Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle International Corporation

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: September 2, 2021
• Docket: 2:14-cv-01699
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

6 * * * 7 RIMINI STREET, INC, Case No. 2:14-cv-01699-LRH-DJA

8 Plaintiff/ Counterdefendant, ORDER

9 v.

10 ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORP., and ORACLE AMERICA, INC., 11 Defendants/ Counterclaimants. 12 13 Before the Court are several pending motions by plaintiff and counterdefendant Rimini 14 Street, Inc. (“Rimini”) and defendants and counterclaimants Oracle International Corporation and 15 Oracle America, Inc. (collectively “Oracle”): Oracle’s motion to bifurcate trial and realign the 16 parties (ECF No. 1269); Rimini’s Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) motion to modify the order of 17 proof and for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) advisory jury (ECF No. 1276); and Rimini’s 18 motion for interlocutory certification (ECF No. 1298).1 All motions are ripe and for the reasons 19 contained within this Order, the Court grants in part and denies in part the parties’ motions. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 In brief and relevant part, Oracle develops, manufactures, and licenses computer software, 22 particularly Enterprise Software Programs. Oracle also provides after-license software support 23 services to customers who license its copyrighted software. Rimini is a company that provides 24 similar after-license software support services to customers licensing Oracle’s copyrighted

25 1 The parties filed portions of their briefing and attached exhibits under seal. Due to the nature of the sealed material, the Court will grant the parties’ request to seal. See Part II.A. While the Court would prefer to 26 keep all the sealed information confidential, some of it is necessary to resolve the pending motions. The 27 Court will therefore include the information unredacted in this order where appropriate. The Court recognizes that the parties have privacy interests in the confidential information, but the public has an even 1 software and competes directly to provide those services. Seth Ravin is the owner and CEO of 2 Rimini. This action has an extensive 11-year history that includes two causes of action. The Court 3 assumes familiarity with its several recent orders in this case and will therefore not reiterate the 4 lengthy case history here.2 5 Now before the Court are the parties cross-motions relating to realignment and bifurcation, 6 on which they have not been able to reach an agreed stipulation. Oracle moves to realign the 7 parties—Oracle would become the plaintiff, and Rimini would become the defendant—and the 8 Court would recaption the case as such. ECF No. 1269. Oracle further moves to bifurcate the issues 9 to be tried by the jury from the equitable issues to be tried by the Court. Id. Alternatively, Rimini 10 moves the Court only to reorder the presentation of proof—Oracle would proceed first, with 11 Rimini presenting its case second—and not change the party terminology, but simply refer to each 12 by its proper name. ECF No. 1276. Additionally, Rimini seeks to appoint a Rule 39 advisory jury 13 to render a ruling on the parties’ equitable claims rather than bifurcate the proceedings. Id. Rimini 14 further moves the Court for an interlocutory certification to the Ninth Circuit regarding whether 15 this Court properly interpreted the term “derivative works” as applied in this case to software 16 updates, within the meaning of the Copyright Act. ECF No. 1298. All motions are ripe for decision. 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 A. The parties’ motions to seal are granted. 19 There is a general presumption that court records should be open and accessible to the 20 public. Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). With non-dispositive motions, 21 this presumption is automatically overcome by a showing that the material to be filed under seal 22 is being done so pursuant to a valid protective order. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 23 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 24 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002)). The parties seek to seal the following non-dispositive filings, 25 pursuant to the operative protective order in this case (ECF No. 58): portions of Rimini’s 26 opposition to Oracle’s motion to bifurcate and realign the parties and related exhibits (ECF 27 2 For a detailed review of the facts involved, the Court directs readers to its recent Order on summary 1 No. 1274); and portions of Oracle’s reply to Rimini’s evidentiary motion and related exhibits (ECF 2 No. 1280). 3 The Court has reviewed these motions to seal and the underlying documents and finds that 4 the filings should be sealed as requested. The information the parties seek to seal consists of “non- 5 public, technologically and commercially sensitive information,” and proprietary business and 6 technical information, that has been designated “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential 7 Information – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” under the protective order. The Court recognizes the 8 significant risk of competitive injury and potential prejudice to the parties if their proprietary 9 information is released to the public. See Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 10 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)) 11 (articulating that compelling reasons may exist to seal a record if it may be used “as sources of 12 business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.”); Hologram USA, Inc. v. 13 Pulse Evolution Corp., Case No. 2:14-cv-00772-GMN-NJK, 2015 WL 105793, at * 1-2 (D. Nev. 14 Jan. 7, 2015) (granting the plaintiff’s motion to seal when the underlying filing contained 15 “sensitive, proprietary, and technical information,” disclosure of which was likely to injure the 16 plaintiff’s competitive posture). The Court further notes that the parties have filed redacted 17 versions of the sealed filings (where appropriate) in the public record, narrowly tailoring their 18 requests to seal and limiting any harm to the public. Accordingly, the Court grants the parties’ 19 motions to seal nunc pro tunc (ECF Nos. 1274 & 1280).

