[Cite as Rick's Foreign Exchange Co. v. Greenlee, 2014-Ohio-4505.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
RICK’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE CO.
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
GLORIA GREENLEE
Defendant-Appellant
Appellate Case No. 26096
Trial Court Case No. 2013-CVI-1880
(Civil Appeal from (Municipal Court) ...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 10th day of October, 2014.
...........
RICK’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE CO., 5269 Cobblegate Boulevard, Moraine, Ohio 45439 Plaintiff-Appellee-Pro Se
GLORIA GREENLEE, 6124 Clematis Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45449 Defendant-Appellant-Pro Se
.............
WELBAUM, J. 2
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Gloria Greenlee, appeals pro se from the decision of
the Miamisburg Municipal Court granting judgment to plaintiff-appellee, Rick’s Foreign
Exchange Co., awarding it $2,143.64 in damages following a bench trial. For the reasons
outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} Rick’s Foreign Exchange Co. (Foreign Exchange), is a family-owned limited
liability company located in Dayton, Ohio, that conducts an automotive repair business. On
December 11, 2013, the president of Foreign Exchange, Richard Reilich, filed a small claims
complaint on behalf of the company against Gloria Greenlee for unpaid services in the amount of
$2,143.64. It is undisputed that Greenlee and her son Kiel were customers of Foreign Exchange
in the spring of 2013, and that they reside in Miamisburg, Ohio. A bench trial was subsequently
scheduled for January 28, 2014, with both parties appearing pro se.
{¶ 3} The following evidence was presented at trial. In the spring of 2013, Kiel
contacted Foreign Exchange to obtain a quote for the cost of labor to remove and replace an
engine in his 1991 Nissan 300ZX. Prior to receiving the quote, Kiel indicated that he had
already purchased a rebuilt engine for the project. Reilich’s son, Ricky Reilich, orally quoted the
cost of labor at $1,400.
{¶ 4} On April 16, 2013, Kiel brought his vehicle to Foreign Exchange for the engine
removal and replacement. A Foreign Exchange technician removed the engine in the vehicle, 3
and upon doing so, noticed some problems with the vehicle. As a result, Foreign Exchange
contacted Kiel and informed him of the problems with the vehicle. Kiel, however, declined all
suggested repairs with the exception of replacing the engine wiring harness. Thereafter, when
Kiel’s replacement engine arrived, Foreign Exchange advised Kiel that the engine was not a
rebuilt engine, but rather a used junk-yard engine. Kiel looked at the engine and agreed to have
it sent back. Kiel then purchased a second engine from Moraine Auto Parts.
{¶ 5} Reilich testified that charges were incurred for examining and unloading the first
engine, as it arrived in a truck without a lift gate. He further testified that the second engine they
received from Moraine Auto Parts was in poor condition, which required them to partially tear
down the engine in order to determine if it was a rebuild, as well as to strip off cut wires and
other broken materials. After examining the engine, Reilich testified that Foreign Exchange
decided not to install the second engine because it was missing a spark plug, had rust in the
cylinder, and failed a cylinder leakage test. According to Reilich, the charges for the teardown
and examination of the second engine were authorized by Kiel based on his instruction to install
the engine.
{¶ 6} Continuing, Reilich then testified that Kiel and Greenlee came to the shop
inquiring why the project was not complete, to which Reilich explained that Foreign Exchange
had not been provided with a suitable replacement engine. He then told Kiel and Greenlee that
they could buy a remanufactured engine through Foreign Exchange, and provided them with
quote. It is undisputed that Kiel wrote Foreign Exchange a $2,500 check as a down payment for
a remanufactured engine. However, a few days later, Greenlee and Kiel called and informed
Reilich that they no longer wanted the remanufactured engine and wanted to pick up the vehicle. 4
{¶ 7} Reilich returned the $2,500 check to Greenlee, and explained that Foreign
Exchange was going to have to charge them for the wiring harness and the time incurred, as they
had removed the old engine, unloaded and inspected the first engine, inspected and tore down the
second engine, and installed the subframe. All of this was reflected in a $2,143.63 invoice
signed by Greenlee, which was admitted into evidence. Greenlee wrote Reilich at check for the
invoice, but Reilich testified that she stopped payment on the check shortly thereafter.
