Richard v. OU PHYSICIANS

2005 OK CIV APP 108, 127 P.3d 618, 2005 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 100, 2005 WL 3602069
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedSeptember 23, 2005
Docket100,393
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 2005 OK CIV APP 108 (Richard v. OU PHYSICIANS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard v. OU PHYSICIANS, 2005 OK CIV APP 108, 127 P.3d 618, 2005 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 100, 2005 WL 3602069 (Okla. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinions

OPINION

ADAMS, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs Teresa Richard and her attorney, Ronald “Skip” Kelly, appeal a trial court order which allowed OU Physicians and PTS Healthcare, Inc., to enforce physician’s liens against the proceeds of payment she received from her uninsured motorist insurance carrier as a result of an automobile accident. Because we conclude that the unambiguous terms of 42 O.S.2001 § 46(B), the statute governing a physician’s lien, provides for such enforcement, we affirm.

¶ 2 Ms. Richard was severely injured in an automobile accident and incurred liability for medical treatment to the various Appel-lees/Defendants. She retained Attorney Kelly to represent her in a claim against the tortfeasor she contended caused the accident and her injuries. HCA Health Services of Oklahoma, Inc., d/b/a OU Medical Center (OUMC) filed a hospital lien under 42 O.S. 2001 § 43, and the remaining Defendants filed physician’s liens under § 46(B). Safeco Insurance Company of America, the tortfea-sor’s liability insurance carrier, paid its policy limits of $25,000 in a cheek made payable jointly to Plaintiffs (the Safeco proceeds). In addition, State Farm, her uninsured motorist insurance carrier, paid its policy limits of $125,000 (the UM proceeds).

¶ 3 Plaintiffs commenced this action to obtain an order from the court determining how the Safeco proceeds should be distributed, apparently believing that none of the defendants were entitled to any of the UM proceeds. OU Physicians and PTS Healthcare asserted a right to a portion of the UM proceeds. Safeco intervened and was ultimately dismissed. After a hearing, the trial court concluded OUMC should receive all of the Safeco proceeds in satisfaction of its hospital lien, that Kelly’s attorney’s fee of $50,000 should be paid first from the UM proceeds, with OU Physicians and PTS Healthcare also to receive payment from those same proceeds, and that the balance should be paid to Ms. Richard.1

[620]*620¶ 4 Plaintiffs make two arguments for reversal, but only one is properly preserved for review. For the first time on appeal, they argue the liens were not properly perfected because they did not name State Farm as an insurer. Based on the appellate record, this issue was never raised in the trial court, and we may not consider it. Steiger v. City National Bank of Tulsa, 1967 OK 41, 424 P.2d 69.2

¶ 5 In their remaining argument, Plaintiffs contend we should apply the reasoning of Kratz v. Kratz, 1995 OK 63, 905 P.2d 753, and conclude that a physician’s lien, like a hospital lien, cannot attach to proceeds of an uninsured motorist insurance policy. Kratz involved a hospital lien governed by the provisions of 42 O.S.2001 § 43.3 Focusing on the language “claim against another for damages” as the asset against which the lien could be asserted, the Court ruled that proceeds of an uninsured or underinsured motorist insurance policy, which the Court characterized as a contractual recovery, were not subject to the hospital lien allowed by § 43.

¶ 6 The physician’s liens claimed by OU Physicians and PTS Healthcare are not authorized by § 43, but by 42 O.S.2001 § 46.4 Section 46(A) contains essentially identical provisions for the benefit of physicians who provide medical services as those in § 43 which benefit hospitals. However, § 46(B) authorizes a lien when an injured patient asserts a “claim against an insurer,’’ which is “in addition to the lien provided for in [§ 46(A)].”

¶ 7 Our goal in applying § 46(B) is to ascertain and follow the Legislature’s intent. Phillips v. Duke Manufacturing, Inc., 1999 OK 25, 980 P.2d 137. In determining that intent, our yardstick is the language of the statute, when given its plain and ordinary meaning. Where that language plainly expresses the intent so that the statute is clear, there is no room for judicial construction. Community Bankers Association v. Oklahoma State Banking Board, 1999 OK 24, 979 P.2d 751.

¶ 8 Moreover, if a physician’s lien is to be treated the same as a hospital lien, as Plaintiffs argue, the Legislature had no reason to adopt § 46(B) because § 46(A) authorized a physician’s lien with the same attributes as those accorded a hospital lien under § 43. We will not assume the Legislature acted in vain.

¶ 9 The UM proceeds are the result of Ms. Richard’s claim against State Farm, an in[621]*621surer. By the express terms of § 46(B), the physician’s liens apply to those proceeds. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

MITCHELL, J., concurs.

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Related

PTS Healthcare, Inc. v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.
2007 OK CIV APP 100 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2007)
Broadway Clinic v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
2006 OK 29 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2006)
Richard v. OU PHYSICIANS
2005 OK CIV APP 108 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2005 OK CIV APP 108, 127 P.3d 618, 2005 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 100, 2005 WL 3602069, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-v-ou-physicians-oklacivapp-2005.