Rittenhouse v. BlendJet, Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 16, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01906
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 GREGORY RITTENHOUSE, and LINDA No. 2:23-cv-01906 WBS DB GAGE, individually and on behalf 13 of all others similarly situated, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT BLENDJET, INC.’S 15 MOTION TO DISMISS v. 16 BLENDJET, INC., and RYAN 17 PAMPLIN, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiffs Gregory Rittenhouse (“Rittenhouse”) and 22 Linda Gage (“Gage”) brought this action against BlendJet, Inc., 23 (“defendant” or “BlendJet”) and its CEO Ryan Pamplin (“Pamplin”) 24 seeking legal and equitable relief for breach of contract, 25 violations of New York General Business Law sections 349-50, 26 violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 27 Practices Act, violations of various other state consumer 28 protection statutes, breach of the implied warranty of 1 merchantability, fraudulent omission, negligent omission, and 2 quasi-contract. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 99-186 (Docket 3 No. 25).) 4 BlendJet now moves to dismiss all Claims brought 5 against it in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) under Federal 6 Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 9(b). (Def.’s 7 Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (Docket No. 28).)1 8 I. Factual and Procedural Background 9 BlendJet is a Delaware corporation with its principal 10 place of business in Benicia, CA. (FAC ¶ 14.) BlendJet sells 11 portable blenders of varying designs and colors for consumer use. 12 (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) The product at issue here is “[t]he BlendJet 2, 13 [which] is a battery-powered personal portable blender made, 14 distributed, sold, and marketed since 2020.” (Id. ¶ 1.) Towards 15 the end of the calendar year of 2023, BlendJet recalled “4.8 16 million BlendJet 2 [p]roducts” and offered customers “a free 17 replacement base and matching lid.” (Id. ¶¶ 59-60, 64.) 18 Plaintiff Gregory Rittenhouse lives in New York, where 19 he purchased two of defendant’s blenders as presents for his wife 20 “in or around December 2022.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 67-70.) He observed 21 that one of his blenders “overheated” while charging. 22 (Id. ¶ 71.) Rittenhouse “also noticed the BlendJet 2 blending 23 blade assembly became wobbly and loose within approximately one 24 1 Because counsel on both sides were affected by the wild 25 fires existing in and around Los Angeles, where they either reside or have their offices, the court has vacated the hearing 26 which was scheduled for January 21, 2025, and takes the motion 27 under submission. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the court finds the motion suitable for decision on the briefs without the need 28 for oral argument. 1 month of his purchase.” (Id. ¶ 72.) 2 Plaintiff Linda Gage lives in Illinois, where she 3 “purchased two BlendJet 2 [p]roducts in early 2023.” 4 (Id. ¶¶ 12, 75.) One of the blenders “was a red chrome color,” 5 which “was more expensive.” (Id. ¶ 75.) Unlike Rittenhouse, 6 Gage participated in BlendJet’s voluntary recall by sending 7 defendant both of her blenders. (Id. ¶ 79.) In return, Gage 8 received “two original model bases, not one original and one 9 chrome [p]roduct as she had purchased. She paid a premium for the 10 chrome [p]roduct and received a less expensive model in return 11 during the recall.” (Id.) 12 II. Justiciability 13 Plaintiff must first show constitutional standing for 14 the court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim, 15 or the claim will be subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of 16 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Shulman v. Kaplan, 58 F.4th 404, 17 407-08 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2023). “To establish Article III 18 standing, [plaintiffs] must show (1) that they ‘suffered an 19 injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or 20 imminent’; (2) ‘that the injury was likely caused by the 21 defendants;’ and (3) ‘that the injury would likely be redressed 22 by judicial relief.’” Id. at 408 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. 23 Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)). 24 BlendJet moves to dismiss the claims of both plaintiffs 25 on mootness and standing (collectively, “justiciability”) 26 grounds. In particular, it argues that neither plaintiff has 27 shown an injury in fact. “To establish an injury in fact, a 28 plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a 1 legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and 2 particularized.’” McGee v. S-L Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700, 705 3 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, 4 Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 597 (9th Cir. 5 2020)). 6 A. Rittenhouse 7 Here, Rittenhouse’s Claims against BlendJet, which are 8 alleged in Counts 1-3 and Counts 5-9 of the FAC, are not 9 justiciable because the FAC does not allege that he suffered an 10 injury in fact. At best, it contains assertions that 11 “Rittenhouse suffered an economic injury because he purchased 12 blenders that are worthless for their intended purpose,” as they 13 “overheated” or had components that “became wobbly and loose 14 within approximately one month of his purchase.” (FAC ¶¶ 71-73.) 15 But neither of Rittenhouse’s grievances rise to the 16 level of an economic injury recognized by the Ninth Circuit. 