Rivas-De Contreras v. Garland
This text of Rivas-De Contreras v. Garland (Rivas-De Contreras v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARMITA JESIBEL RIVAS-DE No. 23-3047 CONTRERAS, Agency No. A208-173-859 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 5, 2024** Pasadena, California
Before: BYBEE, IKUTA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Carmita Jesibel Rivas-De Contreras petitions for review of a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal of an immigration
judge’s (IJ) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s
factual findings for substantial evidence, and we review legal questions de novo.
Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that the gang’s
conduct directed toward Rivas-De Contreras and her sons was not on account of
her membership in a particular social group—even assuming her particular social
group was cognizable—but rather, that the gang was motivated by financial gain
and criminal activity. Rivas-De Contreras testified that the gang demanded money
from her and that they wanted her sons to join the gang. See Zetino v. Holder, 622
F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by
criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus
to a protected ground.”); cf. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that resistance to a gang’s recruitment efforts, by itself, does not
constitute a political opinion for purposes of establishing a protected ground),
abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.
2013) (en banc). She does not point to any record evidence that would compel a
conclusion contrary to the agency’s finding that she cited “no evidence that the
gang members were motivated by an underlying animus against [her] family.” The
BIA properly concluded that the lack of a nexus to a protected ground is fatal to
2 23-3047 Rivas-De Contreras’s claims for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.1
See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Barajas-
Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–60 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining the motive
standard applicable to asylum and withholding of removal).
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Rivas-De
Contreras’s application for CAT relief. To receive CAT protection, Rivas-De
Contreras must establish that “it is more likely than not that . . . she would be
tortured if removed.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).
“Evidence of past torture is relevant (though not alone sufficient) in assessing a
particular petitioner’s likelihood of future torture.” Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland,
25 F.4th 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2022). In denying CAT relief, the agency found no
evidence of past torture, and the record does not compel the conclusion that Rivas-
De Contreras was “tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official in [El Salvador].” Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023).
Although the country conditions evidence that Rivas-De Contreras cites
demonstrates gang activity and government corruption in El Salvador, the record
does not show that Rivas-De Contreras faces a particularized risk of future torture.
1 Because the BIA’s decision is based on the nexus determination, we do not consider Rivas-De Contreras’s other arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
3 23-3047 See Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018). The record does not
compel us to conclude that Rivas-De Contreras is more likely than not to be
tortured if removed to El Salvador.
PETITION DENIED.
4 23-3047
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