R.L.P. v. R.F.M.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 11, 2015
Docket1540 EDA 2014
StatusPublished

This text of R.L.P. v. R.F.M. (R.L.P. v. R.F.M.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
R.L.P. v. R.F.M., (Pa. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

J-A32015-14

2015 PA Super 29

R.L.P., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v.

R.F.M.,

Appellee No. 1540 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered October 14, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2010-06638

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY OLSON, J.:FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2015

I agree with the learned Majority's conclusion that the substantive

provisions of the trial court's custody order should be affirmed. I also concur

in the Majority's assessment that the original transcribed version of the trial

court's order, with its attendant exchanges between the court and counsel,

is far too convoluted and confusing to comply with Rule 1915.10(b) of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. I write separately, however, as I am

unable to agree with the mandatory nature of the Majority's solution to the

present problem; to wit the Majority's holding that, "in order to be

sufficiently specific to be enforced, an order of custody must be entered as a

separate written order, or as a separate section of a written opinion"

designated under the heading of "Order." See Majority Opinion at 1-2 and 7

(emphasis added).

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A32015-14

As the Majority suggests, it is self-evident that, in many if not most

cases, the process of preparing a separate written order will provide the trial

court with an opportunity to organize its thoughts and coherently articulate

the intended terms of its adjudicatory directive. The format of an order is no

guarantee, however, that it will be sufficiently clear and specific to merit

enforcement, as Pa.R.C.P. 1915.10(b) requires. Moreover, nothing in our

procedural or appellate rules, or the relevant interpretive case law, dictates

the precise format of an appealable or enforceable order.1 Accordingly,

unlike my learned colleagues, I would conduct any inquiry under Rule

1915.10(b) on a case-by case basis and allow remand for confirmation or

clarification, as occurred in the present case, where an order does not meet

the "sufficiently specific" criteria of that provision.

____________________________________________

1 Our appellate rules provide that “no order of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket in the lower court,” Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1), and that “[e]very order shall be set forth on a separate document.” Pa.R.A.P. 301(b). In my view, so long as the transcribed notes of testimony docketed as the trial court’s order are sufficiently clear and specific to permit enforcement of the terms of the court’s custody directive, then I believe that Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1) and (b) and Pa.R.C.P. 1915.10(b) have been satisfied.

-2-

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

R.L.P. v. R.F.M.
110 A.3d 201 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
R.L.P. v. R.F.M., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rlp-v-rfm-pasuperct-2015.