The opinion of the Court was delivered by
POLLOCK, J.
This appeal presents the question of the validity under the New Jersey Constitution of a statute that prohibits Medicaid funding for abortions “except where it is medically indicated to be necessary to preserve the woman’s life.” N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 (1981). Medicaid pays for the costs of all childbirths' and abortions to save the life of the mother but, because of the statutory prohibition, does not pay for those therapeutic abortions needed to protect the health of the mother or for elective, nontherapeutic abortions.
Originally plaintiffs claimed that the denial of Medicaid funds violated rights assured by the due process and equal protection clauses of the New Jersey and United States Constitutions. The Chancery Division found the statute violated a fundamental right to health under both Constitutions. Consequently, that court declared the statute invalid and awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs as the prevailing party in a federal civil rights claim. After an appeal had been taken to the Appellate Division, we granted direct certification. 88 N.J. 472 (1981).
Following the Chancery Division decision, however, the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980), determined that the federal Constitution does not invest pregnant women with the right to Medicaid funds for abortions. Although we are bound to honor [293]*293that determination of plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights, we conclude that under the New Jersey Constitution the State may not restrict funds to those abortions to preserve a woman’s life, but not her health. We conclude further that the New Jersey Constitution does not require the funding of elective, nontherapeutic abortions. Without determining whether a constitutional right to health exists in New Jersey, we find that the statute violates the right of pregnant women to equal protection of the law under Art. I, par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the declaration of the invalidity of N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1, 169 N.J.Super. 543. Although plaintiffs have succeeded in their state constitutional claim, they have not prevailed on the federal constitutional claims, and we reverse the award of attorneys’ fees, 173 N.J.Super. 66.
I
In recent years abortion has generated an intense public debate, which is reflected in constantly changing federal and state legislative and administrative responses. With the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), the issue assumed a new dimension.1 In that case, the Court ruled that during the first trimester of a pregnancy the state has no role in the abortion decision, which “must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.” Id. at 164, 93 [294]*294S.Ct. at 732. In the second trimester, the state may “regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.” Id. During the third trimester, the state may “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Id. at 164-65, 93 S.Ct. at 732.
After Roe v. Wade, indigent women received funding for abortions under Medicaid, a joint federal-state program of medical care for the needy. In the three years between the Roe v. Wade decision and the enactment of N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 in 1975, New Jersey did not restrict state Medicaid funding for abortions. See Statement to S-528 (1975); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J.Super. 443, 446 (Ch.Div.1979) (Right to Choose I). In N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1, however, the New Jersey Legislature restricted state Medicaid funds to abortions needed to preserve the life, but not the health, of the mother. Subsequently, in September, 1976, Congress adopted the first version of the “Hyde Amendment,” which, in terms similar to the present version2, provided that federal Medicaid funds should not be used to pay for abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered. Pub.L.No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434. The 1977 version of the Hyde Amendment, Pub.L.No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460, however, extended the permissible use of Medicaid funds to situations in which the mother was the victim of rape or incest, or where two physicians determined “severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term.... ” Although that version of the Hyde Amendment permitted funding for abortions to prevent serious injury, N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 restricts funding to abortions to preserve the life of the mother. Thus, [295]*295the state statute is more restrictive than the 1977 Hyde Amendment.
In that context, plaintiffs filed their original complaint in June, 1978 challenging the statute on a variety of grounds. Plaintiffs alleged the funding restriction violated the federal Medicaid Act as well as provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, including those that guarantee equal protection of the laws. They also asserted that the statute constituted the establishment of religion and impinged upon their free exercise of religion. The action has led to three opinions by the Chancery Division, as well as a final judgment on March 28,1979 and a supplemental final judgment on March 19, 1980. Right to Choose I, 165 N.J.Super. 443; Right to Choose v. Byrne, 169 N.J.Super. 543 (1979) (Right to Choose II); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 173 N.J.Super. 66 (1979) (Right to Choose III).
In its first opinion, the Chancery Division described the parties:
Plaintiffs are four women who were pregnant when their complaint or amended complaint was filed, two mothers on behalf of minor daughters who were then pregnant, a medical doctor, two nonprofit associations formed to protect abortion and welfare rights, and a religious association for abortion rights.
In accordance with R.R. 4:32-1, 2, this court certified the individual plaintiffs as representatives of two classes: Medicaid-eligible women who are seeking funding for elective nontherapeutic abortions and for abortions which are medically necessary for the protection of their health, although their pregnancies are not life-threatening.
