-process issue in
Hutchinson v. Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, Panel A, 2023 Ark.
4 86, 666 S.W.3d 82. Bloodman claimed that Hutchinson supported her position—that the
proceedings should be dismissed because her license was suspended without an opportunity
to be heard in violation of her due-process rights—because the court stated that the interim
suspension of an attorney’s license should only occur primarily after notice and a hearing.
The special judge declined to dismiss the disbarment proceedings on this basis, reasoning as
follows:
Well, that issue went to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and they granted no relief to Ms. Bloodman, and you know maybe if it had occurred now, maybe they would have given relief under [Hutchinson]. I agree. And they’ve said that they prefer that it not be done, and they have the authority to change those rules because they make those rules on the professional conduct rules, but you know, we’re here at the end and towards the sanction -- doing the sanction hearing to determine the sanctions, so this case is almost at conclusion, and you know, since it’s been ruled on before, that issue in this very case, I’m going to deny your motion again to stop the proceedings[.]
Here, relying on Hutchinson, supra, Bloodman argues once more that this court has
expressed its preference that the Committee provide an attorney with notice and a hearing
before suspending his or her law license on an interim basis. Bloodman acknowledges that
the March 22 and October 4, 2016 orders of interim suspension predate the court’s decision
in Hutchinson but nevertheless urges us to find that she renewed her procedural due-process
argument at the June 22, 2023 sanctions hearing. For this reason, Bloodman asserts that the
special judge should have complied with Hutchinson’s mandate to put an end to interim
suspensions of an attorney’s license to practice law without notice and a hearing. The
Committee responds that we have already rejected Bloodman’s procedural due-process
arguments and should do so once more. The Committee further asserts that,
notwithstanding the court’s prior decision, the Procedures do not require pre-suspension
5 hearings and that the court in Hutchinson did not mandate otherwise; rather, it merely
declared its preference for such hearings.
As noted by the Committee, we have already unanimously rejected the argument
that the Procedures authorizing Bloodman’s interim suspension violated her procedural due-
process rights, and upon a review of the entire record, we are not persuaded to reconsider
this ruling. See Bloodman v. Ligon, CV-16-434 (petition for writ of certiorari denied). And
even if the special judge had been required to overlook our prior ruling and reconsider
Bloodman’s due-process arguments in light of Hutchinson, the outcome would still be the
same. In Hutchinson, the Committee suspended William Asa Hutchinson III’s law license
after he was arrested during a traffic stop. 2023 Ark. 86, at 1, 666 S.W.3d at 83. A majority
of this court reasoned as follows:
[T]his court prefers that the Committee and the Director provide an attorney with notice and a hearing before issuing any interim suspension. We recognize the current rules permitted the Committee’s action here. Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Regulating Prof’l Conduct § 16(A). And ex parte interim suspensions may be justified in other cases, particularly when the conduct arises from an attorney’s practice of law. But here, this was a rapid summary suspension for conduct unrelated to petitioner’s practice as a lawyer.
Id. at 2, 666 S.W.3d at 83 (emphasis added).
In other words, Hutchinson did not mandate pre-suspension hearings prior to the
Committee ordering the interim suspension of an attorney’s law license in all cases, nor do
our Procedures require such a hearing. Here, the allegations giving rise to the disbarment
action against Bloodman stemmed from her practice of law and the misuse of her law license,
which is the type of conduct for which the majority in Hutchinson suggested that an interim
suspension may be justified. Therefore, Bloodman’s reliance on Hutchinson is misplaced.
6 Accordingly, the special judge did not err in finding that Bloodman’s procedural due-
process arguments had been brought to finality in Bloodman v. Ligon, supra, and we decline
to reconsider our earlier ruling.
B. Service
Bloodman next argues that we should dismiss the petition for disbarment because the
Committee did not comply with Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
On June 16, 2016, Bloodman filed a motion to dismiss the April 1 petition for
disbarment, arguing that she had never been personally served with the petition or summons
despite the affidavit of service filed on May 24, 2016, that showed that Bloodman had been
served on May 18. Bloodman asserted that the disbarment petition should be dismissed
because the Committee did not comply with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure,
generally identifying “insufficiency of process pursuant to Rule l2(b)(4) and insufficiency of
service of process pursuant to Rule l2(b)(5)” as deficiencies. Bloodman explained that
[s]pecifically, service of process was insufficient because the Affidavit of Service is false; that is, not only was [Bloodman] not personally served with the disbarment complaint, but she was not at the residence listed at the time that the Affidavit of Service reflects that service was completed. To that end, the facts alleged in the Affidavit of Service are alarmingly false.