{¶ 8} Kiel testified he contacted the seller of the first engine who claimed the engine
was operable. However, Kiel admitted that he had agreed to have the first engine returned based
on Foreign Exchange’s advice. Kiel also testified that Moraine Auto Parts advised him that the
second engine was from a junk yard, but that it was operable. Kiel further testified that Foreign
Exchange never gave him an estimate for the teardown of the second engine and that he never
authorized them to tear it down. Kiel also claimed he could not get Foreign Exchange to return
his phone calls for three and one half weeks, and as a result, his car just sat in the shop because
they did not install the second engine.
{¶ 9} In addition, Kiel testified that after obtaining his vehicle back from Foreign
Exchange, he bought a third used junk-yard engine for $1,800 and that Brett Ramey, a Nissan
certified mechanic, installed it for $2,500. According to Kiel, Ramey installed the engine
through the top of the vehicle, and claimed that working from the bottom, as Foreign Exchange
did, creates more work and leaves potential for damage. Kiel also testified that Ramey advised
him that the original wiring harness did not need replaced as represented by Foreign Exchange;
however, Kiel admitted that the wiring harness purchased from Foreign Exchange was used to
install the engine replaced by Ramey. 5
{¶ 10} Kiel further testified that Ramey repaired damages caused by Foreign Exchange,
including cut transmission lines and damaged air conditioning lines. Kiel provided no evidence
of the alleged damages and Ramey did not appear at trial to offer expert testimony. Yet, Kiel did
provide a $6,076.46 invoice from Ramey, which represents the cost of the engine replacement
and the additional repairs.
{¶ 11} On January 29, 2014, the trial court issued a written decision granting judgment
in favor of Foreign Exchange for $2,143.63 plus court costs. At no time did either of the parties
request the trial court to issue findings of fact or conclusions of law. On February 20, 2014,
Greenlee appealed from the judgment of the trial court, raising two assignments of error, and
thereafter filed a motion to strike Foreign Exchange’s appellate brief.
Motion to Strike
{¶ 12} Greenlee contends Foreign Exchange’s appellate brief should be stricken because
it failed to comply with App.R. 13, 16, and 18. We note that App. R. 13(B) provides that
“[c]opies of all documents filed by any party and not required by these rules to be served by the
clerk shall, at or before the time of filing, be served by a party or person acting for the party on all
other parties to the appeal.” Furthermore, section (D) of App.R. 13 states that:
Documents presented for filing shall contain an acknowledgment of service by the
person served or poof of service in the form of a statement of the date and manner
of service and of the names of the persons served, certified by the person who
made service. Documents filed with the court shall not be considered until proof
of service is endorsed on the documents or separately filed. 6
{¶ 13} In this case, Foreign Exchange’s appellate brief does not contain an
acknowledgment of service as required by App.R. 13(D). Greenlee claims that she was never
served a copy of Foreign Exchange’s brief, but that she discovered the document while checking
the status of this appeal via Montgomery County’s online public records system. Greenlee
contends that the service failure prejudiced her because she was not notified of Foreign
Exchange’s filing and was unable to timely file a reply brief. Based on the foregoing, Greenlee’s
motion to strike is sustained; therefore, Foreign Exchange’s appellate brief is stricken from the
record and will not be considered in the determination of this appeal.
Assignment of Error No. I
{¶ 14} Greenlee’s First Assignment of Error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS A LACK
OF FINDING OF FACT AND FINDING OF LAW AGAINST CLEAR AND
CONCISE STATU[T]ES THAT PROTECT THE CONSUMER.
{¶ 15} The arguments in Greenlee’s pro se appellate brief are difficult to discern.
Nevertheless, we presume that she is contending the trial court erred in failing to make any
findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to her Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act
(CSPA) allegations, as she maintains Foreign Exchange violated a number of CSPA provisions.
