1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RICKY GODFREY, Case No. 25-cv-03462-AMO
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 10 DENNIS TRUJILLO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 37 Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff Ricky Godfrey brings this suit against Defendants Dennis Trujillo, Denis Browne, 14 the Estate of Denis Browne, and the City of Richmond, California, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based 15 on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. 16 On August 18, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to 17 dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 32.1 Now pending before 18 the Court is Defendants’ motion for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Dkt. 19 No. 37. Defendants request certification of the following question: 20 Does the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bar a § 1983 action that challenges the validity of evidence used in the 21 plaintiff’s original trial, where the plaintiff’s prior murder conviction was later vacated due to reasons unrelated to alleged police 22 misconduct and replaced with a plea of no contest to voluntary manslaughter and attempted robbery, and where success in the § 1983 23 action would necessarily negate factual elements admitted in the subsequent plea and underlying the still-valid convictions? 24 25 (Id. at 7.) Further, Defendants request a stay of proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. 26 (Id.) 27 1 Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court DENIES the motion to certify an 2 interlocutory appeal. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the Court may certify an appeal of an interlocutory order when 5 it: (1) “involves a controlling question of law,” (2) “as to which there is substantial ground for 6 difference of opinion,” and (3) if “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 7 ultimate termination of the litigation . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). An interlocutory appeal is a 8 “departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final 9 judgment,” and as such requires “exceptional circumstances.” ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int’l 10 Longshore & Warehouse Union, 22 F.4th 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2022). “As to the timing of 11 certification, the district court may certify the order for interlocutory appeal in the text of that 12 order or in a separate order, known as the certification order.” Id. at 1131 (citation omitted). 13 Defendants’ motion, if granted, would require proceeding by the latter approach. 14 DISCUSSION 15 The Court’s August 18 Order granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Godfrey’s Monell 16 claim against the City of Richmond and denied the motion as to the remaining Section 1983 17 claims against Defendants Trujillo and Browne. See Godfrey v. Trujillo, No. 25-cv-03462-AMO, 18 2025 WL 2391445, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2025). There, the Court considered whether the 19 Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred Godfrey’s claims 20 related to his original 1993 conviction. Id. at *4 -*5. Ultimately, the Court concluded Heck did 21 not dispose of the claims because Godfrey’s 1993 conviction had been vacated by a state tribunal 22 prior to his new plea and sentencing in 2023. Id. at *5. 23 Defendants seek certification of an appeal of the August 18 Order, and argue that all three 24 prongs of Section 1292(b) are met; namely, that the question they have proffered presents “a 25 controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and 26 that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 27 litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). These three statutory requirements are conjunctive, meaning 1 August 18 Order presents “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” as the matter may be 2 resolved on that question alone. 3 “To determine if a ‘substantial ground for difference of opinion’ exists under § 1292(b), 4 courts must examine to what extent the controlling law is unclear. Courts traditionally will find 5 that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where ‘the circuits are in dispute on the 6 question and the court of appeals of the circuit has not spoken on the point, if complicated 7 questions arise under foreign law, or if novel and difficult questions of first impression are 8 presented.’” Theodore v. Am. Express Nat’l Bank, No. 23-cv-03710-AMO, 2025 WL 1294648, at 9 *2 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2025) (quoting Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010)). 10 Even so, “[a] substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists might 11 disagree on an issue’s resolution, not merely where they have already disagreed.” Reese v. BP 12 Expl. (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011). But the mere fact “[t]hat settled law might 13 be applied differently does not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Couch, 14 611 F.3d at 633. Indeed “[a] party’s strong disagreement with the Court’s ruling is not sufficient 15 for there to be a ‘substantial ground for difference.’” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Defendants 16 have not shown a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the effect of Heck on the 17 instant complaint. 18 In requesting certification of an interlocutory appeal, Defendants present a variation on the 19 Heck arguments from their initial motion to dismiss. Defendants now concede Godfrey’s 1993 20 convictions were vacated by a state tribunal, Dkt. No. 44 at 5, and instead, argue Heck bars 21 Godfrey’s claims for two reasons. First, they contend cases like Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755 22 (9th Cir. 2014), do not control because the vacatur of Godfrey’s state court convictions was not 23 expressly based on either fabrication of evidence or Brady violations. Dkt. No. 44 at 5. Second, 24 they assert success in this Section 1983 action would imply the invalidity of Godfrey’s 2023 25 conviction for attempted robbery and voluntary manslaughter. (Id.) Neither argument persuades 26 the Court to exercise its discretion to certify this question for interlocutory appeal. See Swint v. 27 Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995) (“Congress thus chose to confer on district 1 To start, Heck prohibits recovery of damages for unconstitutional imprisonment unless the 2 plaintiff can show his previous conviction was “declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 3 make such determination . . . .” 512 U.S. at 487. Defendants read an additional requirement into 4 the Court’s language—the conviction must be declared invalid for the same constitutional 5 violations asserted in the subsequent Section 1983 action.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RICKY GODFREY, Case No. 25-cv-03462-AMO