Defendants are state officials with responsibility for the administration of the State Medicaid statute. Defendant intervenors are three medical doctors, a nonprofit corporation formed to oppose abortion, a nonprofit association of students opposing the war in Vietnam and a nonprofit taxpayers association.
[ Right to Choose I, 165 N.J.Super. at 448-49].
In assaying the consequences of N.J.S.A. 304D-6.1 and its validity under the federal Medicaid Act, the court concluded that the conflict between the statute and the Medicaid Act, even when construed in light of the 1977 version of the Hyde Amendment, constituted a breach of New Jersey’s obligation to provide [296]*296its share of Medicaid funding for necessary medical services. Right to Choose I, 165 N.J.Super. at 454. Therefore, the Chancery Division enjoined defendants from enforcing1 N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 and ordered the issuance of guidelines for funding medically necessary abortions.
The court found further that plaintiffs “were foreclosed from arguing as a matter of federal constitutional law that the withholding of Medicaid funding for elective nontherapeutic abortions is a denial of equal protection of the law....” Right to Choose I, 165 N.J.Super. at 455-56. It reached that conclusion by relying on Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977), which upheld the validity of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions.
Also in Right to Choose I, the Chancery Division rejected plaintiffs’ claims that N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 establishes as a state policy the views of the Roman Catholic Church that life begins at conception, 165 N.J.Super. at 459; that the Roman Catholic Church became excessively entangled in the legislative process, id. at 460; and that the statute interfered with the free exercise of religion. Id. at 462-63.
In response to the court order in Right to Choose I, the Department of Human Services proposed guidelines incorporating the terms of the 1977 Hyde Amendment. That amendment permitted funding for abortions “ ‘where the life of the mother would be endangered ... for the victims of rape or incest ... or ... [in] those instances where severe and long-lasting physical damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians.’ ” Right to Choose II, 169 N.J.Super. at 546, quoting Pub.L.No. 95-480, 92 Stat. 1586.
In sustaining plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge in Right to Choose II, the Chancery Division found that the regulations [297]*297discriminated “against Medicaid eligible women with a medical necessity for an abortion without warrant of a compelling state interest, in violation of equal protection of the law.” 169 N.J.Super. at 552. Underlying that holding was the court’s conclusion that:
[E]njoyment of one’s health is a fundamental liberty which is shielded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and by Article 1, paragraph 1, of the State Constitution against unreasonable and discriminatory restriction. Medicaid funding is in furtherance of that fundamental liberty.
The effect of the proposed guidelines would be to withhold funding for one ■medically necessary procedure and one only, an abortion to protect a woman’s health, although such funding was previously available.
[Id. at 551],
That conclusion also underlay the declaration in the supplemental final judgment that N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Having declared the statute unconstitutional, the court enjoined defendants to fund all Medicaid abortions except elective, nontherapeutic abortions and those to prevent insignificant impairments to health. 169 N.J.Super. at 552.
Thereafter the Department issued new regulations, effective May 1,1980, declaring that “Medicaid will pay for all medically necessary abortions.” N.J.A.C. 10:53-1.14(a). Furthermore, in determining whether an abortion is medically necessary, a physician may consider: “(1) Physical, emotional, and psychological factors; (2) Family reasons; (3) Age.” Id. at (b).
The injunction and new regulations have had a significant effect on the availability oí abortions. In Right to Choose I, the court found that, while the statute was in effect, births to Medicaid-eligible women increased by 30% but the number of Medicaid-funded abortions declined from a monthly average exceeding 900 to fewer than 25. 165 N.J.Super. at 457. We were informed at oral argument that during fiscal year 1981, while the injunction and regulations have been in effect, the [298]*298federal and state governments funded 6,118 abortions: 2,374 were jointly funded and 3,744 were solely state funded.3
In its final opinion, the Chancery Division granted plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988, which permits the court, in its discretion, to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in any action to enforce certain federal civil rights. Although the attorneys’ affidavits failed to segregate time spent on the prevailing issues, the Chancery Division awarded counsel fees to two of the organizations representing plaintiffs: Essex-Newark Legal Services was awarded $13,500 and Rutgers Women’s Rights Litigation Clinic was awarded $6,375. Right to Choose III, 173 N.J.Super. at 74.
Shortly after the decision in Right to Choose III, however, the United States Supreme Court sustained a more restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment, a version that prohibited the use of Medicaid funds for abortions except where the life of the mother was endangered. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 n.27, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2692 n.27, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). In effect, McRae overruled the declaration of the Chancery Division in Right to Choose II that funding Medicaid abortions to protect the life, but not the health, of the mother violated the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution.4 McRae, supra, 448 U.S. at 322-27, 100 S.Ct. at 2691-2694.
