Robert Bean v. Steve Teague

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: February 26, 2014
• Docket: 13-5485
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 14a0155n.06

No. 13-5485

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Feb 26, 2014 DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

Robert Bean, et al., ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF v. TENNESSEE ) Steven Teague, et al., ) ) Defendants-Appellants. ) OPINION )

BEFORE: CLAY and DONALD, Circuit Judges; MAYS, District Judge.*

Samuel H. Mays, District Judge. Defendants-Appellants,

Steven Teague (“Teague”), individually and in his official

capacity as the Monroe County Road Superintendent, and Monroe

County, Tennessee (“Monroe County”), appeal the district court’s

denial of their motion for summary judgment, in which they

asserted Teague’s qualified immunity. Plaintiffs-Appellees

contend that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the

district court’s interlocutory decision. We agree.

* The Honorable Samuel H. Mays, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation. No. 13-5485 Bean et al. v. Teague et al.

I.

Plaintiffs-Appellees filed their complaint against Teague

and Monroe County on October 15, 2010. Plaintiffs-Appellees

filed an amended complaint on November 5, 2011. They alleged

that Defendants-Appellants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by: (1)

terminating or refusing to rehire the Plaintiffs-Appellees in

retaliation for their political associations in violation of the

First Amendment; and (2) depriving the Plaintiffs-Appellees of

their reasonable expectation of future employment with the

Monroe County Road Department (the “Road Department”) in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Defendants-Appellants filed their motion for summary

judgment on January 8, 2013, contending that: (1) Plaintiffs-

Appellees could not establish a case of retaliation; (2) Teague

would have terminated their employment even if they had not

engaged in protected activity; (3) Teague was entitled to

qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiffs-Appellees could not show

that Defendants-Appellants violated Plaintiffs-Appellees’

substantive or procedural due process rights.

The district court denied Defendants-Appellants’ motion for

summary judgment on April 3, 2013. The district court concluded

that: (1) there was a material factual dispute about Teague’s

motivation for firing or refusing to rehire Plaintiffs-

Appellees; (2) Teague was not entitled to qualified immunity for

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that reason; and (3) Monroe County could be liable for Teague’s

actions. Defendants-Appellants timely filed this interlocutory

appeal based on the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity.

II.

The Road Department is responsible for maintaining at least

seven-hundred-sixty (760) miles of road in Monroe County,

Tennessee. Phillip Axley (“Axley”) was the Monroe County Road

Superintendent from September 1, 2002, through August 31, 2010.

At the general election on August 3, 2010, Teague defeated

Axley. Teague became Road Superintendent on September 1, 2010.

Monroe County employed Plaintiffs-Appellees as manual

laborers. They were not in policymaking positions. They were

active supporters during Axley’s campaign. Plaintiff-Appellee

Robert Bean talked to people about voting for Axley. Teague

observed Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl Bivens, David Cline, Jimmy

Cline, Gary Freeman, Ralph Moser, Michael Moser, and Donny

Wattenbarger handing out Axley campaign literature at the polls.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Jimmy Cline, Gary Freeman, and Donny

Wattenbarger spoke to Teague while they worked the polls for

Axley. Plaintiff-Appellee Malchiah Bivens supported Axley in

his 2002 campaign against Teague’s father, Ralph Teague, and in

Axley’s 2010 campaign against Teague. Plaintiff-Appellee James

T. Bryant displayed Axley’s campaign signs in his yard, placed

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Axley bumper stickers on his car, and spoke with friends about

Axley. Plaintiff-Appellee Robert Couch filled in for Axley poll

workers on election day. Plaintiffs-Appellees Charles Gibbons

and Floyd Shaffer worked the polls for Axley on election day.

Teague introduced himself to Gibbons at the polls that day.

Plaintiff-Appellee Joel Hollingshead talked to people about

Axley and took yard signs to supporters on request. Plaintiff-

Appellee Sam Smith spoke to people about Axley. Plaintiff-

Appellee William Stewart, III attended rallies for Axley.

Teague developed concerns about the financial condition of

the Road Department during the election. Teague had no

firsthand knowledge of the financial condition of the Department

before assuming office.

Axley testified that the number of Road Department

employees in August 2010 was in the middle to high thirties. He

testified that he had at most forty (40) employees.

Teague posted a letter at the Road Department some time

after the election. The letter stated that Road Department

employees were required to apply for jobs in Teague’s

administration by August 20, 2010. A stack of applications was

provided. Ten (10) Plaintiffs-Appellees submitted applications

(the “Applicants”).1 The Applicants were: Robert Bean, Carl

1 Defendants-Appellants initially stated that only nine Plaintiffs submitted applications. Plaintiff-Appellee James T. Bryant testified that he had

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Bivens, Malchiah Bivens, James T. Bryant, Robert Couch, Gary

Freeman, Joel Hollingshead, Floyd Shaffer, Sam Smith, Jr., and

Donny Wattenbarger. Seven (7) Plaintiffs-Appellees did not

submit applications (the “Nonapplicants”).2 The Nonapplicants

were: David Cline, Jimmy Cline, Charles Gibbons, Joseph McNabb,

Michael Millsaps, Ralph Moser, and William Stewart, III.

