Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed August 13, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-0825 Lower Tribunal No. 24-17931-CA-01 ________________
Robert A. Harris, Petitioner,
vs.
Michael Dazzo, Respondent.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.
Day Pitney LLP, and Andrew R. Ingalls and Alfredo E. Dally, for petitioner.
Berkeley Law, P.A., and Lorne E. Berkeley (Cooper City), for respondent.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J. Petitioner Robert Harris seeks a writ of certiorari to quash an order
denying his motion to dismiss asserting arbitral immunity. Finding Harris
established the elements for certiorari relief, we grant the petition and quash
the order.
I.
Respondent Michael Dazzo is a Class A owner of Alternative Global
Management, LLC. He and the other Class A owners of Alternative Global
Management, LLC agreed to dissolve the company. Their agreement
required all disputes be resolved by the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) before a three-member panel where each party selects one
arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators select the third neutral.
The third neutral acts as the chairperson of the panel. It further provided that
the arbitrators would be bound by the company’s agreement.
Through a ranking selection process administered by the AAA, Harris
was offered the position as the third neutral and chairperson. AAA required
Harris to complete a General Arbitrator Oath Form, which provided,
I further affirm that consistent with the applicable Rules of the American Arbitration Association, the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, the parties’ agreement, and applicable law: • That I am fit to serve on the above-referenced arbitration and able to fully execute my responsibilities during all phases of the case;
2 • That I will keep confidential all matters relating to the above-referenced arbitration; • That I will maintain a professional demeanor and appearance of impartiality during all phases of this case; • That I will endeavor to effectively manage all phases of this case with a commitment to speed, economy and just resolution in a manner consistent with the parties’ expectations; • That I will bill parties responsibly and ethically and will review my bills for reasonableness relative to the nature and scope of the activity performed prior to submitting them to the AAA.
After issues arose in the arbitration process, Dazzo lodged a formal
objection with the AAA and sought to remove Harris. In October 2024, the
AAA’s Administrative Review Council removed Harris from the arbitration
panel, stating,
On October 8, 2024, the AAA’s Administrative Review Council (“Council”) considered the Claimant’s objection to the continued service of Arbitrator Harris and any response received. After careful consideration of the parties’ contentions, the Council has determined that Arbitrator Harris shall be removed in this case. This decision will be made a part of our administrative file.
The AAA’s rule on disqualification provides that an arbitrator shall be subject to disqualification for partiality or lack of independence, inability or refusal to perform his or her duties with diligence and in good faith, and any grounds for disqualification provided by applicable law. The Council has carefully reviewed and considered the parties’ submissions in this matter. Based upon the Council’s Review Standards available at https://www.adr.org/arc, to which the parties were previously referred, the Council is removing Arbitrator Harris.
3 Separately, Dazzo filed suit against Harris asserting claims for breach
of contract and fraud in the inducement. Dazzo says that Harris acted in a
manner that prejudiced the arbitration proceedings and ran counter to the
General Arbitrator Oath and the parties’ agreement. These alleged acts
include: excluding Dazzo’s party-appointed arbitrators from deliberations;1
failing to review Dazzo’s submissions; refusing to permit conferences or
schedule oral arguments; circulating a prejudicial and biased order to the
other panelists; filing a response to Dazzo’s objections without deliberating
with the remaining arbitrators; providing unreasonably short deadlines for
objections to proposed orders; disregarding panel members’ schedules;
requiring the parties to engage in costly, burdensome, and irrelevant
discovery; issuing false and gratuitous comments about Dazzo and his
counsel, and accusing Dazzo of collusion. Dazzo maintains that these
actions unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings at significant costs to the
parties, in contradiction to Harris’ promises of speed, efficiency, and
impartiality in his AAA Oath—which was executed before arbitration and to
entice the parties to select him.
1 Dazzo’s first party-appointed arbitrator resigned, citing Harris’ “extreme prejudice and bias against Claimants.” Dazzo’s second party-appointed arbitrator also resigned, stating that Harris’ actions prevented reasonable and meaningful time to evaluate rulings and may unfairly prejudice Dazzo and other claimants.