On July 19, the special judge held a motions hearing during which he heard
arguments on Bloodman’s motion to dismiss. The special judge was tasked with determining
whether Bloodman was properly served on May 18 as set forth in the affidavit of service,
and the arguments made by both Bloodman and the Committee were centered on the
accuracy of the process servicer’s account detailed in the affidavit of service—namely,
7 whether Bloodman was present at her home address at the time of service, and whether the
process server listed the correct address on the affidavit of service.
The process server, Andrew Myers, testified that he surveilled Bloodman’s home
between approximately 2:30 and 7:30 p.m. on May 18, 2016. Myers testified that around
7:10 p.m., a vehicle pulled into Bloodman’s driveway, and a teenage boy exited the vehicle
and began walking to the front door of the home. Myers testified further that he
immediately pulled up to Bloodman’s home when the other vehicle arrived, and as
Bloodman opened the door to let the teenager inside, Myers and Bloodman looked at each
other as he loudly stated that he had legal documents for her and informed her that she had
been served. Myers claimed that Bloodman then slammed the door, and he therefore placed
the box of documents on her doorstep and announced through the door that she had been
served and that the papers were outside. Yet Bloodman asserted that she was not at home
during the period Myers claimed to have been monitoring the residence and that she was
in Pine Bluff at the time of alleged service. Bloodman also challenged the accuracy of the
affidavit of service because it reflected that she was served at a home in Bryant, but the actual
location of her home address was in Benton. Myers alleged that he had served Bloodman at
the same address once before—a point at which he claimed Bloodman attempted to evade
service—and that he mistakenly wrote “Bryant” as opposed to “Benton” on the affidavit of
service because his map indicated that Bloodman’s address was in Bryant. While there was
discussion about which city Bloodman’s residence was located in, it was undisputed that the
address was 5528 Lexington Avenue.
8 After hearing arguments from the parties and testimony from Bloodman and Myers,
the special judge denied Bloodman’s motion to dismiss, finding that service was proper. In
reaching this decision, the special judge weighed the credibility of the witnesses and
ultimately determined that, in light of the affidavit of service, Bloodman failed to carry her
burden of proving that service was improper. On August 8, the special judge entered a
written order memorializing his findings. During a short recess at the July 19 hearing, in the
presence of at least three witnesses, Bloodman was personally served in the courtroom with
a box containing the same materials that Myers testified to leaving on her doorstep on May
18—the summons, original petition for disbarment, and related exhibits.
1. Standard of review
As an initial matter, Bloodman contends that the special judge improperly shifted the
burden of proving sufficient service of process to her when that burden lies with the party
responsible for obtaining service of process—here, the Committee.
However, we have held that a return of service is prima facie evidence of valid
service. See Unknown Heirs of Warbington v. First Cmty. Bank, 2011 Ark. 280, at 6, 383
S.W.3d 384, 387. The party claiming that service was not had, has the burden of proof to
overcome the prima facie case created by the proof or return of service. Id. Here, Myers
signed the May 24 affidavit of service wherein he swore that he served Bloodman on May
18 with a true copy of the summons, notice, petition for disbarment, and exhibits. At that
point, the burden shifted to Bloodman, as the party claiming that service was not had, to
overcome the prima facie case of proper service created by the filing of the affidavit of
9 service. Thus, the special judge did not improperly shift the burden of proving sufficient
service of process to Bloodman.
2. Insufficient process
Bloodman now argues that the April 1 petition for disbarment should be dismissed
because the summons did not comply with Rule 4(b)(3) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure. With respect to the required form of a summons to be issued and served in
accordance with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b)(3) provides that
[t]he summons shall be styled in the name of the court and issued under its seal, dated and signed by the clerk or a deputy clerk, and directed from the State of Arkansas to the defendant to be served. It shall contain . . . (3) the name and address of the plaintiff’s attorney, if any, otherwise the address of the plaintiff[.]
Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(3).
Here, Bloodman argues that the summons issued on April 5, 2016, did not strictly
comply with Rule 4(b)(3), specifically because it did not state the name and address of the
Committee’s then-attorney Stark Ligon. Bloodman argues that the April 1 petition for
disbarment must therefore be dismissed. The Committee responds that Bloodman has
waived this argument because she did not argue, either in her motion to dismiss or during
the subsequent hearing, that because Ligon’s name and address had been omitted, the
summons was defective for noncompliance with Rule 4(b)(3). Rather, the Committee
asserts that Bloodman’s motion to dismiss only generally alleged that the disbarment petition
should be dismissed for “insufficiency of process pursuant to Rule l2(b)(4), and insufficiency
of service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)” of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
10 We agree that Bloodman has waived her argument concerning the April 5, 2016
summons. At no point before the special judge did Bloodman argue that the summons was
defective pursuant to Rule 4(b)(3) because it did not include Ligon’s name and address.
Bloodman did not raise this argument in her June 16 motion to dismiss or during the July
19 hearing during which the special judge heard arguments related to the May 18 service of
process. Instead, her arguments before the special judge were focused on the veracity of the
process server’s affidavit of service. Bloodman participated in the disbarment proceedings
and submitted to the court’s jurisdiction for over eight years before raising the argument
that the summons issued on April 5, 2016, did not strictly comply with Rule 4(b)(3) because
it did not state Ligon’s name and address. This argument was raised for the first time in her
opening brief before this court, which was filed in July 2024, and was, simply put, raised
too late. Accordingly, Bloodman waived her argument that the April 5, 2016 summons did
not strictly comply with Rule 4(b)(3) on the basis of its failure to state the name and address
of the Committee’s attorney, and we decline to address it.
3. Insufficient service of process
As an additional basis for dismissal of the April 1 petition for disbarment, Bloodman
asserts that the Committee did not serve her in compliance with Rule 4(f)(1)(A) of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(f)(1)(A) mandates that service of process inside
the state shall be made as follows:
(1) Natural Persons. If the defendant is a natural person at least 18 years of age or emancipated by court order, by:
(A) delivering a copy of the process to the defendant personally, or if he or she refuses to receive it after the process server makes his or her purpose clear, by leaving the papers in close proximity to the defendant[.]
11 Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1)(A).
Whether service was had in a case is a question of fact. See Unknown Heirs of
Warbington, supra. Here, Bloodman argues that the process server did not comply with Rule
4 because he did not deliver the summons and petition for disbarment to Bloodman
personally, and Bloodman could not have refused to receive any papers from him—thereby
permitting him to leave the papers in close proximity to her pursuant to Rule 4(f)(1)(A)—
because she was not at her home at the time of the alleged service. Bloodman disagrees with
the special judge’s credibility determinations, citing a number of alleged inconsistencies
between Myers’s testimony at the July 19 hearing and his affidavit of service as evidence
that allegedly undermines the conclusion that she had been properly served. However,
Bloodman’s disagreement with the findings of fact does not demonstrate error in the special
judge’s assessment. The special judge’s finding that the May 18 service was proper was based
on his review of the testimony and evidence in this case. The special judge had the benefit
of hearing the witnesses’ testimony and was better suited in assessing the credibility of those
witnesses. See Dunklin, 368 Ark. at 452, 247 S.W.3d at 505–06. Accordingly, we cannot say
that the special judge’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, and we decline to dismiss the
April 1 petition for disbarment on this basis.