20 B. Oracle’s motion for realignment is granted; Rimini’s motion to reorder presentation of proof is denied as moot. 21 22 Oracle motions the Court to realign the parties for the jury trial, designating Oracle as the 23 plaintiff to present its proof first at trial, and to recaption the case. Alternatively, Rimini motions 24 the Court to only reorder the presentation of proof at trial, i.e., Oracle will present its case-in-chief 25 first, while Rimini will present its case-in chief second, without making Oracle the “plaintiff” and 26 Rimini the “defendant”. 27 Courts have routinely considered the issue of party alignment for the purpose of 1 City of New York, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (“Indianapolis”); Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. 2 v. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 872-74 (9th Cir. 2000). In doing so, courts are to “look beyond 3 the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute,” because “[l]itigation 4 is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess.” Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (cleaned up). In 5 this context, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a “primary purpose” test: courts are to “align for 6 jurisdictional purposes those parties whose interests coincide respecting the ‘primary matter in 7 dispute.’” Prudential, 204 F.3d at 873 (quoting Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & 8 Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1523 (9th Cir. 1987)). Our sister courts in California have adopted the 9 primary purpose test for determining realignment outside the diversity jurisdiction context. See 10 Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC, Case No. C 02-5693 VRW, 2003 WL 25841157 (N.D. 11 Cal. Oct. 6, 2003); Allegro Ventures, Inc. v. Almquist, Case No. 11-cv-2009-L(WVG), 2013 WL 12 3864329, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2013) (using the “primary purpose” factors articulated in 13 Plumtree as guidance when deciding a motion for realignment); FCE Benefits Adm’rs, Inc. v. 14 Training, Rehabilitation & Development Inst., Case No. 15-cv-01160-JST, 2016 WL 4426897, at 15 *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (same). The Court agrees with their sound reasoning and considers 16 the primary purpose factors to determine whether realignment is proper here. 17 The parties agree that the following claims remain pending before the Court: Rimini has 18 two remaining claims—declaratory judgment of noninfringement to be tried by the jury, and 19 injunctive relief under the California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”) to 20 be tried by the Court; Oracle has five claims to be tried by the jury—copyright infringement, 21 violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, violation of the Lanham Act, inducing breach 22 of contract, and breach of contract—and is seeking damages on all; and three claims to be tried by 23 the Court—for an accounting, unfair competition under the UCL, and declaratory judgment on 24 Rimini’s unfair competition claim. 25 First, given these remaining claims, it is clear to the Court that the primary dispute is 26 whether Rimini committed copyright infringement when it provided third-party support services 27 for Oracle software. The present case is, at its base, an extension of the previous case before the 1 arose after the Court granted summary judgment in part to Oracle on these original claims of 2 copyright infringement and Rimini allegedly changed its support services to comply with the 3 Court’s ruling; thereafter, seeking declaratory judgment that its conduct was no longer infringing. 4 The additional statutory and common law claims all arise out of the process by which Rimini 5 provides these support services. 6 Second, Oracle is the more “natural” plaintiff in this case. See Plumtree, 2003 WL 7 25841157, at *3 (reasoning that the party asserting the affirmative claim of infringement was the 8 “natural plaintiff”). Rimini’s declaratory judgment action for noninfringement is essentially a 9 defense to Oracle’s copyright infringement claims. Oracle’s affirmative position therefore makes 10 it the more appropriate plaintiff while Rimini’s defensive position makes it the more appropriate 11 defendant. Further, as Oracle bears the burden of proof on the jury triable issues, the parties agree 12 that the Court should reorder the presentation of proof so that Oracle presents its case first while 13 Rimini will present its case second. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 683 14 (2014) (articulating that “a copyright plaintiff bears the burden of proving infringement.”). As the 15 party who bears the burden is generally the plaintiff, it is logical that the Court realign the parties 16 as such for trial. See Plumtree, 2003 WL 25841157, at *5 (“[I]t is simply more logical to present 17 the affirmative case for infringement first, rather than presenting the case for noninfringement 18 first.”). Doing so will aid in the presentation of evidence to the jury and limit any potential 19 confusion. 