IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Ricky House, Jr., Jan 23 2026, 8:29 am Appellant-Petitioner CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
January 23, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PC-620 Appeal from the Posey Circuit Court The Honorable Craig Goedde, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 65C01-2202-PC-46
Opinion by Judge May Judges Altice and Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 1 of 11 May, Judge.
[1] Ricky House, Jr., appeals following the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief. He raises one issue on appeal: whether he received ineffective assistance
from trial counsel. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In our opinion deciding House’s direct appeal of his criminal convictions, we
explained the facts of his offenses:
House and his girlfriend, Kendra Tooley, lived in a trailer in Stewartsville that did not have running water. House told Tooley that he had a fantasy about abducting a woman and raping her.
On July 9, 2014, J.L. was living in a shelter in southern Indiana. She was walking back to the shelter in the early evening when House stopped to talk to her. J.L. knew House and Tooley because she had previously worked with Tooley. House asked if J.L. wanted to go with him to see Tooley, and House agreed to bring J.L. back to the shelter before her midnight curfew. J.L. went to House’s trailer where she smoked marijuana with House and Tooley and drank alcohol.
As J.L. was getting ready to leave so that House could return her to the shelter, House “came at” her and placed a rag soaked with chloroform on her face. J.L. lost consciousness and, when she woke up, she was naked, blindfolded, had zip ties on her wrists and ankles, and was tied “spread eagle” on a bed. House repeatedly sexually assaulted J.L. over the next fifty-eight days. Sometimes Tooley would hold J.L.’s head and force her to give House oral sex. House and Tooley made J.L. wear a belt, dog collar, and leash. About halfway through the fifty-eight days,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 2 of 11 House constructed a wooden cage in the trailer. House and Tooley would place J.T. [sic] in the cage and lock the door with a padlock. If J.T. [sic] did exactly what was asked of her, she would be allowed to sit on the couch and watch TV. Either House or Tooley was with J.T. [sic] at all times. When J.T. [sic] screamed and struggled, House told her “to shut up or he would shoot [her], kill [her].” House and Tooley repeatedly threatened to shoot or “sell” J.L. House burned J.L.’s purse and other possessions. According to J.L., House and Tooley regularly consumed marijuana and methamphetamine during this time period.
On September 4, 2014, Ronald Higgs came to the trailer to visit Tooley, who was his ex-wife. Tooley was having back pain and had asked Higgs to bring her painkillers. When Higgs arrived, Tooley told him that they were keeping a woman in a cage. Higgs did not recognize J.L., who “looked like a whipped dog,” was wearing a dog collar, had a rope hanging down her back, was disheveled, and “had a slight odor to her.” Tooley told J.L., “The rules don’t change because [Higgs] is here.” Eventually, J.T. [sic] was able to tell Higgs that she “didn’t want to be there” and that “they wouldn’t let [her] leave.” On September 6, 2014, Higgs was leaving and gave House and Tooley $100 and said that he was taking J.T. [sic] with him. House and Tooley refused to let J.L. leave with Higgs and said, “She is not going nowhere.” Higgs and House got into a physical altercation, while Tooley grabbed the dog collar and tried dragging J.L. back to the cage. House retrieved a gun, which he pointed at Higgs. Higgs ultimately convinced House that J.L. was leaving with him. Higgs took J.L. to his apartment in Evansville where she showered, ate, and called her mother. J.L.’s mother contacted the police, who had been looking for J.L.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 3 of 11 House v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1230, 1231-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations
to the record omitted) (all brackets in original except those noting erroneous
transcription of J.L. as J.T.), trans. denied.
[3] The State charged House with sixteen counts: six counts of Level 1 felony
rape, 1 two counts each of Level 3 felony criminal confinement 2 and Level 5
felony criminal confinement, 3 and one count each of Level 1 felony conspiracy
to commit rape, 4 Level 3 felony kidnapping, 5 Level 5 felony kidnapping, 6 Level
3 felony conspiracy to commit criminal confinement, 7 Class A misdemeanor
battery resulting in bodily injury, 8 and Class A misdemeanor pointing a
firearm. 9 Id. at 1232. The jury found House guilty on all counts. Id. To avoid
double jeopardy, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on four counts
of Level 1 felony rape, two counts of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, and
one count each of Level 5 felony kidnapping, Class A misdemeanor battery
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(b) (2014). 2 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(2) (2014). 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(1) (2014). 4 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(b) (2014) & Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 (2014). 5 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(b)(2) (2014). 6 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(b)(1) (2014). 7 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(2) (2014) & Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 (2014). 8 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c) (2014). 9 Ind. Code § 35-47-4-3 (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 4 of 11 resulting in bodily injury, and Class A misdemeanor pointing a firearm. Id.
