----oo0oo---- GREGORY RITTENHOUSE, and LINDA No. 2:23-cv-1906 WBS DB GAGE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER RE: DEFENDANT RYAN Plaintiffs, PAMPLIN’S MOTION TO DISMISS v. BLENDJET INC., and RYAN Defendants. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiffs Gregory Rittenhouse and Linda Gage (collectively, “plaintiffs”) brought this action against defendants Ryan Pamplin (“Pamplin”) and BlendJet, Inc. (“BlendJet”), seeking legal and equitable relief for violations of New York General Business Law sections 349-50, violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and fraudulent omission under California state law. (See Second Amended Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 132-59 (Docket No. 60).) Pamplin now moves to dismiss all claims against him. (Docket No. 62).)1 The relevant factual and procedural background was summarized in the court’s prior order granting BlendJet’s motion to dismiss an earlier version of the complaint in part. (See Docket No. 49 at 2-3.) Pamplin is BlendJet’s chief executive officer (“CEO”) and co-founder. (SAC ¶¶ 1, 17.) Plaintiffs attribute the popularity of BlendJet’s products “to defendant Pamplin’s personal brand and active marketing.” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4 (capitalization altered).) The gravamen of plaintiffs’ allegations against Pamplin is that he “mastermind[s]” BlendJet’s “sales and marketing strategy.” (See id. ¶¶ 22, 41-52.) In particular, plaintiffs allege that Pamplin has violated the state law of New York, Illinois, and California by failing to disclose “the dangers presented by” BlendJet’s allegedly defective products while advertising them “at a virtual product expo” around March 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 41-44 & nn.3-5.) Plaintiffs allege that Pamplin never mentioned “any defects or dangers” of BlendJet’s products, which are portable blenders (“the blenders”). (Id. ¶ 60.) The earliest consumer complaints about the blenders “date back to at least August 2022.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-36 & nn.1-2.) Pamplin moves to dismiss the claims against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the
1 Plaintiffs allege six claims against BlendJet and/or Pamplin. (SAC ¶¶ 122-59.) In addition to the four brought against Pamplin, plaintiffs allege that BlendJet breached its contracts with them and any warranties of merchantability those contracts implied. (Id. ¶¶ 121-31, 136-47.) Second Amended Complaint does not comply with the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). (See Docket No. 62-1 at 13-18 (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003)).) As the court held with regard to the claims against BlendJet, plaintiffs’ allegations against Pamplin also lack sufficient specificity under Rule 9(b) to impose direct liability on the part of Pamplin for his acts on behalf of BlendJet. (Id. at 6-11.). Among other things, even though “knowledge” may “be alleged generally,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the complaint does not plausibly allege that Pamplin even knew about the blenders’ alleged defects when he advertised them. (See Docket No. 62-1 at 15-18.) Plaintiffs only allege that the earliest consumer complaints about BlendJet’s products “date back to at least August 2022,” but they do not provide specific dates for when Pamplin would have represented that BlendJet’s products were safe to use or even worth buying. (See id. ¶¶ 31-45 & nn.1-5.) In his reply, Pamplin correctly distinguishes FTC ex rel. James v. Quincy Bioscience Holding Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), which plaintiffs cited repeatedly in their opposition and at oral argument. (See Docket No. 67 at 11-12.) There, two corporate executives moved to dismiss on the ground that the government plaintiffs could not hold them personally liable for acts they undertook on behalf of their company. See Quincy Bioscience, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 219-21. The court there denied one executive’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs made allegations about his involvement which were more specific than plaintiffs’ allegations against Pamplin. Id. at 220-21. In fact, the court granted the other executive’s motion precisely because the operative complaint only contained generic allegations about him. Id. The Second Amended Complaint consists of very kind of “conclusory statement[s]” which the Quincy court found unavailing. See id. at 221. The Second Amended Complaint includes references to a particular “virtual product expo” where Pamplin advertised BlendJet’s products. (See SAC ¶¶ 41-52.) However, plaintiffs do not satisfy Rule 9(b) here because they do not allege what in particular Pamplin said at the expo about the blenders or even whether he represented that they were safe to use. (See Docket No. 62-1 at 18.) While some claims may be based on omissions as well as affirmative statements, under Rule 9(b) such claims must allege a “fiduciary relationship,” “exclusive knowledge” of the supposed defects, “active concealment,” or “misleading partial representations.” In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 386 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1179-80 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see also Taleshpour v. Apple Inc., 549 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1038-39 (N.D. Cal. 2021), aff'd, No. 21-16282, 2022 WL 1577802, at *1-2 (9th Cir. May 19, 2022) (stating that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement “is lowered” for omission-based claims). But the