Axley issued separation notices (“Notices”) to all Road

Department employees on August 31, 2010. The Notices stated

that the separation was “permanent” and due to “lack of work.”

Axley testified that he issued the Notices so the Road

Department employees would receive unemployment if they were not

rehired. The parties dispute whether Axley fired the Road

Department employees when he issued the Notices.

The Road Superintendent is the primary decision maker for

Road Department employment. Teague reviewed applications and

conducted interviews during August 2010. Teague could not

officially hire anyone until September 1, 2010. None of the

Plaintiffs-Appellees was rehired on or after September 1, 2010.

Teague hired ten (10) new employees on September 1, 2010.

They were: James Ronald Thomas, Barry West, Misty Brannon,

Patricia Teague, Matthew Cansler, Joshua Harris, Chuck Hunt,

submitted an application. Defendants-Appellants agreed for purposes of summary judgment and admitted in their appellate brief that Bryant had applied. 2 Jacquleen Axley was initially a plaintiff in this case. Jacquleen Axley did not submit an application. She voluntarily dismissed her claims after the district court denied Defendants-Appellants’ motion for summary judgment.

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Norman Nichols, Robert Rodgers, and Larry Valentine. When he

hired them, Teague knew that Patricia Teague, Barry West, and

Robert Rodgers had supported him politically.

Teague had hired two (2) other new employees, Bass Ledford

and Ralph Martin, by September 7, 2010. When Teague hired Bass

Ledford, Teague knew that Ledford had supported him politically.

Bass Ledford had worked for Teague’s father, Ralph Teague, when

Ralph Teague was the Road Superintendent.

Teague rehired fourteen (14) employees on September 1,

2010. A majority of those employees had worked for Ralph Teague

when he was Road Superintendent.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Robert Bean, James T. Bryant, Raymond

Cline, Jimmy Cline, Robert Couch, Gary Freeman, Charles Gibson,

Joseph McNabb, Michael Millsaps, Ralph Moser, Floyd Shaffer,

Samuel Smith, Jr., William Stewart, III, and Donny Wattenbarger

reported to work at the Road Department on September 1, 2010.

They spoke with Teague and recorded the conversation. Teague

told them he had not fired them. He said he did not have any

work for them, but he would notify them if he could employ them.

There is no evidence Teague said anything about the financial

condition of the Road Department.

The parties dispute whether the Road Department’s financial

condition was dire on September 1, 2010. Axley requested

$3,900,000.00 in his annual budget because that amount was

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enough to “get by.” The Road Department budget had been

approved by the State of Tennessee before September 1, 2010.

There was a positive balance in the Road Department’s budget of

$803,838.29 on September 1, 2010. There was a negative balance

of $115,452.37 on September 30, 2010. Teague applied for and

received a $500,000.00 tax anticipation note from the State of

Tennessee. He had reduced the number of Road Department

employees to seventeen (17) by the end of 2010. Plaintiffs-

Appellees filed the complaint in this action after Teague failed

to employ them.

III.

“[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified

immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an

appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

1291 . . . .” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

“[A] qualified immunity ruling [] is . . . a legal issue that

can be decided with reference only to undisputed facts and in

isolation from the remaining issues of the case.” Id. at 529

n.10. A district court’s determination that the summary

judgment record raises a genuine issue of fact about the merits

of a constitutional claim is not a “final decision” for purposes

of appeal. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Canter

v. Cnty. Of Otsego, 14 F. App’x 518, 521 (6th Cir. 2001).

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This Court reviews the application of qualified immunity de

novo. Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 519 (6th Cir.

2010). There are two criteria for analyzing qualified immunity:

(1) whether “the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown (Rules

50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right”; and (2)

“whether the right was clearly established.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quotation marks omitted)

(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).3 “Only if a

defendant raises a purely legal argument under . . . this

analysis may [this Court] exercise jurisdiction over an

interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment in a

qualified immunity case.” Canter, 14 F. App’x at 522.

Monroe County argues that its liability is “inextricably

intertwined” with Teague’s because, if Plaintiffs-Appellees fail

to show that their constitutional rights were violated, the

appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claim against Monroe

County. Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 523-24

(6th Cir. 1999).