IV. Merits
As discussed above, the hearing on the allegations phase of Bloodman’s disbarment
proceeding took place from 2018 through early 2019. After the presentation of all testimony
and evidence, the special judge ordered the Committee and Bloodman to submit
simultaneous proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law ninety days after the transcript
12 of the proceedings was provided to the parties. On January 18, 2023, once the record was
ultimately completed and after numerous extensions of time to file the proposals were
granted, the special judge ordered the Committee and Bloodman to submit simultaneous
proposals by January 24. Both parties submitted proposals in accordance with the special
judge’s order, and they each filed objections to the opposing set of proposed findings of facts
and conclusions of law thereafter. On May 4, the special judge issued a letter opinion stating
that the Committee’s proposal aligned more closely with the judge’s findings and
conclusions. Therefore, the special judge ordered the Committee to prepare the findings of
fact and conclusions of law using its proposal as a starting point but ordered the Committee
to make numerous specific revisions to conform to the evidence and the judge’s rulings. On
May 9, the special judge entered findings of facts and conclusions of law detailing his findings
and conclusions over 236 pages, to which Bloodman objected.
The hearing on the sanctions phase took place on June 22 and August 21, 2023. At
the close of the hearing on August 21, as he did upon the conclusion of the allegations phase
of the disbarment proceedings, the special judge directed the parties to submit simultaneous
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the sanctions phase ninety days after the
transcript was filed. The special judge noted that this would make the filings due on
December 15, and both parties agreed that this deadline was satisfactory. The Committee
filed its proposal in accordance with the special judge’s direction, wherein it recommended
that Bloodman be disbarred. Bloodman failed to file a timely proposal of her own. However,
on December 26, Bloodman filed a motion to strike the Committee’s recommendation for
sanction, arguing, inter alia, that such a recommendation was not permitted under the
13 Procedures. On January 30, 2024, the special judge issued a letter opinion stating that the
Committee’s proposal was adopted in part but directed the Committee once more to make
numerous revisions. Bloodman subsequently filed objections to the January 30 letter opinion
as well as a motion for reconsideration. On February 2, the special judge entered his findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of sanction wherein he recommended that
Bloodman be disbarred. Bloodman objected. On February 8, the special judge denied
Bloodman’s December 26 motion to strike, reasoning that section 13 of the Procedures
allows the special judge to solicit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from the
parties concerning the imposition of sanctions.
As an initial matter, while Bloodman does not challenge any specific finding of fact
or conclusion of law in her briefs, she argues that the special judge impermissibly “rubber-
stamped” the Committee’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law despite her
many objections to the proposal and adoption thereof. Section 13 of the Procedures
provides, in relevant part, that in a disbarment proceeding,
[t]he judge shall first hear all evidence relevant to the alleged misconduct and shall then make and file with the Clerk a written determination as to whether the allegations have been proven. Upon a finding of misconduct, the judge shall then hear all evidence relevant to an appropriate sanction to be imposed, including evidence related to the factors listed in Section 19 and the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in the American Bar Association’s Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, sections 9.22 and 9.32 (1992). See Wilson v. Neal, 332 Ark. 148, 964 S.W.2d 199 (1998).
The judge shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the alleged misconduct of the respondent attorney and the imposition of sanctions . . . [and] [b]efore filing the findings and conclusions, the judge may solicit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from the parties and may submit a draft thereof to the parties or counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their objections and suggestions. The judge shall make a
14 recommendation as to the appropriate sanction from those set out in Section 17(D).[2]
Procedures, § 13(B)–(C).
Bloodman argues that the special judge did not honor the directives of section 13(B)
and (C) of the Procedures, because in essence, he rubber-stamped the Committee’s
proposed allegations and sanction recommendation. We disagree. Following each phase of
Bloodman’s bifurcated disbarment proceeding, the special judge directed the parties to file
proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law as section 13 plainly permits. Bloodman
offers no convincing argument in support of her position that the special judge was
somehow prohibited from doing so, and Bloodman chose not to timely file her own
proposal concerning the recommended sanction. Contrary to Bloodman’s argument, after
hearing all witness testimony and evidence presented during the disbarment proceedings,
the special judge was entitled to invite proposals setting forth findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect to Bloodman’s alleged misconduct and the imposition of sanctions from
the parties prior to making his final recommendation to this court.
A. Conduct
From the pleadings, the entire record, and the evidence admitted during the
allegations phase of Bloodman’s disbarment hearing, the special judge found that 121 of the
176 counts brought by the Committee alleging violations of the Rules had been proved by
a preponderance of the evidence. The Rule violations stemmed from Bloodman’s conduct
2 Section 17(D)(1) of the Procedures provides that disbarment, defined as “[t]he termination of the attorney’s privilege to practice law and removal of the attorney’s name from the list of licensed attorneys,” is a sanction permitted upon a finding of misconduct.
