Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young

568 P.2d 818, 18 Wash. App. 405, 1977 Wash. App. LEXIS 2013
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedAugust 29, 1977
Docket2249-44358-3
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 568 P.2d 818 (Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young, 568 P.2d 818, 18 Wash. App. 405, 1977 Wash. App. LEXIS 2013 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

McInturff, J.

The plaintiffs appeal from a denial of an injunction and the dismissal of their action against the defendants. Plaintiffs sought to declare as invalid a building permit issued by the City of Richland to Mr. Young, a developer, for an 83-unit apartment complex. In addition, they requested an injunction against further construction by Mr. Young under the permit in question and an order requiring him to remove all construction on the premises in question. The action was based on two theories: (1) the City did not comply with the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) because it failed to file a detailed statement on the project's environmental impact and (2) the City failed to comply with its building code in issuing the questioned permit. The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. We affirm.

On February 23, 1976, Mr. Young filed with the City an application for a building permit for an 83-unit apartment complex in North Richland, along with three sets of detailed plans for the project. At the same time he filed an environmental information worksheet. The plans were circulated among various city officials who "redmarked" them to indicate modifications required to bring them into compliance with various city code provisions.

Meanwhile, Robert Leedy, planning supervisor for the City, undertook an environmental evaluation of the project, and he determined that if there were assurances by the applicant that dust would be adequately controlled during the construction phase, there was no need for an environmental impact statement. He did not consider the project as having a significant effect on the quality of the environment in the City of Richland.

On March 1, 1976, the building permit was issued on the plans as redmarked, conditioned upon compliance with the changes made by the city staff. On March 22, 1976, a plan- *408 check letter indicating the modifications in the plans was forwarded to Mr. Young. Sometime after the issuance of the permit, a zone change was made to permit only single-family units on the land in question.

The plaintiffs contend that the City's decision to not require a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) is arbitrary or capricious and/or clearly erroneous because the City did not give appropriate consideration to the question of whether construction of the apartment complex would have a significant impact on the environment. They argue that the City's method of determining the potential impact was inadequate in that the responsible official did not prepare a written "threshold determination" stating his reasons for not requiring an impact statement and that he did not consider the impact of the project on city water, sewer, traffic, school or electrical facilities.

We note first that not all governmental actions require detailed environmental impact statements. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Associates, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 475, 491, 513 P.2d 36, 76 A.L.R.3d 360 (1973). Such statements are required only for "major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment". RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c). There is no argument that the issuance by the City of the building permit to Mr. Young is a "major action." 1 Instead, the disagreement centers around the question of whether construction of the apartment complex would significantly affect the quality of the environment.

In reviewing the actions of a governmental official who determines that an environmental impact statement is not required, two standards are available. The negative threshold determination (no EIS is required) may be overturned because it is clearly erroneous or arbitrary or capricious. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King *409 County Council, 87 Wn.2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976). The test under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard is whether there is evidence in the record to support the administrative decision. The "clearly erroneous" standard is broader because it calls for a review of the entire record and all the evidence instead of merely a search for substantial evidence to support the administrative finding. And, it requires consideration of the public policy contained in the act of the legislature wliich authorized the decision. Thus,

A determination of no significant environmental impact "can be held to be 'clearly erroneous' if, despite supporting evidence, the reviewing court on the record can firmly conclude 'a mistake has been committed.'" Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, [82 Wn.2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973)] supra at 114, quoting Ancheta v. Daly, [77 Wn.2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969)] supra at 260.

Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, supra at 275.

The question to which we apply those standards is whether Mr. Leedy erred in concluding that the apartment construction would not significantly affect the environment. We note that such negative threshold determinations have created considerable litigation. 2 Our Supreme Court has twice addressed the question of what type of actions "significantly affect" the environment. In Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. Tacoma, 83 Wn.2d 416, 423, 526 P.2d 897 (1974), the court noted:

the term "significantly" has been defined to include the examination of at least two relevant factors: (1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area.

(Italics ours.) More recently the court has conceded that a precise and workable definition of the phrase is elusive *410 because of subjective judgments in the area. It said in Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, supra at 278:*

Consistent with this policy it would seem appropriate to state a general guideline rather than attempt a value-laden definition of "significantly." Generally, the procedural requirements of SEPA, which are merely designed to provide full environmental information, should be invoked whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonable probability. See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673-64 & n.16 (9th Cir. 1975).

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Related

Murden Cove Preservation Ass'n v. Kitsap County
704 P.2d 1242 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1985)
Brown v. City of Tacoma
637 P.2d 1005 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1981)
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611 P.2d 1237 (Washington Supreme Court, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
568 P.2d 818, 18 Wash. App. 405, 1977 Wash. App. LEXIS 2013, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richland-homeowners-preservation-assn-v-young-washctapp-1977.