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 10 DENNIS TRUJILLO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 37 Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff Ricky Godfrey brings this suit against Defendants Dennis Trujillo, Denis Browne, 14 the Estate of Denis Browne, and the City of Richmond, California, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based 15 on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. 16 On August 18, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to 17 dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 32.1 Now pending before 18 the Court is Defendants’ motion for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Dkt. 19 No. 37. Defendants request certification of the following question: 20 Does the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bar a § 1983 action that challenges the validity of evidence used in the 21 plaintiff’s original trial, where the plaintiff’s prior murder conviction was later vacated due to reasons unrelated to alleged police 22 misconduct and replaced with a plea of no contest to voluntary manslaughter and attempted robbery, and where success in the § 1983 23 action would necessarily negate factual elements admitted in the subsequent plea and underlying the still-valid convictions? 24 25 (Id. at 7.) Further, Defendants request a stay of proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. 26 (Id.) 27 1 Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court DENIES the motion to certify an 2 interlocutory appeal. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the Court may certify an appeal of an interlocutory order when 5 it: (1) “involves a controlling question of law,” (2) “as to which there is substantial ground for 6 difference of opinion,” and (3) if “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 7 ultimate termination of the litigation . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). An interlocutory appeal is a 8 “departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final 9 judgment,” and as such requires “exceptional circumstances.” ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int’l 10 Longshore & Warehouse Union, 22 F.4th 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2022). “As to the timing of 11 certification, the district court may certify the order for interlocutory appeal in the text of that 12 order or in a separate order, known as the certification order.” Id. at 1131 (citation omitted). 13 Defendants’ motion, if granted, would require proceeding by the latter approach. 14 DISCUSSION 15 The Court’s August 18 Order granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Godfrey’s Monell 16 claim against the City of Richmond and denied the motion as to the remaining Section 1983 17 claims against Defendants Trujillo and Browne. See Godfrey v. Trujillo, No. 25-cv-03462-AMO, 18 2025 WL 2391445, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2025). There, the Court considered whether the 19 Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred Godfrey’s claims 20 related to his original 1993 conviction. Id. at *4 -*5. Ultimately, the Court concluded Heck did 21 not dispose of the claims because Godfrey’s 1993 conviction had been vacated by a state tribunal 22 prior to his new plea and sentencing in 2023. Id. at *5. 23 Defendants seek certification of an appeal of the August 18 Order, and argue that all three 24 prongs of Section 1292(b) are met; namely, that the question they have proffered presents “a 25 controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and 26 that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 27 litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). These three statutory requirements are conjunctive, meaning 1 August 18 Order presents “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” as the matter may be 2 resolved on that question alone. 3 “To determine if a ‘substantial ground for difference of opinion’ exists under § 1292(b), 4 courts must examine to what extent the controlling law is unclear. Courts traditionally will find 5 that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where ‘the circuits are in dispute on the 6 question and the court of appeals of the circuit has not spoken on the point, if complicated 7 questions arise under foreign law, or if novel and difficult questions of first impression are 8 presented.’” Theodore v. Am. Express Nat’l Bank, No. 23-cv-03710-AMO, 2025 WL 1294648, at 9 *2 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2025) (quoting Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010)). 10 Even so, “[a] substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists might 11 disagree on an issue’s resolution, not merely where they have already disagreed.” Reese v. BP 12 Expl. (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011). But the mere fact “[t]hat settled law might 13 be applied differently does not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Couch, 14 611 F.3d at 633. Indeed “[a] party’s strong disagreement with the Court’s ruling is not sufficient 15 for there to be a ‘substantial ground for difference.’” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Defendants 16 have not shown a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the effect of Heck on the 17 instant complaint. 