Riera Bengoechea v. Banco Territorial y Agrícola

40 P.R. 591
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedFebruary 24, 1930
DocketNo. 5038
StatusPublished

This text of 40 P.R. 591 (Riera Bengoechea v. Banco Territorial y Agrícola) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Riera Bengoechea v. Banco Territorial y Agrícola, 40 P.R. 591 (prsupreme 1930).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Deu Toro

delivered the opinion, of the court.

A judgment having been rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in this case, the defendants moved for a new trial; and, upon a denial of that motion, they took the present appeal.

After the transcript of the record and the brief of the appellants were filed in this Supreme Court, the appellees filed three motions to dismiss the appeal. The first motion is based on the ground that the brief fails to comply with Rules 42 and 43 of this court; the ground of the second motion is that the bill of exceptions included in the transcript of the record does not fulfill all the requirements of the law and the practice; and the ground for the third is that certain affidavits included in the transcript are' not duly authenticated.

The appellants, in their turn, filed a motion to correct the transcript by including therein a certified copy of the judgment-roll and a certificate of authentication subscribed by the trial judge.

All the motions were heard on the same day, and the parties thereafter filed extensive briefs in support of their respective contentions.

[593]*593We will, therefore, consider all the questions involved in a single opinion herein. We will take up first the motion for the correction of the transcript.

The appellees object to the correction and invoke, first of all, a certain stipulation made between the parties. The three motions to dismiss were filed during the early part of January last, and after they had been set down for hearing, the parties stipulated for a postponement of the latter, meanwhile “preserving the present legal status or condition of the proceedings.” The appellants’ motion for correction was filed on January 27. The appellees contend that, by reason of that stipulation, the transcript of the record can not be amended but must remain in the condition in which it was on the 7th of January last.

We disagree. The correction of the record is governed by Rules 55 and 56 of this court. Granting full force to the stipulation, that agreement can not be construed in the sense of divesting the appellants of their right to apply for a correction of the record, which right subsisted notwithstanding the setting down for hearing of the motions to dismiss. On the contrary, the stipulation reaffirms that right.

Considering the motion for correction on its own merits, we think that it should be granted. The transcript, although incomplete, was timely filed. The motion for correction, although somewhat delayed, was also filed in time. The failure to include the judgment-roll is explained by the fact of.the filing of a separate appeal from the judgment itself. Perhaps it might have been better if both appeals had been prosecuted jointly. As to the authentication certificate from the trial judge, we think that it serves the purpose of completing the transcript certified by the clerk.

The second and third motions to dismiss can be considered together. Both refer to the question as to whether or not the transcript, which we must consider now in its corrected form, was prepared in accordance with the law and contains all that is required for deciding the appeal.

[594]*594The appeal is one taken from an order denying a motion for a new trial.

The appellees maintain that a motion for a new trial involves in itself a trial; and that, if the motion is denied, the defeated party must, in cose an appeal is taken, prepare a MIL of exceptions or a statement of the case in accordance with the provisions of section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure, construed in connection with section 217 of the same code.

In support of this contention, the appellees argue that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of California on this point, “as the same were worded at the time of the adoption of the said code in Porto Rico”, were identical with those now in force in this Island; and that the Supreme Court of the said State, in construing such provisions, had ordered the dismissal of an appeal “for failure to include in an additional or supplemental bill of exceptions the affidavits introduced in evidence.” Accordingly, the appellees cite the case of Somers v. Somers, 81 Cal. 608, 613, and quote therefrom, in part, as follows:

“If the matter were one which could be controlled by rules of court, and was not governed by positive law, we should be in favor of adopting a rule that hereafter all cases must be presented by bill of exceptions, but that, cases now pending should not be affected thereby. But as we do not believe that this court has any authority to regulate the mode of presenting papers on appeal where one is provided for by statute, we feel constrained to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the papers could only be presented to this court by bill of exceptions. But if we are wrong in this, the certificate in this case is entirely insufficient. There is nothing in it to show that the papers set out in the transcript are true copies of the ones used at the hearing. The certificate simply recites that the affidavits of certain persons were used and considered, but it is not certified that the affidavits set out are the same that were used, or true copies of them. Por ought we can tell, these same parties may have made other and different affidavits, or the copies furnished us may not be correct copies, and other evidence may have been used and considered at the hearing. In other words, the affidavits set out in [595]*595tbe transcript are not authenticated as true copies of the ones used at the hearing, nor is it shown in any way that the ones set out were all that were used.”

Let us examine the statutory provisions. Onr Code of Civil Procedure contains a whole chapter on new trials. It begins with section 220 and ends with section 226. It defines what a new trial is, how it can. be granted, and how it must be applied for. It explains the procedure to be followed when the motion is made on affidavits, or on a bill of exceptions, or on a statement of the case, or on the minutes of the court. It then refers to the hearing, and by section 225 provides as follows:

“Sec. 225. The judgment-roll, and the affidavits, or the recorus and files in the action, or bill of exceptions, or statement, as the case may be, used on the hearing, with a copy of the order made, shall constitute the record to be used on appeal from the order granting or refusing a new trial, unless the motion be made on the minutes of the court, and in that case the judgment-roll and a statement to be subsequently prepared, with a copy of the order, shall constitute the record on appeal. Such subsequent statement shall be proposed by the party appealing, or intending to appeal, within ten days after the entry of the order, or such further time as the court in which the action is pending, or a judge thereof, may allow, and the same, or a copy thereof, be served upon the adverse party, who shall have ten days thereafter to prepare amendments thereto, and serve the same, or a copy thereof, upon the party appealing, or intending to appeal; and thereafter such proceedings shall be had, and within like periods, for the settlement of the statement, as provided by section 223, but the statement shall only contain the grounds argued before the court for a new trial, and so much of the evidence or other matter as may be necessary to explain them: and it shall be the duty of the judge to exclude all other evidence or matter from the statement.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
40 P.R. 591, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/riera-bengoechea-v-banco-territorial-y-agricola-prsupreme-1930.