The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of ninety-three years. Id.
[4] In his direct appeal, House argued “the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence of J.L.’s prior drug usage.” Id. We affirmed House’s
convictions and held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
evidence. Id. at 1234. In addition, we explained that “even if the trial court
erred by excluding the evidence, any error was harmless.” Id.
[5] On February 11, 2022, House filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief
alleging that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 10 The petition
alleged House’s trial counsel performed deficiently in several respects, including
calling Tooley to testify at trial and not objecting to evidence the State elicited
during its cross-examination of Tooley. House also alleged his trial counsel’s
preparation for trial and sentencing was deficient. He asserted his trial counsel
failed to adequately question prospective jurors during voir dire and did not act
on information that a juror was seen reading a newspaper. House’s trial
counsel passed away while House’s petition for post-conviction relief was
pending.
[6] The post-conviction court held a hearing regarding House’s petition on August
15, 2024. On February 12, 2025, the post-conviction court issued an order with
10 The petition also alleged House was entitled to post-conviction relief because of prosecutorial misconduct and juror misconduct, but House does not appeal the post-conviction’s court denial of those claims.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 5 of 11 findings of fact and conclusions of law denying House’s petition for post-
conviction relief. The post-conviction court concluded House was not
prejudiced by any of the alleged flaws in his trial counsel’s defense. It stated:
[T]here was overwhelming evidence proving House committed the charged acts. Namely, [J.L.] testified to her first-hand experiences—at least to the ones in which she was not drugged and rendered unconscious. Likewise, Higgs testified to what he saw, what Tooley told him, what House told him, and what he did to remove [J.L] from the situation. This evidence alone was sufficient to convict House.
(App. Vol. 2 at 186.)
Discussion and Decision [7] House asserts the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. In the
post-conviction court, House bore the burden of proving his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5) (“The
petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a
preponderance of the evidence.”). The post-conviction court ruled against
House, and therefore, he “appeals from a negative judgment and must establish
on appeal the evidence as a whole, leads unmistakably and unerringly to a
conclusion contrary to that reached by the post-conviction court.” Gillespie v.
State, 244 N.E.3d 423, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
[8] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant “the assistance of counsel for his defense.” The actualization of this
right “requires counsel’s assistance be effective.” Warren v. State, 146 N.E.3d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 6 of 11 972, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 858 (2020).
“There is a strong presumption that trial counsel provided effective
representation, and a petitioner must put forth strong evidence to rebut that
presumption.” Id. “Isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics does not
necessarily constitute ineffective assistance.” McCullough v. State, 973 N.E.2d
62, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied. Rather, we
review a petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance by applying the two-part test
articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Bobadilla v. State,
117 N.E.3d 1272, 1280 (Ind. 2019). That test requires the petitioner to “prove:
(1) counsel rendered deficient performance, meaning counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing
professional norms; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant[.]” Id. “[T]o demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s deficient
performance, a petitioner need only show ‘a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’” Middleton v. State, 72 N.E.3d 891 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Strickland,
104 S. Ct. at 2068) (emphasis in Middleton). “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 104
S. Ct. at 2068. “Although the performance prong and the prejudice prong are
separate inquiries, failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail. If
we can easily dismiss an ineffective assistance claim based upon the prejudice
prong, we may do so without addressing whether counsel’s performance was
deficient.” Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ind. 2008) (internal citation
omitted). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 7 of 11 [9] House asserts his trial counsel’s “most egregious example of ineffective
assistance of counsel” was his decision to call Tooley to testify during House’s
case-in chief. (Appellant’s Br. at 16.) House contends his trial counsel should
have known that Tooley’s testimony would incriminate House because of
Tooley’s deposition testimony. House also faults his trial counsel for not
objecting to Tooley’s testimony about uncharged bad acts by House.