15 in at least fifteen separate matters. From our review of the record, we cannot say that the
special judge’s findings are clearly erroneous.
To be sure, the magnitude of Bloodman’s misconduct as outlined in the special
judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and proved through a voluminous record of
evidence and witness testimony is troubling. Among Bloodman’s many proven violations,
there were sixteen violations wherein Bloodman knowingly engaged in dishonesty, deceit,
fraud, or misrepresentation, and twenty-five violations wherein Bloodman’s conduct was
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The evidence demonstrates that, among other
things, Bloodman has exhibited a pattern of making false statements to courts and disobeying
court orders; collecting substantial legal fees, often five-figure sums, from her clients and
failing to provide commensurate legal representation before withdrawing as counsel and
failing to refund any portion of the unearned fees; mishandling and prolonging criminal
appeals to such an unreasonable degree that the entire court of appeals referred her to the
Office of Professional Conduct; and utilizing her law license as a means to delay proceedings
and frustrate the legal process in bad faith in pursuit of personal matters. Moreover,
Bloodman continued to practice law after her license had been suspended. Though, perhaps
one of the most illustrative examples highlighting the extent of Bloodman’s misconduct
involves her representation of Kenneth Brown, Jr.
In March 2013, Kenneth Brown, Jr., was charged with nine felony counts of various
offenses related to his involvement with a drug trafficking organization in a sealed
indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas after
he was arrested during a drug bust in Blytheville earlier that same year. Ten other people
16 were also charged in connection with the drug bust. Later that month, a bond hearing was
conducted for Brown, who was represented by an appointed public defender. Shortly
thereafter, Brown hired Bloodman to represent him and paid her a $25,000 fee. Brown told
Bloodman early on that it was his desire to communicate with the government about
cooperating in exchange for a favorable deal, but Bloodman discouraged him from making
early contact with the government, advising Brown that she could beat the charges. When
Brown was arrested in 2013, a cell phone that Brown had used in his drug dealings was
delivered to Bloodman, along with Brown’s personal cell phone. Bloodman told Brown
that she could either deliver the phones to him in jail so that he could communicate with
his business associates, or she could keep them in a safe and return them to Brown upon his
release so that he could use them to get back into the drug business.
In the course of Bloodman’s representation of Brown, Bloodman and Brown
discussed the list of witnesses who had already negotiated plea agreements and were
cooperating with the government against Brown, including Brown’s co-defendants. In
October 2013, Brown made a recorded telephone-conference call from jail to several
contacts including his mother, sister, and another associate, discussing with them a
suggestion made to him that he could arrange for persons not in custody to kill certain
adverse witnesses to improve his position in his federal case. When asked about the source
of this suggestion at Bloodman’s disbarment hearing, Brown testified that Bloodman had
advised him several times that he could “beat his charges” if he could make government-
cooperating witnesses “go to sleep,” which Brown asserted both parties understood to mean
killing the witnesses.
17 In November 2013, Bloodman successfully motioned for a continuance of Brown’s
December 2, 2013 trial. The trial was continued to April 7, 2014, which gave Bloodman
several months to prepare. In January 2014, a superseding indictment was filed against
Brown, cleaning up the original indictment so that it included only the charges against him,
and charging him with nine felony counts that were essentially the same as those charged in
the initial indictment. In March 2014, Bloodman sought another continuance, reasoning
that she would not be ready for trial in April. Specifically, she claimed that her email account
had been hacked and that a virus had infected the hard drive of her computer, causing her
to lose her trial notebook. Bloodman’s motion was denied because the court found that
there was ample time for her to prepare for the April 7 trial.