The principal constitutional issue in this case is whether

Teague retaliated against Plaintiffs-Appellees for exercising

their First Amendment rights when Teague terminated their

3 The Supreme Court has held that: “The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

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employment or refused to rehire them. To establish a

retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that there was

constitutionally-protected conduct; (2) an adverse action by

defendants sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness

from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) a causal

connection between the first and second elements––that is, the

adverse action was motivated at least in part by plaintiff’s

protected conduct.” Eckerman v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 636 F.3d

202, 207 (6th Cir. 2010). “A plaintiff successfully

demonstrates a causal connection between the adverse action and

the protected conduct by offering direct or circumstantial

evidence indicating that the protected conduct was a substantial

or motivating factor behind the adverse action against

plaintiff.” Id. at 208. “If the plaintiff meets his burden of

establishing retaliation, the burden shifts to defendants to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment

decision would have been the same absent protected conduct.”

Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).4 “[S]ummary judgment is

warranted if, in light of the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable juror could fail to

return a verdict for the defendant.” Id.

4 “Unlike the burden-shifting analysis in Title VII cases, if the defendants meet their burden,” the plaintiff is not permitted to show pretext. Eckerman, 636 F.3d at 208 n.4.

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IV.

Teague argues that his actions were reasonable given the

financial condition of the Road Department when he became

Superintendent. Plaintiffs-Appellees argue that the Court does

not have jurisdiction because Teague’s challenge to the district

court’s finding that there is a disputed issue of material fact

about Teague’s motivation is a challenge to the “correctness of

the district court’s conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting plaintiffs’ . . . claims.” Canter, 14 F.

App’x at 523. Teague’s actual motivation is a question of fact

and is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Johnson, 515

U.S. at 313; Hoard v. Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205, 220 (6th Cir.

1999).

The district court found that “[t]he most simple and

obvious material dispute is the reason why Mr. Teague either

fired or refused to rehire the Plaintiffs. The Defendants’ state

of mind is a fact [] for the jury, not the Court, to resolve.”

Defendants-Appellants’ argument that Teague’s failure to rehire

Plaintiffs-Appellees was reasonable based on the Road

Department’s finances is an attempt to “transform the factual

issue of motivation into the legal question of objective

reasonableness.” Hoard, 198 F.3d at 218. To decide motivation

would require the district court to “resolve the factual dispute

underlying the constitutional claim.” Id. at 217. This Court

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explicitly rejected that approach in Hoard: “As long as

plaintiffs produced evidence that could support a finding that

[the defendant] discharged them on the basis of their political

affiliation, the district court was obligated under Crawford-El

to deny [the defendant’s] motion for summary judgment.” Id. at

219 (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)).

“The district court’s finding that there is a factual

dispute as to [the defendant’s] motivation, in turn, deprives

this court of appellate jurisdiction . . . .” Id. That finding

involves an issue of evidentiary sufficiency. If the district

court “clearly stated the fact that it believed to be in

dispute” was a defendant’s motivation, this Court has no

jurisdiction to consider the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence

about that motivation. Id. at 220.

Teague also argues that the Nonapplicants cannot succeed on

their retaliation claim because they did not apply to work in

the Teague administration. The record does not clearly

establish that the Nonapplicants knew they had to reapply for

jobs they already had, or that they had the opportunity to do

so. Teague claims to have imposed a deadline of August 20,

2010, to apply for positions in his administration by having a

flyer posted in the Road Department, although he had no legal

authority to hire anyone until September 1, 2010. The record

does not establish when or where Teague’s flyer was posted. The

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record does not establish that all of the Nonapplicants saw or

should have seen the flyer. It is unclear whether the

Nonapplicants knew they would be terminated on August 31, 2010,

eleven days after Teague’s proclaimed application deadline, and

thus whether they had notice that they would be required to

reapply for their non-policymaking jobs in the Road Department.

Like Teague’s motivation in rejecting the Applicants, fact

issues pervade the Nonapplicants’ retaliation claims.

The district court clearly stated that there was a material

factual dispute about Teague’s motivation for terminating

Plaintiffs-Appellees or refusing to rehire them. This Court has

no jurisdiction over Teague’s appeal of the denial of summary

judgment.

V.

Monroe County argues that this Court should exercise

pendent appellate jurisdiction over its appeal because the

issues raised in Teague’s appeal are inextricably intertwined

with Monroe County’s. Because this Court does not have

jurisdiction to consider Teague’s appeal, we cannot assert

pendent jurisdiction over Monroe County’s appeal.

VI.

The district court found that there was a material factual

dispute about Teague’s motivation in firing or failing to rehire

Plaintiffs-Appellees. This Court has no jurisdiction to review

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the district court’s decision. This Court cannot assert pendent

jurisdiction over Monroe County. Defendants-Appellants’

interlocutory appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and

the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

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