A further effect of McRae was to affirm the Chancery Division’s decision that the denial of Medicaid funds for abortion did [299]*299not violate the federal constitutional provision against the establishment of religion. Because plaintiffs in McRae lacked standing, the United States Supreme Court declined to reach the claim that the Hyde Amendment violated the free exercise of their religion. Id. at 320, 100 S.Ct. at 2689-2690. Thus, McRae effectively remitted plaintiffs to the contention that the statute violated those provisions of the New Jersey Constitution concerning religion and equal protection. N.J.Const. (1947), Art. I, pars. 1, 3 & 4.
Before evaluating plaintiffs’ claim under the New Jersey Constitution, it is advisable that we set the limits of this opinion by stating what it excludes. It is not a referendum on the morality of abortion. We do not presume to answer the profound questions about the moral, medical, and societal implications of abortion. Nor do we undertake to determine when life begins or at what point a fetus is a person. Our mission is to decide the extent to which the New Jersey Constitution permits a statutory restriction on funding for abortions.
II
Fundamental to our decision is the role of a state court of last resort in our federalist system. Inherent in that role is the interplay between, on the one hand, the individual states, their Constitutions, and courts; and, on the other hand, the federal government, its Constitution, and the Supreme Court. Understanding of the relationship between the United States Supreme Court and a state Supreme Court as interpreters of constitutional rights begins with the recollection that the original states, including New Jersey, and their Constitutions preceded the formation of the federal government and its Constitution. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal.Rptr. 325, 329 (1975).
Over the past two centuries, however, the United States Constitution has emerged as the primary source of fundamental rights. Note, “Developments in the Law — The Interpretation of [300]*300State Constitutional Rights,” 95 Harv.L.Rev. at 1326,1328 (1982) (“State Constitutional Rights”). Nevertheless, in recent years, distinguished jurists and scholars have encouraged state courts, in appropriate cases, to look more closely to their own Constitutions as fonts of individual rights. Although the federal Constitution may remain as the basic charter, state Constitutions may serve as a supplemental source of fundamental liberties. See generally Brennan, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977).
From that perspective, state Constitutions are separate sources of individual freedoms, State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 553 (1980), and restrictions on the exercise of power by the Legislature. State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 225-26 (1977) (Schreiber, J., concurring). By contrast, the United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the federal government. Id. See Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1 (1957). See generally “State Constitutional Rights,” supra, 95 Harv.L.Rev. at 1326-28. Thus, in appropriate cases, the individual states may accord greater respect than the federal government to certain fundamental rights. Although the state Constitution may encompass a smaller universe than the federal Constitution, our constellation of rights may be more complete.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court itself has long proclaimed that state Constitutions may provide more expansive protection of individual liberties than the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy,- U.S.-,-, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2092, 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 428 (1982) (Brennan, J.,'concurring); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-41, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); id. at 91-92, 100 S.Ct. at 2040 (Marshall, J., concurring); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
In addition, this Court has recognized that our state Constitution may provide greater protection than the federal Constitu[301]*301tion. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 227-28 (1981) (standing to challenge searches and seizures); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 249 (1981) (the right to sterilization); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 559 (1980) (free speech protected in some instances against private interference); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 112-13 (1979) (the right of unrelated persons to live as a single unit); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353 (1975) (consent to search); Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174-75 (1975) (exclusionary zoning); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 482, 509 cert. denied sub. nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973) (fundamental right to thorough and efficient public education).
Nonetheless, we proceed cautiously before declaring rights under our state Constitution that differ significantly from those enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the federal Constitution. See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 344-345 (1982); id. at 362-363 (Handler, J., concurring). Our caution emanates, in part, from our recognition of the general advisability in a federal system of uniform interpretation of identical constitutional provisions. Where provisions of the federal and state Constitutions differ, however, or where a previously established body of state law leads to a different result, then we must determine whether a more expansive grant of rights is mandated by our state Constitution. See generally “State Constitutional Rights,” supra, 95 Harv.L.Rev. at 1361.
Ill
Against this background, we consider the implications of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). In McRae, the five-member majority found that the version of the Hyde Amendment that prohibited Medicaid funds for abortions except when necessary to save the life of the mother bore a rational relationship to government’s “legitimate interest in protecting [302]*302the potential life of the fetus.” 448 U.S. at 324, 100 S.Ct. at 2692.
