MaddeN, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:.
The plaintiff, in June 1946, acquired all the rights and assumed all the liabilities of Ware Shoals Manufacturing Company and stands in the position, so far as the instant case is concerned, that Ware Shoals would have been in if the transfer had not occurred. In this opinion the word “plaintiff” will apply to both corporations. The figures used in this opinion are not the true figures involved in the case. They have been simplified and rounded in an attempt to make the computations more understandable. The exact figures involved are given in our findings of fact.
The plaintiff performed war contracts for the Government in the year 1944. In April 1945, it filed its excess profits tax return showing a surtax net income of $3,000,000 and an excess profits tax of $2,000,000. It paid this tax of $2,000,000 during 1945, except for $200,000, which was forgiven by the Tax Adjustment Act of 1945, enacted July 31,1945, 59 Stat. 517, section 3(h) of which added section 784(a) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Section 784(a) granted a 10 percent credit against their excess profits taxes to taxpayers in the position of the plaintiff.
The Quartermaster General, with whose agency the plaintiff’s 1944 Government contracts had been made, took the position that the plaintiff had made excessive profits on its 1944 Government contracts, and initiated a renegotiation of those contracts. By a renegotiation agreement dated August 24,1945, it was provided that $800,000 of those profits should be eliminated from the contract prices, pursuant to the Renegotiation Act, 50 App. U.S.C. (1952 ed.), § 1191. .
If a war contractor paid taxes upon the income which he actually received, and if he was later, as a result of renegotiation, required to return a part of that income to the Government he was, of course, entitled to ah adjustment of his taxes. One way to have accomplished this result would have [320] been for the plaintiff to pay back the $800,000 to the Quartermaster General, and for the Internal Eevenue authorities to pay back to the plaintiff so much of its 1944 taxes as had been imposed upon the $800,000 which the plaintiff had not been allowed to keep. However, section 3806 of the Internal Eevenue Code of 1939, 26 TT.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 3806, added to the Code in 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 964, and amended in 1944, 58 .Stat. 21, 90, provided that in such cases the amount of the tax paid upon the eliminated profit should be credited to the contractor, and he should have to repay to the Government only the amount by which his excessive profits exceeded the tax which he had paid upon those profits.
When the Quartermaster General had arrived at his renegotiation agreement with the plaintiff, he requested the Bureau of Internal Eevenue to make the necessary computation to show how much of the $800,000 of its excessive profits the plaintiff would have to pay back, after the necessary tax adjustments had been made. The Bureau examined the plaintiff’s 1944 return, saw that it showed a tax of 80% oh excess profits, and advised the Quartermaster General that 80% of the $800,000, or $640,000 would be accounted for by the elimination of the tax on the eliminated portion of the profits. That left $160,000 to be repaid by the plaintiff to the Quartermaster General in cash. That sum was so repaid on November 9,1945.
The computation made by the Bureau of Internal Eevenuer, though it was made late in August 1945, after the enactment on July 31 of section 784(a) giving the plaintiff what was in effect a ten percent reduction of its excess profits tax, neglected to take that reduction into consideration. If it had taken the reduction into consideration, it would have shown that the plaintiff, when it had paid its 1944 taxes, would not have .paid $640,000 of excess profits taxes on the $800,000 taken away from it by renegotiation, but would have paid $64;000 (10% of $640,000) less than that, i.e., $576,000, and that only $576,000 should be credited to the plaintiff against the $800,000 which it was obliged, by the renegotiation agreement, to refund, by credit Or otherwise, to the Government. ' In the transaction, then, the plaintiff, because of being credited with paying $64,000 moré taxes than [321] it actually paid, was $64,000 short in its restoration to the Government of the $800,000 of its excessive profits on its contracts.
As we have said, the figures used above are rounded and simplified. There were, in fact, other items in the plaintiff’s 1944 returns which received further study. By valid consents, the questions were kept open and . a revenue agent made a report in 1952, forwarded to the plaintiff in 1953, which included the $64,000 discussed above, as a deficiency in the plaintiff’s 1944 excess profits tax, and interest on the deficiency. The plaintiff paid the.$64,000 plus interest, filed a claim for refund which was denied, and brought this suit.