[10] However, even without Tooley’s testimony, the evidence of House’s guilt was
overwhelming. J.L. gave detailed testimony regarding how House and Tooley
treated her during her nearly two months of confinement. She described how
House used chloroform to render her unconscious and that when she regained
consciousness, she was naked, blindfolded, and restrained with zip ties to a bed.
J.L. explained her hands turned “blue from not having any circulation and not
being able to move [her] body at all for hours.” (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 291.) J.L.
relayed that during her confinement, House and Tooley threatened to either kill
or sell her if she attempted to escape. She also described House whipping her
and his sexual assaults of her. These sexual assaults included an instance when
House rubbed his naked body against J.L. while J.L. was naked and restrained
to a bed. House did this despite J.L. telling him “[t]o stop, [she] didn’t want it.
Just let [her] go.” (Id.) She explained the assaults occurred so often that she
lost count and included both forced sexual intercourse and oral sex. J.L.
identified the wooden cage House built and explained that House and Tooley
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 8 of 11 would confine her in the cage for hours if she disobeyed their orders. 11 She also
described the various other methods of restraint House and Tooley used to
confine her. She identified a dog collar and leash and blindfolds House and
Tooley forced her to wear. 12
[11] In addition, Higgs’s account of the last two days of J.L.’s confinement and the
struggle to remove her from House’s trailer was largely consistent with J.L.’s
testimony about those same events. Moreover, physical evidence corroborated
J.L.’s account. When the police responded to J.L.’s mother’s call, they
observed several deep red ligature marks on J.L.’s neck, arms, and wrists. J.L.
also had additional cuts and bruises on other areas of her body. Inside House’s
trailer, the police observed that the trailer had sheets over the windows to
prevent others from looking into the trailer and J.L. from looking out. Inside
the trailer, officers found various items J.L. described Tooley and House using
to torture her, including belts, zip ties, bungee cords, a mattress with elastic
cords wrapped around it, rope, a whip, and a dog collar with rope attached to
it. A latch lock and padlock on the bedroom door allowed it to be secured from
the outside. Inside the bedroom, officers found the cage where House had
confined J.L. J.L.’s DNA was present on items recovered from the cage, and
11 The wooden cage was identified, offered, and admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. Due to the bulk and nature of the exhibit, it remained in the custody of Posey County, and a photograph of the original exhibit was substituted into the trial court record. 12 The dog collar and leash were identified, offered, and admitted as State’s Exhibit 6, and the blindfolds were identified, offered, and admitted as State’s Exhibits 7 and 8. Due to the bulk and nature of those exhibits, they remained in the custody of Posey County and photographs of the exhibits were substituted into the trial court record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 9 of 11 J.L.’s DNA and House’s DNA were on a bungee cord found attached to a
barstool. Officers also found bottles of chloroform inside the trailer. A digital
camera recovered from the trailer had pictures of J.L. naked, blindfolded, and
tied to a bed. The digital camera also contained pictures of J.L. performing oral
sex on House. While incarcerated awaiting trial, House sent a note to his sister
listing items he wanted her to remove from his trailer, and this note led officers
to find a shotgun hidden underneath a garden tub.
[12] In short, House was found guilty because of the mountain of evidence the State
presented of his guilt and not because of any alleged deficiencies in his trial
counsel’s performance. Even if House had been represented by the most
capable defense attorney imaginable, the jury still would have returned a guilty
verdict, and the trial court still would have imposed a lengthy sentence. There
is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of House’s trial would have
been different had his trial counsel performed differently. For that reason, we
do not need to evaluate whether House’s other criticisms of his trial counsel’s
performance constitute deficient performance because he was not prejudiced by
any of them, and we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 649-50 (Ind.
2021) (holding post-conviction relief petitioner was not prejudiced by trial
counsel’s alleged failures given overwhelming evidence supporting jury’s verdict
that he receives the death sentence).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 10 of 11 Conclusion [13] House’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails because he cannot
satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the
post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
[14] Affirmed.
Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael Frischkorn Brand & Morelock Greenfield, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PC-620 | January 23, 2026 Page 11 of 11