Ridder v. Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. (In Re Ridder)

171 B.R. 345, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1310, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1329, 1994 WL 468440
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 12, 1994
Docket1-19-10550
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 171 B.R. 345 (Ridder v. Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. (In Re Ridder)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ridder v. Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. (In Re Ridder), 171 B.R. 345, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1310, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1329, 1994 WL 468440 (Wis. 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ROBERT D. MARTIN, Chief Judge.

The Plaintiff, Tracy Ann Ridder (“Rid-der”), filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and received a discharge on June 30, 1993. *346 Thereafter, Defendant, Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. (“Great Lakes”), a holder of a nondisehargeable student loan debt, threatened a state court action to collect postpetition interest on the debt.

Ridder did not attempt to have the Great Lakes debt discharged. 1 ,Instead, Ridder’s plan included Great Lakes with all of the other unsecured debts, which were to be paid without interest. From the payments proposed and made, each unsecured creditor ultimately received approximately 41% of its claim. 2 While Ridder was in bankruptcy, Great Lakes did not make any claim for postpetition interest nor did it make any objection to its treatment under the plan.

Ridder made all plan payments and received a discharge. Great Lakes received $4,917.59 in distributions leaving a balance of $7,556.12 remaining on its bankruptcy claim. Believing that balance to be the total amount owed, Ridder tendered $7,556.12 to Great Lakes in full payment. However, Great Lakes demanded that Ridder also pay at least $2,185.66 in interest that accrued after her filing. 3 To determine if she remains personally liable for this postpetition interest, Ridder moved to reopen this case.

Although claims for postpetition interest are disallowed during bankruptcy, after bankruptcy the holder of a nondisehargeable debt may collect from the debtor personally. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 84 S.Ct. 906, 11 L.Ed.2d 772 (1964). Student loans are nondisehargeable in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (1994). 4 Because the debt was not discharged, Great Lakes may collect the postpetition interest from Ridder personally.

Discussion

The amount of an unsecured claim is fixed at the time of filing. “The amount of the claim will be for principal and unpaid interest accrued as of that date.” Robert E. Ginsberg & Robert D. Martin, Bankruptcy: Text, Statutes & Rules, § 10.08, Prentice Hall, 3rd Ed., (1993). The Bankruptcy Code expressly disallows claims for unmatured interest. 5 In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 830 (8th Cir.1989). “[Sjection 502(b)(2) specifies that unmatured interest ... is not to be allowed against the bankruptcy estate.” The rule disallowing claims for unmatured interest would include debts excepted from discharge. *347 Thus, while Great Lakes may have had a claim for unmatured interest, or a claim for interest that would be earned during the pending bankruptcy, it would have been disallowed. 6

The fact that Great Lakes’ claim for post-petition interest would have been disallowed has nothing to do with whether postpetition interest is dischargeable. In re Shelbayah, 165 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1994). “Almost all courts that have considered the issue presented have concluded that the disallowance of postpetition interest has no effect on the dischargeability of a claim for, and an individual’s future liability for, such interest.” Id.; see also Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 84 S.Ct. 906, 11 L.Ed.2d 772 (1964); In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829 (8th Cir.1989). Interest is an integral part of a continuing debt. Bruning, 376 U.S. at 362-63, 84 S.Ct. at 908-09. It provides an incentive for the borrower to promptly repay. It represents the borrowers cost of use of the money. Because Ridder’s student loan was not discharged, the debt was continuing. Postpetition interest is an integral part of the undischarged debt and would itself be nondis-chargeable.

In Bruning, 376 U.S. at 362-63, 84 S.Ct. at 908-09, the court stated, “logic and reason indicate that postpetition interest on a tax claim excepted from discharge by § 17 of the Act should be recoverable in a later action against the debtor.” Id. at 362-63, 84 S.Ct. at 908-09. The court went on to note that “there is no evidence of any congressional intent to the contrary.” Id. The logic behind disallowing unmatured interest during the pendency of the bankruptcy case is related to administrative and equity concerns. Id.; see also In re Hanna, 872 F.2d at 830. Those concerns are no longer present after the case is closed. 7

Bruning is not limited to nondischargeable tax debt. In In re Jordan, 146 B.R. 31, 32 (D.Colo.1992), a court faced with that argument held that Bruning is not concerned with the type of nondischargeable debt, but with the fact that the debt is nondischargeable. The court held that the rule in Brun-ing applies with equal force to student loan debts.

In In re Wasson, 152 B.R. 639, 642 (Bankr.D.N.M.1993), the court held that when a student loan is fully paid through the plan, the postpetition interest on the student loan is discharged. In Wasson, a student loan creditor objected to debtor’s Chapter 13 plan because it did not provide for postpetition interest. The court denied the objection to the plan because 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) expressly provided that postpetition interest would be disallowed. In reaching its decision, the court limited the holding of Brun-ing by determining that it only applied to situations where the nondischargeable debt survived the bankruptcy. Under the Wasson rule, postpetition interest on student loans may be discharged when the allowed claim is paid in full. This is not the situation in our case, nor a result which is here endorsed.

Ridder argues that even if Great Lakes had a claim for unmatured interest, it waived any right to receive it by failing to object to confirmation of the plan which clearly provided for Great Lakes to be paid without interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (1994) 8 ; see also Matter of Gregory, 705 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.1983). Ridder’s argument appears to be based upon the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Matter of Chappel,

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171 B.R. 345, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1310, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1329, 1994 WL 468440, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ridder-v-great-lakes-higher-education-corp-in-re-ridder-wiwb-1994.