Richards v. Department of Revenue

CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedJuly 9, 2012
DocketTC-MD 111239D
StatusUnpublished

This text of Richards v. Department of Revenue (Richards v. Department of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richards v. Department of Revenue, (Or. Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT MAGISTRATE DIVISION Income Tax

RONALD A. RICHARDS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 111239D ) v. ) ) DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) State of Oregon, ) ) Defendant. ) DECISION

Plaintiff appeals Defendant‟s Notices of Deficiency Assessment for tax years 2006, 2007,

2008, and 2009. Prior to trial, Plaintiff withdrew his appeal of tax year 2006. In its Order, filed

March 29, 2012, the court granted Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‟s appeal of tax year

2007.

A trial was held in the Oregon Tax Courtroom, Salem, Oregon, on April 25, 2012.

Kathleen Franklin (Franklin), Enrolled Agent, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Jim

Fryback (Fryback), Assistant Coach, Lane County Community College, testified. Annemarie

Reed (Reed), Income Tax Auditor, appeared on behalf of Defendant.

Defendant‟s Exhibits A through M were admitted without objection.

During the trial, Franklin stated that she submitted documentation with Plaintiff‟s

Complaint in support of Plaintiff‟s claimed business expenses. Reed stated that she did not

receive any documentation except mileage information to substantiate Plaintiff‟s claimed

expenses. Franklin submitted approximately 59 pages with Plaintiff‟s Complaint. Receipts,

mileage logs, credit card statements, or similar documents were not among the 59 pages

submitted with Plaintiff‟s Complaint. Plaintiff submitted no evidence at trial other than

testimony.

DECISION TC-MD 111239D 1 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff testified that “since 2004” he has been a “recruiting coordinator” and that he was

hired by Lane Community College because of his “reputation as a good recruiter” with “west

coast and northwest contacts.” Plaintiff testified that he incurred substantial “unreimbursed

expenses,” recruiting and “finding [basketball] players.” He testified that he submitted the same

“mileage log” and other information, including letters from “head coaches, athletic directors and

HR” to the Internal Revenue Service and those “logs” and letters were “accepted.”

Reed testified that she conducted an “independent audit” of Plaintiff‟s claimed business

expenses. Reed testified that she concluded Plaintiff had a “passion” for coaching but that

coaching was not a “for profit activity,” but a “hobby.” Reed testified that she determined

“Internal Revenue Code Section 183” was applicable because Plaintiff has “engaged in the

coaching activity since 2003” but has not made a “profit” in “three of five” years. Reed testified

that she allowed Plaintiff to deduct his claimed coaching expenses to the “extent of the $1,000

taxable income,” the amount of the “stipend” paid by Lane Community College to Plaintiff. In

response to Reed‟s characterization of Plaintiff‟s activities as a hobby, Fryback, who is currently

a consultant/coach at Lane Community College, testified that Plaintiff‟s position as a recruiting

coordinator is a “job, not a hobby.”

Reed testified that if Plaintiff was allowed to claim “unreimbursed employee business

expenses” he failed to submit any “substantiation” for any of the claimed travel, other business,

meals and coaching expenses. She testified that Plaintiff‟s “mileage log” did not meet the

requirements of “Internal Revenue Code 274” because the log did not include “dates, time,

personal use” and “the starting point was unknown.” (See Def‟s Exs L at 11-20, G at 13-22.)

Reed testified that she discussed with Plaintiff‟s prior representative a request that Plaintiff be

DECISION TC-MD 111239D 2 allowed to claim a “charitable deduction” for the claimed expenses, but denied that request

because “there was no adequate accounting of the actual expenses.”

II. ANALYSIS

“The Oregon Legislature intended to make Oregon personal income tax law identical to

the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for purposes of determining Oregon taxable income, subject to

adjustments and modifications specified in Oregon law.” Ellison v. Dept. of Rev., TC-MD No

041142D, WL 2414746 at *6 (Sept 23, 2005) (citing ORS 316.007). As a result, the legislature

adopted, by reference, the federal deductions, including those allowed under the Internal

Revenue Code (IRC).1 ORS 316.007(2).

It is a well settled principle that “[d]eductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace,

and a taxpayer must satisfy the specific requirements for any deduction claimed.” Gapikia v.

Comm’r, 81 TCM (CCH) 1488, WL 332038 at *2 (2001) (citations omitted). “Taxpayers are

required to maintain records sufficient to substantiate their claimed deductions.” Id. For

example, IRC section 274 imposes strict substantiation of expenses for travel, meals and

entertainment, and gifts, and “with respect to any listed property (as defined in section

280F (d)(4)).” IRC § 274(d).

During the audit examination stage, taxpayers must stand ready to produce “any books,

papers, records or memoranda bearing upon [any] matter required to be included in the return[.]”

ORS 314.425(1).2 When, as in this case, the dispute moves to the Tax Court, the party seeking

affirmative relief bears the burden of proof and must establish his or her case by a

“preponderance” of the evidence. ORS 305.427. The burden in this case falls, at least initially,

1 All references to the IRC and accompanying regulations are to the 1986 code, and include updates applicable to 2008 and 2009. 2 Unless otherwise noted, references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to the 2007 year.

DECISION TC-MD 111239D 3 on the Plaintiff, as he is the party seeking affirmative relief. This court has previously ruled that

“[p]reponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of evidence, the more convincing

evidence.” Feves v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 302, 312 (1971). Evidence that is inconclusive or

unpersuasive is insufficient to sustain the burden of proof. Reed v. Dept. of Rev., 310 Or 260,

265, 798 P2d 235 (1990). Finally, in an income tax appeal, this court has the statutory authority

to determine the correct amount of the deficiency (e.g., tax), “even if the amount so determined

is greater or less than the amount of the assessment determined by the Department of

Revenue[.]” ORS 305.575.

IRC section 162(a) provides in relevant part that “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction

all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on

any trade or business[.]” Such expenses include expenses for the business use of a car or truck

(i.e., mileage incurred for work purposes). IRC § 162(a)(2). For a deduction to be allowed as a

business expense, it must be both “ordinary” and “necessary” to a taxpayer's trade or business.

IRC § 162(a).

“To be „necessary[,]‟ an expense must be „appropriate and helpful‟ to the taxpayer's

business. * * * To be „ordinary[,]‟ the transaction which gives rise to the expense must be of a

common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.” Boyd v. Comm'r, 83 TCM

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Related

Welch v. Helvering
290 U.S. 111 (Supreme Court, 1933)
Reed v. Department of Revenue
798 P.2d 235 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1990)
Feves v. Department of Revenue
4 Or. Tax 302 (Oregon Tax Court, 1971)
Roelli v. Department of Revenue
10 Or. Tax 256 (Oregon Tax Court, 1986)

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