Ringer v. United States

153 F.R.D. 594, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5560, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19487, 1993 WL 597405
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 20, 1993
DocketCiv. No. 3:93-CV-0391-H
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 153 F.R.D. 594 (Ringer v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ringer v. United States, 153 F.R.D. 594, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5560, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19487, 1993 WL 597405 (N.D. Tex. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SANDERS, Chief Judge.

Before the Court are Defendant on Counterclaim’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Join Additional Party, filed September 17,1993; and Defendant’s Opposition thereto, filed September 29, 1993.

I. BACKGROUND

At issue in this case are the unpaid payroll taxes relating to the A-l Car Rental Agency, Inc., for fiscal quarters in 1982, and the unpaid trust fund taxes relating to Denture Centres of America for fiscal quarters in 1981-83. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 66721, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) assessed penalties against Jurgen Ringer, Plaintiff, based on the unpaid taxes described above. In making the assessments, the IRS alleged that Plaintiff is a party responsible for col[595]*595lecting and paying over the unpaid taxes, and that Plaintiff -willfully failed to do so. The IRS made identical assessments against Robert E. Williams, Defendant on Counterclaim (“Williams” or “Third-Party Defendant”).2

Plaintiff paid a portion of the assessments, and, on February 25, 1993, Plaintiff filed this suit demanding a refund of the portion of the assessments which he paid. See USLIFE Title Ins. Co. v. Harbison, 784 F.2d 1238, 1243 (5th Cir.1986) (“A person whom the IRS determines to be responsible has two years from the date she pays the tax in which to file for a refund and thereby challenge her liability.”). On April 21, 1993, the government filed a timely answer, and, on June 21, 1993, the government moved to join Williams and to counterclaim against Plaintiff and Williams. The government claims that both Plaintiff and Williams are “responsible parties” and that joinder of Williams was necessary to ensure that, should the Court not find Plaintiff to be a responsible party, the IRS would still be able to collect the unpaid taxes and assessments from Williams. The Court granted the government’s motion on June 22, 1993. Plaintiff replied to the government’s counterclaim on June 25, 1993, and Williams replied to the same on August 19, 1993.

On September 17, 1993, Williams filed his Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Join Additional Party. In his Amended Answer, Williams raises a number of affirmative defenses and a counterclaim against the United States. The Court notes that the government, while disputing the merits of these affirmative defenses and the counterclaim, does not oppose the amendment of Third-Party Defendant’s Answer to include the defenses and counterclaim. Defendant’s Opposition at p. 1, n. 1. The Court GRANTS Third-Party Defendant’s Motion insofar as to allow Third-Party Defendant to include the affirmative defenses and counterclaims in his Answer.

In his Motion, Williams also requests leave to join a third party, K. Mark Pistorius (“Pis-torius”). Williams suggests that Pistorius should ultimately be held responsible for the unpaid taxes. In support of this suggestion, Williams alleges that he transferred funds to Pistorius with the intention that Pistorius would pay the disputed taxes, and that Pisto-rius failed to pay the taxes.

The government opposes the joinder of Pistorius on jurisdictional grounds. As discussed below, the Court agrees with the government. The Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Williams’ claims against Pistorius; Third-Party Defendant’s Motion is DENIED insofar as it requests leave to join third party Pistorius.

II. ANALYSIS

Third-Party Defendant asserts that jurisdiction over Pistorius is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1340.3 See Williams’ Proposed Amended Answer at p. 5. Third-Party Defendant’s claim against Pistorius, however, has nothing to do with federal tax laws. Williams’ claim against Pistorius appears to be one of contribution, or, perhaps, theft. Theft is clearly not controlled by the federal tax laws. Further, responsible persons are jointly and severally liable for penalties and unpaid taxes under § 6672, and there is no right to contribution in § 6672 actions. McCray v. U.S., 910 F.2d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 921, 111 S.Ct. 1313, 113 L.Ed.2d 246; USLIFE, 784 F.2d at 1243; Hornsby v. Internal Revenue Service, 588 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.1979). Hence, there is no jurisdiction under § 1340.

Williams also asserts that his claims against Pistorius arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the government’s claim against Williams. See Williams’ Proposed Amended Answer at p. 5. From [596]*596Williams’ point of view, the common transaction or occurrence is the failure of anybody to pay the unpaid taxes of the A-l Car Rental Agency and the Denture Centers of America. The Court will treat Williams’ assertion as an attempt to invoke supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

In approaching this problem, the Court looks to Carlucci v. U.S., 793 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y.1992). In Carlucci, Plaintiff Car-lucci attempted to assert a contribution claim against third party defendant Magnotta on the basis that Magnotta was a responsible party under § 6672. In Carlucci, the IRS agreed that Magnotta was a responsible party under § 6672. The court found that the contribution claim against Magnotta involved issues “that would normally be expected to be resolved in one forum” because they were part of a common transaction or occurrence. 793 F.Supp. at 485. Despite that fact, the court specifically declined to invoke supplemental jurisdiction, stating:

First, permitting these various third party actions to continue during the pen-dency of the Government’s § 6672 proceedings against Carlucci and Magnotta would interfere with the efficient collection of the taxes owed on behalf of the Davenport employees because it would simply prolong and complicate the proceedings —
Second, the court’s declining to decide the contribution actions will not prejudice Carlucci as he may bring his contribution action after the resolution of this action ....
Finally, the judiciary is charged with the duty to promote, not undermine, the goals of Congress as manifested in the public laws of the United States. In recognition of this policy, it has been a longstanding rule among the federal courts that contribution actions should not be heard during the pendency of a § 6672 because those claims would inappropriately prolong and complicate a tax collection proceeding.

Carlucci v. U.S., 793 F.Supp. at 486.

Under the reasoning of Carlucci whether the Court views Williams’ claim as one of contribution or of theft, the claim should not be brought in this § 6672 action. Williams’ claim will “prolong and complicate” this case, thus frustrating the Congressional goal of efficient tax collection proceedings.

Moreover, in Carlucci,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bellovin v. United States
983 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. New York, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
153 F.R.D. 594, 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5560, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19487, 1993 WL 597405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ringer-v-united-states-txnd-1993.