complaint does not plausibly allege any of these circumstances, and thus it does not properly allege an actionable omission. See, e.g., In re Apple, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 1179-80; Taleshpour, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 1038-39. In terms of Rule 9(b)’s “who, what, when, where, and how” requirement, plaintiffs still falter in answering the crucial question of “what, when,” or “how” Pamplin defrauded or even just misled plaintiffs. See Cassi v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-1801 WBS JDP, 2023 WL 7168348, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2023) (quoting Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106-07); accord In re Origin Materials, Inc. Sec. Litig., 766 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1006-07, 1014- 15 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting In re Rigel Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 697 F.3d 869, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2012)) (granting motion to dismiss in part on Rule 9(b) grounds where operative complaint omitted specific “statements or omissions”). Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that Pamplin controlled BlendJet’s marketing strategy. Even if true, however, such allegations do not suffice to personally hold him liable. In In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Products Liab. Litig., No. 22-md-3047, 2024 WL 4719068, at *2-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)), multiple individuals sued a social media company’s CEO and co-founder for “fraudulent concealment” and “negligent concealment” of “the negative health effects of platform usage on young users” under the laws of several states, including New York. Id. at *1-2. The court there dismissed the claims seeking to hold the CEO personally liable because “control alone . . . is insufficient to establish a corporate officer’s participation” in the alleged tortious conduct. Id. at *3-5. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Pamplin’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 62) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6 are DISMISSED without prejudice as to defendant Ryan Pamplin. (Id.) Plaintiffs have twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint, if ee nnn ene en ee eS EI ES EIU IIE EE
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----oo0oo---- GREGORY RITTENHOUSE, and LINDA No. 2:23-cv-1906 WBS DB GAGE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER RE: DEFENDANT RYAN Plaintiffs, PAMPLIN’S MOTION TO DISMISS v. BLENDJET INC., and RYAN Defendants. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiffs Gregory Rittenhouse and Linda Gage (collectively, “plaintiffs”) brought this action against defendants Ryan Pamplin (“Pamplin”) and BlendJet, Inc. (“BlendJet”), seeking legal and equitable relief for violations of New York General Business Law sections 349-50, violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and fraudulent omission under California state law. (See Second Amended Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 132-59 (Docket No. 60).) Pamplin now moves to dismiss all claims against him. (Docket No. 62).)1 The relevant factual and procedural background was summarized in the court’s prior order granting BlendJet’s motion to dismiss an earlier version of the complaint in part. (See Docket No. 49 at 2-3.) Pamplin is BlendJet’s chief executive officer (“CEO”) and co-founder. (SAC ¶¶ 1, 17.) Plaintiffs attribute the popularity of BlendJet’s products “to defendant Pamplin’s personal brand and active marketing.” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4 (capitalization altered).) The gravamen of plaintiffs’ allegations against Pamplin is that he “mastermind[s]” BlendJet’s “sales and marketing strategy.” (See id. ¶¶ 22, 41-52.) In particular, plaintiffs allege that Pamplin has violated the state law of New York, Illinois, and California by failing to disclose “the dangers presented by” BlendJet’s allegedly defective products while advertising them “at a virtual product expo” around March 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 41-44 & nn.3-5.) Plaintiffs allege that Pamplin never mentioned “any defects or dangers” of BlendJet’s products, which are portable blenders (“the blenders”). (Id. ¶ 60.) The earliest consumer complaints about the blenders “date back to at least August 2022.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-36 & nn.1-2.) Pamplin moves to dismiss the claims against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the
1 Plaintiffs allege six claims against BlendJet and/or Pamplin. (SAC ¶¶ 122-59.) In addition to the four brought against Pamplin, plaintiffs allege that BlendJet breached its contracts with them and any warranties of merchantability those contracts implied. (Id. ¶¶ 121-31, 136-47.) Second Amended Complaint does not comply with the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). (See Docket No. 62-1 at 13-18 (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003)).) As the court held with regard to the claims against BlendJet, plaintiffs’ allegations against Pamplin also lack sufficient specificity under Rule 9(b) to impose direct liability on the part of Pamplin for his acts on behalf of BlendJet. (Id. at 6-11.). Among other things, even though “knowledge” may “be alleged generally,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the complaint does not plausibly allege that Pamplin even knew about the blenders’ alleged defects when he advertised them. (See Docket No. 62-1 at 15-18.) Plaintiffs only allege