17 See McGee, 982 F.3d at 705-08 & nn.4-6 (recognizing three 18 theories of economic injury in a putative class action against a 19 popcorn merchant: benefit of the bargain, overpayment, and 20 diminution of value). In particular, he does not allege that the 21 blender stopped working. Indeed, the FAC even states that 22 Rittenhouse was able to solve the issues on his own. (See FAC ¶¶ 23 8, 72.) Accordingly, the court will dismiss Rittenhouse’s Claims 24 of breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, false 25 advertising, violations of other states’ consumer protection 26 statutes, fraudulent omission, negligent omission, and quasi- 27 contract against BlendJet. 28 B. Gage 1 In contrast, Gage has alleged an injury in fact in 2 Counts 1 and 4-9. As plaintiffs allege, she participated in 3 BlendJet’s voluntary recall and “received a less expensive model 4 in return” after paying “a premium for” the chrome model she sent 5 back. (See FAC ¶¶ 75, 79.) In that sense, she did not receive 6 “the benefit of the bargain” she made with BlendJet. See McGee, 7 982 F.3d at 705-06. Accordingly, the court will not dismiss 8 Gage’s current Claims on justiciability grounds. 9 Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. 10 BlendJet asserts that Gage suffered no injury in fact because its 11 voluntary recall addressed any injury which she may have 12 sustained. See Sharp v. FCA US LLC, 637 F. Supp. 3d 454, 468-69 13 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (“conclud[ing] that dismissal is appropriate on 14 prudential mootness grounds” after assessing adequacy of recall). 15 A court may dismiss a complaint on “prudential mootness” grounds 16 when it determines that a “coordinate branch[] of government” 17 will provide the relief sought by plaintiffs. Id. at 463-64 18 (quoting Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 19 1208, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.)). 20 At first glance, the doctrine of prudential mootness 21 seems to support defendant’s suggestion. However, the Ninth 22 Circuit has upheld applications of “prudential mootness only in 23 the bankruptcy context.” Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 24 1161 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Bowen v. Energizer Holdings, 25 Inc., 118 F.4th 1134, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2024) (reversing 26 dismissal of a products liability complaint alleging that 27 sunscreen contained a carcinogen on justiciability grounds 28 despite defendants’ recall efforts). In effect, BlendJet asks 1 the court to find that a voluntary recall cures any legal 2 violation defendant may have committed in furnishing the product 3 or recalling it. The court cannot do so under the applicable 4 Ninth Circuit precedent. Accordingly, the court will not dismiss 5 Gage’s Claims based on failure to allege injury in fact. 6 III. Plausibility and Rule 9(b) 7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 8 dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to state “a claim to 9 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Moreover, Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “a party [alleging claims that 12 sound in fraud] must state with particularity the circumstances 13 constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Pursuant to that 14 requirement, the Ninth Circuit has held that a fraud plaintiff’s 15 complaint “must include an account of the time, place, and 16 specific content of the false representations as well as the 17 identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Depot, 18 Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc., 915 F.3d 643, 667-68 (9th 19 Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). It clarified that “the pleading ‘must 20 ‘identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct 21 charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the 22 purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false.’’” Id. 23 (quoting Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 24 2013)). 25 A. Counts 1 and 6 26 Both Rittenhouse and Gage plausibly allege that a 27 contract exists between themselves and BlendJet as well as that 28 defendant may have breached it. As alleged in the FAC, 1 Rittenhouse and Gage each paid money for defendant’s products. 2 These exchanges give rise to contracts which may contain implied 3 warranties of merchantability under either New York or Illinois 4 state law. See Cosgrove v. Oregon Chai, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 3d 5 562, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (positing that a New York contract could 6 have an implied warranty of merchantability); Van Zeeland v. Rand 7 McNally, 532 F. Supp. 3d 557, 565-66 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (finding 8 that an Illinois contract may contain an implied warranty of 9 merchantability). To the extent BlendJet alleges that 10 affirmative defenses such as waiver defeat plaintiffs’ 11 contractual Claims, the court declines to address them at the 12 motion to dismiss stage. See CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 13 966, 972 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 8 14 does not require plaintiffs to plead around affirmative 15 defenses.”). For this reason, the court will deny BlendJet’s 16 motion to dismiss as to its Claims of breach of contract and 17 breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 18 B. Counts 2-4 19 In Count 2, Rittenhouse alleges that BlendJet violated 20 New York General Business Law section 349, which prohibits 21 “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, 22 trade[,] or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” In 23 Count 3, he alleges that BlendJet violated New York General 24 Business Law section 350, which prohibits “false advertising” in 25 the same scope. For either Claim, “a plaintiff must allege that 26 a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct, that is 27 (2) materially misleading, and that (3) the plaintiff suffered 28 injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.” 