Richardson v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 16, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-05080·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DEWAYNE RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, -against- CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK CITY 21 Civ. 5080 (PAE) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; DEPT ORDER OF SERVICE CARTER; CAPTAIN LAW; OFFICER SANCHEZ; OFFICER GOZMAN; CAPT PERRY; NYC HEALTH + HOSPITALS; DEPT HARVEY, Defendants. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Dewayne Richardson (“Richardson”), presently held in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action asserting claims of violations of his federal constitutional rights and state law, and seeking damages and injunctive relief. He sues: (1) the City of New York; (2) the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”); (3) George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”) Deputy Warden Carter; (4) GRVC Correction Captain Law; (5) GRVC Correction Officer Gozman; (6) Vernon C. Bain Center (“VCBC”) Correction Officer Sanchez; (7) GRVC Correction Captain Perry; (8) NYC Health + Hospitals (“H+H”); and (9) VCBC Deputy Warden Harvey. The Court construes Richardson’s complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and state law. By order dated July 12, 2021, the Court granted Richardson’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses Richardson’s claims against the DOC. The Court also denies without prejudice Richardson’s application for the Court to request pro bono counsel. The Court further directs

service on H+H, and requests that the other remaining defendants waive service of summons. The Court additionally directs that H+H and the other remaining defendants comply with Local Civil Rule 33.2. I. Applicable Legal Standards The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). II. Discussion A. DOC The Court must dismiss Richardson’s claims against the DOC because an agency of the City of New York, such as the DOC, is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where

otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). It is well-established that “where a plaintiff has named the Department of Correction[] as a defendant, he has sued a non-suable entity.” Adams v. Galletta, 966 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The Court therefore dismisses Richardson’s claims against the DOC. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. Application for the Court to Request Pro Bono Counsel Richardson has filed an application for the Court requesting pro bono counsel. Dkt. 4. The factors to be considered in ruling on an indigent litigant’s request for counsel include the merits of the case, his efforts to obtain a lawyer, and his ability to gather the facts and present the

case if unassisted by counsel. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60-62 (2d Cir. 1986). Of these, the merits is “[t]he factor which command[s] the most attention.” Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172. Because it is too early in the proceedings for the Court to assess the merits of the action, the Court denies Richardson’s application for the Court to request pro bono counsel without prejudice to Richardson’s filing another such application at a later date. C. Service on H+H Because Richardson has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals

Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Richardson is proceeding IFP and could not have served a summons and the complaint on H+H until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be issued for H+H. The Court therefore extends the time to serve H+H with the complaint until 90 days after the date that a summons is issued for H+H. If the complaint is not served on H+H within that time, Richardson should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information

necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”).

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