18 In requesting certification of an interlocutory appeal, Defendants present a variation on the 19 Heck arguments from their initial motion to dismiss. Defendants now concede Godfrey’s 1993 20 convictions were vacated by a state tribunal, Dkt. No. 44 at 5, and instead, argue Heck bars 21 Godfrey’s claims for two reasons. First, they contend cases like Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755 22 (9th Cir. 2014), do not control because the vacatur of Godfrey’s state court convictions was not 23 expressly based on either fabrication of evidence or Brady violations. Dkt. No. 44 at 5. Second, 24 they assert success in this Section 1983 action would imply the invalidity of Godfrey’s 2023 25 conviction for attempted robbery and voluntary manslaughter. (Id.) Neither argument persuades 26 the Court to exercise its discretion to certify this question for interlocutory appeal. See Swint v. 27 Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995) (“Congress thus chose to confer on district 1 To start, Heck prohibits recovery of damages for unconstitutional imprisonment unless the 2 plaintiff can show his previous conviction was “declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 3 make such determination . . . .” 512 U.S. at 487. Defendants read an additional requirement into 4 the Court’s language—the conviction must be declared invalid for the same constitutional 5 violations asserted in the subsequent Section 1983 action. The Supreme Court has never 6 articulated this additional requirement nor has the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, Taylor v. Cnty. of Pima, 7 913 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2019), and Roberts v. City of Fairbanks, 947 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 8 2020), dispose of Defendants’ argument. Both cases involved convictions invalidated by state 9 tribunals for reasons other than constitutional violations in the underlying proceeding. See Taylor, 10 913 F.3d at 932 (state convictions invalidated by vacatur through subsequent plea agreement); 11 Roberts, 947 F.3d at 1195 (state convictions invalidated by settlement agreement). Therefore, 12 Heck does not require the vacatur of the prior conviction to be based on the same constitutional 13 violations that underlie the Section 1983 claim. 14 As for Defendants’ second argument, they assert Godfrey’s 2023 plea of “no contest” 15 functioned as an admission of the factual basis for the conviction, meaning Godfrey admitted his 16 involvement in the death of Harvey Norfleet. Dkt. No. 44 at 7-8, 10. Since the Section 1983 suit 17 challenges the evidence originally presented to convict Godfrey, Defendants argue finding such 18 evidence unconstitutional would invalidate the admissions of fact that form the basis of the 2023 19 conviction. (Id.) The Court disagrees. Defendants misapprehend the Court’s original analysis 20 related to this point:
21 Godfrey’s claims do not mandate the factfinder consider actual innocence. While a malicious prosecution claim requires termination 22 of the original case in the plaintiff’s favor, the Section 1983 claims here have no such requirement. Godfrey does not need to ultimately 23 prove he did not murder Norfleet, or that he was not involved in the attempted robbery. He need only show he suffered a constitutional 24 violation by officials acting under color of state law. Even if he prevails on his Section 1983 claims, a judgment in his favor would 25 leave his 2023 conviction, and its factual basis, undisturbed. 26 Godfrey, 2025 WL 2391445, at *5 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, the 27 basis of the 2023 conviction is not the evidence acquired through Defendants’ 1992 investigation, 1 factfinder determined Trujillo and Browne fabricated evidence or committed Brady violations 2 during the 1992 investigation, those findings would only apply to the 1993 conviction—which has 3 been vacated. 4 In support of their position, Defendants rely heavily on Sanders v. City of Pittsburg, 5 14 F.4th 968 (9th Cir. 2021). But the case is inapposite. There, the appellant was involved in a 6 foot chase with the police, during which the officer ordered his K-9 to bite the fleeing Sanders. Id. 7 at 970. Thereafter, Sanders was charged with resisting arrest and pled “no contest.” Id. He 8 subsequently brought a Section 1983 action against the officer and the city based on alleged 9 excessive force related to the use of the dog during the pursuit. Id. The Ninth Circuit held 10 Sanders’ claims were barred by Heck because the conviction for resisting arrest was based on 11 Sanders’ admission that the officer had used lawful force when deploying the K-9. Id. at 971-72. 12 Lawful force cannot form the basis of an excessive force claim. Id. at 971. Consequently, success 13 on the Section 1983 claim would contradict the conviction for resisting arrest, since Sanders had 14 admitted that use of the K-9 was lawful force. Id. at 972. The instant case, however, differs. 15 As explained, supra, success in this Section 1983 action would not invalidate any 16 admissions forming the basis of the 2023 conviction. For instance, the enhancements to which 17 Godfrey pled “no contest” included the admission that he “discharged a firearm” which “caused 18 death to Harvey D. Norfleet.” Dkt. No. 21-5 at 3. Defendants assume that finding Browne or 19 Trujillo fabricated evidence would invalidate this admission. It would not. Should Godfrey 20 prevail in this action, the factfinder would not exonerate him of any involvement in the death of 21 Mr. Norfleet—Godrey’s claims here are only about whether the investigative techniques used in 22 1992 were constitutional. Actual innocence is not a precondition of success. Unlike Sanders, the 23 constitutional violations alleged here do not arise out of the events surrounding the still valid 2023 24 conviction—they apply to the now vacated 1993 conviction. Further, neither party has asserted 25 any of the admissions underlying that 2023 plea agreement directly involved the evidence subject 26 to the fabrication of evidence and Brady claims. So, Sanders does not disturb the Court’s original 27 reasoning. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to certify an interlocutory appeal and 3 motion to stay the case are DENIED. 4 This Order terminates Docket No. 37. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: October 30, 2025 al: Mad 8 ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12
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