20 Realignment is further appropriate as doing so will not prejudice Rimini—the parties have 21 already agreed that Oracle should present its case-in-chief first, and to provide the jury with the 22 procedural history of this case, including that it was originally filed by Rimini. Accordingly, in its 23 broad discretion, see Lloyd v. Pendleton Land & Exploration, Inc., 22 F.3d 623, 635 (5th Cir. 24 1994) (“Alignment of the parties lies in the sound discretion of the court.”), the Court grants 25 Oracle’s motion for realignment and denies Rimini’s motion to reorder the burden of proof as 26 moot.3

27 1 C. Oracle’s motion to bifurcate the jury triable issues from the equitable claims is granted; Rimini’s motion to empanel an advisory jury is denied as moot. 2 3 Oracle motions the Court to bifurcate the upcoming trial and separate the jury triable issues 4 from the equitable issues to be tried by the Court. Alternatively, Rimini motions the Court to 5 empanel a Rule 39(b) advisory jury to decide the parties’ equitable claims. 6 Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may bifurcate a trial for 7 the convenience of the court and the parties, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize the 8 trial process. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). Under Rule 42(b), a district court has broad discretion to 9 bifurcate as part of its trial management. Hangarter v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 373 10 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th 11 Cir. 2002)); Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982). In considering a motion to 12 bifurcate trial, courts have weighed the factors of convenience, prejudice, judicial economy, 13 reducing risk of confusion, and whether the issues are clearly separable. See Judge Virginia A. 14 Phillips et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, California & Ninth Circuit Editions § 15 16:160.4 (April 2021 Update). Here, the Court finds that bifurcating the upcoming trial as proposed 16 by Oracle is appropriate. 17 First, there is no right to a jury trial under the UCL; rather, a violation of the UCL occurs 18 as a matter of law when there has been a violation of a predicate act. See Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini 19 Street, Inc., 209 F.Supp.3d 1200, 1207 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2016). As to Oracle’s claim for an 20 accounting, Oracle may have a right to a jury trial, but it is not required. See Sid & Marty Krofft 21 TV Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 1977). Oracle seeks to have its 22 claim heard by the Court, and Rimini spent the entirety of its briefing arguing that its UCL claim 23 should not be bifurcated but made no argument as to Oracle’s claim for an accounting. 24 Accordingly, the Court has discretion to bifurcate the parties UCL claims and Oracle’s claim for 25 an accounting. 26 Second, the Court finds that in its discretion, bifurcation of the claims to be tried by the 27 Court and the jury is appropriate. Bifurcation will expedite and economize the trial. The parties 1 included; Rimini estimates 15 days. While the parties dispute the exact length of the trial, the Court 2 is cognizant that the trial in Oracle I lasted approximately one month. Given the complexity of the 3 pending claims and issues in this case, the Court foresees the trial here lasting at least a similar 4 length of time. Bifurcating the legal from equitable issues will expedite the jury trial length 5 regardless of which parties’ estimate is correct. 6 Bifurcation will also conserve resources. The Court strives to ensure that jurors time is not 7 wasted—asking jurors to sit through presentation of evidence and argument on issues they will not 8 be asked to decide, especially when that could extend the trial up to two weeks, is not an efficient 9 use of their time or the Court’s resources. And ordering jurors to prolong their service for the 10 presentation of evidence that is outside their purview unnecessarily increases the cost to taxpayers. 11 While Rimini provides that some overlap exists for evidence presented regarding the UCL claim 12 and Rimini’s claims and/or defense to be presented to the jury, Rimini cites almost exclusively to 13 depositions. It is the Court’s understanding that a number of witnesses will be appearing by 14 deposition and the Court is not concerned that portions of the same witness’s deposition would 15 need to be shown in the two proceedings. The limited number of witnesses that may need to appear 16 in-person twice does not obviate the Court’s concerns that expanding the trial two additional weeks 17 would unnecessarily waste judicial resources and jurors’ time. Furthermore, the Court will preside 18 over both the jury and bench trials in this case. If certain evidence presented during the jury trial 19 is pertinent to the parties’ equitable claims, the Court will be able to consider that without the need 20 to have that evidence repeated. 