Rios v. Lux Interior and Renovation LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 20, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-01686
StatusUnknown

This text of Rios v. Lux Interior and Renovation LLC (Rios v. Lux Interior and Renovation LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rios v. Lux Interior and Renovation LLC, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ines Ruiz Rios, et al., No. CV-23-01686-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Lux Interior and Renovation LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 At issue is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against Defendants. 16 (Doc. 22). Defendants did not file a response. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 17 finds that default judgment against Defendants is warranted. 18 I. Background 19 Plaintiffs Ines Ruiz Rios, Alba Garcia Herrera, Reynaldo Hidalogo Diaz, Lazaro 20 Yusnier Lemus Cedeno, Omar Mejia, Gerardo Meza, Walter Rodriguez, Alcides 21 Rodriguez Rugama, and Amara Abigail Terrazas Raya (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint on 22 August 18, 2023, against their former employers, Lux Interior and Renovation LLC, 23 Katisleidys Martinez, John Doe Martinez, Julia Martinez, and John Doe Martinez II 24 (“Defendants”). (Doc. 1). The Complaint alleges claims under the Fair Labor Standards 25 Act (“FLSA”) for unpaid overtime and minimum wages and the Arizona Minimum Wage 26 Act (“AMWA”) for unpaid minimum wages and unpaid wages. (Id.) An additional claim 27 under the Arizona Wage Act (“AWA”) is also pled. (Id.) Plaintiffs served process on 28 Defendants via alternative service on October 19, 2023. (Docs. 9–12). Defendants failed 1 to answer or otherwise respond, and the Clerk of Court entered default against all 2 Defendants on November 7, 2023. (Doc. 15). Plaintiffs then filed the present Motion for 3 Entry of Default Judgment on March 11, 2024, and Defendants have not responded. 4 (Doc. 22). Plaintiffs also request that the Court allow them to recover attorney fees and 5 costs. (Doc. 22 at 24). 6 II. Default Judgment 7 After the Clerk of Court enters default, the Court may enter default judgment 8 pursuant to Rule 55(b). The Court’s “decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 9 discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the 10 Court should consider and weigh relevant factors as part of the decision-making process, 11 it “is not required to make detailed findings of fact.” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 12 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). In deciding whether default judgment is warranted, the 13 Court considers the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) 14 the merits of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at 15 stake, (5) the possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable 16 neglect, and (7) the policy favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 17 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). When considering the merits and sufficiency of the 18 complaint, the Court accepts as true the complaint's well-pled factual allegations, but the 19 plaintiff must establish all damages sought in the complaint. See Geddes v. United Fin. 20 Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Having reviewed the Complaint and the default 21 judgment motion, the Courts finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of default 22 judgment as to the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA claims. 23 A. The Possibility of Prejudice 24 The first Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. 25 Defendants failed to respond to the Complaint or otherwise appear in this action despite 26 being served by Plaintiffs. (Docs. 8–12). Moreover, by failing to answer, Defendants are 27 deemed to have admitted the truth of those statements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d) 28 (“Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as 1 to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading”). 2 The Court is satisfied that if the Motion is not granted, Plaintiffs “will likely be without 3 other recourse for recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 4 (C.D. Cal. 2002). This factor supports the entry of default judgment. 5 B. Merits of the Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint 6 The second and third Eitel factors favor default judgment where the complaint 7 sufficiently states a plausible claim for relief under the Rule 8 pleading standards. 8 PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp 2d at 1175; Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388–89 (9th 9 Cir. 1978). These two factors should be considered in tandem and are interrelated. Dr. 10 JKL Ltd. v. HPC IT Educ. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Plaintiff 11 brings claims under the FLSA and state-law claims under the AMWA and AWA. 12 1. FLSA Claims 13 Congress enacted the FLSA “to protect all covered workers from substandard 14 wages and oppressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 15 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981). The FLSA requires employers to pay non-exempt workers a 16 minimum wage for any time spent working during the workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 17 Also, among the FLSA's central provisions is its requirement that employers pay non- 18 exempted workers at one and a half times the regular rate for any time worked in excess 19 of forty hours in a single week. 29 U.S.C. § 207; see Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 20 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1042 (2016). In order to state a claim for unpaid wages under the FLSA, 21 a Plaintiff must “allege facts showing that there was a given week in which he was 22 entitled to but denied minimum wages [.]” Landers v. Quality Commc'ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 23 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2014). 24 As mentioned, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay them for several 25 workweeks and for overtime pay as required under the FLSA. (Doc. 1 at 21–22). 26 Plaintiff Ines Ruiz Rios alleges that she worked approximately 70 hours a week during 27 the course of her employment but was never paid overtime. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 42–45). The 28 same is true for Plaintiff Reynaldo Hidalgo Diaz who also worked approximately 70 1 hours a week but was paid a flat rate regardless of how many hours he worked. (Doc. 1 2 at ¶¶ 58–61). The pattern was repeated for Plaintiffs Lazaro Yunsier Lemus Cedeno, 3 Omar Mejia, Gerardo Meza, Walter Ulises Espinoza Rodriguez, Alcides Rodriguez 4 Rugama, and Amara Abigail Terrazas Raya. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 66–67, 74–75, 82–83, 90–91, 5 98–99, 106–107). Because the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint are deemed 6 true upon default, Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants violated the FLSA. See Geddes 7 v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that allegations in the 8 complaint, except those related to damages, are taken as true for a default). 9 2. AMWA Claims 10 The AMWA provides the minimum wage under Arizona law. A.R.S. § 23-363. 11 The AMWA mandates that “Any employer who fails to pay the wages ... required ... shall 12 be required to pay the employee the balance of the wages ... owed, including interest 13 thereon, and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid wages[.]” A.R.S.

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Rios v. Lux Interior and Renovation LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rios-v-lux-interior-and-renovation-llc-azd-2025.