In addition, Greenlee claims the trial court’s decision granting judgment in favor of Foreign
Exchange was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 16} As it relates to Greenlee’s claims that the trial court erred in failing to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law, we note that pursuant to Civ.R. 52, a trial court is not 7
required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law unless requested in writing. Pursuant to
R.C. 1925.16, Civ.R. 52 applies equally to small claims proceedings. Falkiewicz v. Blackburn,
151 Ohio App.3d 562, 2003-Ohio-677, 784 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). Therefore, as neither
party in this case requested findings of fact or conclusions of law, the trial court did not err in
failing to issue the same.
{¶ 17} Regardless, even if the trial court had been required to issue findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it was not required to address the CSPA violations alleged by Greenlee, as
she failed to raise them in a counterclaim. While small claims procedure does not contemplate
the filing of an answer or other responsive pleading, Pennington Paving, Inc. v. Bloedel, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 2009CA2, 2009-Ohio-2425, ¶ 13, it does contemplate the filing of counterclaims.
{¶ 18} R.C. 1925.02(C) states that: “Any person who files a counterclaim or cross-claim
shall file it with the small claims division and serve it on all other parties at least seven days prior
to the date of the trial of the plaintiff’s claim in the original action.” Additionally, R.C.
1925.05(A) provides that notice of the small claims filing served on the defendant must state: “If
you believe you have a claim against the plaintiff, you must file a counterclaim with the court and
must serve the plaintiff and all other parties with a copy of the counterclaim at least seven days
prior to the date of the trial of the plaintiff’s claim.” Furthermore, claims under the CSPA must
be brought in the form of a cause of action; therefore, they may be brought as a counterclaim, but
not as a defense. Atelier Design, Inc. v. Campbell, 68 Ohio App.3d 724, 728, 589 N.E.2d 474
(2d Dist.1990).
{¶ 19} Here, Greenlee was served notice of Foreign Exchange’s small claims complaint,
which specifically stated that: “Any counterclaim against the Plaintiff * * * must be filed with the 8
Clerk and served on Plaintiff at least seven (7) days prior to the above trial date.” Small Claims
Complaint (Dec. 11, 2103), Miamisburg Municipal Court Case No. 13CVI01880, Docket No. 2,
p. 1. The record establishes that Greenlee did not file any counterclaim, let alone a CSPA
counterclaim. While the alleged CSPA violations are briefly alluded to during trial, Greenlee
never formally asserted them as part of a counterclaim, nor did she articulate the specific
provisions that Foreign Exchange allegedly violated. Rather, Greenlee improperly used the
alleged CSPA violations as a defense.
{¶ 20} Because Greenlee’s CSPA claims were not properly raised before the trial court,
the court did not err in failing to address them. See Mitchell v. Ell, 157 Ohio App.3d 271,
2004-Ohio-2812, 810 N.E.2d 986, ¶ 10, 16-18 (12th Dist.) (finding the trial court did not err in
failing to address a CSPA issue that was raised as a defense as opposed to a counterclaim). We
also need not address the CSPA allegations, as “it is axiomatic that a party cannot raise new
arguments for the first time on appeal.” Ihenacho v. Ohio Inst. of Photography & Technology,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24191, 2011-Ohio-3730, ¶ 70, citing State ex rel. Gutierrez v.
Trumbull Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 175, 177, 602 N.E.2d 622 (1992). (Other citation
omitted.)
{¶ 21} As for Greenlee’s manifest weight challenge, it is now well-established that
appellate courts apply the same manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard in criminal and civil
cases. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17. In
turn, when a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an
appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 9
trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
{¶ 22} In a manifest-weight analysis, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to
be given to their testimony are primarily for the trier of facts to resolve. State v. DeHass, 10
Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Because the factfinder,
be it the jury, or, * * * the trial judge, has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, the
cautious exercise of discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment is against
the manifest weight of the evidence requires that a substantial deference be extended to the
factfinder’s determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the
testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has
seen and heard the witnesses.” State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL
476684, *5 (Aug. 22, 1997).