4 Citing section 682.051, Florida Statutes, Harris moved to dismiss
asserting arbitral immunity. He maintained that the allegations relate entirely
to his decisions and conduct as an arbitrator. Dazzo responded that his
claims are based on Harris’ pre-arbitration representations in the AAA oath,
and therefore, arbitral immunity does not apply.
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court accepted
Dazzo’s arguments and denied the motion. In support, it relied upon cases
from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Greenspan v. LADT, LLC, 111 Cal. Rptr.
3d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding arbitral immunity barred an investor’s
civil suit against the arbitrator alleging that arbitrator failed to issue a timely
award as required by arbitration provider’s rules); Baar v. Tigerman, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (superseded by statute) (rejecting claim of
arbitral immunity where arbitrator breached his contractual obligation to
render a timely award; under California law, arbitrator loses jurisdiction if
award not timely made). Harris timely petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari.
II.
The common law writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary remedy.”
Broward Cnty. v. G.B.V. Int’l., Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. 2001). It “allows
a superior court to direct a lower tribunal to inform it of the events below in a
5 pending case so that the superior court can review the proceedings for
regularity.” M.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 189 So. 3d 134, 138 (Fla.
2016). “The writ functions as a safety net and gives the upper court the
prerogative to reach down and halt a miscarriage of justice where no other
remedy exists.” Broward Cnty., 787 So. 2d at 842.
Generally, certiorari review is not available to review orders denying a
motion to dismiss. Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246, 252
(Fla. 2023). Before a Court may grant certiorari relief from a denial of a
motion to dismiss, a party must demonstrate a departure from the essential
requirements of the law that results in material injury that cannot be corrected
on plenary appeal. Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d
812, 822 (Fla. 2004). The last two showings are jurisdictional in nature.
Certiorari relief has been traditionally available for a trial court’s
rejection of claims of absolute immunity—as it involves immunity from suit.
See Univ. of Miami v. Ruiz ex rel. Ruiz, 164 So. 3d 758, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015); Fuller v. Truncale, 50 So. 3d 25, 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Being forced
to defend the suit when immune is irreparable harm. Mills v. Kinnan, No.
2D2024-0891, 2025 WL 1006826, at *3 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 4, 2025). See
also Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Monk, 68 So. 3d 316, 318 (Fla. 1st DCA
2011) (“[A]bsolute immunity protects a party from having to defend a lawsuit
6 at all, and waiting until final appeal to review an order denying dismissal on
immunity grounds renders such immunity meaningless if the lower court
denied dismissal in error.”); Crowder v. Barbati, 987 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla.
4th DCA 2008) (“Thus, any remedy that enforced immunity upon final appeal,
after the case had been fully defended, would be meaningless.”). But
certiorari relief is not available for a mere defense to liability. See Vericker
v. Powell, 406 So. 3d 939, 945 (Fla. 2025); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San
Perdido Ass’n, Inc., 104 So. 3d 344, 353 n.6 (Fla. 2012).
Accordingly, we must determine whether arbitrators are protected by
absolute immunity or simply provided a defense to liability.
A.
Arbitration is a “process whereby a neutral third person or panel, called
an arbitrator or arbitration panel, considers the facts and arguments
presented by the parties and renders a decision which may be binding or
nonbinding.” § 44.1011(1), Fla. Stat. (2025). It is “an alternate forum for
litigation where the competing parties have the chance to present evidence
to a finder of fact.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Broward Ins. Recovery Ctr.,
LLC, 322 So. 3d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). The proceedings are quasi-
judicial in nature. Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So. 2d 102, 106 (Fla. 1951).
“Although not conducted with the same degree of formality as a judicial
7 proceeding, arbitration proceedings are impressed with the same procedural
safeguards.” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Mango Hill #6 Condo. Ass’n, Inc.,
117 So. 3d 1226, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
Floridians have used arbitration for over 200 years. It existed both at
common law and by statute. See Johnson v. Wells, 73 So. 188, 190 (Fla.