The majority opinion precipitated vigorous dissents from four members of the Court, who attacked that opinion at several points. Of particular relevance is the dissenters’ contention that, by denying Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions, the Hyde Amendment was not supported by a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify its restriction on the exercise of the fundamental right to choose an abortion. In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the Court’s earlier decision in Roe v. Wade prevented the State from “excludpng] a woman from medical benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled solely to further an interest in potential life when a physician, ‘in appropriate medical judgment,’ certifies that an abortion is necessary ‘for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.’ ” 448 U.S. at 352, 100 S.Ct. at 2713 (citations omitted). He found a denial of equal protection to a class consisting of poor pregnant women who, under Medicaid, had a right to necessary medical treatment. Those women “are confronted with a choice between two serious harms: serious health damage to themselves on the one hand and abortion on the other.” Id. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 2712. He found further that the denial of funds for medically necessary abortions was “tantamount to severe punishment.” Id. at 354, 100 S.Ct. at 2714. Consequently, protection of potential life could not be used as a reason to deny indigent women necessary medical care.
Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, concurred with Justice Stevens:
I agree entirely with my Brother Stevens that the State’s interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus cannot justify the exclusion of financially and medically needy women from the benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled solely because the treatment that a doctor has concluded is medically necessary involves an abortion.
[ 448 U.S. at 329, 100 S.Ct. at 2702].
The majority in McRae concluded that the prohibition on the use of Medicaid funds for abortion to protect the health of the [303]*303mother did not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Under the supremacy clause, U.S.Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, that interpretation precludes our reaching a different result as a matter of federal law. We remain obligated, however, to evaluate N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 in light of the Constitution of New Jersey.
In more expansive language than that of the United States Constitution, Art. I, par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution provides: “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” The state Bill of Rights, which includes that provision, has been described as expressing “ ‘the social, political, and economic ideals of the present day in a broader way than ever before in American constitutional history.’ ” Milmed, “The New Jersey Constitution of 1947” in N.J.S.A.Const., Arts. I-III91 at 110 (1971). By declaring the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of safety and happiness, Art. I, par. 1 protects the right of privacy, a right that was implicit in the 1844 Constitution. Heckel, “The Bill of Rights,” in II Constitutional Convention of 1947, 1336 at 1339 (1951).
The right of privacy has been found to extend to a variety of areas, including sexual conduct between consenting adults, State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 224-29 (1977) (Schreiber, J., concurring); the right to sterilization, In re Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 249; and even the right to terminate life itself. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 19, 40 — 41, 51 cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct. 319, 50 L.Ed.2d 289 (1976). These cases establish that “under some circumstances, an individual’s personal right to control her own body and life overrides the State’s general interest in preserving life.” In re Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 249.
In recent years, moreover, a body of law has developed in New Jersey acknowledging a woman’s right to choose whether [304]*304to carry a pregnancy to full-term or to undergo an abortion. Even before Roe v. Wade, this Court intimated that a woman who had contracted rubella during her pregnancy had a right to choose whether to give birth to a defective child or undergo an abortion. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 62-63 (1967) (Weintraub, C. J., dissenting in part). That intimation became a reality in Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 432 (1979), in which the Court held that a woman had a cause of action for deprivation of the right to decide whether to bear a child with Down’s Syndrome. We reaffirmed that right last year in Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66 (1981), holding that a mother, after giving birth to a child with cystic fibrosis, had a right to choose whether to conceive a second child who might suffer from the same genetic defect. See Comras v. Lewin, 183 N.J.Super. 42 (App.Div.1982) (negligent deprivation of right to choose to abort). See also Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Ass’n, Inc., 71 N.J. 478 (1976) (private non-profit hospital may not use moral concepts to limit common-law right of access to quasi-public hospital facilities for elective abortions).
Although we decline to proceed as far as the Chancery Division in declaring that the New Jersey Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to health, Right to Choose II, supra, 169 N.J.Super. at 551, we recognize that New Jersey accords a high priority to the preservation of health. More than 70 years ago, Chancellor Pitney recognized that
[ajmong the most [important] of personal rights, without which man could not live in a state of society, is the right of personal security, including ‘the preservation of a man’s health from such practices as may prejudice or annoy it,’ a right recognized, needless to say, in almost the first words of our written Constitution.
[Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748, 757 (E. & A. 1908) (citations omitted) ].
With these long-standing principles of state law in mind, we assess whether the restriction of Medicaid reimbursement to abortions to protect the life of the mother is compatible with the state guarantee of equal protection of the laws. In New Jersey, equal protection of the laws is assured not only by the Four[305]*305teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but also by Art. I, par. 1 of the state Constitution. Levine v. Dep’t of Insts. & Agencies, 84 N.J. 234, 257 (1980); Jersey Shore Medical Center v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 148 (1980). In construing the constitutional guarantees of equal protection, this Court has frequently applied a similar standard of review, whether the guarantee arose from the state or federal Constitution. Levine v. Dep’t of Insts. & Agencies, supra, 84 N.J. at 257.