that the earliest consumer complaints about BlendJet’s products “date back to at least August 2022,” but they do not provide specific dates for when Pamplin would have represented that BlendJet’s products were safe to use or even worth buying. (See id. ¶¶ 31-45 & nn.1-5.) In his reply, Pamplin correctly distinguishes FTC ex rel. James v. Quincy Bioscience Holding Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), which plaintiffs cited repeatedly in their opposition and at oral argument. (See Docket No. 67 at 11-12.) There, two corporate executives moved to dismiss on the ground that the government plaintiffs could not hold them personally liable for acts they undertook on behalf of their company. See Quincy Bioscience, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 219-21. The court there denied one executive’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs made allegations about his involvement which were more specific than plaintiffs’ allegations against Pamplin. Id. at 220-21. In fact, the court granted the other executive’s motion precisely because the operative complaint only contained generic allegations about him. Id. The Second Amended Complaint consists of very kind of “conclusory statement[s]” which the Quincy court found unavailing. See id. at 221. The Second Amended Complaint includes references to a particular “virtual product expo” where Pamplin advertised BlendJet’s products. (See SAC ¶¶ 41-52.) However, plaintiffs do not satisfy Rule 9(b) here because they do not allege what in particular Pamplin said at the expo about the blenders or even whether he represented that they were safe to use. (See Docket No. 62-1 at 18.) While some claims may be based on omissions as well as affirmative statements, under Rule 9(b) such claims must allege a “fiduciary relationship,” “exclusive knowledge” of the supposed defects, “active concealment,” or “misleading partial representations.” In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 386 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1179-80 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see also Taleshpour v. Apple Inc., 549 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1038-39 (N.D. Cal. 2021), aff'd, No. 21-16282, 2022 WL 1577802, at *1-2 (9th Cir. May 19, 2022) (stating that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement “is lowered” for omission-based claims). But the complaint does not plausibly allege any of these circumstances, and thus it does not properly allege an actionable omission. See, e.g., In re Apple, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 1179-80; Taleshpour, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 1038-39. In terms of Rule 9(b)’s “who, what, when, where, and how” requirement, plaintiffs still falter in answering the crucial question of “what, when,” or “how” Pamplin defrauded or even just misled plaintiffs. See Cassi v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-1801 WBS JDP, 2023 WL 7168348, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2023) (quoting Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106-07); accord In re Origin Materials, Inc. Sec. Litig., 766 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1006-07, 1014- 15 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting In re Rigel Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 697 F.3d 869, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2012)) (granting motion to dismiss in part on Rule 9(b) grounds where operative complaint omitted specific “statements or omissions”). Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that Pamplin controlled BlendJet’s marketing strategy. Even if true, however, such allegations do not suffice to personally hold him liable. In In re Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Products Liab. Litig., No. 22-md-3047, 2024 WL 4719068, at *2-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)), multiple individuals sued a social media company’s CEO and co-founder for “fraudulent concealment” and “negligent concealment” of “the negative health effects of platform usage on young users” under the laws of several states, including New York. Id. at *1-2. The court there dismissed the claims seeking to hold the CEO personally liable because “control alone . . . is insufficient to establish a corporate officer’s participation” in the alleged tortious conduct. Id. at *3-5. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Pamplin’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 62) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6 are DISMISSED without prejudice as to defendant Ryan Pamplin. (Id.) Plaintiffs have twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint, if ee nnn ene en ee eS EI ES EIU IIE EE
they can do so consistent with this Order.? atte A, (hh be □ Dated: June 11, 2025 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 2 The parties appear to agree that plaintiffs do not have to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold Pamplin personally liable on plaintiffs’ claims against him. (See Docket No. 66 at 6-9.). (See Docket No. 62-1 at 13 (quoting Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2016)) (“A ‘corporate officer or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he authorizes or directs or in which he participates, notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation and not on his own behalf.’”).) Because the court dismisses the claims against Pamplin under Rule 9(b), it does not reach the question of whether, or to what extent, BlendJet’s corporate veil may insulate Pamplin from personal liability.