Richards v. Department of Revenue
Opinion
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Income Tax
RONALD A. RICHARDS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 111239D )
v. )
)
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) State of Oregon, )
)
Defendant. ) DECISION
Plaintiff appeals Defendant‟s Notices of Deficiency Assessment for tax years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Prior to trial, Plaintiff withdrew his appeal of tax year 2006. In its Order, filed March 29, 2012, the court granted Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‟s appeal of tax year 2007.
A trial was held in the Oregon Tax Courtroom, Salem, Oregon, on April 25, 2012.
Kathleen Franklin (Franklin), Enrolled Agent, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Jim Fryback (Fryback), Assistant Coach, Lane County Community College, testified. Annemarie Reed (Reed), Income Tax Auditor, appeared on behalf of Defendant.
Defendant‟s Exhibits A through M were admitted without objection.
During the trial, Franklin stated that she submitted documentation with Plaintiff‟s Complaint in support of Plaintiff‟s claimed business expenses. Reed stated that she did not receive any documentation except mileage information to substantiate Plaintiff‟s claimed expenses. Franklin submitted approximately 59 pages with Plaintiff‟s Complaint. Receipts, mileage logs, credit card statements, or similar documents were not among the 59 pages submitted with Plaintiff‟s Complaint. Plaintiff submitted no evidence at trial other than testimony.
DECISION TC-MD 111239D 1
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff testified that “since 2004” he has been a “recruiting coordinator” and that he was hired by Lane Community College because of his “reputation as a good recruiter” with “west coast and northwest contacts.” Plaintiff testified that he incurred substantial “unreimbursed expenses,” recruiting and “finding [basketball] players.” He testified that he submitted the same “mileage log” and other information, including letters from “head coaches, athletic directors and HR” to the Internal Revenue Service and those “logs” and letters were “accepted.”
Reed testified that she conducted an “independent audit” of Plaintiff‟s claimed business expenses. Reed testified that she concluded Plaintiff had a “passion” for coaching but that coaching was not a “for profit activity,” but a “hobby.” Reed testified that she determined “Internal Revenue Code Section 183” was applicable because Plaintiff has “engaged in the coaching activity since 2003” but has not made a “profit” in “three of five” years. Reed testified that she allowed Plaintiff to deduct his claimed coaching expenses to the “extent of the $1,000 taxable income,” the amount of the “stipend” paid by Lane Community College to Plaintiff. In response to Reed‟s characterization of Plaintiff‟s activities as a hobby, Fryback, who is currently a consultant/coach at Lane Community College, testified that Plaintiff‟s position as a recruiting coordinator is a “job, not a hobby.”
Reed testified that if Plaintiff was allowed to claim “unreimbursed employee business expenses” he failed to submit any “substantiation” for any of the claimed travel, other business, meals and coaching expenses. She testified that Plaintiff‟s “mileage log” did not meet the requirements of “Internal Revenue Code 274” because the log did not include “dates, time, personal use” and “the starting point was unknown.” (See Def‟s Exs L at 11-20, G at 13-22.) Reed testified that she discussed with Plaintiff‟s prior representative a request that Plaintiff be
DECISION TC-MD 111239D 2 allowed to claim a “charitable deduction” for the claimed expenses, but denied that request because “there was no adequate accounting of the actual expenses.”
II. ANALYSIS
“The Oregon Legislature intended to make Oregon personal income tax law identical to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for purposes of determining Oregon taxable income, subject to adjustments and modifications specified in Oregon law.” Ellison v. Dept. of Rev., TC-MD No 041142D, WL 2414746 at *6 (Sept 23, 2005) (citing ORS 316.007). As a result, the legislature adopted, by reference, the federal deductions, including those allowed under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).1 ORS 316.007(2).
It is a well settled principle that “[d]eductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must satisfy the specific requirements for any deduction claimed.” Gapikia v. Comm’r, 81 TCM (CCH) 1488, WL 332038 at *2 (2001) (citations omitted). “Taxpayers are required to maintain records sufficient to substantiate their claimed deductions.” Id. For example, IRC section 274 imposes strict substantiation of expenses for travel, meals and entertainment, and gifts, and “with respect to any listed property (as defined in section 280F (d)(4)).” IRC § 274(d).
During the audit examination stage, taxpayers must stand ready to produce “any books, papers, records or memoranda bearing upon [any] matter required to be included in the return[.]” ORS 314.425(1).2 When, as in this case, the dispute moves to the Tax Court, the party seeking affirmative relief bears the burden of proof and must establish his or her case by a “preponderance” of the evidence. ORS 305.427. The burden in this case falls, at least initially,
1 All references to the IRC and accompanying regulations are to the 1986 code, and include updates applicable to 2008 and 2009.
2 Unless otherwise noted, references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to the 2007 year.
DECISION TC-MD 111239D 3 on the Plaintiff, as he is the party seeking affirmative relief. This court has previously ruled that “[p]reponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of evidence, the more convincing evidence.” Feves v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 302, 312 (1971). Evidence that is inconclusive or unpersuasive is insufficient to sustain the burden of proof. Reed v. Dept. of Rev., 310 Or 260, 265, 798 P2d 235 (1990). Finally, in an income tax appeal, this court has the statutory authority to determine the correct amount of the deficiency (e.g., tax), “even if the amount so determined is greater or less than the amount of the assessment determined by the Department of Revenue[.]” ORS 305.575.
IRC section 162(a) provides in relevant part that “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business[.]” Such expenses include expenses for the business use of a car or truck (i.e., mileage incurred for work purposes). IRC § 162(a)(2). For a deduction to be allowed as a business expense, it must be both “ordinary” and “necessary” to a taxpayer's trade or business. IRC § 162(a).
“To be „necessary[,]‟ an expense must be „appropriate and helpful‟ to the taxpayer's business. * * * To be „ordinary[,]‟ the transaction which gives rise to the expense must be of a common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.” Boyd v. Comm'r, 83 TCM (CCH) 1253, 2002 WL 236685 at *2 (US Tax Ct 2002) (internal citations omitted). The Oregon Tax Court has stated that “* * * an ordinary expense is one which is customary or usual. This does not mean customary or usual within the taxpayer's experience but rather in the experience of a particular trade, industry or community.” Roelli v. Dept. of Rev., 10 OTR 256, 258 (1986) (citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 US 111, 54 S Ct 8, 78 L Ed 212 (1933)); Guinn v. Dept. of Rev., TC-MD No 040472D, 2005 WL 1089727 at *4 (Apr 19, 2005) (citing Roelli at 258).
DECISION TC-MD 111239D 4
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