Conventional equal protection analysis employs “two tiers” of judicial review. Briefly stated, if a fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the legislative classification is subject to strict scrutiny; the state must establish that a compelling state interest supports the classification and that no less restrictive alternative is available. With other rights and classes, however, the legislative classification need be only rationally related to a legitimate state interest. United States Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 157-58 (1982).
Neither poverty nor pregnancy gives rise to membership in a suspect class. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 2380, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1293-94, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Taxpayers Ass’n v. Weymouth Tp., 80 N.J. 6, 38 n.15 (1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 1672, 52 L.Ed.2d 373 (1977). Nor is there a fundamental right to funding for an abortion. Harris v. McRae, supra, 448 U.S. at 316, 100 S.Ct. at 2687-88; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 469, 97 S.Ct. at 2380. The right to choose whether to have an abortion, however, is a fundamental right of all pregnant women, including those entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for necessary medical treatment. As to that group of women, the challenged statute discriminates between those for whom medical care is necessary for childbirth and those for whom an abortion is medically necessary. Under N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1, those needing abortions receive funds only when their lives are at stake. By granting funds when life is at risk, but withhold[306]*306ing them when health is endangered, the statute denies equal protection to those women entitled to necessary medical services under Medicaid.
Thus, the statute impinges upon the fundamental right of a woman to control her body and destiny. That right encompasses one of the most intimate decisions in human experience, the choice to terminate a pregnancy or bear a child. This intensely personal decision is one that should be made by a woman in consultation with trusted advisers, such as her doctor, but without undue government interference. In this case, however, the State admittedly seeks to influence the decision between abortion and childbirth. Indeed, it concedes that, for a woman who cannot afford either medical procedure, the statute skews the decision in favor of childbirth at the expense of the mother’s health.
To justify the discrimination, the State asserts as its compelling interest the protection of potential life. Although that is a legitimate state interest, at no point in a pregnancy may it outweigh the superior interest in the life and health of the mother. Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 163-65, 93 S.Ct. at 731-33. Yet the funding restriction gives priority to potential life at the expense of maternal health. From a different perspective, the statute deprives indigent women “of a governmental benefit for which they are otherwise eligible, solely because they have attempted to exercise a constitutional right.” Harris v. McRae, supra, 448 U.S. at 346, 100 S.Ct. at 2710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Concededly, the Legislature need not fund any of the costs of medically necessary procedures pertaining to pregnancy; conversely, it could include in its Medicaid plan medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is not available. Id. at 311 n.16, 100 S.Ct. at 2685 n.16. Once it undertakes to fund medically necessary care attendant upon pregnancy, however, [307]*307government must proceed in a neutral manner.5 Given the high priority accorded in this State to the rights of privacy and health, it is not neutral to fund services medically necessary for childbirth while refusing to fund medically necessary abortions. Nor is it neutral to provide one woman with the means to protect her life at the expense of a fetus and to force another woman to sacrifice her health to protect a potential life.6
[308]*308By controlling funds for schools, prisons, highways, housing, welfare, and other public needs, the legislative and executive branches fulfill the definition of our constitutional rights. Those two branches properly enjoy wide latitude in making fiscal decisions, but the State may not use its treasury to persuade a poor woman to sacrifice her health by remaining pregnant. Statutes such as N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 “can be understood only as an attempt to achieve with carrots what government is forbidden to achieve with sticks.” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 15-10 at 933 n.77 (1978). The statute affects the right of poor pregnant women to choose between alternative necessary medical services. No compelling state interest justifies that discrimination, and the statute denies equal protection to those exercising their constitutional right to choose a medically necessary abortion.
Although we have employed the conventional two-tiered equal protection analysis, the conflicting individual and governmental interests do not easily fit into a rigid analytical structure. See Matthews v. Atlantic City, 84 N.J. 153, 165 (1980).
Nearly ten years ago, Chief Justice Weintraub wrote:
Mechanical approaches to the delicate problem of judicial intervention under either the equal protection or the due process clauses may only divert a court [309]*309from the meritorious issue or delay consideration of it. Ultimately, a court must weigh the nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent public justification, and decide whether the State action is arbitrary. In that process, if the circumstances sensibly so require, the court may call upon the State to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient public need for the restraint or the denial.
[Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491-92, cert. denied sub. nom Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973) ].