21 The court further finds that bifurcation is warranted to avoid confusing the issues before 22 (and not before) the jury and to avoid any undue prejudice that may result from the presentation 23 of evidence that is only relevant to the parties’ equitable claims. This case is complex with over 24 80 claims of copyright infringement and potential complex damages allocations. Limiting 25 evidence and argument to that which is squarely before the jury will therefore limit any potential 26 confusion and allow the jurors to decide the issues before it more readily. It will also not prejudice 27 either party for the Court to hold a bench trial following the jury trial. 1 Finally, the Court finds that bifurcation does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment. The 2 Court intends to hold the jury trial first, and the bench trial second. See Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Avcar 3 Leasing Syst., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 4 U.S. 469, 479 (1962)) (“[W]here there are issues common to both the equitable and legal claims, 5 ‘the legal claims involved in the action must be determined prior to any final court determination 6 of [the] equitable claims.’”). And the Court will properly rely on any overlapping factual findings 7 the jury makes that are applicable to the Court’s determination of the parties’ UCL and accounting 8 claims. See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) 9 (“[I]n a case where legal claims are tried by a jury and equitable claims are tried by a judge, and 10 the claims are based on the same facts, in deciding the equitable claims the Seventh Amendment 11 requires the trial judge to follow the jury’s implicit or explicit factual determinations.” (cleaned 12 up)). The Court does not find it necessary to ask the jury to render an advisory ruling on these 13 issues, and therefore, denies Rimini’s motion as moot.4 The Court makes clear that this ruling 14 makes no determination or limits what evidence Rimini may introduce or argue related to its claim 15 or defenses at the jury trial. 16 D. Rimini’s motion for interlocutory appeal is denied. 17 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a party may appeal a non-final order “upon the consent 18 of both the district court and the court of appeals.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 19 673 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1981) (“In re Cement”). A movant seeking an interlocutory 20 appeal has a heavy burden to show that “exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the 21 basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.” Coopers & 22 Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) (quoting Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 23 1248 (7th Cir. 1972)); see also Pac. Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 24 U.S. 1305, 1309 (1977) (“The policy against piecemeal interlocutory review other than as provided 25 for by statutorily authorized appeals is a strong one.” (citation omitted)); James v. Price Stern 26 Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Section 1292(b) is a departure from the 27 1 normal rule that only final judgments are appealable, and therefore must be construed narrowly.”). 2 Indeed, 1292(b) is to be “used only in exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory 3 appeal would avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” In re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1026. And, 4 importantly, “[s]ection 1292(b) was not intended to make denials of summary judgment routinely 5 appealable[.]” Ahrenholz v. Bd. Of Tr. of University of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 2000). 6 Rimini seeks an order certifying the following question for interlocutory appeal: Whether 7 a software update that contains no copyrighted code or any other expressive elements of another 8 copyrighted software program, but is developed using that program and is designed to work with 9 it, is a “derivative work” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. This 10 question stems from the Court’s order on summary judgment in which the Court determined that 11 one of Rimini’s software updates constituted a derivative work. See ECF No. 1253 at 52-53; Rimini 12 Street, Inc. v. Oracle International Corp., 473 F.Supp.3d 1158, 1211-12 (D. Nev. 2020). Relying 13 on Ninth Circuit precedent Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) the Court 14 held that Rimini’s specific individual update was a derivative work because it existed in a concrete 15 and permanent form, and it substantially incorporated protected material from the preexisting work 16 because it was created using Oracle’s utility tools and it was designed to interact only with Oracle’s 17 software. 