Rivera-Pedrogo v. Villamil-Wiscovitch

CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedMarch 21, 2023
Docket3:22-cv-01039
StatusUnknown

This text of Rivera-Pedrogo v. Villamil-Wiscovitch (Rivera-Pedrogo v. Villamil-Wiscovitch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rivera-Pedrogo v. Villamil-Wiscovitch, (prd 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

JUAN C. RIVERA-PEDROGO,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL NO. 22-1039 (CVR)

DR. FERNANDO L. VILLAMIL- WISCOVITCH,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Juan C. Rivera-Pedrogo (“Plaintiff”) brings forth this medical malpractice claim against defendant Dr. Fernando L. Villamil-Wiscovitch (“Defendant”) based on diversity jurisdiction. (Docket No. 1). Before the Court now is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to Dismiss”) where he alleges the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Docket No. 35). For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that diversity jurisdiction is present. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff is an industrial engineer, who led an active lifestyle from a young age. (Docket No. 1, at p. 2). He participated in a wide variety of sports and athletic competitions, including the Ironman Triathlon. Id. In 2017, Plaintiff started experiencing “severe lower back pain that rendered it impossible for him to continue running and participating in triathlon competitions. . . .” (Docket No. 1, at p. 3). Per his coworkers’ recommendations, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s office for an evaluation. Id. Page 2 _______________________________

Defendant, an orthopedic surgeon specializing in the spine, evaluated Plaintiff and referred him to an anesthesiologist, who treated Plaintiff for approximately three months using blockage therapy. Id. These treatments proved unsuccessful at easing his pain, so Defendant ultimately recommended that Plaintiff undergo surgery, which was scheduled for November 8, 2018. (Docket No. 1, at pp. 3-4). “Following the surgical procedure, [P]laintiff awoke with intense lower back pain and multiple neurologic deficits in the right lower extremity including a dense foot drop, which defendant doctor attributed to a [sic] intraoperative finding that complicated the proposed surgery, which prompted him to perform additional procedures.” Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff started physical therapy immediately after his surgery, but his condition did not improve. Id. at p. 5. “Desperate [from] his persistent pain, atrophy, and profound weakness of the right lower extremity, . . . [Plaintiff] sought and underwent a revision procedure with Dr. Yamil Rivera-Colón [on] November 2019”; but, like before, Plaintiff’s pain did not improve. Id. On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present suit in federal court, alleging inter alia that “Defendant Dr. Fernando Villamil’s surgery deviated from the standard of care in multiple ways regarding his treatment of [Plaintiff], thus incurring in gross negligence and medical malpractice.” (Docket No. 1, at p. 6). Defendant answered the Complaint on January 28, 2022, and subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on January 25, 2023. (Docket Nos. 10 and 35, respectively). Defendant claims dismissal is warranted because, although he is a resident of Oklahoma, his domicile is in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 35, at p. 2). Thus, since both parties are domiciled in Puerto Rico, diversity jurisdiction is lacking and the Court should, consequently, dismiss the Complaint. Id. Page 3 _______________________________

Plaintiff opposed dismissal on February 22, 2023, arguing that diversity was present at the time of filing the Complaint and remains as such because Defendant’s true domicile is Oklahoma. (Docket No. 41, at p. 2). To this end, Plaintiff provides a myriad of evidence that,1 in his view, demonstrates Defendant “was domiciled in Oklahoma long before the date of the filing of [the] complaint and still is.” Id. On March 14, 2023, Defendant replied to Plaintiff’s Opposition reiterating that, despite his current residence and Plaintiff’s alleged “selective and anticipated biased interpretation of the facts and documents”, “neither at present nor certainly at the time of the filing of this action did he have the intention of establishing his domicile in Oklahoma.” (Docket No. 58, at pp. 2-3). LEGAL STANDARD It is well recognized that “‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore must be certain that they have explicit authority to decide a case.’” Roselló- González v. Calderón-Serra, 398 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bonas v. Town of North Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2001)). See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”). As such, “[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, [. . .] which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that “‘the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence.’” Murphy v. U.S., 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing

1 Plaintiff filed a total of twenty-seven (27) exhibits, which the Court will discuss in more detail further on in the Opinion. (Docket No. 41, Exhibits 1-27). Page 4 _______________________________

Taber Partners, I. v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1992); Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001). When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (“Rule 12(b)(1)”),2 “[t]he district court must construe the Complaint liberally and treat all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1987)); Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522 (citing K.W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 721, 726 (1st Cir. 1988)). “A party, however, may not rest merely on ‘unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law.’” Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522 (citing Washington Legal Found. V. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993)). “‘[S]ubjective characterizations or conclusory descriptions of a general scenario which could be dominated by unpleaded facts’ will not defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir. 1992)) (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, in a diversity action, Rule 12(b)(1) allows “a party [to] contest the court’s subject matter jurisdiction by challenging the allegations in the complaint as insufficient on their face or by questioning the accuracy of those allegations.” Hernández- Santiago v.

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Rivera-Pedrogo v. Villamil-Wiscovitch, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rivera-pedrogo-v-villamil-wiscovitch-prd-2023.