The plaintiff does not contest the fact that there was an underpayment by it to the Government, arising out of the computation of its 1944 taxes and its renegotiation agreement, of $64,000. It says, however, that the $64,000 underr payment was not a deficiency in the payment of its taxes, but was only a failure to pay an amount which it had, by its renegotiation agreement, promised to pay and had not paid. The plaintiff says it should not have had to pay either the $64,000 or the interest, but it foregoes claiming the $64,000, and claims only the interest.
We consider first the plaintiff’s contention that, under the applicable statutes, the underpayment was not a deficiency, bearing statutory interest, but was a mere failure to pay a contract debt. It would seem that, the plaintiff having paid its taxes in the correct amount, an overestimate of what those taxes would be, which resulted in giving the plaintiff $64,000 too much credit against its contract debt of $800,000 to the Government, would not result in an underpayment of tax, because the tax had in fact been paid in full. It would be merely a mistaken credit against the contract debt.
. Section 271 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as it read before it was amended in 1944, in general defined a deficiency as the amount by which the tax really owing exceeds the amount shown on the taxpayer’s return, plus other amounts previously assessed and minus amounts “previously abated, credited, refunded or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax.” Under that statute it could well be urged that the $64,000 had, in effect, been “credited” to the plaintiff [322] “in respect of” its 1944 taxes, since the excessive credit on its renegotiation debt arose out of a computation of its 1944 taxes. In Baltimore Foundry and Machine Corporation, 7 T.C. 998, and Stow Manufacturing Company, Inc., 14 T.C. 1440, affirmed 190 F. 2d 723 (CA2), cert. den. 342 U.S. 904, which were governed by section 271 before its amendment in 1944, it was held that an erroneous section 3806 credit resulted in a deficiency.
Section 271 was amended by section 14 of the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 231, 245. As amended, its subsection (a) defined a deficiency as the amount by which the tax really owing exceeds the amount shown on the return, plus amounts previously assessed and minus
(2) the amount of rebates, as defined in subsection (b) (2), made.
Then subsection (b) of section 271 defines “rebate” as follows:
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MaddeN, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:.
The plaintiff, in June 1946, acquired all the rights and assumed all the liabilities of Ware Shoals Manufacturing Company and stands in the position, so far as the instant case is concerned, that Ware Shoals would have been in if the transfer had not occurred. In this opinion the word “plaintiff” will apply to both corporations. The figures used in this opinion are not the true figures involved in the case. They have been simplified and rounded in an attempt to make the computations more understandable. The exact figures involved are given in our findings of fact.
The plaintiff performed war contracts for the Government in the year 1944. In April 1945, it filed its excess profits tax return showing a surtax net income of $3,000,000 and an excess profits tax of $2,000,000. It paid this tax of $2,000,000 during 1945, except for $200,000, which was forgiven by the Tax Adjustment Act of 1945, enacted July 31,1945, 59 Stat. 517, section 3(h) of which added section 784(a) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Section 784(a) granted a 10 percent credit against their excess profits taxes to taxpayers in the position of the plaintiff.
The Quartermaster General, with whose agency the plaintiff’s 1944 Government contracts had been made, took the position that the plaintiff had made excessive profits on its 1944 Government contracts, and initiated a renegotiation of those contracts. By a renegotiation agreement dated August 24,1945, it was provided that $800,000 of those profits should be eliminated from the contract prices, pursuant to the Renegotiation Act, 50 App. U.S.C. (1952 ed.), § 1191. .
If a war contractor paid taxes upon the income which he actually received, and if he was later, as a result of renegotiation, required to return a part of that income to the Government he was, of course, entitled to ah adjustment of his taxes. One way to have accomplished this result would have [320] been for the plaintiff to pay back the $800,000 to the Quartermaster General, and for the Internal Eevenue authorities to pay back to the plaintiff so much of its 1944 taxes as had been imposed upon the $800,000 which the plaintiff had not been allowed to keep. However, section 3806 of the Internal Eevenue Code of 1939, 26 TT.S.C. (1952 ed.) § 3806, added to the Code in 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 964, and amended in 1944, 58 .Stat. 21, 90, provided that in such cases the amount of the tax paid upon the eliminated profit should be credited to the contractor, and he should have to repay to the Government only the amount by which his excessive profits exceeded the tax which he had paid upon those profits.
When the Quartermaster General had arrived at his renegotiation agreement with the plaintiff, he requested the Bureau of Internal Eevenue to make the necessary computation to show how much of the $800,000 of its excessive profits the plaintiff would have to pay back, after the necessary tax adjustments had been made. The Bureau examined the plaintiff’s 1944 return, saw that it showed a tax of 80% oh excess profits, and advised the Quartermaster General that 80% of the $800,000, or $640,000 would be accounted for by the elimination of the tax on the eliminated portion of the profits. That left $160,000 to be repaid by the plaintiff to the Quartermaster General in cash. That sum was so repaid on November 9,1945.
The computation made by the Bureau of Internal Eevenuer, though it was made late in August 1945, after the enactment on July 31 of section 784(a) giving the plaintiff what was in effect a ten percent reduction of its excess profits tax, neglected to take that reduction into consideration. If it had taken the reduction into consideration, it would have shown that the plaintiff, when it had paid its 1944 taxes, would not have .paid $640,000 of excess profits taxes on the $800,000 taken away from it by renegotiation, but would have paid $64;000 (10% of $640,000) less than that, i.e., $576,000, and that only $576,000 should be credited to the plaintiff against the $800,000 which it was obliged, by the renegotiation agreement, to refund, by credit Or otherwise, to the Government. ' In the transaction, then, the plaintiff, because of being credited with paying $64,000 moré taxes than [321] it actually paid, was $64,000 short in its restoration to the Government of the $800,000 of its excessive profits on its contracts.
As we have said, the figures used above are rounded and simplified. There were, in fact, other items in the plaintiff’s 1944 returns which received further study. By valid consents, the questions were kept open and . a revenue agent made a report in 1952, forwarded to the plaintiff in 1953, which included the $64,000 discussed above, as a deficiency in the plaintiff’s 1944 excess profits tax, and interest on the deficiency. The plaintiff paid the.$64,000 plus interest, filed a claim for refund which was denied, and brought this suit.
The plaintiff does not contest the fact that there was an underpayment by it to the Government, arising out of the computation of its 1944 taxes and its renegotiation agreement, of $64,000. It says, however, that the $64,000 underr payment was not a deficiency in the payment of its taxes, but was only a failure to pay an amount which it had, by its renegotiation agreement, promised to pay and had not paid. The plaintiff says it should not have had to pay either the $64,000 or the interest, but it foregoes claiming the $64,000, and claims only the interest.
We consider first the plaintiff’s contention that, under the applicable statutes, the underpayment was not a deficiency, bearing statutory interest, but was a mere failure to pay a contract debt. It would seem that, the plaintiff having paid its taxes in the correct amount, an overestimate of what those taxes would be, which resulted in giving the plaintiff $64,000 too much credit against its contract debt of $800,000 to the Government, would not result in an underpayment of tax, because the tax had in fact been paid in full. It would be merely a mistaken credit against the contract debt.
. Section 271 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as it read before it was amended in 1944, in general defined a deficiency as the amount by which the tax really owing exceeds the amount shown on the taxpayer’s return, plus other amounts previously assessed and minus amounts “previously abated, credited, refunded or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax.” Under that statute it could well be urged that the $64,000 had, in effect, been “credited” to the plaintiff [322] “in respect of” its 1944 taxes, since the excessive credit on its renegotiation debt arose out of a computation of its 1944 taxes. In Baltimore Foundry and Machine Corporation, 7 T.C. 998, and Stow Manufacturing Company, Inc., 14 T.C. 1440, affirmed 190 F. 2d 723 (CA2), cert. den. 342 U.S. 904, which were governed by section 271 before its amendment in 1944, it was held that an erroneous section 3806 credit resulted in a deficiency.