Shortly thereafter the Court rejected a rigid equal protection test based either on mere rationality or strict scrutiny. Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 370 (1975), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 901, 96 S.Ct. 2220, 48 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). The following year, the Court employed a balancing test in analyzing equal protection claims under the state Constitution. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Pashman stated: “[WJhere an important personal right is affected by governmental action, the Court often requires the public authority to demonstrate a greater ‘public need’ than is traditionally required in construing the federal constitution.”7 Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., supra, 80 N.J. at 43.
[310]*310This balancing test is particularly appropriate when, as here, the statutory classification indirectly infringes on a fundamental right. See United States Chamber of Commerce v. State, supra, 89 N.J. at 158; Matthews v. Atlantic City, supra, 84 N.J. at 167. In balancing the protection of a woman’s health and her fundamental right to privacy against the asserted state interest in protecting potential life, we conclude that the governmental interference is unreasonable.8 Elective, nontherapeutic abortions, however, do not involve the life or health of the mother, and the State may pursue its interest in potential life by excluding those abortions from the Medicaid program.
Our holding is not that the State is under a constitutional obligation to fund all abortions. Rather, we hold that the State may not jeopardize the health and privacy of poor women by excluding medically necessary abortions from a system providing all other medically necessary care for the indigent. A woman’s right to choose to protect her health by terminating her pregnancy outweighs the State’s asserted interest in protecting a potential life at the expense of her health. Therefore, we hold that the restriction of funding to abortions necessary to save the life of the mother violates the New Jersey Constitution. It remains to determine the effect of that violation.
[311]*311IV
Appraisal of a constitutional defect begins with the assumption that the Legislature intended to act in a constitutional manner. State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 349-50 (1970) (limiting statute proscribing loud and profane language in public only to words likely to incite breach of peace or offend listener). With that assumption in mind, we must determine whether the Legislature would want the statute io survive with appropriate modifications rather than succumb to constitutional infirmities. Jordan v. Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Ass’n, 90 N.J. 422, 431-32 (1982). Stated otherwise, we must ascertain whether the Legislature would have declined to adopt the statute or would have adopted it with the constitutional interpretation. United States Chamber of Commerce v. State, supra, 89 N.J. at 152. That decision depends on the purpose, subject, and effect of the statute. See Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 202 (1969) (interpreting intestacy law and wrongful death act definition of “children” to include illegitimate children). It is our duty to save a statute if it is reasonably susceptible to a constitutional interpretation. State v. Profaci, supra, 56 N.J. at 350. In appropriate cases, therefore, a court may engage in “judicial surgery” to excise a constitutional defect or engraft a needed meaning. See New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, 82 N.J. 57, 75 (1980) (limiting election financing reporting act to avoid overbreadth problem); Collingswood v. Ringgold, supra, 66 N.J. at 357 (limiting an ordinance requiring prior registration of canvassers and solicitors to door-to-door activity on private property); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 473 (1974) (adding notice and warning requirement to obscenity statute); Camarco v. City of Orange, 61 N.J. 463, 466 (1972) (limiting broad anti-loitering ordinance to interferences with others in public places or threats of immediate breach of peace); State v. Profaci, supra; State v. Zito, 54 N.J. 206, 218 (1969) (interpreting statute proscribing failure to give good account of one’s self so as to prevent arrest without [312]*312opportunity to explain apparently inculpatory circumstances); Schmoll v. Creecy, supra.
Before the enactment of N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1, the Legislature provided funds for all abortions, even those not required to protect the life or health of the mother. One purpose of the statute was to eliminate the use of public funds for abortion “on demand.” See Statement to S-528 (1975). From this legislative history and the words of the statute, we have no doubt that the Legislature would not want to return to funding elective, non-therapeutic abortions. It is equally clear that the Legislature would want to fund abortions to preserve the life of the mother. Given the high priority accorded to protecting an individual’s interest in health and privacy, we believe that the Legislature would prefer that the statute not succumb to its constitutional infirmity but that it survive with coverage extended to medically necessary abortions. From that perspective, we hold that the appropriate construction of N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 is that it limits Medicaid funds to those abortions medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. The determination of “medical necessity” is the proper province of physicians, who may be guided, to the extent consistent with competent medical treatment, by the regulations of the Department of Human Services. See N.J.A.C. 10:53-1.14(b).
We do not hold directly that the statute was intended to encompass abortions to terminate pregnancies where the mother was the victim of rape or incest. Nonetheless, under those regulations, physicians might well conclude that such abortions are medically necessary.
V
Additionally, plaintiffs claim that N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 violates the constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of religion, N.J.Const. (1947), Art. 1, par. 3, and proscribing establishment of one religious sect in preference to another. Id., par. 4. Harris v. McRae, supra, determined the parallel federal constitutional [313]*313claims by rejecting the establishment claim and declining, because no plaintiff had standing, to pass on the free exercise issue. 448 U.S. at 319-21, 100 S.Ct. at 2689-90.
