IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI WESTERN DIVISION
RITTIK SUNAR PETITIONER
V. Civil Case No. 5:26-cv-00546-DCB-BWR
WARDEN OF ADAMS COUNTY RESPONDENT CORRECTIONAL CENTER
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Rittik Sunar (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Nepal, filed his pro se Petition [1] for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in June 2026, challenging the length of his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and seeking his immediate release from Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) detention or a bond hearing. Pet. [1] at 8. Having considered the Petition [1] and the relevant law, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice because Petitioner’s post-removal-period detention claim is premature under the framework set forth in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). I. BACKGROUND In January 2025, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations detained Petitioner when he entered the United States. Pet. [1] at 11. On July 14, 2025, an immigration judge ordered that Petitioner be removed from the United States. Id. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the BIA dismissed his appeal on May 8, 2026. Id. II. DISCUSSION 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers federal district courts “within their respective jurisdictions” the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every
individual detained within the United States,” including noncitizens. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2). “A district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear an alien's Section 2241 petition challenging the lawfulness of his or her detention.” Wekesa v. United States Att'y, No. 22-10260, 2022 WL 17175818, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2022); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision
barring habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent's constitutional challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”); Imran v. Harper, No. 25-30370, 2026 WL 93131, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (“[D]istrict courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to review § 2241 petitions challenging the lawfulness of a noncitizen’s detention . . . .”). Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which provides that “the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90
days (. . . referred to as the ‘removal period’)[,]” during which time the alien shall be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). “After that time elapses, however, § 1231(a)(6) provides only that certain aliens ‘may be detained’ while efforts to complete removal continue.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 298 (2018) (emphasis in original).
2 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and construed § 1231(a)(6) to mean that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” 533
U.S. at 699. “Zadvydas then concluded that six months was a presumptively reasonable period of detention, beyond the removal period, in which to effectuate deportation.” Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702). “After that, the Court concluded, if the alien ‘provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ the Government must either rebut that showing or release the
alien.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 299 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). “This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final on May 8, 2026, when the BIA dismissed his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (“An order of removal made by
the immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the Act shall become final: (a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . .”). The 90-day removal period does not expire until August 6, 2026. The six-month period of presumptively valid detention following the removal period will not expire
3 until February 7, 2027. The 90-day removal period has not yet expired, and Petitioner “has not been in post-removal-order detention longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period set forth in Zadvydas. Consequently, any challenge to
his . . . post-removal-order detention is premature.” Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”) (emphasis added); Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Zadvydas thus created a ‘6-month
presumption’ of the validity of detention under § 1231, after which an alien could attack the reasonableness of his continued detention.”) (emphasis added). III. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the Petition [1] be denied and dismissed without prejudice because Petitioner’s post-removal-order claim is premature. IV. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. Id. The district judge will determine de novo any part of the Report and Recommendation that has been properly objected to. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The 4 district judge may accept, reject, or modify the Report and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id. An objecting party must specifically identify the findings, conclusions, and
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI WESTERN DIVISION
RITTIK SUNAR PETITIONER
V. Civil Case No. 5:26-cv-00546-DCB-BWR
WARDEN OF ADAMS COUNTY RESPONDENT CORRECTIONAL CENTER
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Rittik Sunar (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Nepal, filed his pro se Petition [1] for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in June 2026, challenging the length of his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and seeking his immediate release from Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) detention or a bond hearing. Pet. [1] at 8. Having considered the Petition [1] and the relevant law, it is recommended that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice because Petitioner’s post-removal-period detention claim is premature under the framework set forth in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). I. BACKGROUND In January 2025, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations detained Petitioner when he entered the United States. Pet. [1] at 11. On July 14, 2025, an immigration judge ordered that Petitioner be removed from the United States. Id. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the BIA dismissed his appeal on May 8, 2026. Id. II. DISCUSSION 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers federal district courts “within their respective jurisdictions” the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every
individual detained within the United States,” including noncitizens. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., art I, § 9, cl. 2). “A district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear an alien's Section 2241 petition challenging the lawfulness of his or her detention.” Wekesa v. United States Att'y, No. 22-10260, 2022 WL 17175818, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 2022); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit provision
barring habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent's constitutional challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”); Imran v. Harper, No. 25-30370, 2026 WL 93131, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (“[D]istrict courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to review § 2241 petitions challenging the lawfulness of a noncitizen’s detention . . . .”). Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which provides that “the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90
days (. . . referred to as the ‘removal period’)[,]” during which time the alien shall be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). “After that time elapses, however, § 1231(a)(6) provides only that certain aliens ‘may be detained’ while efforts to complete removal continue.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 298 (2018) (emphasis in original).
2 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and construed § 1231(a)(6) to mean that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” 533
U.S. at 699. “Zadvydas then concluded that six months was a presumptively reasonable period of detention, beyond the removal period, in which to effectuate deportation.” Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702). “After that, the Court concluded, if the alien ‘provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ the Government must either rebut that showing or release the
alien.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 299 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). “This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final on May 8, 2026, when the BIA dismissed his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (“An order of removal made by
the immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the Act shall become final: (a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . .”). The 90-day removal period does not expire until August 6, 2026. The six-month period of presumptively valid detention following the removal period will not expire
3 until February 7, 2027. The 90-day removal period has not yet expired, and Petitioner “has not been in post-removal-order detention longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period set forth in Zadvydas. Consequently, any challenge to
his . . . post-removal-order detention is premature.” Agyei-Kodie v. Holder, 418 F. App'x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”) (emphasis added); Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Zadvydas thus created a ‘6-month
presumption’ of the validity of detention under § 1231, after which an alien could attack the reasonableness of his continued detention.”) (emphasis added). III. RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the Petition [1] be denied and dismissed without prejudice because Petitioner’s post-removal-order claim is premature. IV. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. Id. The district judge will determine de novo any part of the Report and Recommendation that has been properly objected to. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The 4 district judge may accept, reject, or modify the Report and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id. An objecting party must specifically identify the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations to which he objects. A district judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party who fails to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations shall be barred, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal any proposed factual finding or legal conclusion adopted by the Court to which he did not object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). SIGNED, this 24th day of July, 2026. Bradley W. Rath s/ BRADLEY W. RATH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE