NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 6 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICKY MENDOZA, No. 22-15933
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-07160-SI
v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM SULLIVAN, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 11, 2024 San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Ricky Mendoza appeals the district court’s order denying his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first-degree
murder. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them
here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. The court reviews de novo the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Earp v. Davis, 881 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2018). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which governs this appeal, we cannot
grant habeas relief unless the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that
was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;”
or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).
1. Mendoza argues the California Court of Appeal unreasonably erred by
concluding there was sufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder
because no rational trier of fact could credit the testimony of purported
accomplices Martin and Hellums. Evidence is sufficient under the Due Process
Clause when, upon “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
“[U]nder Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally
beyond the scope of review.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995). The court
“must presume” that the jury resolved conflicting inferences “in favor of the
prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The
California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded, based on the testimony of
2 Hellums and Martin and other corroborating evidence, that the jury could have
found Mendoza guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mendoza nevertheless insists that the testimony of Martin and Hellums was
insufficient to convict him because it was uncorroborated and “incredible,
insubstantial, and inherently implausible.” For support, Mendoza relies on the
Ninth Circuit’s rule that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is insufficient to
support a conviction if it is “incredible or insubstantial on its face,” Laboa v.
Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted), and the Supreme
Court’s statement in Lilly v. Virginia that accomplice confessions are
“presumptively unreliable,” 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (citation omitted). But the
Ninth Circuit precedent discussed in Laboa “does not constitute ‘clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’” and “therefore
cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” See Parker v. Matthews,
567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)). And Lilly concerns
the implications under the Confrontation Clause of introducing out-of-court
confessions by accomplices, not the sufficiency of in-court testimony by
accomplices. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131.
We conclude the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Mendoza’s
Jackson challenge was not “objectively unreasonable.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566
U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
3 2. Mendoza argues that Martin’s testimony was insufficiently
corroborated under California Penal Code § 1111.1 Although this corroboration
rule “is not required by the Constitution or federal law,” Mendoza may show that
he was deprived of his due process right to fundamental fairness if he establishes
that the state court “arbitrarily deprive[d] [him] of a state law entitlement.”
Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added) (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343,
346 (1980)).
Mendoza was not arbitrarily deprived of a state law entitlement in violation
of due process. The California Court of Appeal examined the record evidence and
concluded that Martin’s testimony was adequately corroborated under § 1111. In
particular, the court recognized that Mendoza’s presence at the party was
corroborated by Hellums, who testified that Mendoza was with the Norteño group
earlier in the day and entered the party with them. It also noted that the text
messages between Mendoza and his girlfriend strongly indicated that Mendoza
was present when Navarro was killed. Moreover, Martin’s account was further
corroborated by forensic evidence concerning where and how Navarro was shot, as
well as expert ballistics testimony.
Although the California Court of Appeal did not expressly discuss federal
1 California Penal Code § 1111 provides that a “conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.”
4 due process, we may presume it adjudicated Mendoza’s due process claim on the
merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). By expressly
addressing § 1111 and holding it was satisfied, the court could have reasonably
determined that Mendoza received a fundamentally fair trial and was not arbitrarily
deprived of a state law entitlement.
3. Mendoza argues he was deprived of due process and his rights under
the Confrontation Clause because he was not permitted to cross-examine Martin
sufficiently. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits” on
cross-examination, and “[n]o Confrontation Clause violation occurs as long as the
jury receives sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the
witness.” Fenenbock v. Dir. of Corr. for Cal., 692 F.3d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
The California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that Mendoza had an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine Martin and probe his credibility and
potential biases.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 6 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICKY MENDOZA, No. 22-15933
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-07160-SI
v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM SULLIVAN, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 11, 2024 San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Ricky Mendoza appeals the district court’s order denying his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first-degree
murder. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them
here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. The court reviews de novo the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Earp v. Davis, 881 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2018). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which governs this appeal, we cannot
grant habeas relief unless the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that
was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;”
or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).
1. Mendoza argues the California Court of Appeal unreasonably erred by
concluding there was sufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder
because no rational trier of fact could credit the testimony of purported
accomplices Martin and Hellums. Evidence is sufficient under the Due Process
Clause when, upon “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
“[U]nder Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally
beyond the scope of review.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995). The court
“must presume” that the jury resolved conflicting inferences “in favor of the
prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The
California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded, based on the testimony of
2 Hellums and Martin and other corroborating evidence, that the jury could have
found Mendoza guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mendoza nevertheless insists that the testimony of Martin and Hellums was
insufficient to convict him because it was uncorroborated and “incredible,
insubstantial, and inherently implausible.” For support, Mendoza relies on the
Ninth Circuit’s rule that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is insufficient to
support a conviction if it is “incredible or insubstantial on its face,” Laboa v.
Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted), and the Supreme
Court’s statement in Lilly v. Virginia that accomplice confessions are
“presumptively unreliable,” 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (citation omitted). But the
Ninth Circuit precedent discussed in Laboa “does not constitute ‘clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’” and “therefore
cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” See Parker v. Matthews,
567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)). And Lilly concerns
the implications under the Confrontation Clause of introducing out-of-court
confessions by accomplices, not the sufficiency of in-court testimony by
accomplices. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131.
We conclude the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Mendoza’s
Jackson challenge was not “objectively unreasonable.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566
U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
3 2. Mendoza argues that Martin’s testimony was insufficiently
corroborated under California Penal Code § 1111.1 Although this corroboration
rule “is not required by the Constitution or federal law,” Mendoza may show that
he was deprived of his due process right to fundamental fairness if he establishes
that the state court “arbitrarily deprive[d] [him] of a state law entitlement.”
Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added) (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343,
346 (1980)).
Mendoza was not arbitrarily deprived of a state law entitlement in violation
of due process. The California Court of Appeal examined the record evidence and
concluded that Martin’s testimony was adequately corroborated under § 1111. In
particular, the court recognized that Mendoza’s presence at the party was
corroborated by Hellums, who testified that Mendoza was with the Norteño group
earlier in the day and entered the party with them. It also noted that the text
messages between Mendoza and his girlfriend strongly indicated that Mendoza
was present when Navarro was killed. Moreover, Martin’s account was further
corroborated by forensic evidence concerning where and how Navarro was shot, as
well as expert ballistics testimony.
Although the California Court of Appeal did not expressly discuss federal
1 California Penal Code § 1111 provides that a “conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.”
4 due process, we may presume it adjudicated Mendoza’s due process claim on the
merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). By expressly
addressing § 1111 and holding it was satisfied, the court could have reasonably
determined that Mendoza received a fundamentally fair trial and was not arbitrarily
deprived of a state law entitlement.
3. Mendoza argues he was deprived of due process and his rights under
the Confrontation Clause because he was not permitted to cross-examine Martin
sufficiently. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits” on
cross-examination, and “[n]o Confrontation Clause violation occurs as long as the
jury receives sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the
witness.” Fenenbock v. Dir. of Corr. for Cal., 692 F.3d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
The California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that Mendoza had an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine Martin and probe his credibility and
potential biases. For example, defense counsel elicited testimony on cross-
examination that: (i) Martin was originally charged with murder and attempted
murder in this case, and could have received a life sentence; (ii) after the first jury
deadlocked, Martin agreed to plead guilty to an unspecified violent crime with a
ten-year sentence and to testify in the retrial of Mendoza; and (iii) Martin had
repeatedly lied to police when first questioned about the shooting. Further, the trial
5 court permitted defense counsel to read a stipulation that informed the jury that
Martin had been identified as the shooter in a separate unrelated murder, and that
he had been charged with that murder and several other serious crimes.
Accordingly, we agree that the limits on Mendoza’s cross-examination of Martin
did not violate Mendoza’s constitutional rights.2
4. Mendoza argues that he was deprived of due process because the trial
court failed to correctly instruct the jury about accomplice testimony. “[An]
erroneous jury instruction can rise to the level of constitutional error if it ‘so
infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Brewer
v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 72 (1991)). “[T]he fact that [an] instruction was allegedly incorrect under state
law is not a basis for habeas relief.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72.
Here, no such “infect[ion]” that violated due process occurred. Id. at 72.
California’s rules regarding accomplice testimony, including California Penal
Code § 1111, are not required by the Constitution or any holding of the Supreme
Court. See Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979. Accordingly, Mendoza is not entitled to relief.
See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72.
5. Because we conclude that no constitutional errors occurred, there is
2 Because federal review of habeas relief under § 2254(d) is limited to the state court record, Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811, 819 (2022), Petitioner’s motion for judicial notice (Dkt. 44) is DENIED.
6 no cumulative prejudice. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Because we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no
cumulative prejudice is possible.”).
AFFIRMED.