1916); Gaines Constr. Co. v. Carol City Utils., Inc., 164 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla.
3d DCA 1963). Indeed, laws concerning arbitration have existed since
Florida was a territory. See Fla. Terr. Acts 1828, p.190 (“That it shall and
may be lawful for all persons desirous of ending any matter of difference,
controversy or quarrel, in which any action at law or in equity will lie, . . . to
agree that their said matter of difference, controversy or quarrel shall be
adjusted and determined by arbitration . . . .”). See also Comp. Gen Laws.
1927, § 4552-4559.
In 1957, the Florida Legislature created the Florida Arbitration Code.
Ch. 57-402, Laws of Fla. The Code was based on the 1955 Uniform
Arbitration Act, which was adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It provided a framework governing
the rights and procedures for arbitration. It was subsequently transferred to
another chapter in 1967, but remained unchanged for years. See Ch. 67-
254, Laws of Fla.
8 In 1989, the Legislature enacted additional laws concerning alternative
dispute resolution. These granted civil judges the authority to refer cases to
mediation and arbitration. See Ch. 89-31, Laws of Fla. One section provided
that the mediator and arbitrator have “judicial immunity in the same manner
and to the same extent as a judge.” Id. at § 5. This statute is still in effect
today. See § 44.107, Fla. Stat. (2025).
Twenty-four years later, the Florida Legislature performed an overhaul
and revised the Arbitration Code. Ch. 2013-232, Laws on Fla. This revised
Code was based on the 2000 Uniform Arbitration Act, which was also
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Fla. S.B. 530 (2013) Staff Analysis, 3 (Mar. 15, 2013). It granted
arbitrators immunity “from civil liability.” Ch. 2013-232, § 15, Laws on Fla.
See also Unif. Arbitration Act 2000 § 14, cmt. 1 (“In addition to the grant of
immunity from a civil action, arbitrators are also generally accorded immunity
from process when subpoenaed or summoned to testify in a judicial
proceeding in a case arising from their service as arbitrator. This full
immunity from any civil proceedings is what is intended by the language in
Section 14(a).”) (internal citations omitted).
Florida’s Revised Arbitration Code is now found in Chapter 682.
Section 682.051, Florida Statutes, provides:
9 (1) An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity.
(2) The immunity afforded under this section supplements any immunity under other law.
(3) The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure required by s. 682.041 does not cause any loss of immunity under this section.
(4) In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an arbitrator or representative of an arbitration organization is not competent to testify, and may not be required to produce records as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the same extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity. This subsection does not apply:
(a) To the extent necessary to determine the claim of an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of the arbitration organization against a party to the arbitration proceeding; or
(b) To a hearing on a motion to vacate an award under s. 682.13(1)(a) or (b) if the movant establishes prima facie that a ground for vacating the award exists.
(5) If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization arising from the services of the arbitrator, organization, or representative or if a person seeks to compel an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration organization to testify or produce records in violation of subsection (4), and the court decides that the arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization is immune from civil liability or that the arbitrator or representative of the organization is not competent to testify, the court shall award to the arbitrator, organization, or representative reasonable attorney fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation.
10 § 682.051, Fla. Stat. (2025). “Arbitrator” is defined as “an individual
appointed to render an award, alone or with others, in a controversy that is
subject to an agreement to arbitrate.” § 682.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2025).
Pertinent to our analysis is the phrase, “civil liability to the same extent
as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity.” § 682.051(1),
Fla. Stat. In Florida, judges are cloaked with absolute immunity for acts
performed in their judicial capacities. Johnson v. Harris, 645 So. 2d 96, 98
(Fla. 5th DCA 1994). See also Berry v. State, 400 So. 2d 80, 83 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1981) (“[I]t is not a tort for the judiciary to judge.”). It is “an immunity
from suit, not just from an assessment of damages.” Kalmanson v. Lockett,
848 So. 2d 374, 378 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Accord Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11 (1991) (“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an
immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”).
