[Cite as Rios v. Bassett-Bocker, 2025-Ohio-2328.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Jason Rios Court of Appeals No. L-24-1046
Appellant Trial Court No. JC17261400
v.
Aleka R. Bassett-Bocker DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: July 1, 2025
*****
Neil S. McElroy, for appellant
Brianna L. Stephan, for appellee.
DUHART, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal by appellant, Jason Rios (“father”), from the April 29,
2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. {¶ 2} Father sets forth two assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it made findings regarding abuse by the [f]ather contrary to the doctrine of res judicata.
2. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it made findings regarding abuse by the [f]ather contrary to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Background
{¶ 3} Father and appellee, Aleka Bassett-Bocker (“mother”) are the parents of
R.B., who was born in July 2015. Father and mother were never married.
{¶ 4} In March 2017, father filed a complaint, in juvenile court, to establish the
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning R.B. In June 2017, mother
and father reached an interim agreement.
{¶ 5} On August 9, 2018, mother filed a motion to modify parental rights and
responsibilities (“motion to modify”) in which she sought to change their shared
parenting schedule of one week on/one week off due to allegations that father abused
R.B., which allegations were being investigated by child protective services (“CPS”).
{¶ 6} On September 17, 2018, a hearing was held before a magistrate and the next
day the magistrate issued a decision finding that it was in R.B.’s best interest for father to
be the residential parent and legal custodian. On September 25, 2018, the juvenile court
issued a judgment entry designating father, who lived in Michigan, the residential parent
and legal custodian of R.B. Mother filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision. On
May 6, 2019, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry (“the 2019 custody order”)
denying mother’s objection and affirming its September 25, 2018 judgment.
2. {¶ 7} On May 27, 2020, mother filed a motion to modify based on allegations that
father abused R.B., and that the State of Michigan was conducting an investigation. In
the summer of 2020, R.B. was removed from father’s home and placed with mother in
Ohio. Also that summer, Monroe County Child Protective Services (“Michigan CPS”)
filed a child protective complaint against father in Monroe County Michigan Probate and
Family Court (“Michigan court”) which included allegations that father rubbed oils with
marijuana on R.B., blew marijuana smoke in R.B.’s face and stuck a wand up R.B.’s
buttocks. The juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction to the Michigan court so the
Michigan court could exercise temporary jurisdiction in the child protective case.
{¶ 8} In March 2022, the Michigan court entered an “Order of Dismissal
Following Jury Verdict” in which it set forth that the jurors rendered their verdict finding
no statutory grounds for the Michigan court to exercise jurisdiction over father or R.B.,
and ordered its temporary jurisdiction terminated.
{¶ 9} On March 30, 2022, in juvenile court, father filed a motion to modify, and on
April 8, 2022, mother filed a motion to modify. Juvenile court then formally accepted
and reasserted its original jurisdiction. On September 21 and 22, 2023, the trial on the
motions to modify was held before a magistrate in juvenile court.
{¶ 10} On November 20, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision finding a
substantial change in circumstances in R.B.’s life since the 2019 custody order. The
3. magistrate set forth, inter alia:
In 2019, Michigan child protection services (CPS) conducted an investigation involving [R.B.] because the child presented with significant and substantial levels of THC in his system on a number of occasions immediately subsequent to father’s parenting time and at the onset of mother’s parenting time. The child, mother and father all admitted that father had been rubbing ointments containing THC and/or CBD on [R.B.]’s skin. In fact, in 2020, father admitted that the oils he used on [R.B.] contained THC and further reported to the CPS worker that “He’ll [R.B.] always have THC in his system. He’s allowed to and this is a legal right.” . . . [R.B.] was uncomfortable with father rubbing the ointments on his skin, and with the way the ointments made him feel. Father claimed that mother was the one who administered the THC to their son. There was no credible evidence to support father’s claim against mother. Based on this investigation, Michigan CPS substantiated physical abuse. . .
During the Summer of 2020 when he was about 4-years-old, [R.B.] reported to mother at a parenting time exchange that his buttocks hurt. Mother immediately had the child examined by medical professionals who found that [R.B.] suffered a tear in his anus. [R.B.] disclosed that his father had caused the injury when he inserted a “wand” into the child’s anus. [R.B.]’s report was and is consistent with the injury he suffered. Significantly, father reports that he does own and uses a “wand” in his role as a “medicine man[.]”