18 A district court has discretion to certify an order for interlocutory appeal if the three 19 following criteria are met: (1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) there is 20 substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may 21 materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. In re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1026. “Even 22 when all three statutory criteria are satisfied, district court judges have ‘unfettered discretion’ to 23 deny certification.” Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., Case No. 04-1566-ST, 2008 WL 426510, 24 at *3 (D. Or. Feb 13. 2008) (quoting Ryan, Beck & Co., LLC v. Fakih, 275 F.Supp.2d 393, 396 25 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). 26 First, a question is “controlling” when “resolution of the issue on appeal could materially 27 affect the outcome of the litigation in the district court.” In re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1026. 1 more of an abstract legal issue or what might be called one of ‘pure’ law, matters the court of 2 appeals ‘can decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.’” McFarlin v. Conseco 3 Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 677). “The 4 legal question must be stated at a high enough level of abstraction to lift the question out of the 5 details of the evidence or facts of a particular case and give it general relevance to other cases in 6 the same area of law. And the answer to that question must substantially reduce the amount of 7 litigation left in the case.” Id. at 1259. 8 While Rimini has framed its question to appear as a “pure” question of law, the Court’s 9 order on summary judgment is uniquely tied to the factual questions at play in this case. The 10 Court’s ruling that Rimini’s update is a derivative work, while based on its interpretation of the 11 statutory language and Ninth Circuit case law, did not hold that an update is always a derivative 12 work or that an update containing no Oracle written expression is a derivative work in the abstract. 13 It held that in this specific situation, the PPACA Phase 3 update HCM104288 was a derivative 14 work within the meaning of the Copyright Act. While review of this question of law will 15 undoubtedly further resolution of copyright issues both in our sister district courts and this case, 16 the Ninth Circuit will have to delve into a voluminous factual record to render a ruling on the 17 question. The Court’s order on summary judgment (the order Rimini wishes the Court to certify 18 on interlocutory appeal), is 94 pages long and is ruling on approximately 2,800 pages of briefing 19 and over 43,000 pages of supporting exhibits, declarations and appendices.5 Further, Rimini’s 20 question is not a “fundamental” issue to this case, such as whether a party is necessary and proper, 21 whether a court has jurisdiction, or what is the correct choice of law. See United States v. 22 23 5 The Ninth Circuit articulated: 24 Although section 1292(b) requires certification by the trial court of “controlling” questions of law, the appeals it authorizes are from orders not questions. Thus, our review of the 25 present controversy is not automatically limited solely to the question deemed controlling by the district court. We recognize that the scope of appellate review under section 1292(b) 26 is not so broad as to allow reexamination of all matters previously ruled upon in the case. 27 Nonetheless, we may address those issues material to the order from which appeal has been taken. 1 Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1959). Accordingly, the Court declines to find Rimini’s 2 question controlling. 3 Second, a “substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists 4 might disagree on an issue’s resolution, not merely where they have already disagreed. Stated 5 another way, when novel legal issues are presented, on which fair-minded jurists might reach 6 contradictory conclusions, a novel issue may be certified for interlocutory appeal without first 7 awaiting development of contradictory precedent.” Reese v BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 8 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011). “Courts traditionally will find that a substantial ground for difference of 9 opinion exists where ‘the circuits are in dispute on the question and the court of appeals of the 10 circuit has not spoken on the point, if complicated questions arise under foreign law, or if novel 11 and difficult questions of first impression are presented.’” Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 12 633 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 3 Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 3:212 (2010) (footnotes 13 omitted)). 