Yet Dazzo focuses on the words “acting in that capacity.” He claims it
means that the immunity is not absolute. Not so. This simply means that
the person must be acting in his role as an arbitrator to receive the
immunity—not that the immunity is a mere defense to liability. This is like
judicial immunity, which applies to “judicial acts.” See Fuller, 50 So. 3d at 28
(“A judge or quasi-judicial official may claim judicial immunity if he can
11 demonstrate two prerequisites: (1) the ruling in question was a ‘judicial act;’
and (2) there was jurisdiction to issue the ruling.”).
At bottom, arbitral immunity is absolute in nature. It is immunity from
suit. Kidwell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 975 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Dragging an arbitrator into a litigation causes material harm that cannot be
corrected on plenary appeal. Fuller, 50 So. 3d at 28. Certiorari relief is
available.
B.
Next, we must determine whether the trial court departed from the
essential requirements of the law by denying the motion to dismiss. To do
so, we need to examine the complaint’s allegations and determine whether
they show that Harris was acting in the capacity of arbitrator. See generally
Henry v. City of Mount Dora, 371 So. 3d 386, 390 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“To
determine whether conduct constitutes a ‘judicial act’ for purposes of
immunity, the court should consider (a) whether the precise conduct was
performed as a normal judicial function; (b) whether the event occurred in
the courtroom or in chambers; (c) whether the controversy centered around
a case pending before the judge; and (d) whether the confrontation arose
directly or immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.”).
12 In the complaint, Dazzo alleges that Harris executed the AAA Oath and
he breached that agreement. Specifically, he claims Harris excluded party-
appointed arbitrators from deliberations and decisions, failed to review
submissions, refused to permit conferences or schedule oral arguments,
circulated a prejudicial order, filed a response to Dazzo’s objections without
deliberating with others, provided unreasonably short deadlines, disregarded
other panel-members’ schedules, made gratuitous comments, and accused
Dazzo of collusion. Dazzo maintains that these actions were in
contravention of his AAA Oath and unnecessarily prolonged the
proceedings.
Our review leads us to one conclusion—these allegations fall squarely
within Harris’ role as an arbitrator. While Dazzo tries to frame this as a
breach of Harris’ pre-arbitration AAA Oath, Harris was acting in the capacity
of an arbitrator. § 682.051(1), Fla. Stat. These events occurred during, and
are centered around, the arbitration proceeding. Indeed, they were integrally
related to the arbitral process. What is more, the AAA Administrative Review
Council expressly removed Harris for these arbitral acts.
To this end, absolute immunity attaches. Harris’ immunity is not
overcome by allegations of bad faith, malice, or incompetence, such as
13 these. Kalmanson, 848 So. 2d at 378. The existence of the oath or an
arbitration agreement does not override the immunity.
And so, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the
law—section 682.051, Florida Statutes. See Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 890 (Fla. 2003). It failed to apply the correct
law. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995). This
resulted “in a miscarriage of justice.” Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla.
1983).
III.
Dazzo warns this Court that if we grant certiorari we will be setting
“dangerous precedent.” Quite the opposite. If we were to follow Dazzo’s
reasoning, all arbitrators and judges would be opened to litigation. A
disgruntled litigant would simply need to cite their oath of office. This simply
cannot be. See Harris, 645 So. 2d at 97–98 (citing Sparks v. Duval Cnty.
Ranch Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 976, 979–80 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“[T]he absolute
immunity that judges enjoy exists for the benefit of the judicial system and of
the public, not for that of the judge. Only a hero could exercise an unfettered
judgment while facing, day after day and case after case, the prospect of
personal ruin implicit in permitting every losing party to sue him for
damages.”); New England Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 199 F.3d
14 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999) (“As with judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, arbitral
immunity is essential to protect decision-makers from undue influence and
protect the decision-making process from reprisals by dissatisfied litigants.”).
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the
order denying Harris’ motion to dismiss. Harris is entitled to absolute
immunity. The lawsuit should be dismissed.
Petition granted; order quashed.