Richey v. Commissioner

19 T.C. 926, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 230
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMarch 4, 1953
DocketDocket Nos. 24966, 24967, 24968, 24971
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 19 T.C. 926 (Richey v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richey v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 926, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 230 (tax 1953).

Opinion

OPINION.

Arundell, Judge:

There was originally an issue in each of these proceedings as to whether the petitioners were liable as transferees of Wade and Eichey, Incorporated, for any deficiency in the taxes of that corporation. The parties have stipulated figures which disclose that, as stockholders of the corporation, each of the petitioners upon dissolution of the corporation received from it net assets of a value in excess of the amount of the deficiency determined by the* respondent. The petitioners are therefore liable as transferees for any deficiency that may result from our decision on the excess profits tax issue.

In its excess profits tax return for the year 1940, Wade and Eichey, Incorporated, reported a net profit from sales of brown ore in the amount of $53,261.41 of which it deducted $22,780.27 as being net abnormal income which was attributable to prior years. The respondent disallowed the deduction and the petitioners allege that he erred in that disallowance. On amended petitions it is now claimed that the amount of net abnormal income was either $38,825.13 or $45,670.05, dependent on the method of computation.

The corporation of Wade and Eichey, Incorporated, was engaged in the mining of brown iron ore and the quarrying of dolomite. The parties are agreed that the two operations were separate. The claim in these proceedings rests entirely on the brown ore mining operations. The evidence establishes that the corporation, as the result of its prospecting on the land leased from the Eepublic Steel Corporation, discovered the extensive iron ore deposit that became known as the Big Pit. As the result of that discovery, the corporation’s production of ore and its income were considerably higher in 1940 than in the two preceding years in which it was in existence.

The respondent’s objection to any allowance for abnormal income is based on two grounds. First, that there was no abnormal income within the meaning of section 721 (a) (2) (C) of the Internal Revenue Code. Second, that if there was abnormal income, the petitioners have not shown that it was attributable to 1938 and 1939.

Section 721 (c) of the Code provides for the exclusion from income of the current year of the net abnormal income that is attributable to other taxable years. Section 721 (a) (2) (C) recognizes as a separate class of income the income resulting from exploration and/or prospecting extending over a period of more than 12 months. Even though a taxpayer is engaged in mining, the income that results from prospecting is a separate class of income under section 721. Morrisdale Coal Mining Co., 13 T. C. 448. The net abnormal income is ex-cludible if the abnormal income exceeds 125 per cent of the average amount of gross income of the same class for the four previous years, or if the taxpayer was not in existence for that number of years, then for the years in which it was in existence. Code section 721 (a) (1).

We think that the corporation has met the tests prescribed by the statute.

The respondent’s arguments to the contrary are not convincing. He contends that the petitioners have confused gross income from brown ore with income resulting from exploration, discovery, etc., of tangible property, citing Eitel-McCullough, Inc., 9 T. C. 1132. In that case, we pointed out that the taxpayer’s income was due to a number of factors, and the evidence did not establish separately the part that was due to research and development and the part that was the result of other factors. We said in that case, in part:

The statute by its terms requires identification of a “class” of income, either of any class described in subsections (a)(2)(A) to (F), inclusive, or of some other class under the regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.

The corporation in this case has elected to come under the class described in subsection (C) of section 721 (a) (2). It kept separate from its other operations the operations which it claims bring it under that subsection. The exploration and prospecting operations, and the resultant income, are thus identifiable, and in this respect the present case is distinguishable from that of Eitel-McCullough, Inc., supra.

The respondent’s argument places stress on the two methods used by the corporation in prospecting for ore. In 1938 and in the early months of 1939, the corporation prospected by the open pit method. It found some ore pockets by that method. The indications were that there was a more extensive deposit, but it could not be reached by the digging of open pits. The corporation then, in 1939, purchased and began the use of a Keystone drill which was capable of sinking holes to a much greater depth than the open pits which were dug by hand. Within a few months — less than 12 — the corporation blocked out the Big Pit and thereafter mined and sold ore from it.

The statute does not prescribe that exploration or prospecting shall be confined to any particular method. Here, although the corporation changed its method of prospecting from hand digging to machine drilling, the prospecting was continuous throughout the year 1938 and well into 1939 before it discovered the deposit which resulted in increased income in 1940. Prospecting has been defined as the “searching for new deposits * * *."1 We know of no definition that restricts prospecting to a particular method.

The respondent also argues that at least some part of the income realized in 1940 was due to an increased price for ore and that such part is not to be attributed to prior years, citing Regulations 109, section 30.721-8, and Southwestern Oil & Gas Co., 6 T. C. 1124, 1132. The respondent’s basic position is sound. But the fact that some part of the increased income is due to an increased price does not preclude allocation of the remainder of the abnormal income to prior years. Southwestern Oil & Gas Co., supra. The stipulation is that in November 1939, the price paid by Republic Steel Corporation was increased from 6 cents per unit2 to 6% cents. The parties have also stipulated figures which show that the average sales price of ore per unit and per ton was higher in 1940 than in the two preceding years. From these figures it is possible to work out fairly the amount of 1940 income that was due to the higher price for ore in that year. This matter will be discussed further in the latter part of this opinion.

Another argument advanced by the respondent is that there was no mining income in 1940 which was the result of over a year’s unproductive exploration or prospecting. The statute does not require that the exploratory years be wholly unproductive. We think that this is a sufficient answer to this part of the respondent’s argument.

The respondent also contends that the increase in income was not due solely to exploration and prospecting, as required by section 721, but resulted from a combination of factors. He cites cases wherein we referred to income being due to factors other than those mentioned in the statute, such as management and salesmanship, good will, the use of physical assets, and the use of new machinery and equipment. Ramsey Accessories Manufacturing Corporation, 10 T. C. 482, Keystone Brass Works, 12 T. C. 618. Such factors were not responsible for the increased income of Wade and Richey, Incorporated, in the year 1940.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Richey v. Commissioner
19 T.C. 926 (U.S. Tax Court, 1953)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
19 T.C. 926, 1953 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 230, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richey-v-commissioner-tax-1953.