Roanoke Marble & Granite Co. v. Standard Gas & Oil Supply Co.

154 S.E. 518, 155 Va. 249, 1930 Va. LEXIS 162
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedSeptember 12, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 154 S.E. 518 (Roanoke Marble & Granite Co. v. Standard Gas & Oil Supply Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roanoke Marble & Granite Co. v. Standard Gas & Oil Supply Co., 154 S.E. 518, 155 Va. 249, 1930 Va. LEXIS 162 (Va. 1930).

Opinion

Hudgins, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The Roanoke Marble and Granite Company, hereinafter referred to as the lessor, is the owner of a parcel of land on Jefferson street in the city of Roanoke, which on the 5th day of April, 1926, it leased to a partnership composed of John L. Laughon and S. E. Wood for a period of five years, with an option to extend the lease upon certain conditions.

In the lease, it was agreed between the parties that the lessees should use the leased land for the sole purpose of conducting and operating a filling station for the sale of gasoline, motor oil and other commodities and accessories generally used for automobiles and commonly sold or handled by filling stations. Under the terms of the lease, the lessees had the right, by and with the consent and approval of the lessor, to erect and install in and upon the leased premises, buildings, structures, tanks, improvements, equipment and appliances.

Pursuant to this lease, the lessees installed in and attached to the freehold and under the surface of the premises a large gasoline supply tank of 12,500 gallons capacity. By the terms of the lease, the lessor was required to, and did, contract with the Norfolk and Western Railway Company to install a siding leading to the leased premises, in order that gasoline might be purchased in carload lots at a lower price and pumped directly from the tank car to the gasoline supply tank, and from it piped directly to the surface pumps. This 12,500 gallon gasoline supply tank was connected with pipes leading to the railroad siding.

[252]*252S. E. Wood, one of the lessees, assigned his interest in the said lease to his partner, John L. Laughon, who was recognized as the sole lessee by the lessor. On the 14th day of December, 1927, John L. Laughon was adjudicated a bankrupt. Laughon’s trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed any interest in “accessories, furnishings, fixtures, machinery, appliances, equipment, etc.,” erected by the lessees and used in connection with the filling station. The trustee in bankruptcy, after making the disclaimer, sold the lease as an asset of the estate of the bankrupt, John L. Laughon, to the Standard Gas and Oil Supply Company, the appellee, and the lessor recognized it as an assignee of the said lease.

Approximately one year later, in April, 1929, the lessor was informed that the appellee was removing, or attempting to remove, the 12,500 gallon supply tank installed under the surface of the leased premises and connected with pipes as described above. The lessor immediately instituted suit, in the Hustings Court of the city of Roanoke, praying that the appellee be enjoined and restrained from removing the said tank. A temporary restraining order was granted; the appellee filed a demurrer and answer to the bill, and later moved to have the temporary injunction dissolved. The cause was heard on the bill, the demurrer, the answer, the motion to dissolve, and affidavits filed in support of the allegations in the bill. The lower court held that the lessor had an adequate remedy at law, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the suit.

From this decree the case is here on appeal.

It is contended by the Standard Gas and Oil Supply Company, hereinafter referred to as the appellee, that the gasoline tank in question is a trade fixture and that the appellee has a right to remove it at any time within the term of the lease. If it were conceded that, in the absence of any agreement upon the subject, the tank was a trade fixture and that it was removable during the term by the tenant, [253]*253how is that right, or privilege, affected by the provisions of the lease? The pertinent parts of the lease are as follows:

“1. The lessees shall use the lands hereinabove described for the sole purpose of maintaining and operating a filling station thereon for the sale of gasoline, motor oils, and the other commodities and accessories generally used for automobiles and now commonly sold or handled by filling stations. Subject at all times to the approval of the lessor as to the location, kind and nature, the lessees shall have the right to build, erect, construct, and maintain upon the premises above described such buildings, tanks, pumps, driveways, storehouses, repair shops,. and other things as may be reasonably necessary for the conduct of the business contemplated.

“7. All buildings, tanks, pumps, fixtures, and improvements of every kind and description erected upon the premises hereby leased shall be the property of and belong exclusively to the lessees free from any liens and encumbrances, and upon the termination of this lease all such structures, buildings, improvements, fixtures, tanks, pumps and appliances installed, constructed, or erected upon said premises by the lessees shall be the property of and belong exclusively to the lessor.

“8. Any and all buildings, structures, tanks, improvements, equipment, and appliances erected, constructed, or installed upon the premises hereby leased shall as to kind, nature, description and location be subject to the approval of the lessor.”

A concise analysis of the above provisions may be stated thus: (1) The sole use of the premises contemplated by the parties was the erection and maintenance of a filling station, with the installation of the necessary equipment therefor. (2) The lessees were given the right to construct and maintain buildings, tanks, pumps, driveways, storehouses and repair shops, and other things reasonably neces[254]*254sary for the operation of the filling station. (3) The lessees, before locating any of the above-mentioned structures and appliances, had to obtain the approval of the lessor, not only of the spot on which they were to be located on the premises, but the kind, nature and description of the same were also to be approved by him. (4) When this approval of the lessor was obtained and the necessary fixtures and appliances erected and installed on the premises, they were for the use of the lessees during the term of the lease. (5) On the termination of the lease, such buildings, structures, tanks, improvements, equipment and appliances so erected or installed became the absolute property of the lessor.

The appellee contends that the lessor has no interest in the tank and other appliances unless such tank and appliances are on the leased premises at the termination of the lease. This contention is based on the construction of the first four lines of paragraph 7, namely, “All buildings, tanks, pumps, fixtures, and improvements of every kind and description erected upon the premises hereby leased shall be the property of and belong exclusively to the lessees.” This clause, standing alone and separated from other parts of the contract, gives color to that claim. The appellee recognizes the settled rule of construction, namely, that contracts must be construed so as to give effect to every part thereof, but contends that the first clause of paragraph 7 is in such'conflict with the last clause that it is impossible to reconcile the two, unless the two are construed to mean that during the term of the lease all buildings, equipment, fixtures, etc., on the premises are the absolute property of the lessee and that at the termination of the lease all such buildings, tanks, fixtures, etc., remaining on the property are to become the property of the lessor. To this construction of the lease we cannot agree.

A careful examination of the entire lease, including paragraph 7, shows that the parties intended two things. [255]

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Bluebook (online)
154 S.E. 518, 155 Va. 249, 1930 Va. LEXIS 162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roanoke-marble-granite-co-v-standard-gas-oil-supply-co-va-1930.