Richardson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 9, 2020
Docket4:18-cv-04620
StatusUnknown

This text of Richardson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Richardson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richardson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 TROY ALEXANDER RICHARDSON, CASE NO. 18-cv-04620-YGR

6 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S AND DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 7 vs. PARTIAL SUMMARY ADJUDICATION ON CALCULATION ISSUE; EXTENDING TIME 8 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, ET SETTING FURTHER CASE MANAGEMENT 9 AL., CONFERENCE 10 Defendants. Dkt. No. 81, 91

11 Plaintiff Troy Richardson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the 12 statutory and common law of the state of California alleging that defendants California 13 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and the individual CDCR employees 14 named. Plaintiff alleges that he was released from prison after serving the prison sentence allotted 15 to him by the applicable Court orders, rules, and regulations, but was reincarcerated wrongly and 16 treated as an escaped prisoner. (See operative Third Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 57.) At the 17 request of the parties, the Court permitted limited, early cross-motions for partial summary 18 judgment on the issue of the correct release date. (See Order Vacating Trial and Pretrial 19 Deadlines, Dkt. No. 79.) 20 Plaintiff filed his motion for partial summary judgment on October 21, 2019 (Dkt. Nos. 81- 21 84) seeking adjudication of the correct calculation of plaintiff’s resentencing and a determination 22 that, as a matter of law, CDCR re-calculated plaintiff’s sentence on September 12, 2016, without 23 legal authority to do so. Defendants CDCR, Gipson, Hatton, Pina, Weeks, Castaneda, Marion, 24 Montoya, Quintero, Johnston, Lebard, Davis, Beeson, Moreno, Burris, Bomgardner, Ouye, Alfaro, 25 Fernandez, Bautista, Bjorgum, Rios, Allison, Cullen, Gold, Kunz, Jones, Macomber, White, and 26 Smalley (collectively, “defendants”) filed their cross-motion for summary adjudication on 27 November 4, 2019 (Dkt. No. 91) contending that plaintiff’s entire incarceration was lawful and 1 therefore all of plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.1 On December 10, 2019, the Court heard 2 oral argument regarding the limited question of the calculation of plaintiff’s release date. 3 Having carefully considered the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the 4 motions, the admissible evidence in the record,2 the parties’ arguments at the hearing, and the 5 pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the scope of the 6 summary adjudication order sought by each side in its motion, but finds, as a matter of law, that 7 the earliest possible release date based upon his December 22, 2014 resentencing, was 8 approximately February 10, 2019. 9 I. SUMMARY OF FACTS3 10 Plaintiff was charged with crimes in connection with a robbery that occurred on October 11 21, 2011. Plaintiff was taken into local custody technically as of October 25, 2011. On May 24, 12 2012, plaintiff pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the Honorable Michael N. Garrigan to ten 13 years in prison—five years for his plea of guilty to second-degree robbery plus a five-year 14 enhancement for his admission to a prior “strike” conviction. (Shyrock Decl. Exh. 1.) All 15 remaining charges against Plaintiff were dismissed.4 The original abstract of judgment (“AOJ”) 16 was dated June 6, 2012. The AOJ listed the enhancement as use of a firearm (under Penal Code § 17 12022.5(a)). The June 6, 2012 AOJ provided that plaintiff would receive credit for time spent in 18 custody up to the date of sentencing – 212 days “actual local time” and 180 days “local conduct 19

20 1 Defendants also moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the Court had limited the issues to be considered in this early motion 21 for partial summary to the release date calculation issue, the Court ordered stricken and did not consider the qualified immunity issue. (See Order issued November 14, 2019, Dkt. No. 98.) 22 2 Defendants object to Exhibits U and V to counsel’s declaration in support of plaintiff’s 23 motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 83-2 at 72, 74) because they lack foundation and are not authentic. (F.R.E. 901.) It appears that these documents represent counsel’s interpretation of how 24 CDCR’s calculation procedures should have been applied to Plaintiff’s sentence as described on the December 26, 2014 abstract of judgment. (ECF No. 83 ¶¶ 22-23.) The exhibits are not 25 properly considered as evidence, but the Court nevertheless considers them as part of plaintiff’s arguments on the calculation issue. 26 3 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are undisputed for purposes of these motions. 27 4 The parties agree that, due to the nature of the crimes to which he pleaded, plaintiff was limited to 15% credit earning, meaning he would be required to serve eight-and-a-half years of a 1 credit” for a total of 392 days of credit. 2 A. April 2013 Resentencing 3 On April 22, 2013, plaintiff was re-sentenced by the Honorable Franklin M. Stephenson as 4 a result of a deal plaintiff reached with the prosecutor to reduce his sentence by approximately one 5 year based on plaintiff’s cooperation in an unrelated case. (Shryock Decl. Exh. 2.) The transcript 6 of the sentencing hearing states that Judge Stephenson ordered that plaintiff be given “actual days 7 credit, pursuant to the agreement of the parties in court, of 863 actual days, 132 good time credits, 8 for a total of 993 (sic) days credit for time served.” (Id. at 3:27-4:1, “sic” notation in original 9 transcript.) The AOJ dated April 23, 2013 states, at line 8, “STIPULATED THAT DEFT. 10 RECEIVE CTS IN THE AMOUNT OF 863 DAYS” and the boxes on the bottom of the form state 11 “credit for time spent in custody Total days: 993 included: actual local time: 863 local conduct 12 credits: 130.” (Helbraun Decl. Exh. C.) 13 On September 23, 2014, a CDCR Records Analyst in CDCR’s Legal Processing Unit 14 (“LPU”) wrote to Judge Stephenson, seeking clarification of two issues related to the April 23, 15 2013 AOJ: (1) the number of pre-sentence credit days; and (2) the five-year enhancement was not 16 a term authorized by Penal Code section 12022.5(a). The CDCR Records Analyst stated that the 17 court had “granted too many actual days” credits when it gave plaintiff 863 total days, since 18 plaintiff had not been in custody 863 actual days, but only 549.5 (Helbraun Decl., Exh. D.) The 19 letter cited two cases for the argument that “when the trial court resentences a defendant who has 20 already commenced serving a term for the crime, the trial court should only compute the actual 21 time spent in prison following the initial sentencing.” (Id.) The letter continued:

22 It is the responsibility of the [CDCR] to determine the amount of worktime credit to which an inmate is entitled from the date of initial sentencing. At the time of 23 defendant’s original sentencing, he was granted a total of 392 days (212 actual and 180 conduct). The CDCR will calculate and apply the appropriate amount of good 24 time/work time credits. 25 26 5 The Court notes that the difference between 863 and 549 is 314. Plaintiff’s credits had 27 been increased by 314 in the April 23, 2013 AOJ as part of an agreement for plaintiff’s cooperation with the prosecution in an unrelated criminal matter. (See Defs’ Response to P’s 1 (Id.) As to the second issue, the CDCR Records Analyst noted that the April 23, 2013 AOJ gave a 2 five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.5(a), but the statute only allowed for 3 enhancements of 3, 4, or 10 years.

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Related

People v. Brown
278 P.3d 1182 (California Supreme Court, 2012)
In re Williams
83 Cal. App. 4th 936 (California Court of Appeal, 2000)
People v. Tinker
212 Cal. App. 4th 1502 (California Court of Appeal, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
Richardson v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-v-california-department-of-corrections-and-rehabilitation-cand-2020.