Riverton Lime & Stone Co. v. Commissioner

28 T.C. 446, 1957 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 181
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMay 24, 1957
DocketDocket No. 55005
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 28 T.C. 446 (Riverton Lime & Stone Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Riverton Lime & Stone Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 446, 1957 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 181 (tax 1957).

Opinion

OPINION.

Rice, Judge:

Section 114 (b) (4) (A) of the 1939 Code3 provides that the allowance for depletion in the case of stone shall be “5 per centum * * * of the gross income from the property during the taxable year * * Subparagraph (B) defines gross income from the property as “the gross income from mining * * and includes within the term mining “not merely the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by mine owners or operators in order to obtain the commercially marketable mineral product or products * * *.” In Black Mountain Corporation, 21 T. C. 746 (1954), we agreed that the Commissioner, in his regulations, had properly interpreted the phrase “commercially marketable mineral product” to mean the “first commercially marketable mineral product.”

The primary issue before us is whether crushed limestone, or pure hydrated hydraulic lime, was the “first commercially marketable mineral product” arrived at in petitioner’s production operations.

Petitioner contends that hydrated hydraulic lime was the first commercially marketable product which it produced since no market existed for its limestone until it reached that state. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that the limestone here in issue .could have been used in its crushed state for agricultural purposes and that crushed limestone and not hydrated hydraulic lime was therefore the first marketable product which the petitioner produced. He, accordingly, contends that petitioner’s depletion allowance must be limited to 5 per cent of the theoretical gross income derived from the sale of crushed stone plus the amount realized from the sale of quarry screenings.

We found as a fact that even though petitioner’s crushed limestone could have been used for agricultural purposes, it could not and did not sell the limestone in that state because of its inferior chemical composition and that hydrated hydraulic lime was, therefore, the first commercially marketable mineral product which it produced. We think “commercially marketable” means that there is commerce or trade in a mineral product and that there is an established market in which such product is sold. Here there was neither so far as this particular crushed limestone was concerned. But, even in the face of those facts, the respondent argues that because the crushed stone which the petitioner produced could have been used for agricultural purposes, it must compute its allowable depletion on the theoretical gross income supposedly derived from the sale of the crushed stone. It seems to us that the effect of that argument is to read the words “commercially marketable” out of the statute.

As the Court of Appeals said in United States v. Cherokee Brick 6 Tile Co., 218 F. 2d 424, 425 (C. A. 5, 1955):

The statutory language is clear and unambiguous, which is that gross income from mining must include the income from ordinary treatment processes which must be applied to the ore or mineral in order to obtain the commercially marketable mineral product, that is, the first product which is marketable in commerce. There is no provision in the statute for excluding any process before such a marketable product is reached. * * *

See also United States v. Merry Brothers Brick & Tile Co., 242 F. 2d 708 (C. A. 5, 1957); United States v. Sapulpa Brich & Tile Corporation, 239 F. 2d 694 (C. A. 10, 1956); Townsend v. Hitchcock Corporation, 232 F. 2d 444 (C. A. 4, 1956); and American Gilsonite Co., 28 T. C. 194 (1957).

We therefore conclude that the gross income which petitioner derived from the sale of hydrated hydraulic lime plus the income from the sale of quarry screenings is the proper basis for computing its allowable percentage depletion.

The second issue presented for our consideration is the proper method of computing the depletion base. Had all of petitioner’s sales been of pure hydrated hydraulic lime, the issue would not exist. Gross income from the property could then have been equated to gross receipts. However, such was not the case. As the record reveals, sales of the product were made in both a pure and a mixed state. Therefore, we must arrive at a figure which most clearly reflects gross income from the pure product, excluding therefrom the costs and proportionate profits attributable to those processes utilized thereafter to produce the mixed product. At best, any figure will be only an approximation since the bulk of petitioner’s sales were of the mixed product.

The Code provides that the basis against which the statutory depletion percentage is to be applied is the “gross income from the property.” The regulations 4 state:

if the product is * * * processed * * * before sale, “gross income from the property” means the representative market or field price (as of the date of sale) of a mineral product of like kind and grade as beneficiated by the ordinary treatment processes actually applied,* * *. If there is no such representative market or field price (as of the date of sale), then there shall he used in lieu thereof the representative 'market or field price of the first marketable product resulting from any process or processes * * * minus the costs and proportionate profits attributable to the * * * processes beyond the ordinary treatment processes. If the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that another method of computation, other than the computation of profits proportionate to costs, clearly reflects the gross income from the property, then such gross income shall be computed by the use of such other method. [Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner contends that $19.20 per ton, the minimum price received by it for hydrated hydraulic lime in its pure state during the years in issue, was the representative market price for that product. It computes its gross income from the property by multiplying the total tonnage of that product sold in each year, whether in a pure or mixed state, by $19.20, and adds to that figure the amounts realized from the sale of quarry screenings.

Respondent challenges that method. He contends that petitioner has failed to establish that $19.20 was the representative market price per ton for pure hydrated hydraulic lime during the years in issue. He argues that while $19.20 might represent the market price per ton for that small portion of petitioner’s total production of hydrated hydraulic lime which was sold in the pure state, it cannot be said to represent the market price for the much greater quantity of that product which was sold in the admixed state. Therefore, he argues, there being no representative market price for “a mineral product of like kind and grade as beneficiated by the ordinary treatment processes actually applied,” gross income from the property must be determined on the basis of the market price “of the first marketable product resulting from any process or processes,” here the admixed product, “minus the costs and proportionate profits attributable to the * * * processes beyond the ordinary treatment processes.”

Accordingly, respondent would apply to petitioner’s gross sales, the ratio which the cost of the ordinary treatment processes bears to the entire cost of production.

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Bluebook (online)
28 T.C. 446, 1957 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/riverton-lime-stone-co-v-commissioner-tax-1957.