Since [R.B.]’s original disclosure to medical professionals about the cause of his anal injury in 2020, [R.B.] has consistently reported that his father put a wand in his butt causing the anal tear . . . Father denies [R.B.]’s claim, and, instead, claims that either mother caused the injury and/or coached [R.B.] to say that his father caused the injury. Father’s hypothetical claims against mother regarding [R.B.]’s anal injury are not supported by any evidence. Mother denies father’s coaching claims. Furthermore, [R.B.] consistently denies that his mother has ever coached him on these issues. . .
In the Summer of 2020, [R.B.] was removed from his father’s possession to live with his mother in Toledo while the sexual abuse allegations were being investigated and prosecuted in Michigan between July 2020 through March of 2022. [R.B.]’s needs were being met in mother’s care . . . During those nine to ten months, father had supervised and limited contact with his son. After the Michigan child protection case to terminate father’s parental rights was dismissed for insufficient evidence to exercise jurisdiction,
4. possession of [R.B.] was returned to his father for a few weeks between March and April of 2022. During this time, mother and father filed the instant action, and possession of [R.B.] was removed from father and returned to mother. Significantly since July of 2020 and for over three years, father has had only about two weeks of unsupervised contact with [R.B.] since the child disclosed the cause of his anal injury. . .
Significantly, [R.B.] does not want to visit with his father. [R.B.] does not want to be touched by his father. Currently, [R.B.]’s parenting time with father is supervised . . . once per week. Although father reports that [R.B.] has fun with father at the supervised visits, [R.B.] states [that] he “pretends” to enjoy his supervised visits with father. . . Significantly, [R.B.] is concerned about father touching him due to the history of sexual abuse, and his counselor reports that she has not witnessed any coaching behavior by [R.B.] on these issues.
Since this court’s [2019 custody order], father claims that mother was abusing [R.B.] when he was a toddler. . . [E]ven subsequent to an LCCS investigation, there were no findings of abuse by mother and no charges were ever brought against mother due to father’s claim. In December of 2022, however, child protection services became involved with mother due to allegations of sexual abuse of a minor who lived in mother and her significant other’s household. In December of 2022 while LCCS completed its investigation, [R.B.] was removed from mother’s possession. At that time, both mother and father had supervised parenting time with [R.B.]. Ultimately since about January 2023, [R.B.] was removed from his mother’s possession and placed with his maternal step-grandfather where he continues to live.
[R.B.] has been continuing in counseling services since September of 2022, and he is doing well in school. . . [H]owever, [R.B.] started to regress and self-harm when his contact with mother was limited to supervised contact for a few hours per week. [R.B.] wanted desperately to have more contact with his mother. LCCS investigation finally concluded with indicated sexual abuse by mother. Mother has consistently denied the allegations. Soon thereafter and upon the recommendation of the GAL, [R.B.]’s parenting time with mother increased and became less restrictive. With his increased contact with mother, [R.B.] is again making significant progress in counseling. . .
5. Father works as a medicine man and a spiritual leader. He lives with his significant other, has two other minor children and one other adult child. His home is appropriate. Mother has one other child besides [R.B.]. She is employed as a secretary and an entertainer. Mother claims that father repeatedly threatens her. Mother continues in counseling services. The GAL has no safety concerns regarding mother with [R.B.]. . . The GAL believes that father does not give deference to [R.B.]’s continuing belief that father has abused him, or that [R.B.] has a need for a significant relationship with his mother. The GAL believes that it is in [R.B.]’s best interest to live in the custody of his mother, that father should continue to have only supervised contact with his son, and that father and son should engage in reunification counseling to reestablish a safe and healthy relationship between them before father’s parenting time is expanded and becomes less restrictive. By a preponderance of the evidence since the last court order, this court agrees that these GAL recommendations are in the child’s best interest under these circumstances.
{¶ 11} The magistrate found that naming mother the residential parent and legal
custodian of R.B. and awarding father supervised parenting time with R.B. was in the
best interest of the child. The juvenile court, by judgment entry, adopted the magistrate’s
decision. Father objected to the custody determination. On January 30, 2024, the
juvenile court denied father’s objection, upheld the Magistrate’s Decision and awarded
legal custody of R.B. to mother and supervised parenting time to father. Father appealed;
this court remanded the case for a final appealable order. On April 29, 2024, the juvenile
court issued its judgment entry. Father again appealed.
6. First and Second Assignments of Error
{¶ 12} Father’s assigned errors are related and will be addressed together.