Our rules of standing are more liberal than the federal rules, however, and any slight additional interest is sufficient to afford standing to private individuals to raise issues of great public interest. Jordan v. Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Ass’n, 90 N.J. 422, 432 (1982); Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491 (1980). Here, the explicit allegation of a conviction that, under some circumstances, abortion is a religious duty is a sufficient additional interest to warrant consideration of the merits. Therefore, we will address both the establishment and free exercise issues under our Constitution.
Previously, this Court has concluded that the state Constitution, insofar as its prohibition on the establishment of religion is concerned, is less pervasive than the United States Constitution. Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N.J. 523, 528 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 403 U.S. 945, 91 S.Ct. 2274, 29 L.Ed.2d 854 (1971). Nonetheless, to determine whether a statute violates this prohibition, we have generally followed the federal standard. That standard requires a determination: (1) whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose; (2) whether its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) whether it fosters excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 523 (1982). See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Rel. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653, 100 S.Ct. 840, 846, 63 L.Ed.2d 94 (1980). Applying that test to this case, we conclude that the statute does not contravene the constitutional prohibition. First, the statute is related to a secular purpose, the protection of potential human life and the encouragement of childbirth. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 313, 100 S.Ct. at 2686; Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 162-63, 93 S.Ct. at 731-32. Second, the principal effect is not to advance religion. Merely because a statute is consistent with one or more religions does not mean that its principal effect is religious. [314]*314McRae, supra, 448 U.S. at 319-20, 100 S.Ct. at 2689-90; Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N.J. 199, 215 (1960).
Plaintiffs allege further that the Roman Catholic Church lobbied intensively for the passage of the statute and, therefore, that religion became so entangled in the legislative process that the statute is invalid. The claim, in essence, is that direct or indirect pressure by a religious organization on the legislative process is, without more, a violation of the state Constitution. We disagree.
The facts do not support the broad allegations of excessive influence by a single religious group. Not every anti-abortion lobbyist represented the Roman Catholic Church; not every Catholic legislator voted to restrict abortion funding. In fact, some Catholic legislators voted against the statute.
Even if we were to accept plaintiffs’ factual allegations and the questionable view that the state constitutional provision directly proscribes “entanglement,” see Marsa v. Wernik, 86 N.J. 232, 239 n.2 (1981), we perceive no basis for limiting the right of any citizen or group of citizens to seek to persuade elected representatives that a particular viewpoint should be enacted into law. Limiting access to the Legislature on the basis of religion might well violate other fundamental constitutional guarantees, most notably Art. I, par. 6 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects”), and Art. I, par. 18 (“The people have the right freely ... to make known their opinions to their representatives”). An organization, even one with a particular religious orientation, has the right to lobby for the passage of legislation. On the record before us, we conclude that neither the Roman Catholic Church nor any other religious organization became so entangled in the legislative process that the statute constitutes the establishment of religion in violation of the Constitution.
Plaintiffs contend finally that, because some women in some circumstances believe an abortion represents an expression of divine will, the statute infringes on the free exercise of [315]*315religion. To the extent the statute prevents those women from obtaining an abortion, plaintiffs argue, it interferes with the free exercise of their religious beliefs. Again, we disagree.
The argument misconstrues the guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Art. I, par. 3. True, government may not interfere with the free exercise of religion — e.g., by barring clergy from serving as delegates to a state constitutional convention, McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 55 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1978); by requiring compulsory school attendance to age 16 in violation of religious tenets, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1534-35, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); or by conditioning eligibility for unemployment benefits on willingness to work on the Sabbath. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793-95, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). It is equally true, however, that the State need not facilitate free exercise. State v. Fass, 62 N.J.Super. 265 (Cty.Ct.1960), aff’d, 36 N.J. 102 (1961), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 370 U.S. 47, 82 S.Ct. 1167, 8 L.Ed.2d 398 (1962). The constitutional right to the free exercise of religion is not a promise that following one’s faith will be free from cost.- All the Constitution assures is that government will not interfere with the exercise of religious freedom.
It may be, as plaintiffs contend, that for some an abortion represents the fulfillment of a religious duty. That duty, however, cannot serve as the basis for requiring public funding, for to compel facilitation of the exercise of that religious duty may well violate the prohibition against the establishment of religion. See State v. Fass, supra, 62 N.J.Super. at 268. We conclude that the statute does not violate either the prohibition against the establishment of or the guarantee of free exercise of religion.