In the days leading up to trial, Bloodman filed several motions. On April 3, she filed
a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to continue the April 7 trial. The same day, she
filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude most, if not all, evidence against Brown on the
basis that it was prejudicial. On April 4, Bloodman filed a motion to withdraw as Brown’s
counsel. She explained that she had not been adequately compensated for her representation
of Brown, despite his earlier payment of the full $25,000 fee, and asserted that the
superseding indictment had changed their contractual arrangement and allegedly caused her
undue hardship. Bloodman was allowed to withdraw from the case, and counsel from the
federal public defender’s office was appointed to represent Brown going forward. Assistant
United States Attorney Chris Givens, the lead prosecutor on Brown’s case, testified at
Bloodman’s disbarment hearing that it was clear to him from the beginning of this case that
Bloodman was very unfamiliar with federal law and that she was often nonresponsive to his
18 communications. Givens testified further that Bloodman was relieved from the case because
she was unprepared, and the court did not believe she would ever be prepared. Prior to the
court’s ruling on Bloodman’s motion to withdraw, Bloodman did not disclose to the court
that she had devoted substantial time and effort to other cases in which she was pursuing
personal interests—including a case filed by Bloodman pro se involving her minor son’s
participation on his school’s basketball team and a case in which she challenged and appealed
to exhaustion a $250 sanction imposed against her due to her failure to comply with a court
order—during the continuance period between December 2013 and April 2014.
After Bloodman withdrew from Brown’s case, Brown wrote to Givens from jail. He
explained that he thought Bloodman had been ready to go to trial on April 7 as scheduled,
and that he had been following Bloodman’s lead since day one. Further, Brown wrote that
he had wanted to speak to Givens, but Bloodman had kept him from doing so, assuring
Brown that she could “beat it.” Brown also wrote to Judge Leon Holmes asking what he
could do about the $25,000 fee that his family and friends had collected and paid Bloodman
to represent him. Givens testified at Bloodman’s disbarment hearing that, by the time Brown
eventually entered a guilty plea in December 2014, he was the last to do so among the
eleven defendants originally charged.
Special Judge Smith found that Bloodman’s actions violated the following Rules: 1.1;
1.2(d); 1.3; 3.2; 3.4(a); and 8.4(b)-(d).3 To start, Bloodman counseled her client to arrange
3 Rule 1.1 provides that a lawyer “shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1.
19 for adverse witnesses in his case to be killed as a means of improving his chances of prevailing
at trial. In other words, Bloodman advised her client to engage in conduct that any person,
and especially a lawyer, would readily deem criminal in nature. Doing so was a clear
abrogation of her professional obligations and violated many Rules. Moreover, Bloodman
received, retained, and concealed Brown’s business cell phone—material evidence of his
criminal conduct—and represented to Brown that she would safeguard the phone until he
was able to reclaim and use it to resume his criminal activity. Engaging in conduct of this
nature can result in criminal repercussions under Arkansas law, and it reflects adversely on
Bloodman’s honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer. Additionally, Bloodman
misrepresented in her motion to withdraw from Brown’s case that Brown had not honored
3 Rule 1.2(d) provides that a lawyer “shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.” Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.2(d). 3 Rule 1.3 provides that a lawyer “shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.3. 3 Rule 3.2 provides that a lawyer “shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.2. 3 Rule 3.4(a) provides that a lawyer “shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act[.]” Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.4(a). 3 Rule 8.4 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [or] (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 8.4(b)–(d).
20 his contractual obligations to her even though he had paid the full quoted fee early in the
representation. Aside from that, Bloodman lacked the required knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation necessary to effectively represent Brown, and she failed to
act with diligence in her representation of him. She was unprepared for Brown’s trial despite
obtaining a continuance, using the months leading up to Brown’s trial date to instead pursue
personal legal matters; failed to explore his desire to cooperate with the government; and
delayed the resolution of his case. Based on a review of the record—as we conclude with
respect to each violation now before the court—the special judge’s findings are not clearly
erroneous.
B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The purpose of disciplinary actions is to protect the public and the administration of
justice from lawyers who have not discharged their professional duties to clients, the public,
the legal system, and the legal profession. Newman, 365 Ark. at 516, 231 S.W.3d 667. When
the Rules have been violated by either serious or lesser misconduct, a penalty phase proceeds
in which the defendant attorney and the Committee’s executive director are allowed to
present evidence and arguments regarding aggravating and mitigating factors to assist in
determining the appropriate sanction. See Tapp, 2017 Ark. 185, at 10, 519 S.W.3d at 322.