Father’s Arguments
{¶ 13} Father argues the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply
with respect to his alleged abuse of R.B. Father submits that res judicata ensures the
finality of a decision, citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979), and collateral
estoppel bars relitigating an issue of fact which was previously determined in a prior
action between the same parties or their privies, citing State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield
Hts., 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 64 (2002). He further contends that the doctrines apply to
decisions rendered across state lines such that when the same claim or issue is litigated in
two courts, the second court should give res judicata effect to the first court’s judgment,
regardless of the order in which the cases were filed. He cites Chicago, R.LP. Ry. v.
Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 615-17 (1926) in support. He also argues that because of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, the judgment of one state binds another state by res judicata
as to the same claims made in the first action. He refers to U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 and
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) in support.
{¶ 14} Father notes, citing SMS Financial XXVI, L.L.C. v. Waxman Chabad Ctr.,
2021-Ohio-4174, ¶ 79 (8th Dist.), he must demonstrate four elements to establish res
judicata: (1) a final decision on the merits in the first case; (2) a second case involving the
same parties or a person in privity; (3) the second case raises claims which were, or could
have been, litigated in the first case; and (4) the claims in the second case arise out of the
same occurrence as the first case.
7. {¶ 15} Father asserts that in the Michigan case, the jury made a final decision on
the merits regarding the allegations of abuse against him and although mother was not a
party “she was apprised of the case and was afforded involvement in the proceedings,” as
she was present, with counsel, at several hearings and had the opportunity to raise issues,
present evidence and testify concerning the allegations. Father maintains that “[f]or our
purposes ‘privity’ only requires mutuality of interest” and mother’s “current claim that
change in circumstances exists based on the abuse allegations wholly aligned with the
claims” brought by Michigan CPS and she failed to present any evidence, except for her
own testimony, to support her claim that father abused R.B. Father cites to Brown v.
Dayton, 89 Ohio St.3d 245 (2000). He further argues that both cases included the same
claim for relief, “wherein both parties’ desired result being the removal of [R.B.] from the
care and custody of Father based on the abuse allegation and thereby awarding Mother
custody of [R.B.].”
{¶ 16} Father insists the juvenile court relied on a finding that he abused R.B.
when the court determined there had been a change of circumstances, but this finding was
precluded by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Mother’s Arguments
{¶ 17} Mother argues that the juvenile court recognized the parents’ motions to
modify as to the 2019 custody order, applied R.C. 3109.04, relevant to the modification,
and then considered the mandatory best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F).
Mother contends the juvenile court correctly applied the law and was not precluded from
doing so by any determination reached in the Michigan child protective case. She asserts
8. res judicata did not preclude the juvenile court from adjudicating the parents’ requests to
reallocate custody or from considering evidence in determining R.B.’s best interest.
{¶ 18} Mother notes that the Michigan child protective case concerned abuse
allegations that “Father was administering liquid marijuana to [R.B.] and blowing
marijuana smoke in his face” and “on 7/16/2020 or 7/17/2020 . . . Father stuck a sharp
wand of some sort up [R.B.]’s buttocks.” Mother submits the Michigan case focused on
R.B.’s welfare and Michigan’s interest in protecting R.B. rather than resolving custody
disputes between the parents, so the custody claims were not actually litigated in the
Michigan court.
{¶ 19} Mother argues that nothing in the disposition of the Michigan case
permanently foreclosed the right of either parent to seek modification of the 2019 custody
order, where the primary consideration is the best interest of the child. She asserts the
juvenile court did not err when it considered the existence, investigation and adjudication
of abuse allegations against father which arose after the 2019 custody order and were
probative of the child’s best interest in modifying that order. She cites R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(h).
{¶ 20} Mother further argues that she was neither a party or in privity with a party
to the Michigan child protective case, nor was there a final judgment on the merits as to
custody or a full and fair opportunity for her to have litigated the issue. Mother maintains
that custody of R.B. was neither heard nor decided by the Michigan court, and the abuse
allegations in Michigan CPS’s petition to terminate father’s parental rights are not
identical to issues derived from a best interest analysis.
9. {¶ 21} Mother asserts “in the context of abuse proceedings, the relationship
between a parent and a children services agency does not meet the criteria for privity[, as
Michigan CPS] represents the interests of the state and the welfare of children, whereas a
parent represents [his or her] own personal interests and rights concerning the[] child.