Section 271 was amended by section 14 of the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 231, 245. As amended, its subsection (a) defined a deficiency as the amount by which the tax really owing exceeds the amount shown on the return, plus amounts previously assessed and minus
(2) the amount of rebates, as defined in subsection (b) (2), made.
Then subsection (b) of section 271 defines “rebate” as follows:
(2) The term “rebate” means so much of an abatement, credit, refund, or other repayment, as was made on the ground that the tax imposed by this chapter was less than the excess of the amount specified in subsection (a) (1) over the amount of rebates previously made; and $ # * * *
We take this cryptic language to mean that, to be a “rebate” which, if erroneously made, may be corrected by the assessment of a deficiency, the rebate must be a credit or refund previously given or made on the ground that the taxpayer was supposed to have overpaid his tax. The $64,000 here under discussion was credited to the plaintiff, not on the ground that it was supposed to have overpaid its tax, but on the mistaken ground that it had paid more tax, on an item eliminated by the negotiation from its income, than it had actually paid and was therefore entitled to more credit against its contract debt than it was in fact entitled to.
Section 271, as amended in 1944, and as applicable to the instant case, does not contain the flexible language about credits or refunds “in respect to such tax” which it contained before its amendment in 1944. Yet in Morris Kurtzon, 17 T.C. 1542, involving a tax year to which section 271 as amended was applicable, it was held that a section 3806 credit [323] constituted a “rebate.” The opinion did not advert to the change made by the amendment of section 271.
We think it is not correct to regard the erroneous credit given to the plaintiff as being a “rebate” on its taxes, within the meaning of section 271. If not, the mistaken credit on the plaintiff’s renegotiation debt did not create a deficiency in the plaintiff’s tax payments, but rather gave rise to an underpayment of its contract obligation. Statutory interest applicable to a deficiency was, therefore, not properly chargeable.
The Government argues, in the alternative, that even if the $64,000 shortage was a contract debt rather than a deficiency, the debt nevertheless bore interest and hence the plaintiff has not paid more than it owed.
A debt owing to the United States bears interest, even though there is no statute or contract so providing. Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 288; Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 295, 296; United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, 200 F. 2d 936, 942. These cases hold that the rate of interest is to be determined by the Court. In Eversharp, Inc. v. United States, 129 C. Cls. 772, this court held that 4 percent was a fair rate of interest upon a debt owing to the United States as a result of a renegotiation of a war contract.
The renegotiation agreement in the instant case provided that the plaintiff would pay the agreed amount “within ten (10) days after contractor shall have received a fully executed counterpart of this agreement or within ten (10) days after receipt of tax credit determination referred to in Article 3 herein, whichever date is the later.” The plaintiff had received the tax credit determination by November 9, 1945, because on that day it paid the Government the amount not covered by the tax credit. The agreement further provided:
Interest at the rate provided by law in the District of Columbia as the rate which is applicable in the absence of express contract as to the rate of interest, shall accrue and be payable upon each payment due under this agreement from and after the due date thereof * * *.
[324] The District of Columbia Code, c. 27, § 28-2701, provides for interest at 6% in such situations.
The plaintiff urges that the allowance of interest, in the absence of an agreement to pay interest, or in the case of an unclear agreement, is a matter of equity, and that there is no equity in the Government’s position in this case. The plaintiff says that it was not notified of any default on its part until the Government, in 1953, asserted the deficiency which 'is the subject of this suit. The plaintiff cites United States v. United States Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 512, 530, rejecting a claim of the United States for interest against a surety, prior to the time when the surety was notified that the principal was in default. It cites District Court cases rejecting claims for interest on excessive profits prior to the time when the United States demanded repayment of the excessive profits, United States v. Jackson, 131 F. Supp. 642 (D.C. Mich.), or prior to the time that any serious effort was made to recover them, United States v. Douglas, 151 F. Supp. 254 (D.C. Fla.).
The plaintiff says that it was an “innocent debtor” and that it “never suspected that it owed the War Department a single dollar.” It would be remarkable if a taxpayer, even one used to dealing in large figures, would fail to notice that it had been credited, against an agreed renegotiation debt of $812,586,