The following aggravating factors were developed by the American Bar Association Joint
Committee on Professional Standards and adopted by this court in Wilson v. Neal, 332 Ark.
148, 964 S.W.2d 199 (1998):
(1) prior disciplinary offenses;
(2) dishonest or selfish motive;
21 (3) a pattern of misconduct;
(4) multiple offenses;
(5) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with these Procedures or orders of the Committee;
(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct;
(8) vulnerability of the victim;
(9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(10) indifference to making restitution; and
(11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances.
Mitigating factors are:
(1) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(3) personal or emotional problems;
(4) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct;
(5) full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude towards the proceedings;
(6) inexperience in the practice of law;
(7) character or reputation;
(8) physical disability;
(9) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when:
22 (a) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability;
(b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct;
(c) the respondent’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and
(d) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely.
(10) delay in [the] disciplinary proceedings;
(11) impositions of other penalties or sanctions;
(12) remorse;
(13) remoteness of prior offenses.
Tapp, 2017 Ark. 185, at 10–12, 519 S.W.3d at 322–23; see also Procedures § 19(B)–(C).
Special Judge Smith found that the following aggravating factors applied: (1) a pattern
of misconduct; (2) multiple offenses; and a (3) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature
of her conduct. Specifically, the special judge noted that Bloodman demonstrated a pattern
of misconduct for more than five years prior to the interim suspension and committed 121
separate violations of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, all while denying having
violated even one Rule. Conversely, Special Judge Smith found that the following
mitigating factors applied: (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record; and (2) a delay in
the disciplinary proceedings.
C. Sanction
We must now determine the appropriate sanction in this case. Pursuant to section
17 of the Procedures, violations of the Rules fall into two separate categories of misconduct:
23 serious misconduct and lesser misconduct. Dunklin, 368 Ark. at 462, 247 S.W.3d at 511.
Serious misconduct warrants a sanction terminating or restricting the lawyer’s license to
practice law, whereas lesser misconduct does not. Ligon v. McCallister, 2020 Ark. 81, at 6,
593 S.W.3d 461, 464. Section 17(B) of the Procedures provides that conduct will be
considered serious misconduct if any of the following considerations apply:
(1) The misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds;
(2) The misconduct results in, or is likely to result in, substantial prejudice to a client or other person;
(3) The misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the attorney;
(4) The misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct;
(5) The attorney’s prior record of public sanctions demonstrates a substantial disregard of the attorney’s professional duties and responsibilities; or
(6) The misconduct constitutes a “Serious Crime,” as defined in these Procedures.
Special Judge Smith found that Bloodman had committed 121 separate Rule
violations, that these numerous violations constituted “serious misconduct” pursuant to
section 17(B) of the Procedures, and that the violations greatly outweighed the two
mitigating factors discussed above. Notably, as discussed above, the special judge pointed
out that there were sixteen proven violations wherein Bloodman knowingly engaged in
dishonesty, deceit, fraud or misrepresentation, and twenty-five proven violations wherein
Bloodman’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. For these reasons, the
special judge determined that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. Bloodman argues that
24 we should reject the special judge’s disbarment recommendation because the evidence
presented does not support such an extreme sanction. We disagree.
In light of the record and our discussion above, it is clear that Bloodman has engaged
in systematic abuse of the legal system for years, both personally and professionally.
Bloodman’s misconduct across the fifteen separate matters yielded 121 violations of the
Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct involving “serious misconduct,” and was
thoroughly detailed in the special judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. This
misconduct seriously undermines the confidence that the public places in the legal
profession. See Tapp, supra. The proven violations are further exacerbated by the fact that
the evidence demonstrates an ongoing pattern of misconduct in the years leading up to, and
at times persisting after, the interim suspension of Bloodman’s license to practice law, and
that Bloodman has not acknowledged the wrongful nature of her conduct. We therefore
accept Judge Smith’s recommendation and enter an order of disbarment.
Special Justices JEFFREY HATFIELD and LAUREN BALLARD join.
WOOD and HILAND, JJ., not participating.
Charlene A. Fleetwood, Arkansas Supreme Court Office of Professional Conduct, for
petitioner.
Terrence Cain, for respondent.