VI
After the Chancery Division held that N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 violated both the federal and state Constitutions, plaintiffs moved for reasonable attorneys’ fees. The court granted the [316]*316motion and awarded plaintiffs counsel fees totaling $19,875. Right to Choose III, 173 N.J.Super. at 74.
The general rule pertaining to counsel fees is that “sound judicial administration will best be advanced” if litigants bear their own counsel fees except in those situations designated by R. 4:42. See Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 48 N.J. 291, 301 (1966). One exception is in cases “where counsel fees are permitted by statute.” R. 4:42-9(a)(8). Relying on that exception, plaintiffs claim they are entitled to fees as a “prevailing party” in an action to enforce federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (section 1988). Thus, the question becomes whether plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees as “the prevailing party” under the federal statute.
After the decision in Right to Choose III, the United States Supreme Court determined that the federal Constitution was not violated by the Hyde Amendment, which restricted Medicaid reimbursement to those abortions necessary for the protection of the life of the mother. Harris v. McRae, supra. As previously indicated, we are bound by that determination of federal law. Consequently, plaintiffs have not prevailed on the merits of their federal claims. Thus, no basis exists as a matter of federal law for the award of counsel fees under section 1988.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that they are the prevailing party because they have prevailed on their state law claim, which arises from the same facts as the federal claims. Stated otherwise, plaintiffs contend that, because they have prevailed on a pendent state claim, they are entitled to counsel fees under section 1988. The flaw in that contention is that section 1988 permits an award of counsel fees to a party who prevails on a state claim only when the federal claims are adjudicated favorably for that party or not adjudicated at all. Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activs. Ass’n, 574 F.2d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1978). No counsel fees may be allowed where the federal claims have been decided adversely to “the prevailing party.” Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1982); Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1980).
[317]*317Even parties who obtain preliminary or interlocutory relief are not prevailing parties within section 1988 unless they prevail ultimately on the merits of at least some of their federal claims. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1989-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980); Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974) (discussing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1617); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 54.70[4] at 1309 (2d ed. 1982). While a fee award need not await the resolution of the entire controversy, Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., supra, 416 U.S. at 722-24, 94 S.Ct. at 2021-22, it is clear that “Congress intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.” Hanrahan v. Hampton, supra, 446 U.S. at 758, 100 S.Ct. at 1989. Compare id. (denying fees to plaintiff who won reversal of directed verdict) and Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 652 (7th Cir. 1981) (denying fee to plaintiff who won reversal of dismissal for failure to state a claim) with Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980) (fee permitted when relief obtained by settlement and consent order), and Iranian Students Ass’n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353-54 (5th Cir. 1979) (granting fee to students who obtained temporary restraining order to permit demonstration and consent decree to change rules for future demonstrations).
Under the statute, a preliminary injunction reflects a judgment not on the merits of the claim, but merely a likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail. Plaintiffs who challenge the constitutionality of a statute and obtain interim relief must await a plenary hearing for a determination of their rights to counsel fees. See Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1977). Because success on the merits is considered to be a condition precedent to an award of counsel fees, federal courts generally reject applications for counsel fees based on obtaining a preliminary injunction. E.g., Smith v. University of No. Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 346-53 (4th Cir. 1980) (fees denied to professor who won prelimi[318]*318nary injunction continuing employment but ultimately lost on merits); Parks v. Grayton Park Assocs., 531 F.Supp. 77, 79-80 (E.D.Mich.1982) (fees denied to plaintiffs who won temporary and preliminary injunctions but lost on merits of discrimination claim). Contra, Deerfield Med. Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (misquoting Hanrahan). Our recent decision in Westfield Centre Serv. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 86 N.J. 453 (1981), in which we approved a counsel fee for an attorney who obtained a preliminary injunction, is distinguishable because it involved an award of counsel fees predicated not on section 1988, but on the state Franchise Practices Act, N.J.S.A. 56:10-1 to 10-15. Furthermore, after the issuance of a preliminary injunction under that Act, the ultimate claim for injunctive relief became moot. Thus, Westfield is similar to those federal cases in which the Court never reached the merits of the claim for relief.
Although plaintiffs here succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction, permanent relief was ultimately sustained only on the basis of the state, not the federal, Constitution. In brief, plaintiffs did not prevail on the merits of any of their federal claims and, therefore, are not entitled to counsel fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988.
VII
We hold that N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1 violates equal protection of the laws under the New Jersey Constitution by limiting funds to abortions medically necessary to preserve the mother’s life. We construe that statute to require Medicaid funding of all abortions that are medically necessary to preserve the mother’s life or health. Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees is denied.