14 Rimini asserts its reading of the Copyright Act and relevant Ninth Circuit case law to 15 support its position that substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist. The Court reviewed 16 these substantive arguments when it ruled on summary judgment and while it may not have cited 17 each case Rimini relied upon, the Court painstakingly reviewed the relevant case law and properly 18 relied upon binding Ninth Circuit precedent, Micro Star. As explained above, the Court’s ruling is 19 factually specific to the circumstances of this particular update. While Rimini disagrees with the 20 Court’s ruling and interpretation of this well settled case law, simply that it may “be applied 21 differently does not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Couch, 611 F.3d at 22 633. 23 Finally, resolution of the question will not materially advance the ultimate termination of 24 the litigation. This case is in an advanced state—it has been pending for 7 years, exhaustive 25 discovery has been completed, the parties have filed their joint proposed pretrial order, and the 26 Court anticipates this case will be set for trial in early to mid-2022, barring any unforeseen 27 circumstances. Therefore, it is clear to the Court that this case will be resolved long before the 1 case. See Shurance v. Planning Control Intern., Inc., 839 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Indeed, 2 an interlocutory appeal might well have the effect of delaying the resolution of this litigation, for 3 an appeal probably could not be completed before July, 1988, when trial is currently scheduled.”); 4 Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 676 (reasoning that interlocutory appeals “delay the litigation in the district 5 court, since the proceedings in that court normally grinds to a halt as soon as the judge certifies an 6 order in the case for an immediate appeal.”). Additionally, as discussed above, the Court expects 7 the jury trial to last approximately 1 month, with a subsequent bench trial on equitable claims to 8 follow. While requesting the Ninth Circuit to review this discrete issue may advance the 9 termination of certain issues, a “substantial amount of litigation remains in the case regardless of 10 the correctness of the Court’s ruling” on this one issue. See Lillehagen v. Alorica, Inc., Case No. 11 SACV 13-0092-DOC (JPRx), 2014 WL 2009031, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2014) (cleaned up). 12 Finally, the Court notes that even after this case is concluded at the district court level, it is likely 13 to have an exhaustive appeal process; Oracle I was appealed to the Ninth Circuit several times and 14 even went up to the Supreme Court. The Court sees no reason that this case will not likewise result 15 in a robust appeals process. 16 Accordingly, the Court denies Rimini’s motion.6 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that that the parties’ motions to seal (ECF Nos. 1274; 19 1280) are GRANTED nunc pro tunc. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Oracle’s motion to bifurcate trial and realign the parties 21 (ECF No. 1269) is GRANTED. The Court ORDERS the Clerk of Court to designate Oracle 22 America, Inc. and Oracle International Corporation as “Plaintiffs/ Counterdefendants” and Rimini 23 Street, Inc. and Seth Ravin as “Defendants/ Counterclaimants.” The case will be recaptioned as 24 follows: 25 /// 26 /// 27 2 ORACLE INTERNATIONA CORP., and Case No. 2:14-cv-01699-LRH-DJA 3 ORACLE AMERICA, INC., 4 Plaintiffs/ Counterdefendants, 5 v. 6 RIMINI STREET, INC, and SETH RAVIN, 7 Defendants/ Counterclaimants. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rimini’s Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) motion to 10 || modify the order of proof and for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) advisory jury (ECF 11 || No. 1276) is DENIED as moot. Following a jury trial on the parties’ legal issues, the Court will 12 || subsequently hold a bench trial on the parties’ UCL claims and Oracle’s claim for an accounting. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rimini’s motion for interlocutory certification pursuant 14 || to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (ECF No. 1298) is DENIED. 15 The parties are reminded that ANY and ALL future pre-trial motions, including, but not 16 || limited to, motions in limine, motions pertaining to witnesses or evidence, and motions to 17 || reconsider, are limited to one filing per party per type of motion, of no more than 30 pages in 18 || length, not including tables of content, tables of authorities, signature pages, or other non- 19 || substantive portions of the filing. Exhibits are limited to no more than 100 pages per filing, not 20 || including cover pages, and they must be evidentiary in nature. See ECF No. 1240; LR 7-3; LRIA 21 || 10-3. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. / 23 DATED this 2nd day of September, 2021. 24 L R. HICK 35 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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