That is, a parent’s interest in the proceedings is in maintaining parental rights and [a]
relationship with the[] child, while the state, when prosecuting a petition to terminate
parental rights, seeks to end that relationship by[]way of proof of parental unfitness. The
claims and defenses available to children services in such proceedings are based on
statutory duties, which are separate and distinct from the claims and defenses available to
a parent engaged in a custody dispute.”
Standard of Review
{¶ 22} Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies is a question of law. Lycan v.
Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4676, ¶ 21. Therefore, a de novo standard of review is employed,
and no deference is given to the trial court’s decision. Id.
Applicable Law
{¶ 23} “The doctrine of res judicata involves both claim preclusion . . . and issue
preclusion (traditionally known as collateral estoppel).” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73
Ohio St.3d 379, 381 (1995).
{¶ 24} The doctrine provides that a final judgment rendered on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is a complete bar to any subsequent actions on the same
claims between the same parties or those in privity. Brooks v. Kelly, 2015-Ohio-2805, ¶
7.
10. {¶ 25} Claim preclusion has four elements: (1) a prior final, valid decision on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties
as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the
first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was
the subject matter of the first action. Lycan at ¶ 23, citing Hapgood v. Warren, 127 F.3d
490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997).
{¶ 26} Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) prevents parties from relitigating facts
and issues in a second action which were fully litigated in a prior action. Thompson v.
Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183 (1994). Issue preclusion applies even if the causes of
action differ. Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 81 Ohio
St.3d 392, 395 (1988).
{¶ 27} Privity may be found where one had “[a]n interest in the result or an active
participation in the original lawsuit” or where individuals raise “identical legal claims and
seek identical rather than individually tailored results.” O'Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty
Corp., 2007-Ohio-1102, ¶ 9, citing Brown v. Dayton, 89 Ohio St.3d at 248 and Grava.
{¶ 28} R.C. 2151.23 provides in relevant part:
(A) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code as follows:
...
(2) . . . to determine the custody of any child . . . ;
11. (F)(1) The juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody matters in accordance with sections 3109.04 and 3127.01 to 3127.53 of the Revised Code . . .
R.C. 3109.04 states in pertinent part:
(E)(1)(a) The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, . . . and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. . .
(F)(1) In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section, whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of a decree allocating those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: ...
(h) Whether either parent . . . previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; . . . and whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected child . . .
R.C. 3127.01(B)(3) states:
“Child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court that provides for legal custody, physical custody, parenting time, or visitation with respect to a child. “Child custody determination” includes an order that allocates parental rights and responsibilities.
{¶ 29} Therefore, under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a), modification of a decree that
allocates parental rights and responsibilities involves the threshold question of whether a
change of circumstances occurred, and if so, then the question is whether modifying the
prior decree is required to fulfill the child’s best interest. “Thus, as a practical matter, a
custody and visitation order is never absolutely final. This fact makes application of res
12. judicata impractical. The very purpose of res judicata is to deter the repeated litigation of
resolved issues, thereby ensuring finality in judgments and the conservation of judicial
resources. . . However, in the area of custody and visitation, we sacrifice finality and
some of our limited judicial resources in order to secure a higher value-the best interests
of children.” Kelm v. Kelm, 92 Ohio St.3d 223, 227 (2001).
Analysis
{¶ 30} Father contends the juvenile court relied on a finding that he abused R.B.
when it determined, with respect to the parties’ motions to modify, that there had been a
change of circumstances, but this finding was precluded by res judicata and collateral
estoppel.
{¶ 31} Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we find father failed to
establish that the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar the juvenile court from
considering the abuse allegations levied against father in the Michigan court. Father did
not demonstrate that mother was in privity with Michigan CPS as mother sought custody
of R.B. in juvenile court while Michigan CPS prosecuted the complaint alleging father
abused R.B. and sought to remove R.B. from father’s custody and terminate father’s
parental rights. Thus, the legal claims raised by mother and Michigan CPS are not
identical and their desired outcomes differed. Since Michigan CPS and mother each
sought individually tailored results, their interests were not the same. Moreover, father
failed to establish that mother could have been awarded custody of R.B. in the Michigan
child protective action.
13. {¶ 32} We therefore conclude that the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion
and issue preclusion) did not apply with respect to the allegations that father abused R.B.,
and the juvenile court did not err when it made findings regarding abuse by father in
support of a change in circumstances. Accordingly, we find father’s assignments of error
not well-taken.
{¶ 33} The April 29, 2024 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Father is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal, pursuant
to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
14.