{¶ 23} With the foregoing standard in mind, we conclude that the judgment in favor of
Foreign Exchange is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There is no dispute that
Kiel requested Foreign Exchange to remove and replace the engine in his vehicle, and that Kiel
was to provide the replacement engine. The record clearly establishes that Foreign Exchange
removed the original engine as requested and thereafter waited for Kiel to provide a good
replacement engine. The record indicates that additional expenses were incurred due to Kiel’s
replacement engines being in poor condition. Reilich further testified that the first engine had to
be unloaded from a truck without a lift gate and be examined, and the second engine had to be
examined and torn down to determine whether it should be installed. Reilich also testified that 10
Kiel agreed to have Foreign Exchange replace the engine wiring harness and that a new wiring
harness was ordered, which Kiel testified that he was able to use. In addition, Reilich’s son,
Ricky, also testified that he always replaces Nissan engines by removing the subframe and taking
the engine out from the bottom.
{¶ 24} The removal of the engine, the unloading and inspection of the first engine, the
tear down and inspection of the second engine, the charge for the wiring harness, and the
installation of the subframe are all accounted for as work performed in the $2,143.64 invoice
provided to Greenlee and Kiel. At no time did Greenlee deny Reilich’s claim that she stopped
payment of the $2,143.64 check she provided him. The fact that the trial court found Reilich
and his son credible and believed their testimony regarding the work they performed does not
mean the court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As the trier of fact
in this case, the trial court was free to believe some, all, or none of Greenlee and Kiel’s testimony
and was free to give more credence to the testimony of Reilich and his son Ricky.
{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, Greenlee’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. II
{¶ 26} Greenlee’s Second Assignment of Error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
CONDUCTING ITS HEARING IN A MANNER THAT DID NOT ONLY
APPEAR TO BE PARTIAL BUT WAS IN FACT PARTIAL TOWARDS THE
PLAINTIFF.
{¶ 27} Under this assignment of error, Greenlee contends the trial court conducted trial 11
in a biased, unfair manner that was partial to Reilich and Foreign Exchange. We disagree.
{¶ 28} Judicial bias is defined as “ ‘a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue
friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed
anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind
which will be governed by the law and facts.’ ” State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181,
2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St.
463, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), paragraph four of the syllabus. (Other citation omitted.) Trial
judges are “ ‘presumed not to be biased or prejudiced, and the party alleging bias or prejudice
must set forth evidence to overcome the presumption of integrity.’ ” Eller v. Wendy’s Internatl.,
Inc., 142 Ohio App.3d 321, 340, 755 N.E.2d 906 (10th Dist.2000), quoting Okocha v.
Fehrenbacher, 101 Ohio App.3d 309, 322, 655 N.E.2d 744 (8th Dist.1995). (Other citation
omitted.) “[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these
presumptions.” (Citation omitted.) In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241,
2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.
{¶ 29} The trial court has discretion to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth * * *.” Evid.R. 611(A). Additionally, a
trial court “may interrogate witnesses, in an impartial manner, whether called by itself or by a
party.” Evid.R. 614(B). “ ‘[I]n the absence of any showing of bias, prejudice, or prodding of a
witness to elicit partisan testimony,’ we presume that trial courts act [with] impartiality by asking
questions from the bench, to learn material facts or develop the truth.” Easterling v. Easterling,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18523, 2001 WL 369734, *2 (April 13, 2001), quoting Jenkins v. 12
Clark, 7 Ohio App.3d 93, 97, 454 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist.1982).
{¶ 30} “Further, during a bench trial, a trial court enjoys even greater freedom in
questioning witnesses because the court cannot prejudicially influence a jury with its questions or
demeanor.” (Citations omitted.) Brothers v. Morrone-O’Keefe Dev. Co., 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 05AP-161, 2006-Ohio-1160, ¶ 11. “A trial court’s questioning of a witness is not deemed
partial for purposes of Evid.R. 614(B) merely because the evidence elicited during the
interrogation was damaging to one of the parties.” (Citation omitted.) Klasa v. Rogers, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83374, 2004-Ohio-4490, ¶ 32.