1 See Plavin v. Grp. Health Inc., 146 N.E.3d 1164, 1168 (N.Y. 2 2020). New York law requires plaintiffs bringing claims under 3 either General Business Law section to specify a particular act 4 or practice defendant committed. See Shaw v. Club Managers Ass’n 5 of Am., Inc., 923 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 6 In Count 4, Gage alleges that BlendJet violated the 7 Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Such a claim (1) requires “a 8 deceptive act or practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant’s 9 intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the 10 occurrence of the deception in a course of conduct involving 11 trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff that is 12 (5) a result of the deception.” De Bouse v. Bayer, 922 N.E.2d 13 309, 313 (Ill. 2009). In particular, a plaintiff bringing a 14 claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 15 Practices Act “must actually be deceived by a [specific] 16 statement or omission that is made by the defendant.” Id. at 17 315-16. 18 In Counts 2-4 of the FAC, neither plaintiff specifies a 19 particular deceptive trade practice or act (including false 20 advertising) by BlendJet which he or she perceived before 21 purchasing its blenders. Because plaintiffs’ Claims in Counts 2- 22 4 sound in fraud, the result is the same under federal law, which 23 requires particularity or specificity as well. See Depot, 915 24 F.3d at 667-69 & n.17 (applying the particularity requirement of 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to claims arising under 26 California’s consumer protection statutes). Accordingly, the 27 court must dismiss the FAC’s state law Claims for deceptive trade 28 practices and false advertising. 1 C. Count 5 2 In Count 5 of the FAC, plaintiffs, who reside in 3 Illinois and New York, allege that BlendJet has violated the laws 4 of other states, such as California, Connecticut, Maryland, and 5 Missouri. (FAC ¶¶ 138-44.) In contrast to the FAC’s 6 constitutional standing issues, Count 5 raises the question of 7 whether plaintiffs have statutory standing to bring claims under 8 the laws of states where they do not reside or are otherwise 9 connected. See Shulman, 58 F.4th at 407 n.1. 10 Named “[p]laintiffs must show they have standing for 11 each claim they raise, and plaintiffs do not have standing to 12 bring claims under the laws of states where they have alleged no 13 injury, residence, or other pertinent connection.” Jones v. 14 Micron Tech. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 3d 897, 908-09 (N.D. Cal. 2019); 15 see Corcoran v. CVS Health Corp., 169 F. Supp. 3d 970 (N.D. Cal. 16 2016) (collecting cases reaching the same result). Here, 17 however, the FAC does not specify where Gage bought the blenders 18 except for reciting her domicile, and thus it is devoid of any 19 “pertinent connection[s]” between Gage and “sister states” 20 besides Illinois. Jones, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 908-09. 21 The same applies to Rittenhouse and the state of New 22 York. See id. Because of the lack of any pertinent connection 23 between Rittenhouse or Gage and sister states, the court will 24 dismiss the FAC’s Claims for violations of those states’ 25 deceptive trade practices laws. To the extent such Claims in 26 Count 5 are duplicative of the Illinois and New York state law 27 Claims in Counts 2-4 of the FAC, they are dismissed as redundant. 28 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 1 D. Counts 7-9 2 Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority in support 3 of their fraudulent omission Claim in Count 7 of the FAC. Cf. 4 Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 5 2003) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried 6 in briefs.”). Even if they did, plaintiffs neglect to specify 7 what representations or omissions BlendJet made to them before 8 selling the products at issue to plaintiffs, which is fatal to 9 their Claims of actionable omissions. See Depot, 915 F.3d at 10 667-68 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). Therefore, the court will 11 dismiss the FAC’s Claims of fraudulent omission. 12 Plaintiffs concede that Count 8 of the FAC for 13 negligent omission fails to state a claim. (See Opp. to Mot. at 14 28-30 & n.3 (Docket No. 37).) The court will therefore also 15 dismiss the FAC’s Claims for negligent omission. 16 As for the FAC’s last Claim for quasi-contract or 17 unjust enrichment, plaintiffs “request leave to amend to remove” 18 Count 9 alleging such Claims. (Opp. to Mot. at 30.) Because the 19 court concludes that the FAC plausibly alleges that contracts 20 exist between each plaintiff and BlendJet, the court accepts 21 plaintiffs’ offer. See Crowley v. VisionMaker, LLC, 512 F. Supp. 22 2d 144, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Accordingly, the court will dismiss 23 the FAC’s Claims for quasi-contract. 24 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BlendJet’s motion to 25 dismiss plaintiffs’ Claims against it (Docket No. 28), be, and 26 the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART. Count 5 and Counts 7-9 are 27 DISMISSED without prejudice as to both plaintiffs. Counts 1-3 28 and 6 are DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff ee OI IEE OI EI OEE IOI EIEIO EIDE IEE OSE IESE ID eee

1 Rittenhouse. (Docket No. 25.) Count 4 and Counts 6-3 are 2 DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff Gage. (Id.) 3 | BlendJet’s motion to dismiss is DENIED in all other respects. 4 Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order to file 5 an amended complaint if they can do so consistent with this 6 Order. bbl Ah (hi. 7 Dated: January 16, 2025 WILLIAMB.SHUBB 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11