NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIEGO SAUL RIVAS-MONGE, No. 23-414 Agency No. Petitioner, A202-002-121 v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 31, 2026** San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN, MILLER, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Diego Saul Rivas-Monge, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal
from an order of an immigration judge denying his applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
“We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo,” Bringas-Rodriguez v.
Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), and we review its “factual
findings underlying its determination that a petitioner failed to establish eligibility
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT for substantial
evidence,” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2021). Under the
deferential substantial evidence standard, the agency’s findings of fact are
“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
1. Rivas-Monge challenges the Board’s finding that he did not experience
persecution. Whether an applicant has established past persecution is reviewed for
substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 851 (2026).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Rivas-Monge failed to
establish past persecution because his alleged harms were not so severe as to rise to
the level of persecution.
Rivas-Monge testified to three incidents of harm. The first occurred the day
before a national election in March 2014. While wearing a shirt supporting the
FMLN political party, he was stopped by two soldiers and a policeman and asked
why he was a member of the FMLN. One of the men hit Rivas-Monge in the chest
2 23-414 and told him he had to vote for the opposing political party, ARENA. On election
day, Rivas-Monge voted for the FMLN without incident.
A few months later, Rivas-Monge was confronted by members of the 18th
Street gang at the phone store where he worked. The gang members demanded that
Rivas-Monge sell them phones with chips registered under other people’s names.
When Rivas-Monge refused, the gang told him he “was in their eyesight” because
he had not voted for ARENA in the election. Later that month, Rivas-Monge was
stopped by two gang members who asked him again to activate phones for them.
When Rivas-Monge refused, the gang members put him in a car and took him to a
house where they hit his eye and knee and stole his computer. The gang members
told him that since he had not helped them get the phones, he had to join the gang.
Rivas-Monge sought medical care and received three stitches. He then reported the
third incident to the authorities, and the police said they would open an
investigation. The next day, a gang member called Rivas-Monge, asked why he
had filed a report, and threatened to kill him. After the phone call, Rivas-Monge
left El Salvador for the United States.
The record does not compel the conclusion that the harms Rivas-Monge
experienced in El Salvador, even considered cumulatively, rise to the level of
persecution. “‘Persecution is an extreme concept’ that means something
considerably more than discrimination or harassment.” Donchev v. Mukasey, 553
3 23-414 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th
Cir. 1995)). Rivas-Monge did not suffer “serious injuries” and was not subject to
“serious physical violence” akin to the types of beatings, assault, and torture that
we have previously held compel a finding of past persecution. Sharma v. Garland,
9 F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1019–
21 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a single minor physical assault followed by
unrestrained religious expression did not compel the conclusion that petitioner
suffered persecution); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the conclusion that petitioner suffered persecution was not compelled
where petitioner was beaten, robbed twice, and threatened by a mob). Although
what Rivas-Monge experienced was no doubt frightening, we have recognized that
not all negative treatment constitutes persecution. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917,
934 (9th Cir. 2004).
2. Rivas-Monge also has not established an “objectively ‘reasonable
possibility’ of persecution upon return to [El Salvador].” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,
918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400
F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005)). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that Rivas-Monge failed to establish that the individuals he fears maintain a
continuing interest in harming him. Rivas-Monge testified that the two soldiers and
police officer who harassed him were removed from his town after he reported the
4 23-414 incident to the mayor, and he never saw them again. The record therefore does not
compel the finding that Rivas-Monge’s fear of future harm from those men is
objectively reasonable. Rivas-Monge also testified that his mother resided in El
Salvador unharmed for several years after his departure, and his father has twice
traveled back to El Salvador without incident. “The ongoing safety of family
members in the petitioner’s native country undermines a reasonable fear of future
persecution.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066.
Because Rivas-Monge failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution, the Board correctly found him ineligible for asylum. See
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029. And because Rivas-Monge did not show that
he is entitled to asylum, he necessarily did not make the “more stringent” showing
required for withholding of removal. Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066.
3. To show eligibility for CAT protection, Rivas-Monge must demonstrate
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIEGO SAUL RIVAS-MONGE, No. 23-414 Agency No. Petitioner, A202-002-121 v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 31, 2026** San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN, MILLER, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Diego Saul Rivas-Monge, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal
from an order of an immigration judge denying his applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
“We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo,” Bringas-Rodriguez v.
Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), and we review its “factual
findings underlying its determination that a petitioner failed to establish eligibility
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT for substantial
evidence,” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2021). Under the
deferential substantial evidence standard, the agency’s findings of fact are
“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
1. Rivas-Monge challenges the Board’s finding that he did not experience
persecution. Whether an applicant has established past persecution is reviewed for
substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 851 (2026).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Rivas-Monge failed to
establish past persecution because his alleged harms were not so severe as to rise to
the level of persecution.
Rivas-Monge testified to three incidents of harm. The first occurred the day
before a national election in March 2014. While wearing a shirt supporting the
FMLN political party, he was stopped by two soldiers and a policeman and asked
why he was a member of the FMLN. One of the men hit Rivas-Monge in the chest
2 23-414 and told him he had to vote for the opposing political party, ARENA. On election
day, Rivas-Monge voted for the FMLN without incident.
A few months later, Rivas-Monge was confronted by members of the 18th
Street gang at the phone store where he worked. The gang members demanded that
Rivas-Monge sell them phones with chips registered under other people’s names.
When Rivas-Monge refused, the gang told him he “was in their eyesight” because
he had not voted for ARENA in the election. Later that month, Rivas-Monge was
stopped by two gang members who asked him again to activate phones for them.
When Rivas-Monge refused, the gang members put him in a car and took him to a
house where they hit his eye and knee and stole his computer. The gang members
told him that since he had not helped them get the phones, he had to join the gang.
Rivas-Monge sought medical care and received three stitches. He then reported the
third incident to the authorities, and the police said they would open an
investigation. The next day, a gang member called Rivas-Monge, asked why he
had filed a report, and threatened to kill him. After the phone call, Rivas-Monge
left El Salvador for the United States.
The record does not compel the conclusion that the harms Rivas-Monge
experienced in El Salvador, even considered cumulatively, rise to the level of
persecution. “‘Persecution is an extreme concept’ that means something
considerably more than discrimination or harassment.” Donchev v. Mukasey, 553
3 23-414 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th
Cir. 1995)). Rivas-Monge did not suffer “serious injuries” and was not subject to
“serious physical violence” akin to the types of beatings, assault, and torture that
we have previously held compel a finding of past persecution. Sharma v. Garland,
9 F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1019–
21 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a single minor physical assault followed by
unrestrained religious expression did not compel the conclusion that petitioner
suffered persecution); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the conclusion that petitioner suffered persecution was not compelled
where petitioner was beaten, robbed twice, and threatened by a mob). Although
what Rivas-Monge experienced was no doubt frightening, we have recognized that
not all negative treatment constitutes persecution. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917,
934 (9th Cir. 2004).
2. Rivas-Monge also has not established an “objectively ‘reasonable
possibility’ of persecution upon return to [El Salvador].” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr,
918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400
F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005)). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that Rivas-Monge failed to establish that the individuals he fears maintain a
continuing interest in harming him. Rivas-Monge testified that the two soldiers and
police officer who harassed him were removed from his town after he reported the
4 23-414 incident to the mayor, and he never saw them again. The record therefore does not
compel the finding that Rivas-Monge’s fear of future harm from those men is
objectively reasonable. Rivas-Monge also testified that his mother resided in El
Salvador unharmed for several years after his departure, and his father has twice
traveled back to El Salvador without incident. “The ongoing safety of family
members in the petitioner’s native country undermines a reasonable fear of future
persecution.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066.
Because Rivas-Monge failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution, the Board correctly found him ineligible for asylum. See
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029. And because Rivas-Monge did not show that
he is entitled to asylum, he necessarily did not make the “more stringent” showing
required for withholding of removal. Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066.
3. To show eligibility for CAT protection, Rivas-Monge must demonstrate
“(1) that he would ‘more likely than not’ be tortured if removed to [El Salvador],
and (2) that the torture would be inflicted with government acquiescence.” Ruiz-
Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16(c)(2), 208.18(a)(1)). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s
determination that it is not more likely than not that Rivas-Monge will be tortured
if removed.
5 23-414 “Evidence of past torture is relevant . . . in assessing a particular petitioner’s
likelihood of future torture.” Ruiz-Colmenares, 25 F.4th at 751. Because the
agency correctly concluded that Rivas-Monge’s past harm did not rise to the level
of persecution, his past mistreatment necessarily falls short of the definition of
torture. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1067. In addition, the Board correctly determined
that Rivas-Monge’s generalized country conditions evidence fails to show that he
faces a particularized, ongoing risk of future torture. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v.
Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2022), as amended. And Rivas-Monge’s
“speculative fear of torture is insufficient to satisfy the ‘more likely than not’
standard.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2021).
PETITION DENIED.
6 23-414