{¶ 31} We review a trial court’s questions under an abuse of discretion standard. State
v. Johnson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-1103, 2004-Ohio-4842, ¶ 10. “ ‘Abuse of discretion’
has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” (Citation
omitted.) AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50
Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound
reasoning process that would support that decision.” Id.
{¶ 32} Initially, Greenlee claims the trial court was biased because the judge made a
statement at trial that his grandfather and father were mechanics. Upon reviewing the record, we
do not find the trial court’s statement rises to the level of bias, as the judge was merely explaining
why he was asking Reilich about the price of an engine wiring harness. See Trans. (Jan. 28,
2014), p. 15-16.
{¶ 33} In addition, Greenlee claims the trial court showed bias when it said at the
beginning of trial that it would not make copies of the exhibits for the parties, and then later made
copies for Foreign Exchange. This argument has no merit, because the record indicates the trial 13
court also made copies of an invoice for Greenlee after Kiel indicated he wanted to admit that
document into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit B. See Id. at 43.
{¶ 34} Next, Greenlee claims the trial court showed bias by leading Reilich through his
testimony and by hindering the presentation of her defense. As previously noted, a trial court is
permitted to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence. Evid.R. 611(A). In this instance, the trial court was presented with two
pro se parties that needed extra guidance in presenting their cases. The trial court attempted to
provide this guidance by alerting them as to when they could and could not ask questions and by
interrogating the witnesses itself. The record indicates the trial court gave each party equal
guidance in presenting its case. In addition, the record indicates that the bias Greenlee
complains of was nothing more than the trial court attempting to facilitate an orderly pro se trial.
While the trial court may have expressed certain opinions about the testimony, the record
indicates that the court’s statements and questions do not amount to an error requiring this matter
be reversed.
{¶ 35} Finally, Greenlee claims the trial court was biased and unfair because it would
not allow her to present the alleged CSPA violations in her defense. As discussed under the
First Assignment of Error, a violation of the CSPA is not a defense, but a cause of action.
Atelier Design, Inc., 68 Ohio App.3d at 728, 589 N.E.2d 474. Therefore, because Greenlee
never filed a counterclaim alleging CSPA violations, those arguments were irrelevant to trial and
it was not improper for the trial court to prohibit her from addressing them.
{¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons, Greenlee’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. 14
Conclusion
{¶ 37} Having overruled both of Greenlee’s assignments of error, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
HALL, J., concurs.
DONOVAN, J., concurring:
{¶ 38} In my view, Greenlee was not asserting a counterclaim under the CSPA as she
did not seek damages. Rather, Greenlee was offering a defense of illegality and/or fraud to
Foreign Exchange’s contract claim. Thus, the trial court was required to consider Greenlee’s
defenses.
{¶ 39} Further, in my view, Civ.R. 8(C) permitted the trial court to grant a continuance
to Greenlee in order to provide appellee the requisite seven days notice of any alleged CSPA
violations constituting a counterclaim, which would warrant rescission of the contract. But
Greenlee never requested a continuance, thus any such argument has been waived. Absent the
seven days notice requirement under R.C. 1925.02(C), Civ.R. 8(C) would have permitted the trial
court, in “the interest of justice” to consider any counterclaim mistakenly asserted as a defense, as
a defense. I’d note the Atelier Design Inc. case cited by the majority did NOT consider the
“interest of justice” provision of 8(C).
{¶ 40} Finally, I concur in the affirmance of judgment by the majority because the trial
court was free to reject Greenlee’s testimony regarding her signature on Exhibit 1, a written
estimate. Her signature on Exhibit 1, dated April 16, 2014 would support the judgment in favor 15
of Foreign Exchange for $2,143.63 plus costs. Accordingly, I would affirm but for reasons other
than those articulated by the majority.
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Copies mailed to:
Rick’s Foreign Exchange Co. Gloria Greenlee Hon. Robert W. Rettich, III