Ritter v. State

69 S.W. 262, 70 Ark. 472, 1902 Ark. LEXIS 99
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJune 14, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 69 S.W. 262 (Ritter v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ritter v. State, 69 S.W. 262, 70 Ark. 472, 1902 Ark. LEXIS 99 (Ark. 1902).

Opinion

Battle, J.

W. H. Ritter was indicted by a grand jury of the Greene circuit court, at the February term, 1901, for embezzlement. The indictment, omitting the formal parts, is as follows: “The said W. Ii. Ritter on the 14th day of December, 1900, in the county of Greene aforesaid, then and there being over the age of 16 years and being the cashier of the Greene County Bank, an incorporated company, and having in his custody and possession as such cashier as aforesaid, and then and there having come into possession as such cashier as aforesaid, $10,000, gold, silver and paper money, lawful money of the United States of America and the property of the Greene County Bank as aforesaid, did unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently’ make way with, embezzle and convert to his own use said sum of $10,000 as aforesaid, without the consent of the Greene County Bank as aforesaid, against the peace,” etc.

He was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty; and was tried and convicted; and his punishment was fixed at one year’s imprisonment in the penitentiary. He filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he appealed.

The Greene County Bank, mentioned in the indictment, was a corporation, organized under the laws of Arkansas, and did a general banking business. The appellant was its cashier from the year 1892 up to January 1, 1902, on or about which time it failed. He was and is over the age of 16 years. His duties as cashier were to take charge of the money and assets of the bank, and to receive funds on deposit; make collections; keep the records of the bank; receive the mail of the bank and answer it; and to keep the statements of other banks to it on file. It was his duty also to keep the cash book, balance book, collection register, remittance register, interest and exchange book, while the assistant cashier kept the journal and depositors’ ledger, and made out statements to depositors. He “had in his charge at the time of his election, that is, at the time he took charge as cashier, in cash about $16,000, and in bills receivable and scrip, both county and city, and cash accounts with other banks, and collection items, to the amount of $80,000 or $90,000.” After he had been cashier for many years a large portion of the assets of the bank disappeared, and he, failing to account for them satisfactorily, was indicted for their conversion.

1. Appellant’s first contention is that the indictment is defective, because it does not allege that he was an officer of the bank. This was unnecessary. A cashier is an officer. Merchants Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604; Bissell v. First Nat. Bank of Franklin, 69 Pa. St. 415; Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 1 Wall. 234. An allegation that he was cashier of the bank was equivalent to an averment that he was an officer.

2. Appellant insists that the trial court erred in admitting a copy of the account of the Greene County Bank with the Merchants’ Laclede National Bank, of St. Louis, Missouri, as evidence. The last named bank, which for convenience we will call Laclede Bank, was a correspondent in St. Louis, Missouri, of the former bank. J. B. Sullivan was its bookkeeper, and kept 'an account of the business transactions of the two banks with each other in .the books of the Laclede Bank. Many of the items of the account were derived by him from letters of remittance by the Greene County Bank to the latter, which were received, opened, and handed to him by mailing clerks. Other items were for drafts drawn by the former upon the latter, deposits and perhaps money sent by express. The drafts were returned to the former monthly,- and the letters of remittance were retained by the latter. From time to time, and frequently, Sullivan, the bookkeeper of the Laclede Bank, furnished the Greene County Bank with statements of its account with his bank. He testified that these statements were a correct copy of the account kept by him, except certain changes which were made in them after they were forwarded to the Greene County Bank; and that these changes increased the credits of the last named bank to a considerable amount, which he stated. Upon this testimony and the facts stated, which were proved, the statements forwarded to the Greene County Bank were received as evidence.

The objection to the evidence was specific. There was no ■ objection to its admission on the ground that the bookkeeper did not make the entries in the account in the discharge of his duties and in the regular course of his business, and that each entry was not made at or about the time of the transaction thereby recorded. But appellant objected to its admission, in part, because many of the items in the account were for remittances and drafts of the Greene County Bank, of which the letters of remittances and the drafts themselves were the best evidence. This may be true, but they could not have answered the purpose for which the account was adduced. It contained a statement of all the debits and credits of the Greene County Bank, and was a record or history of the business transactions of the two banks with each other, and was admitted for the purpose of showing the indebtedness of one to the other at various times, the funds of one in the hands of the other, and the fraudulent and unauthorized alterations in the same while in the possession of appellant. This the letters of remittance and drafts could not do. The drafts were evidence of their contents, but not for their payment, as the account was.

The letters of remittance were in the possession of the Laclede Bank, were outside of the state, and secondary evidence was admissible to prove their contents. Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125, 134; Shepard v. Giddings, 22 Conn. 282; Eaton v. Campbell, 7 Pick. 10.

While it is not positively stated, the evidence indicates that all the drafts of the Greene County Bank upon the Laclede Bank that could be found were read as evidence in the trial of appellant, and to this extent the objection to the admission of the account was thereby made of no avail.

Another objection to the admission of the account as evidence was that many of its items were for remittances, and that they were shown by letters received by the Laclede Bank from the Greene County Bank; and that Sullivan, the bookkeeper, testified that these letters were received through the mails, and were opened and handed to him by a mail clerk, and that all he knew of what was received from the Greene County Bank he learned from the letters handed to him by the mail clerks. If the account, under these circumstances, was not competent evidence of the remittances, it is obvious that its admission for that purpose was not prejudicial to appellant. To that extent it showed a legitimate disposition of the assets of the Greene County Bank, and in that respect was beneficial to him, and contributed to maintain his defense.

3. Appellant also insists that the circuit court erred in admitting copies of the account of the Greene County Bank with the Third National Bank of St. Louis, Missouri, as evidence. The latter was also a correspondent in St. Louis, Missouri, of the former bank. Eugene Mosby was supervisor of the bookkeepers of the Third National Bank. Numerous copies of different parts of the account of the Greene County Bank with it were furnished to the former bank. Mosby testified that he compared the balances in the copies with the balances in the original, and that he found that false and fraudulent alterations had been made in the copies for the purpose of increasing the credits of the former bank.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
69 S.W. 262, 70 Ark. 472, 1902 Ark. LEXIS 99, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ritter-v-state-ark-1902.