Rider v. Sanchez

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedFebruary 12, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-02028
StatusUnknown

This text of Rider v. Sanchez (Rider v. Sanchez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rider v. Sanchez, (S.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDRE RIDER, Case No.: 3:20-cv-02028-DMS-RBB CDCR #T-13317, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. 1) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS 14 OWENS, SILVA, MIRANDA, AND

15 POLLARD; AND D. SANCHEZ, Correctional Officer; R. 16 OWENS, Correctional Sergeant; A. 2) DIRECTING USMS TO EFFECT 17 SILVA, Correctional Officer; A. SERVICE OF FIRST AMENDED MIRANDA, Correctional Lieutenant; M. COMPLAINT ON DEFENDAND 18 POLLARD, Correctional Warden, SANCHEZ 19 Defendants. 20 21 22 23 I. Procedural History 24 On October 14, 2020, Plaintiff Andre Rider, currently incarcerated at Richard J. 25 Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California filed a civil rights 26 complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In addition, Plaintiff 27 filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 28 See ECF No. 2. 1 On October 27, 2020, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and 2 DISMISSED claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. See ECF No. 4. Plaintiff was granted 4 leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading 5 identified in the Court’s Order. See id. 6 Plaintiff was also informed that “[d]efendants not named and any claims not re- 7 alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived” (Id. at 13 citing S.D. CAL. 8 CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 9 (9th Cir. 1989); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012)). 10 On February 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). See 11 ECF No. 8. In his FAC, Plaintiff no longer names Owens, Silva, Miranda, and Pollard as 12 Defendants. Thus, these Defendants are DISMISSED from this action. See Lacey, 693 13 F.3d at 928. 14 II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 15 A. Standard of Review 16 As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 17 proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 19 prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 20 a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 21 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); 22 Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 24 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 25 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 26 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 27 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 28 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 1 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 2 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 3 Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 4 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 6 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 7 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 556 U.S. 544, 570 8 (2007)); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 9 “Courts must consider the complaint in its entirety,” including “documents 10 incorporated into the complaint by reference” to be part of the pleading when 11 determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 12 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Schneider v. Cal. 13 Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) 14 (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading 15 for all purposes.”). 16 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 17 On September 1, 2019, Defendant Sanchez “came to building 4, on Facility ‘A’ 18 yard” to “inform Plaintiff that he has been selected to take” a random urinalysis test. 19 (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff questioned why he had been selected by Sanchez said, “I don’t have 20 time to answer any bullshit questions right now.” (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff asked to “speak 21 with the “2nd watch program [sergeant].” (Id. at 4.) However, Plaintiff alleges Sanchez 22 “became very upset” and told Plaintiff that the sergeant was “very busy.” (Id.) He 23 further claims Sanchez threatened to write him a “CDC RVR-115” if Plaintiff refused to 24 take the test. (Id.) 25 Plaintiff again asked the “tower officer” if he could see the sergeant and was told 26 no by Sanchez. (Id.) “At that moment, [Sanchez] intentionally threw Plaintiff to the 27 ground, real hard.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims Sanchez knew Plaintiff used a walker and cane 28 but Sanchez responded that he “didn’t care” and “continued calling Plaintiff [an] 1 asshole.” (Id.) Plaintiff informed Sanchez that he was “suffering pain from being thrown 2 to the ground, real hard” and asked to “go to medical” but Sanchez refused and “placed 3 Plaintiff back into his assigned cell.” (Id.) 4 Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, along with compensatory and punitive damages. 5 (Id. at 11.) 6 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 7 “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right 8 secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation 9 was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 10 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 11 975 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir.

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Bluebook (online)
Rider v. Sanchez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rider-v-sanchez-casd-2021.